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on February 19, 2017
The makings of the Vietnam War upon serious study and retrospect will make one want to scream. How our White House under the leadership of Lyndon Baines Johnson gradually and without the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff got involved in a land war in Vietnam.
In a period of two years of constant arguing and intrigue the United States found itself hopelessly entangled in a war. Much of the military leaders advised against getting involved in the war. The only White House official who argued against military involvement was George Ball who did not bring his dissent outside the walls of the White House.
H.R. McMaster brings forth the wrong thinking and mistake prone analysis of President Johnson and Robert McNamara who stumbled their way in making a full military commitment. In doing so in a stealthy way and lying to the American public they found themselves fully immersed in a political civil war in which we could not win.
In a period of two years of constant arguing and intrigue the United States found itself hopelessly entangled in a war. Much of the military leaders advised against getting involved in the war. The only White House official who argued against military involvement was George Ball who did not bring his dissent outside the walls of the White House.
H.R. McMaster brings forth the wrong thinking and mistake prone analysis of President Johnson and Robert McNamara who stumbled their way in making a full military commitment. In doing so in a stealthy way and lying to the American public they found themselves fully immersed in a political civil war in which we could not win.
HALL OF FAMEon February 28, 2015
For those of age during the Vietnam war, there is no doubt that objectivity is difficult as to why America got involved and eventually pulled out. The view of those who fought the war is usually quite different from those who instigated it and were responsible for its disastrous outcome. It takes courage to go into battle and fight for a cause that through the detestable bureaucratic legislation called the draft one is forced to fight for. It takes just as much courage to voluntarily fight in a war that has been marketed as being necessary, unavoidable, and winnable. This book gives further evidence that the disaster of the Vietnam war was not the result of those who fought it, but rather with the DC clowns who feigned competence in military matters and those who remained silent or acquiesced in the horrible circus of political maneuvering.
There are some who may hold to the premise that Lyndon Johnson and his closest advisors showed real guts in attempting to fight against the Vietnamese Communist threat and to “save American face”. But it does not take any intestinal fortitude or keen intellect to indulge in the deceit and verbal machinations that are delineated in meticulous detail in this book. For those readers who want the raw, naked truth about Vietnam, this book is highly recommended, and its study will reveal that the author has definitely done his homework.
Having its origin in the National Security Act of 1947, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) during the Vietnam war is portrayed in this book as more of a collection of “technicians for planners” than a body of individuals who carefully thought out strategies and tactics. Some readers may be shocked as to what little influence the JCS had on actual policy decisions during the buildup of the war and its actual execution in the years that followed. One can only wonder whether this was the result of tacit agreement with those policies or rather from an excess of veneration for the Presidency and his cabinet officers. The author seems to argue for a superposition of both of these, and frequently the JCS is accused of placating the president.
Robert McNamara is rightfully portrayed as an evil demon in this book, as a government bureaucrat who cannot engage in self-criticism and smug in the certainty of his analysis and assessments of progress in the war. McNamara’s dwelling at the time was definitely a cesspool of apodictic certainty as is well brought out in this book, especially in the manner in which he interacted with the president and the JCS.
Johnson failed along with his vision of the Great Society. The JCS failed. Robert McNamara and Cyrus Vance failed. The only success of that time was the drive to end the debacle of the Vietnam war. This book is a microscopic view of these failures, and the biggest lesson to take away from the study of this book is an appreciation of just how removed from reality a government bureaucracy can be, and how uncritical adulation for a president or an idea can result in horrible destruction and heartache.
There are some who may hold to the premise that Lyndon Johnson and his closest advisors showed real guts in attempting to fight against the Vietnamese Communist threat and to “save American face”. But it does not take any intestinal fortitude or keen intellect to indulge in the deceit and verbal machinations that are delineated in meticulous detail in this book. For those readers who want the raw, naked truth about Vietnam, this book is highly recommended, and its study will reveal that the author has definitely done his homework.
Having its origin in the National Security Act of 1947, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) during the Vietnam war is portrayed in this book as more of a collection of “technicians for planners” than a body of individuals who carefully thought out strategies and tactics. Some readers may be shocked as to what little influence the JCS had on actual policy decisions during the buildup of the war and its actual execution in the years that followed. One can only wonder whether this was the result of tacit agreement with those policies or rather from an excess of veneration for the Presidency and his cabinet officers. The author seems to argue for a superposition of both of these, and frequently the JCS is accused of placating the president.
