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Correlli Barnett

Desert Generals Hardcover – January 1, 2003

by Correlli Barnett (Author)

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A collection of intimate portraits of the five men who lead the British Army through the battles of the Desert Campaign in 1940-1943: Richard O Connor, Alan Cunningham, Neil Ritchie, Claude Auchinleck, and Field Marshall Montgomery. A comprehensive account of the Desert Campaign is provided. Author: Correlli Barnett Format: 352 pages, hardcover Publisher: Castle (2003) ISBN: 9780785815914

Print length

352 pages
Language

English
Publisher

Castle
Publication date

January 1, 2003
Dimensions

5.75 x 1.25 x 8.5 inches
ISBN-10

0785815910
ISBN-13

978-0785815914
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Correlli Barnett
58
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Robert Crisp
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Product details

Publisher ‏ : ‎ Castle; 0002- edition (January 1, 2003)
Language ‏ : ‎ English
Hardcover ‏ : ‎ 352 pages
ISBN-10 ‏ : ‎ 0785815910
ISBN-13 ‏ : ‎ 978-0785815914
Item Weight ‏ : ‎ 1.35 pounds
Dimensions ‏ : ‎ 5.75 x 1.25 x 8.5 inches

Best Sellers Rank: #2,334,752 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
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William

I love Winston but did he ever blow it in the ...

Reviewed in the United States 🇺🇸 on April 13, 2017

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This is a riveting book that I think would be an outstanding read for everyone from the WWII novice to an attendee at the US Army War College. However, if you are a fan of either the former Prime Minister, Winston S. Churchill or Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery than you may want to brace yourself. The Desert Generals doesn’t paint a very flattering picture of either of these two British icons. I love Winston but did he ever blow it in the desert. Oh well, even the great ones are wrong on occasion. I think I need to be a little more positive in this review so I will put it another way: Had it not been for Winston S. Churchill, the desert war may have ended two years earlier before Rommel and his vaunted Afrika Korp could have been fully deployed in theater. Winston’s insistence to aid the Greeks robbed Richard O’Conner (the original Desert Fox) and his boss Archibald Wavell of further resources. Winston congratulated Wavell and ordered him to “make [the Army] secure in Benghazi and to concentrate all available forces in the Delta in preparation of a move to Europe.” Units were diverted to Greece in a lost cause! What’s worse is that everyone in the British Military understood it to be a lost cause. These same units could have been used to kick the Italians off the continent quite possibly before the Germans arrived in force. Barnett summed it up as follows:

The Greek question was a major crisis in grand strategy; by his decision to intervene, the Prime Minister showed for the first time in the war that although he was a Churchill, he was not a Marlborough. Instead of his ancestor’s cold and long-sighted sagacity, he displayed emotional impulse; sometimes generous, sometimes ruthless, always overwhelming. Greece was the first occasion in the war that these impulses had worked disastrously. It was a mistake the more disastrous because of the alternative objective of Tripoli, which O’Connor believed he could obtain.

So what is good about this you ask? If you are a lover of the legend of Erwin Rommel and the Afrika Korps; if you ever begged your mom to allow you to stay up late so you could watch reruns of Rat Patrol in your pajamas; If your favorite war movie of all time was Patton and in your mind George C. Scott is Patton….than you will thank the PM for that stupid, stupid move of sending O’Conner’s best units to Greece, in a lost cause, only to become POWs when complete victory was in sight! If it wasn’t for Churchill the war on the African continent very well could have been over! Barnett’s book would have been a mere pamphlet!

There is another piece to this story. It is that of the UK’s self-proclaimed Messiah, Field-Marshal the Viscount Bernard Law Montgomery. Only about 20% of this book is devoted to Monty – the last 20%. The Desert Generals defrocks Monty. He was the original Desert Sloth who at best didn’t understand mobile desert warfare and at the worst was a braggart, a liar, and maybe slightly autistic with his habit of repeating everything he said twice! Everything he said twice!

