The only reason for one more star is its clear form’at in simple, plain English.
The book is incoherent, confusing and utterly disappointing. From the beginning the book self-contradicts itself.
Graham Allison, “Destined for War,” 1st Mariner Books Ed., (Boston, MA: Mariner Books, 2018), p. xi
I have written my work, not as an essay to win the applause of the moment, but as a possession for all time.—Thucydides, “History of the Peloponnesian War”
While the author’s busy listing his academic and social achievements throughout the pages, the book provides no realistic answer to this rather heavy and pressing matter.
Allison, “Destined for War,” p. 60
...Britain had become the “workshop of the world,” and by 1880 it accounted for almost a quarter of the world’s manufacturing output and trade. Its investments powered global growth, and its fleets protected global trade...Britain was “both policeman and banker to the world...”
Ibid., p. 64
...Britons experienced Germany’s industrial growth most immediately in the form of German exports displacing British products at home and abroad. Between 1890 and 1913, Britain’s exports to Germany doubled—but were still worth only half the value of its imports from Germany, which had tripled. A best-selling book in 1896, “Made in Germany,” warned Britons that “a gigantic commercial state is arising to menace our prosperity, and contend with us for the trade of the world.”
Ibid., p. 67
...The Germans seeming World Power status were ultimately, as Michael Howard has written, “not concerned with expanding within what they saw as a British dominated world-system. It was precisely that system which they found intolerable, and which they were determined to challenge on a basis of equality."
Ibid., p. 309
“...But at every step which we take in this direction England will resolutely oppose us...There is no standing still in the world’s history...It is obviously impossible to keep things in the status quo, as diplomacy has so often attempted...The principle of the balance of power in Europe, which has, since the Congress of Vienna, led an almost sacrosanct but entirely unjustifiable existence, must be entirely disregarded.”
Ibid., p. 55
[The Germans] build navies so as to play a part in the world affairs.—Winston Churchill, speech to the House of Commons, March 1914
Wonder if the author follows stuff like the latest “Arctic” Circle Conference 2022. It was like the main topic there was “China.” The rivalry so openly goes on everywhere as what the rising side now pursues is a new order over the whole world, not just over the periphery of its mainland.
Allison, “Destined for War,” p. 220
...the Department of Defense and intelligence community “hedge.” They strive to maintain military superiority, strengthen defense ties to key allies and friends—specifically Japan, South Korea, and India—develop intelligence assets, and plan for conflict with an adversary whose name, like Voldemort’s, they are not allowed to speak, but against whom they develop specific weapon systems and operation war plans.
In 2021, the Chinese foreign minister put out three core bottom lines Beijing wanted Washington to agree to: 1) Do not get in the way of the development for the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 2) Respect all PRC’s territorial claims over the places like South China Sea or Republic of China (ROC: Taiwan), and 3) Respect the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its rules (so basically rule-based order: The real point is, however, not the rule per se but more like who writes it to become the de-fact’o author’ity).
Since it definitely harms the core interest of the US as the leader of current global order, Washington has done the opposite to all these CCP demands. It has imposed the semiconductor export bans and sanctioned leading Chinese technology firms, while the US and its key allies have solidified ties with ROC. The POTUS made clear in the press conference after a recent summit with the PRC Pres./ CCP Chair. Xi that US policy on ROC remains unchanged.
At the end of the US[A]-PR[C] Summit in Bali, last month, Pres. Biden said America would “vigorously” compete with China, but there isN’T gonna be an-other Cold War between the two.
The Presid’ent was right. America will try its best to keep the stat’us qu’o, and there won’t be another “cold” war, for the current US-PRC rivalry is NOT like the US-USSR rivalry over ideologies, but much more like the British-German rivalry towards the Great War over the global waters and trade/ economy.
In reality Communist ideology was prevented pretty well from spreading with US policies like Marshall Plan as long as countries under the ideology could not challenge the "actual" US economic hegemony.