Robert McNamara is rightfully portrayed as an evil demon in this book, as a government bureaucrat who cannot engage in self-criticism and smug in the certainty of his analysis and assessments of progress in the war. McNamara’s dwelling at the time was definitely a cesspool of apodictic certainty as is well brought out in this book, especially in the manner in which he interacted with the president and the JCS.
Johnson failed along with his vision of the Great Society. The JCS failed. Robert McNamara and Cyrus Vance failed. The only success of that time was the drive to end the debacle of the Vietnam war. This book is a microscopic view of these failures, and the biggest lesson to take away from the study of this book is an appreciation of just how removed from reality a government bureaucracy can be, and how uncritical adulation for a president or an idea can result in horrible destruction and heartache.
on September 10, 2017
If you served in Vietnam, served during the Vietnam era, had a relative who was killed or served, knew someone who was killed or served, or care anything about the senseless war that defined the sixties, then this book will make you angry.
McMaster goes into painstaking detail about the politics and incompetence that not only kept us in Vietnam, but in how the war escalated to the point that it did. Since this is a review of the book and not the war, I will, as hard as it is, keep my comments focused on the book. I will say that this was a difficult book to read as I kept getting angry about how the whole thing was handled. I was in the military from 1966 to 1969 and, as many of us did, knew this was a war we should have never been in.
My problem with the book is that although McMaster does an excellent job of providing insight into who was making decisions, the political climate of the time, and the lack of military expertise being listened to, the book is very repetitive. He explains an event, then gives a different view of the same event, but feels the need to repeat much of what he has already said.
After slogging through the minutiae and finally reaching the epilogue, I was expecting some new insight about what I had just read. Instead, it was a recap of the book, and one could almost read it alone and get the message McMaster intended.
This is an important book. It proves that we do not learn from the past, and just how much our government is capable of doing to keep the American public in the dark. For me one of the saddest quotes is from Admiral David Lamar McDonald, “Maybe we military men are all weak. Maybe we should have stood up and pounded the table….. I was part of it and sort of ashamed of myself too. At times I wonder, ‘why did I go along with this kind of stuff?'”
Yes, why did you? Okay I said I was not going to lose focus.
This one gets three stars. It could have been better written but it is a must read.
McMaster goes into painstaking detail about the politics and incompetence that not only kept us in Vietnam, but in how the war escalated to the point that it did. Since this is a review of the book and not the war, I will, as hard as it is, keep my comments focused on the book. I will say that this was a difficult book to read as I kept getting angry about how the whole thing was handled. I was in the military from 1966 to 1969 and, as many of us did, knew this was a war we should have never been in.
My problem with the book is that although McMaster does an excellent job of providing insight into who was making decisions, the political climate of the time, and the lack of military expertise being listened to, the book is very repetitive. He explains an event, then gives a different view of the same event, but feels the need to repeat much of what he has already said.
After slogging through the minutiae and finally reaching the epilogue, I was expecting some new insight about what I had just read. Instead, it was a recap of the book, and one could almost read it alone and get the message McMaster intended.
This is an important book. It proves that we do not learn from the past, and just how much our government is capable of doing to keep the American public in the dark. For me one of the saddest quotes is from Admiral David Lamar McDonald, “Maybe we military men are all weak. Maybe we should have stood up and pounded the table….. I was part of it and sort of ashamed of myself too. At times I wonder, ‘why did I go along with this kind of stuff?'”
Yes, why did you? Okay I said I was not going to lose focus.
This one gets three stars. It could have been better written but it is a must read.
on April 20, 2017
This books is simply excellent: if you're interested in the Vietnam War, or more broadly in military-political history, you cannot find a more significant book to deepen your understanding.
I've read extensively on the Vietnam war, both ground-level accounts by soldiers, as well as higher-level perspectives that cover the political context and strategies. I don't know why it took me so long to get to this one, but I'm really glad I did.
The writing is lucid, detailed, and honest throughout. The account is completely believable, because it is fully consistent with other information that is available, this feels at once like a more detailed account of what has been known, and at the same time a brilliant revelation of the lies and incompetence (and arrogance) that led to the military and political disaster, and so many lives lost (on all sides) for no purpose.
There are many detailed reviews of the book available, so there's not much I can add that would likely be useful. I strongly recommend reading the book.
I've read extensively on the Vietnam war, both ground-level accounts by soldiers, as well as higher-level perspectives that cover the political context and strategies. I don't know why it took me so long to get to this one, but I'm really glad I did.