There appears to be three Desert Generals that understood how to fight tank battles in the wide expanses of the desert: Erwin Rommel, Richard O’Conner, and Chad Auchinleck. O’Conner, by a bad stroke of luck, is taken prisoner by the Germans after making a wrong turn in the desert. Enter Auchinleck who appoints two unsuited candidates for command of the 8th Army prior to taking the job himself. Like O’Conner, Auk understands desert warfare or at least he “gets it” or is “getting it” prior to the 1st battle of El Alemein. After Auk saves the day the PM visits 8th Army and fires Auk and several members of his staff. Again, looking at this in a positive light, Having Monty take the helm of 8th Army helped to cement Rommel’s reputation for an eternity. Had Auk been left in charge Rommel would have likely been a POW.

I think you will love Correlli Barnett’s writing style. He splits the Desert War into six parts and after each part Barnett adds a commentary section during which he critically analyzes the actions of each of the desert Generals. I think even Monty would agree that this is a tidy way to keep track of everything. Tidy way to keep track of everything. Also, his sarcasm is very humorous at times.

The Desert Generals is packed with information but one fact stood out. At no time did Rommel have more than 4.5 divisions of Germans under his command. At the same time, the German’s had 190 divisions deployed in the East. The Desert War was in fact a side show of the big show. The author wonders what would have happened if Germany would have sent a few more Panzer divisions over to the desert rather than have them swallowed up on the Russian Steppes. Would things have been a little different?

In the end Monty had 2-3x more tanks, men, planes etc. than the Axis. If you just count German tanks Monty had about 6x more than Rommel…but who can forget the Italians…going to war without the Italians is like going deer hunting and not bringing along your accordion. Monty could do nothing because he never understood how to fight a tank battle in the desert. He could not think as fast as Rommel. He did not understand how to integrate tanks and infantry like the Germans did or like Auk. He attacked on too narrow a front and sacrificed too many tanks. He didn’t understand that putting infantry behind fixed fortifications was worthless….Oh Monty. Was he really that arrogant ass portrayed in Francis Ford Coppala’s Patton played by Michael Bates? Yes, according to Barnett, I’m afraid he was but he did help to propagate a legend.

This is a riveting book that I think would be an outstanding read for everyone from the WWII novice to an attendee of the US Army War College. I decided to download this book to my kindle when I read that The Desert Generals was one of British Historian, John Keegan’s top 50 favorite books regarding WWII and the only book of the 50 about the war in the desert. Also, Rick Atkinson quoted from this book in his masterpiece: Army at Dawn.

