This concise work of about 180 pages functions as a synopsis of the forces that have been driving the Syrian Civil War ever since the demise of the Egypt-Syria Unted Arab Republic in 1961. There are no descriptions of military engagements or any of the other information that normally makes up a journalist’s narrative. The author has written other books on Syria and provides much interesting information, but the writing is sometimes unclear.
The war is essentially a conflict between Sunni Muslims and the Alawis, a minority that is nominally Shia. Syria gained full independence from France just after World War II. The nation is divided by religious sects of whom the most numerous are Sunni Muslims (15%) Christians (10%) and Alawis (10%). There are further divisions by region, tribe, and family. Crucial among these is the Ba’ath and the Alawi. The Ba’ath is a pan-Syrian, socialist, political party. The Alawi are considered Shia Muslims although the exact nature of their faith is not clear. Traditionally the Alawi lived in a mountainous and isolated area of the northwest, but now in addition to being more numerous live in the cities as well. Popular tradition considers them ignorant and alienated from the rest of society but they seem to have cultivated strong coherence as a group and considerable resilience. Among the Alawi is the al-Asad family that has been ruling Syria since 1971. Among nations, Syria is a friend of Russia and Iran. Both states maintain military bases inside their friend (Iran maintains ten), but they are competitors with each other. Syria is one arena of competition. It’s interesting that these friends have something in common. Both consider themselves cheated by the West -- Russia by its loss of control of Eastern Europe, Iran by the overthrow of Mossadegh.
Before the coup of September 8, 1961, Syria was part of the United Arab Republic, a state formed from Egypt and Syria, but the Syrian military found the Union constricting. The United Arab Republic was split. After some conflicts of military officer factions there was another coup in 1963 which was eventually the cause of the present Civil War. This second time, essentially by chance the ruling Sunni Military Committee was replaced by an Alawi-dominated Military Committee. From this point the (Alawi-dominated) Separatists, a coalition of minority sects, were in control. They ensured their long-term dominance by bringing more and more of their co-religionists into military service at the expense of more orthodox Sunni Muslims. This absorption has gone on continually to the point where the military is about 80% Alawi. The Sunni have been reduced from a higher position in society to a lower. A similar situation existed for Baathists. The author writes, “Many Alawis had themselves been suffering from Alawi-dominated Ba’athist dictatorship, often just as much or occasionally even more than non-Alawis.” (p. 69)
When the Arab Spring demonstrations began in late 2010, non-Alawis began deserting the military. This was enough to show the Syrian war was mainly a war of Alawi versus others. The revolution was seen in the West as part of the Arab-wide uprising for democracy and better government. This was an natural position to take since Bashar al-Asad was a tyrant and a butcher. Opinion polls in Syria showed some Sunni support for the revolution and majority Christian support for the 2011 demonstrators while some Alawis were against. The sectarian cause soon became clear. After a year the conflict was clearly a civil war and people retreated to a sectarian point of view. I found in this book one instance of idealism -- the so-called Four Towns Agreement, which established pathways to safe areas for the civilian population of two towns in besieged areas. Even so, some maintained that this was a criminal population transfer.
Sunni countries like Turkey and Arabia attempted to mediate but finding the efforts ineffective, frequently ended up siding with the opposition. The long-standing sectarian divide reasserted itself on a regional level. Iran had its own motives for being pro-regime, since Syria could be a transmission belt for military resources for Hezbollah in Lebanon. The author provides a one-sentence explaination of Russia’s participation as an attempt to prevent the entry of terrorists. Both Iran and Russia have military bases in Syria and are adding to them. Countries aiding the military opposition claim support for a political solution also. Western countries didn’t try any dialog with Damascus; they had withdrawn ambassadors by 2012. It’s reasonable to suppose the war will go on at least until Asad steps down from power, which will not be at least until 2021.
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