The writing is lucid, detailed, and honest throughout. The account is completely believable, because it is fully consistent with other information that is available, this feels at once like a more detailed account of what has been known, and at the same time a brilliant revelation of the lies and incompetence (and arrogance) that led to the military and political disaster, and so many lives lost (on all sides) for no purpose.
There are many detailed reviews of the book available, so there's not much I can add that would likely be useful. I strongly recommend reading the book.
on April 21, 2017
This account is undoubtedly factual. I was in Vietnam as a fighter pilot, F-4 Phantom, We were often loaded with bombs and in late 1965 were
given the most ridiculous targets--small fords in creeks, etc. McNamara said we had plenty of munitions, but I remember going after a small wooden bridge with air-to-air rockets! It was the silliest use of air power imaginable and the book spells out why. I found it interesting and a good
explanation of why we lost that war. I think the book could have been shortened, but it is an interesting read... Makes me want to dig up LBJ and
hang him. Imagine him looking over a map of Vietnam and picking targets while the Chiefs of Staff of the armed forces were kept away. The
book should be required reading for any politician who is forced to wage war.
given the most ridiculous targets--small fords in creeks, etc. McNamara said we had plenty of munitions, but I remember going after a small wooden bridge with air-to-air rockets! It was the silliest use of air power imaginable and the book spells out why. I found it interesting and a good
explanation of why we lost that war. I think the book could have been shortened, but it is an interesting read... Makes me want to dig up LBJ and
hang him. Imagine him looking over a map of Vietnam and picking targets while the Chiefs of Staff of the armed forces were kept away. The
book should be required reading for any politician who is forced to wage war.
on April 9, 2017
During the time of the Vietnam War I was suspicious of the Politicians in Washington. This doubting started with JFK and was supported by the McMara staff. Washington did not want the true voice of the military known because of other objectives. No way could the United States win this war because of the lack of trust that President and his staff had for supporting parties. Any other crime the President and his staff would have been sent to jail. We let the lives of over 55,000 soldiers pay the price for irrational decisions. Another failure and very sad.
on January 8, 2016
Written by a soldier-scholar who is now a Lt. General. Well-written indictment of McNamara, the Joint Chiefs, and Lyndon Johnson. The details of the lies, deceptions, and derelictions have been more fully set forth in David Halberstam's "The Best and the Brightest".
on June 15, 2017
I served in the US Air Force from 1966 - 1970 and was stationed mostly stateside at Travis AFB in California. I was on the ground crew assigned to the 602nd OMS.What I saw during that period was plane loads of servicemen being flown via commercial airlines to Vietnam only to see many military cargo planes coming back with stacks of coffins, especially toward the end of 1969 and the beginning of 1970. At times the cargo planes (C141s) were converted to medivacs and wounded servicemen were being treated on their way back to the US. Horrific sights.
To think that the war in Vietnam was just an experiment for McNamara along with his MBA cronies and served a political whim of President Johnson is appalling. More then 50,000 of us were killed for no reason other than serving at the pleasure of an incompetent president, a technocrat defense secretary, and a bunch of four star officers who could or would not stand up to their bosses. Shame on them. General McMaster has a lot of courage to indict the military who were just as complicit. Finally an honest voice from that side of the house. How many of those servicemen whose names are on the wall in DC could have been alive if not for the exhibited callous behavior by a few. . .
To think that the war in Vietnam was just an experiment for McNamara along with his MBA cronies and served a political whim of President Johnson is appalling. More then 50,000 of us were killed for no reason other than serving at the pleasure of an incompetent president, a technocrat defense secretary, and a bunch of four star officers who could or would not stand up to their bosses. Shame on them. General McMaster has a lot of courage to indict the military who were just as complicit. Finally an honest voice from that side of the house. How many of those servicemen whose names are on the wall in DC could have been alive if not for the exhibited callous behavior by a few. . .
on May 13, 2017
One of the best books written on Viet Nam War. Tells the truth how President Johnson and his staff deceived the American people and got us into a war that we didn't need too enter. Then once we made a commitment he sent tens of thousands of our Sons & Daughters to fight the war, but he and McNamera lied to the American people and used our troops in a way, that cost us over 58,000 dead and thousands injured to preserve his Presidential campaign. McNamera should have been tried for treason for what he did or I should say didn't do. On the battlefield, the American troops defeated the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong. After the Tet Offensive General Giap said in his autobiography he had been defeated and was wiling to go to the Paris Peace Talk and negotiate peace. However, he saw that the American politics were against their own troops so the war was lost in the streets of the US. This is all because the Johnson administration wanted to save their legacy.