You will enjoy the book. Enjoy the book. Oh shut up Monty

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R. A Forczyk

Bashing the Montgomery Myth

Reviewed in the United States 🇺🇸 on November 10, 2000

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This work is a study of military leadership under stress, not a detailed blow-by-blow campaign history. The setting is the Libyan and Egyptian deserts, between June 1940 and January 1943. The perspective is thoroughly British and the fluctuating tide of British military fortunes is depicted by a detailed examination of the five key commanders in this period. Originally written in 1960, this work was revised in 1981 to incorporate the later information on the role of Enigma. Although Barnett's main contention - that General Montgomery's accomplishments were more mythical than factual - is not addressed until the last chapters, it is the primary intent of the author to debunk this myth.
The first chapters deal with the opening of the desert war and the initial victories of Field Marshal Wavell and General O'Connor over the Italians. Beda Fomm was O'Connor's brilliant victory, but today it is overshadowed by Rommel's battles. Despite the extent of these victories, the victors were soon forgotten: O'Connor was captured in the initial attack of the German Afrika Korps and Wavell was relieved by Churchill. Although this was an interesting phase of the war for the British, these chapters lack the dynamic quality that the rest of the book has.
General Sir Alan Cunningham, a hero of the campaign in Ethiopia, was sent to replace O'Connor. He was the first British general to face Rommel on even terms, but he lasted in command for only three months. When Cunningham took command, the British were still reeling from Rommel's first offensive and desperately attempting to raise the siege of Tobruk. Cunningham presided over the premature Operation "Crusader" to relieve Tobruk, constantly goaded by Churchill to strike at once. Barnett's portrait of Cunningham is interesting in two respects. First, as a successful colonial soldier suddenly thrust into command of a large mechanized army, Cunningham fumbled Operation Crusader (although more for non-technical reasons, like failure to achieve mass at the decisive point or maintain unity of effort). Cunningham was able to recover and muddle through to a victory of sorts, but suffered a loss of confidence that was fatal to his continued command. This is Barnett's second interesting point, on the strain of battle command upon the commander. Ostensibly, Cunningham was relieved due to "battle fatigue" but the erosion of his command authority and confidence was closer to the truth.
General Auchinleck, the British Commander-in-Chief in the Mideast, then made a disastrous choice in selecting General Ritchie to temporarily command the 8th Army. Although Operation Crusader had forced Rommel to abandon the siege of Tobruk and pull back, Ritchie took over command as the Germans swept back up to the Gazala line outside Tobruk. Ritchie was well-connected politically and he possessed a soldierly image but unfortunately, his professional abilities were modest. Ritchie was unimaginative and indecisive - fatal attributes when faced by an adversary like Rommel - and his static defense and piece-meal use of armor resulted in the 8th Army's greatest defeat. After Tobruk was lost and Rommel pushed into Egypt, Auchinleck decided to relieve Ritchie and take over command of the 8th Army himself.
Barnett's portrait of Auchinleck and his chief-of-staff Dorman-Smith is intended to vindicate these men as the true saviors of Egypt and British military fortunes in Africa. The case is persuasive. Although only in command for a few months, Auchinleck stopped Rommel at the First Battle of El Alamein and began the process of re-organizing the 8th Army into a more effective force. Dorman-Smith was a military intellectual, and he accurately predicted Rommel's likely course of action and advised Auchinleck on British dispositions. Unfortunately, Churchill visited Egypt right after 1st Alamein and Auchinleck and Dorman-Smith were relieved. The reasons are ambiguous, but the purge was due to political and personal reasons much more than military factors. The benefactor was General Montgomery, who became the new commander of 8th Army.
Barnett's portrait of Montgomery is even more unflattering than most American portrayals of this controversial general. I was unaware, for example, that while at Sandhurst Montgomery has set another cadet on fire as part of a hazing incident (and even recounted it in his memoirs). Montgomery took command when the British were finally receiving massive reinforcements in Egypt and Rommel's forces were at their weakest. Engima decryption also gave Montgomery valuable insight into the enemy's strength and weaknesses. Nevertheless, Montgomery's set-piece Second Battle of El Alamein was nearly a failure. The breakthrough battle was a muddle that nearly foundered on Rommel's minefields and anti-tank barriers. When German supply difficulties finally helped to turn the battle his way, Montgomery clearly fumbled the pursuit and allowed the Afrika Korps to escape. However, Barnett cites the creation of the Montgomery Myth - that his battles all went according to plan and that he was invincible - as necessary to restoring bruised British military prestige. In these pages, Montgomery is clearly labeled as a vainglorious liar of limited military capabilities, but with a keen eye for public relations.
This book is an excellent study of command. For these readers who believe that Hitler interfered with the German war effort, this book is valuable for showing how Churchill also interfered. Churchill's Greek adventure in 1941 weakened the British in North Africa at a critical moment, as well as his diversion of forces to the Far East in December 1941. Likewise, Churchill's insistence on holding indefensible Tobruk in 1942 led to a great British disaster. Furthermore, Churchill was constantly badgering his commanders to attack which reduced the amount of time they had to learn their commands and build up their forces.
There are only two areas I can fault in this book. First, the sketch maps are absolutely awful. The reader will need to find other campaign maps to support the text because these are crude in the extreme. The second area is on the strategic impact of the war in the desert. Several times, Barnett makes the assertion that the war could have been lost if the Germans had broken through at El Alamein. Of course, Barnett is British and the British would like to have everyone believe that the British Army won the Second World War (or at least prevented it from being lost). Barnett also parades "what if" fantasies about German troops reaching the Persian Gulf in a month or even going on to India. This is nonsense, even without hindsight. Rommel's logistics were stretched to the breaking point getting to El Alamein but Barnett makes it sound like going an extra 1,500 miles would be easy. The book lacks balance in placing the Desert War in its proper historical perspective: it was a sideshow for the Germans and a valuable training ground for the British, but the war was decided elsewhere. Loss of Cairo did not equate to loss of the war. Barnett might have done well to remember that Napoleon's conquest of Egypt under similar circumstances (British naval superiority) did not produce any great strategic result for him. It is hard to see how Rommel's handful of troops and tanks could have done much beyond taking Cairo and even harder to see how holding Cairo would have saved Hitler's empire.

