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The Devil We Know: Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower Paperback – August 18, 2009
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As ex–CIA operative Robert Baer masterfully shows, Iran has maneuvered itself into the elite superpower ranks by exploiting Americans’ false perceptions of what Iran is—by letting us believe it is a country run by scowling religious fanatics, too preoccupied with theocratic jostling and terrorist agendas to strengthen its political and economic foundations.
The reality is much more frightening—and yet contained in the potential catastrophe is an implicit political response that, if we’re bold enough to adopt it, could avert disaster.
Baer’s on-the-ground sleuthing and interviews with key Middle East players—everyone from an Iranian ayatollah to the king of Bahrain to the head of Israel’s internal security—paint a picture of the centuries-old Shia nation that is starkly the opposite of the one normally drawn. For example, Iran’s hate-spouting President Ahmadinejad is by no means the true spokesman for Iranian foreign policy, nor is Iran making it the highest priority to become a nuclear player.
Even so, Baer has discovered that Iran is currently engaged in a soft takeover of the Middle East, that the proxy method of war-making and co-option it perfected with Hezbollah in Lebanon is being exported throughout the region, that Iran now controls a significant portion of Iraq, that it is extending its influence over Jordan and Egypt, that the Arab Emirates and other Gulf States are being pulled into its sphere, and that it will shortly have a firm hold on the world’s oil spigot.
By mixing anecdotes with information gleaned from clandestine sources, Baer superbly demonstrates that Iran, far from being a wild-eyed rogue state, is a rational actor—one skilled in the game of nations and so effective at thwarting perceived Western colonialism that even rival Sunnis relish fighting under its banner.
For U.S. policy makers, the choices have narrowed: either cede the world’s most important energy corridors to a nation that can match us militarily with its asymmetric capabilities (which include the use of suicide bombers)—or deal with the devil we know. We might just find that in allying with Iran, we’ll have increased not just our own security but that of all Middle East nations.The alternative—to continue goading Iran into establishing hegemony over the Muslim world—is too chilling to contemplate.
- Print length288 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherCrown
- Publication dateAugust 18, 2009
- Dimensions5.2 x 0.6 x 8 inches
- ISBN-100307408671
- ISBN-13978-0307408679
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Editorial Reviews
Review
—John Perkins, author of the New York Times bestseller Confessions of an Economic Hit Man
“The most important and original book on the Middle East to appear in many years. Baer’s subject is the growing power of Iran; his goal is ending the pattern of American failure; his message is that we’ve been backing the wrong horse. This is a book McCain and Obama should ponder.”
—Thomas Powers, Pulitzer Prize-winning author of The Man Who Kept the Secrets and Intelligence Wars
"The Devil We Know, Bob Baer has once again peered into the future and has brought back uncomfortable truths that won't satisfy any partisan. But his book does force us to do something that, unfortunately, doesn't come naturally to the chattering classes. Think.”
—James Risen, Pulitzer Prize-winning author of State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration
“An important text studded with keen insights into a nation about which America remains dangerously misinformed.”
—Kirkus Reviews
“Timely and provocative...adds an important perspective to a crucial international debate.”
—Publishers Weekly
“Challenges conventional wisdom…[a] timely and provocative analysis.”
—Denver Post
About the Author
Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.
The Iranian Paradox
One Friday morning in 2005, I attended prayer services at Tehran University. I was traveling with a crew from Britain’s Channel 4, and we were treated as VIPs. Security checks were waived and we were given the press booth right next to Ayatollah Kashani, who addressed the faithful for the next two hours. The vast hall was only half full, but Kashani’s sermon was long and furious, something straight out of 1979.
Out on the street, a demonstration was forming. There were effigies of President Bush, blood running from his pointed teeth. Across the street, some demonstrators unfurled banners: Marg bar amerika—“Death to America.”
I walked for a time among the demonstrators. There was one old man who seemed especially passionate about bringing death to America, shaking his fist and shouting. I walked up to him. “Do you mean all Americans?” I asked.
He looked at me curiously. “Where are you from?” he said. I told him I was American. He winked and leaned in closer to me.
“How can I get an American visa?” he asked.
Iran is a country of nuances. Unfortunately, at just the time it most needs to, the United States doesn’t see those nuances, or under- stand Iran for what it is: a country that’s deeply pious, yet desperately trying to modernize. Iran’s religious parties generally receive only about 10 percent of the vote—considerably less than in Turkey, a member of NATO and an American ally.
Americans see Iran’s president and mullahs as relics from a dark age, when in reality they’re a driving force behind Iran’s modernization. Since the U.S.-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, it’s true, there’s been a conservative retrenchment, with hard-liners winning the presidency and a majority in parliament. A U-turn like this was all but inevitable with hostile armies on two of Iran’s borders. But once the wars are over, Iran will no doubt return to modernizing.
Iranians watch our movies, read our books, listen to our music. They have taken to the Internet and modern technology with an obsession equal to our own. Today Persian is the most common language on the Internet after English and Mandarin Chinese. Iran’s president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad writes his own blog.
In some ways, Iran has matched our own modern standards. The country’s population growth has plummeted from a high of 3.2 in 1986 to 1.2 in 2001, only slightly higher than Americans. The Iranians also keep an old Shia practice with regard to pleasure and sex, one that Sunni Muslims consider morally forbidden: zawaj al-mita’—“pleasure marriage,” or sanctioned prostitution. The way it works is, a mullah will grant a license for a man and a woman to marry for a set period—two hours, a week, a month. The mullah’s only concern is making sure the man pays for the child if the woman becomes pregnant. It’s paradoxes like these that make Iran so difficult to grasp.
