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Cradle of Conflict: Iraq And the Birth of Modern U.S. Military Power Hardcover – January 1, 2005
Purchase options and add-ons
- Print length462 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherNaval Inst Pr
- Publication dateJanuary 1, 2005
- Dimensions6.5 x 1.5 x 9.5 inches
- ISBN-101591144442
- ISBN-13978-1591144441
Product details
- Publisher : Naval Inst Pr; 0 edition (January 1, 2005)
- Language : English
- Hardcover : 462 pages
- ISBN-10 : 1591144442
- ISBN-13 : 978-1591144441
- Item Weight : 1.75 pounds
- Dimensions : 6.5 x 1.5 x 9.5 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #6,289,699 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #683 in Operation Desert Storm Military History
- #3,336 in Iraq War History (Books)
- #8,281 in Military Strategy History (Books)
- Customer Reviews:
About the authors
Dr Michael Knights is a military historian by training, an expert on the Middle East by chance, and a front-line observer of modern warfare by choice. He came to this crossroads by a long and winding path. Before graduating from King's College London Department of War Studies, Mike had done pretty much every low-paid job under the sun, between periods of wandering the Arab world as an itinerant backpacker.
He graduated with a new PhD on Saddam's Iraq just as the invasion happened in 2003 and the rest is history. Mike's life since then has been a classic post-9/11 story: embedding with the US-led coalition and the armed forces of Iraq, the Kurdish Peshmerga, Yemen's tribes, Lebanese fighters, the UAE and Saudi Arabia as they fought enemies like Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and Iran-backed militias amidst the chaos of occupation, withdrawals, the Arab Spring, and the ISIS war and its aftermath. He is called upon as an advisor to Western government, military and the intelligence community decision-makers.
Mike is a passionate believer in the value of contemporary history because the memories of participants fade and distort so quickly - both those in smoke-filled rooms and the corridors of power, and those in the trenches. In his view, contemporary history can only make sense if the author has been there and seen it with their own eyes, walked the ground, and lived with the participants.And military history has to be backstopped by sumptuous, detailed mapping and the best participant photographs available. As we enter a new era of immersive military history, the reader will increasingly become the experiencer through augmented reality and geospatial walk-throughs of the battlefield. The military historian has to be at the forefront of this change, whether they are chronicling the wars of today or those of generations past.
Discover more of the author’s books, see similar authors, read author blogs and more
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Geography matters in terms of tribal histories, power relationships and traditional routes for bedouins, traders and smugglers.
For the uninitiated westerner/American, almost impossible to make sense of viewing things from our value systems and experiences until you understand how all those things work and have evolved in the various regions.
Really helped me 'figure it out'. Not going to win literary awards-if you want entertainment, go read Lawrence of Arabia.
Knights' focus is on military decision-making. With so many of the same decision-makers serving during the first and second Iraq wars--Dick Cheney and Colin Powell, for example--why did policy toward Iraqi president Saddam Hussein change so dramatically? How did the intermediary years of sanctions and containment change both Iraqi and U.S. military tactics?
His narrative is detailed but flows well. He understands the policy process and military decision-making better than most journalists. With a rich array of textual sources and interviews with key U.S. officials, Cradle of Conflict serves well as a reference for now distant episodes such as the 1994 Iraqi deployment toward the Kuwait border and U.S. military planning spurred by Baghdad's obstruction of U.N. inspections in 1997 and 1998. His military analysis is astute. He shows, for example, how the Iraqi military adapted to U.S. tactics during the interwar years.
Knights also interweaves detailed knowledge of Iraqi politics. He explains with insight, for example, Saddam's oil-smuggling schemes with Kurdistan Democratic Party leader Masoud Barzani. He examines the mutual decisions which led to the Kurdish leader betraying competitors and other Iraqi opposition figures by allowing Iraqi Republican Guards to attack Erbil in 1996, an episode that challenged the Clinton administration during a sensitive electoral season.
Cradle of Conflict's contribution to understanding the planning behind Operation Iraqi Freedom is especially valuable as the Iraq war continues in its fifth year. While many embedded journalists and military correspondents focus only on the U.S. Army and Marines' contribution to the war, Knights adds insight into the decisions surrounding the air war. He discusses, for example, the failed attempt to decapitate the Iraqi leadership on the first night of the conflict as well as the U.S. decision to dilute the "shock and awe" bombing campaign and to stage it at night rather than in the morning when it might have killed Iraqi intelligence and military planners. He astutely recognizes that Iraqis go passive in the face of crisis until they sense who will be the victor.
Still, Knights leaves some questions unanswered. While acknowledging the CIA's faulty analysis, he does not address the source of its identification of the bunker targeted by the decapitation strike. The bunker did not exist. While Iraqi National Congress leader Ahmad Chalabi is the usual scapegoat in such matters, he could not be in this case because Langley did not talk to him. Knights also accepts too readily the conventional wisdom about the impact of de-Baathification and exaggerates the numbers affected. He also overestimates the willingness of top-tier Saddam loyalists to reintegrate into a new Iraq. Here, greater attention to preexisting insurgency plans would be welcome.
While many journalists--George Packer, David Rieff, and others--skew analysis to fit politics in their accounts, Knights researches, fact-checks, and relies upon more than blogs and fellow journalists. Knights has constructed a superior account that deserves to be read by serious journalists and policy practitioners.
Michael Rubin
Middle East Quarterly
Spring 2008
It covers the impact of the Goldwater-Nichols defense department reorganization that has worked wonders in reducing inter-service rivalry and which was first put to the test in Gulf I.
It covers the changes in munitions, equipment, training, recon that comprise the present day forces.
It is also the most complete story I've seen on what Saddam was doing during the gaps between Gulf I and Gulf II. You get the feeling that a local, not well educated or travelled person, focused on his own issues just couldn't see what his statements were saying to the rest of the world.
My only complaint is that the book ends just a little bit too early. There's not much on hos we are to get out of the mess that exists over there now. This is a book on how the military fights wars, not on how we conduct the peace afterwards.
Highly recommended.