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J. J. Bradshaw

A classic that has stood the test of time very well

Reviewed in the United Kingdom 🇬🇧 on February 21, 2014

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I first read this book many years ago and it left a lasting impression. I bought the Kindle version as it is one of those books that I return to and never tire of reading. Today we can't really appreciate just what a shock this book must have been when it was published, challenging a general who was at the time considered a national hero and almost infallible military genius whilst rehabilitating the reputations of his predecessors. The book was truly iconoclastic and original yet also displayed great insight and superb analysis. This edition is the later version which includes some considerations of the original judgments following the declassification of Ultra intelligence and other sources not available when the book was first wrote. The book is most famous for the damning judgement offered of Montgomery yet this is very unfair as his portrait of the brilliant O'Connor, the strategist Wavell and the hugely under rated Auchinleck are balanced and well argued. Many dismissed Barnett as some sort of hatchet bearing character assassin yet his portraits of the flawed Cunningham and Ritchie are remarkably sympathetic and paint pictures of generals who were incapable of meeting the challenges they faced but who were far from foolish or incompetent as often portrayed. History has been very kind to these chapters and conventional wisdom has changed to allign with Barnett's arguments, Auchinleck especially is now rightfully regarded as one of Britain's best generals of the war and the victim of a terrible injustice whilst Wavell's brilliant balancing between so many threats and demands (North Africa, East Africa, the Levant, Iraq and the Balkans) is now also recognized as a fine achievement and again as being the victim of a great injustice following the disasters in the Balkans and stripping of the army in Libya masterminded by his political masters. O'Connor displayed a dash and daring not shared by many other British senior generals in the war and in many ways was a British Rommel in his fearless willingness to run great risks and also command from the front. Which brings us to Monty. The picture of Monty deviates from the balanced and well argued analysis of most of the book and does become rather polemical however this has to be placed in the context of the even more polemic attitude of Montgomery towards almost every other allied commander of the war and his ghastly egomania which fed a myth of his inheriting a shambolic mess and following inept and hopeless failures to transform the 8th Army and achieve stunning successes and his being blessed with military genius. There is no doubt that Montgomery was a very competent general with a gift for leadership which I think Barnett under appreciates however he inherited an army which had a sound defensive position, excellent logistical support and was recieving equipment in quantities his opponents could only dream of and succeeded Auchinleck after he had already stopped Rommel's German-Italian army at El Alamein. Given the legend Montgomery created around himself aided by Churchill famous comment about defeats and victories either side of second El Alamein and his appalling behaviour to all and sundry it is hardly surprising that Barnett's picture of him was somewhat biased and unfairly critical in turn. That his predecessors achieved far more than they were credited with when this book was published and that the true achievement of Montgomery was less than his own self created legend are I think beyond doubt however that does not mean he was not a fine general. That O'Connor combined military genius along with remarkable modesty bordering on self deprecating humbleness doesn't mean that the egoistic and thoroughly unappealing Monty was not also a fine general. Yet for all that the sections dealing with Montgomery contain many well observed comments and it is not the out and out hatchet job it has often been described as. Barnerr recognises his resolution at El Alamein and also recognises his changes after the initial El Alamein plan failed to achieve its objectives. Barnett however judges Montgomery according to his own self proclaimed version of history demonstrating that the idea of the master plan at El Alamein working in exact accordance with the plan was untrue, that Montgomery made full use of ideas that predated his arrival and that his assigning two seperate army corps the same axis of advance was a major contributory factor to the failure to break out and crush the German-Italian army. In each case I think the evidence supports Barnett. The irony is that is Monty had been more honest and gracious in recognising his predecessors and his own shortcomings I believe history would have been much kinder to him. Certainly the book is much kinder to Montgomery than Montgomery was towards Auchinleck, O'Connor or indeed almost any of his contemporaries. The overwhelming majority of this book has stood the test of time and laid the foundations for a complete re-appraisal of the British army in the desert war and now very much represents the consensus view of historians in most respects. Wonderfully written in a very engaging style the book is well paced and is never a chore to read. A true 5* book, marvelous.

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John Bennett

A searching assessment. A classic history.