In fact, it wasn’t about checking the Soviet influence, but keeping the US influence and control over the passages/ access to secure resources vit’al for the US global leadership. In other words, it wasn’t really about Communism or Soviet Union, but more like containing movements that opposed the way Washington led the post-1945 global order.
Washington managed to contain “most” of its en-emies (no-friends) as they were stuck in the Eurasian Continent away from the major water passages protected by the US Naval Forces. However, Vietnam (as well as Cuba) was a different story as it was pr’o-je[c]ting too far and deep along the South China Sea towards the Strait of Malacca, the very “gate and bridge” between the Pacific and Indian Ocean provoking the US intervention there.
After an unsuccessful attempt to “liberate” South Vietnam, the US pulled out of the country and dug in across the 1st Island Chain. It turned out Vietnam’s navy couldn’t play much role in the South China Sea after all, so that Washington found it not difficult for the US Navy to play its role as usual.
It was easier for Washington to cause trouble between Hanoi and Beijing instead, and the path’/ pass’age would be secured as long as the countries like the Philipp’ines, Malaysia and Singapore were still protected by the US naval supremacy. Likewise, had countries like Djibouti and Egypt (for Suez Canal) or any of the Saudi-led Gulf kingdoms (for Strait of Hormuz) been lost, Washington would’ve been in trouble, but the passage through Hormuz was still protected by the US Naval Forces, despite the de-part’ure of Iran in 1979, with all the Gulf kingdoms intact on its side.
Bottom line is that the Soviet Union and its block were no “real threat” to the US economic dominance, whereas the People's Republic of China today “intents” to become cap’able of taking it over. The PRC under the name of that very ideology is a “fake” Communist state as its real policy is extreme Capitalism coercively buying up all its diplomatic and military needs (like technologies or even carrier aviation skills) with money.
I'm not saying the USSR wasn't a great power. I'm simply saying it was a great power that didn’t cross the line to undermine the core interest of Washington’s world economic domin’ance, so that the two powers could co-exist as the US Navy could secure what the country really needed: Its control over the water passages like vital infrastructure stretching across the globe. And it was in fact even better with the existence of Soviet Union since the US could "use" it as a reason for the unity of the global free market economy under its leadership.
Again, the USSR Navy was nothing compared to the US Naval Forces, and the two economies were not seriously intermingled. On the other hand, the US-PRC economy’s been inseparable within one system like British and German Empires, but this rising China is not like Japan or Germany back in the late-20th century that grew wealthy “under” the US-led global order:
Within the frame it led to establish, Washington allowed its beaten-up enemies Tokyo and Berlin, upon the lessons from the consequence of Treaty of Versailles, “freely compete” to grow “with” their bestowed privileges under the US policies like Marshall Plan. However, the PRC under CCP wants to build a “new” order and rule, and for that it will have to break through the almost-cent-ur’y-old US-led g[u]l’obal order after all.
I expected a lot when I read the book’s entr'/ intr'o-duct'ion hoping that all the praises from the big names would kind of guarantee the author's claim that the war with PRC is NOT in-e-fæҫ’/ -vis’/ -vit’able. Looks like it was a false hope, and I was very disappointed honestly as I closed the book; I had to read through the pages with the utmost patience realizing that the author is not fit for getting us sail through this apparently unavoidable conflict between the United States of America and People's Re-peopl’/ -publ’ic of Chin’/ Qin’a in the right way.
Allison, “Destined for War,” p. xiv
...Proximate causes for war are undeniably important. But the founder of history believed that the most obvious causes for bloodshed mask even more significant ones. More important than the sparks that lead to war, Thucydides teaches us, are the structural factors that lay its foundations: conditions in which otherwise manageable events can escalate with unforeseeable severity and produce unimaginable consequences.
After all these foundations and introductions, without seeing it could bring an even more destructive c’on-sequence/ -second later, the book’s c’on-clos’/ clus’ion is all about simply avoiding the proximate causes like simply cleaning the surface of a deep scar as much as our eyes can see (while he was complaining about Washington lacking long-term strategies).
Allison, “Destined for War,” p. 83, p. 276
As Paul Kennedy neatly puts it, the leaders of Britain and Germany considered that their clash in 1914...the wartime struggle between London and Berlin was but a continuation of what had been going on for at least fifteen or twenty years...
It won't work while the structural chess board is set, unless either side “voluntarily and unconditionally” submits in the other’s favor e-vent’ually or both the nations launch space explorations into the unknown “hoping” tous les deux turn out successful like the case of Portugal & Spain in the late-15th to early-16th century.
I don’t understand why the author would take the Spain & Portugal case as a successful model to resolve the current US-PRC rivalry. The real reason Spain and Portugal didn't have to fight over the first open "global" waters was because they didn't know how big the globe really was. If they knew the modern topography they would have to fight over it. But at the time finding the unknown for possibly "endless" ad-vent’ures and following economic profits must have seemed way more reasonable than fighting the rival to death over the little discovery of the world.
Likewise if the US and PRC somehow "both successfully" exploit the outer space the result could be like that of Spain & Portugal in the late-15th century Ann’o Dam’/ Dom’in-i. But, over the present-day global waters and trade/ economy they won't sign a deal to draw a line to share their “limited” opp’ortunities.
After the world m’ap was completed with the water passages clearly marked towards India and China, Habsburg-Spain annexed the neighboring Port’ugal and ruled the whole global waters until the mid-17th century (1580-1640).
However, the Independence of Portugal and Peace of Westphalia both pr’actically and off’icially took half of the Spanish dom’ain ov’er the gl’obal waters giving France the chance to barge in the stage with significant size of territorial and economic control in both the West and East Indies (Did you know some Indian provinces and the locals there still speak French today?) with its fast growing naval power (including its “troupes de marine” established in 1623, the second such maritime mob'ile infantry fighting force established only after the Spanish as the first in 1574) and well-equipped/ -trained ground forces that dominated its neighboring nations like the Dutch Republic and Spain, while England, starting with the death of Elizabeth I, was suffering from its social di-vis’ion and a series of destructive civil wars throughout the 17th century.
The book suggests a solution that depends on the US-led United Nations. The UK-led Congress of Vienna was, too, established to pre-vent/ -wind devastating conflicts among powers from happening again, yet, what happened at the end of it (when the left-out German states were united)? How did the Peace of Westphalia go before that (when the left-out British Isles were united)? How about the Treaty of Tordesillas? Had the Pope not di-vided the whole world “only” for Spain and Portugal in the first place, the rising Bourbon-France with its society united under the leadership of “Cardinals” Rich’elieu and Maz’arin, wouldn’t have had to join the rising Protest’ant “anti-Habsburg” allies to crush its own fellow Catholic brethren in a prolonged war where millions lost their lives, would it?
Is our UN really different just because it includes the PRC? It includes all 193 currently-recognized nations, but for whose interest was it really established that is meant to antagonize the outsiders like PRC anyways despite its official status as a Permanent Member of the Security Council since 1971? Look how the ROC was sacrificed back then for the immediate US interest facing both Vietnam and the Soviet Union (also a UNSC Permanent Member lol). Remember how it worked for Washington against Beijing over South Sudan (oil) back in summer 2011? It won't matter how much money Beijing spends to change and control it; the PRC will be sidelined after all for the "cause" that Washington put as the base of the very order unless the order itself is replaced.
And come to think about it, neither ROK nor DPRK (another people’s re-peopl’ic...sigh) was a UN member state until 1991, but as soon as they joined the UN the first North Korean Nuclear Crisis broke out as Pyongyang announced its withdrawal from NPT. How sad; its on-ly “half-successful” action (because of Truman’s decision with no principle for a long-term peace) was the Korean War, and now we should change her name to "DN (Disunited Nations)."