Reviewed in the United Kingdom 🇬🇧 on March 28, 2013

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A revealing assessment of the work of key generals, notably O'Connor, Auchinleck and Montgomery (including their superiors and the officers they commanded). O'Connor is seen as very capable, and historically underrated. His fluid approach was well ahead of the time. Auchinleck's work is re-assessed to show some strong qualities, both as a general and personally. Montgomery is seen as professional and capable, but cautious, and happiest in set battles. His deliberate misinterpretation of Auchinleck's work was the start of his building a myth which was at its height when this book was published.

The structure of the army is given detailed assessment. Though there was some forward thinking in the 1930's, for example in the use of armour, most army officers were more likely to be of the character of 'gentlemen amateurs' and tied to strong regimental traditions. Most had no knowledge or experience of armour. Throughout the desert battles the army struggled to integrate armour and infantry - something that was fundamental to the German army.

Intelligence work gave the desert generals a clear picture of Rommel's dispositions - his tank strengths, fuel supplies and so on - which was crucially important to successful planning.

Significantly Churchill's role in the desert campaigns is seen by Correlli as often not helpful. O'Connor had pushed the Italians back and was poised to take Tripoli when Churchill decided to send O'Connor's forces (against advice) to defend Greece, leaving only green troops in Africa. Rommel quickly pushed them back - and for this failure Churchill sacked the Commander in Chief, Wavell. Auchinleck pushed the over-extended Rommel back; but Churchill then announced that there would be no more reinforcements for Auchinleck: new demands of the Far East now had priority. Rommel duly advanced again and was only stopped by Auchinleck at the first battle of Alemain on the Egyptian border. Churchill sacked Auchinleck.

At Alamein Montomery was able to build huge forces. But Correlli argues that the 2nd battle of Alemain may not have been necessary at all: the Torch landings in French North Africa threatened Rommel's bases, so Rommel would have had to withdraw anyway. Of the Torch landings Rommel said "This is the end of the army in Africa". It is evident however that Churchill wanted a victory by British and Empire forces for political purposes. Churchill also wanted Rommel destroyed, but Montgomery failed here - Rommel conducted a skilful retreat.

The quality of British equipment is criticised: For example new tanks arrived in the desert with nuts hand tight. Also, tank design was inconclusive: British tanks were of two types - a slow heavily armoured tank (intended for infantry support) and a light and faster cruiser tank for other purposes. Neither was fully up to the job. Finally, American tanks filled the gap. Interestingly the Germans made very successful extensive use of their 88mm anti-aircraft gun against tanks, but the British - who had a similar gun - did not do so - showing, says Correlli, rigid thinking.

Additional notes and research written by Correlli Barnett about twenty years after the first edition (which are included) show that the book is balanced and fair. This is essential reading for anyone interested in the desert wars.

6 people found this helpful

Rob Evo

generals

Reviewed in the United Kingdom 🇬🇧 on June 18, 2013

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Correlli Barnett gives a good account of the desert generals, highly critical of some and certainly points out the ones who were totally out of their depth. If O'Conner had'nt got captured he would have been a match for Rommel.Auchinleck made the mistake of selecting Cunningham and then Richie who were both out of their depth and it cost dearly.I think Gott would have been a bad choice had he not been killed because he was never a dynamic leader. Auchinleck gave in to the pressure from the meddling Churchill he should have stuck to his words of earlier and told Churchill he would attack when the army was ready and trained,
which is what Monty told him and got away with it, who knows Auchinleck may have turned out to be the victor.Monty was not with out his faults but they were forgotten because of the victory over Rommel and thats all that mattered in the end

One person found this helpful

Roger Parker

A thoughtful and complete evaluation of the desert generals, ...

Reviewed in the United Kingdom 🇬🇧 on December 15, 2015

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A thoughtful and complete evaluation of the desert generals, and their leadership styles, and correctly ranking O'Connor as the outstanding general of the North African campaign

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Amazon Customer

This is the best book about the North African Campaign

Reviewed in the United Kingdom 🇬🇧 on October 28, 2014

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This is the best book about the North African Campaign. More impressive because it was written by a non historian, and in 1960. At the time it was met with controversy as it put pay to the 'Monty' myth, and even questioned the need and timing of the second Battle of El Alamein (or third battle depending on what you are counting). It does well with the 'what ifs' and revisits the performance of all the commanders at the time, including Sir Winston Churchill.

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Desert Generals Hardcover – January 1, 2003

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