Truth be told, global orders like the Treaty of Tordesillas, Peace of Westphalia, Congress of Vienna or even the latest United Nations have indulged violence elsewhere in order to avoid conflicts among my’/ mai’/ maj’or powers in favor of the me’/ mi’/ mæ’/ maj’or-leading order. We can’t really keep the world peace this way as the order just intervenes to enforce “historically ignorant” and hasty “makeshift” settlements between weaker entities just to save the order’s face causing never-ending regional conflict after conflict.
The 30-year old ongoing Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict is just one of the examples: Bak’u launched another massive artillery bombardment into Armenian territory as soon as it watched the Russian forces suffer from the West-backed Ukrainian counter-offensive. The West was sort of taking it as an opportunity to weaken Russian influence on its periphery while trying to diversify its energy sources, and what was the UN supposed to do? And where was the United Nations when the US-NATO forces pulled out of Afghanistan after 20 years of mayhem?
The hi-story in this book is not one continuing, long stor’y of our Humanity, but a mere collection of (sab[e]r’ed) sever’ed/ sever’al/ separ’ate stories defined and named for the convenience of our studies.
We should NOT think as if we are living at the end of our Human history. Someday we as well will be remembered like a history of medi’evɔl times to our descendents, and all our works with the United Nations today are gonna be remembered like our predecessors’ with their Vienna Congress after all.
Allison, “Destined for War,” p. 149
Chinese seek victory not in a decisive battle but through incremental moves designed to gradually improve their position...
That’s because PRC isn’t strong enough to face the US head on yet. What if it was already stronger than the US? The author talks a lot about “weiqi.” Is he a “weiqi” pr’actitioner? In weiqi, as we’re ready we strike hard and take as much enemy territory as possible to completely subjugate it. Does he really believe the Chinese leadership would still be playing a “slow” weiqi when it is clearly strong enough to beat its rival?
Why does the author think Beijing wants to grow much stronger building up its military power, especially PLA naval c’ap-ab’ilities in a frantic pace that’s n’ever been witnessed before, even surpassing the German naval power growth 100 years ago? I don’t understand why this “American” elite says his country should buy Beijing enough time to grow stronger to win.
The Art of War talks about winning without fight? Sure, if they can really win without a fight, that’ll be ideal, but what if they see they can’t? The most popular emperors in so-called the “Chinese” history (line’s vague to define it though) were all the greatest conquerors. They often had to use their military might to enforce the very “harmonious” order “with Zh’oŋ-gu’o de Zi’on-/ Ti’an-zi/ -ge (The Heaven’s-son of Middle-kingdom) as the center of all” upon those who refused it.
In this reality, what’s most important? Act’ual military readiness to “fight and win wars,” right? And that’s precisely what Pres. Xi’s PRC’s been doing in last whole dec’ade. The book seems passionate talking about famous ancient be’/ fi’g-ures and their dict’ums, but did Sun Tzu's “Art of War” really prevail facing the British naval power? Pres. Xi sees the “simple” reality (at least when it comes to the “principle” of diplomacy depending on one’s own strength, not on mercy from one’s counterpart) while the author, an American ad-vis’or, seems to be trapped in you know what.
Allison, “Destined for War,” p. 149
War for Chinese strategists is primarily psychological and political; military campaigns are a secondary concern. In Chinese thinking...for instance, through access or denial to trade. If psychological deterrence and economic incentives fail, the barbarians outside China’s borders can be set against one another in a contest in which everyone would lose except China. Eroding the enemy’s material capability and morale, and backing him into an alley from which there is no exit, is far better than defeating him on the battlefield.
What Chinese thinking? Are the good, old US economic sanctions imposed on outsiders that refuse to accept the American way any different? Mon-sieur Professor, your book quotes Sun Tzu's “Thou shalt kn’ow thy enemy and ‘thyself.’”
Google "young h d kim's global war of powershift and hegemony" to find the complete review with my own suggestions.
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