The signs of change are everywhere. One of the most popular dramas on Iranian state television is about an Iranian diplomat who saves French Jews from the Nazis during World War II. The average age of marriage for an Iranian woman today is twenty-five; during the Shah’s last year in power, it was thirteen. And doctors reportedly perform more sex-change operations in Iran than in any other country except Thailand, with the Iranian government even paying up to half the cost for some transsexuals.
If you stroll around north Tehran, the part that runs up into the hills, that’s where you’re really struck by the contrasts. There are food courts serving Thai and Chinese food, with plastic trays and soft drinks. Young unmarried girls and boys share hookahs at outdoor restaurants, the girls’ head covers pushed back, down around the neck. In Iran, unlike in Saudi Arabia, religious police aren’t on every corner to enforce the “moral order.” And unlike in Sudan, there are no arrests in Iran for the grave offense of naming a teddy bear “Mohammed.”
While I was in Tehran, I was regularly invited to parties; I’d heard rumors they were as hip and wild as anything that goes on in the cosmopolitan Western capitals of the world. But I figured I’d already pressed my luck even coming to Iran, and anyhow I couldn’t stay up that late to find out. What did all this tell me about Iran’s imperial grasp? The parties, the love affair with the Internet, the changing sexual mores—they augur a country modernizing, looking beyond its borders.
One piece of Iran that’s trying to modernize but can’t is the economy. For the life of me, I couldn’t find a single good restaurant in Tehran. The restaurants reminded me of those in the Soviet Union: buffets with lousy service. There were more waiters than needed, but all of them stood around, surly, turning away when you wanted something. Kitchens ran out of everything. And breakfasts were peculiar, with mountains of watermelon and boiled eggs and nothing else. Omelets were apparently an outrageous luxury, though with relentless charm and cajoling you might get one.
Another thing that reminded me of the Soviet Union were the soulless, water-streaked cement apartment buildings, office buildings, and hotels. Concierges are invariably polite but hopeless in trying to help you with anything. Phones mostly don’t work, and Internet connections are erratic. To be sure, there are well-heeled Iranian elite reading Lolita and dining on nouvelle cuisine, but they keep out of sight.
Tehran’s big problem is the internal combustion engine. The Iranian national car, the Peykan, is one of the noisiest, worst- polluting, and least fuel-efficient cars in the world. It was in production for forty years, and many of the cars on Iran’s roads predate the 1979 revolution. With gasoline running as low as 7 cents a gallon until recently, though, there wasn’t much incentive for change. Even so, in the last three years, 250,000 Iranian cars have been converted to natural gas or hybrids, and today Tehran’s smog has cleared up enough to see the snow-covered Elburz Mountains to the north.
When I visited south Tehran’s Kumaila Mosque, ground zero of Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolution, I noticed the distinct smell of opium smoke drifting through the narrow alleys. This was a conservative neighborhood, the place where the Islamic revolution started, yet there was an incomprehensible tolerance for a vice forbidden almost everywhere else in the world.
And it wasn’t as if the Iranian government couldn’t close down the opium dens if it wanted to. Iran is a police state. Every day I drove around Tehran, or walked around the streets and bazaars, I was stopped and my papers checked—just because I looked out of place, a foreigner. The tamperproof ID card I was issued by the Ministry of Information was more sophisticated than those you’d find in the United States—a permanent digital record of the ex–CIA agent, now an accredited journalist in Iran.
The contradictions continue. Tehran’s Imam Khomeini International Airport is one of the most modern and least traveled in the world—and, I should add, the most polite. On arrival, I handed my passport to an immigration official wearing the hijab, or head covering. When she saw I was American, she said, “I’m so sorry.” She entered my name on the flat-screen monitor, then picked up the phone and called someone. A minute later, a man in a suit without a tie appeared behind her. He motioned for me to follow him.
There’s no point in pretending I felt anything other than dread. I knew the reputation of the Iranian secret police during both the Shah’s regime and the revolution. I remembered how we came across pictures of Iranian dissidents in Tehran’s notorious Evin Prison, left in the courtyard in the freezing cold, their legs broken with baseball bats. Or pictures of the CIA’s station chief in Beirut after he’d been beaten by Iranian proxies and left to die of pneumonia. Or of Iranian liberals in the late nineties, executed in their homes. Even today, the Iranians still occasionally serve up medieval punishment for crimes, including amputations and public floggings.
And Americans, even after a certain thaw in Iranian-American relations, weren’t immune from the Iranian police state. On March 8, 2007, the former FBI agent Robert Levinson flew to the Iranian free-trade zone of Kish Island—and disappeared like a diamond in an inkwell. At this writing, the FBI’s best guess is that a rogue element of Iran’s intelligence service grabbed him. Not exactly what you’d expect from a modern country. But this is the most important nuance of Iran: It’s a country desperately trying to modernize, not one that has already modernized.
I waited nervously until the man in the suit came back. “I’m very sorry,” he said, “but we must fingerprint you.”
As I followed him to his office, he explained that his ministry had started fingerprinting Americans after the United States instituted the same practice for Iranians visiting the United States. It was a simple matter of reciprocity, equal justice. I had to stop him from apologizing. Iran still had the capacity to surprise me.
A misconception Americans have about Iran is that Iranians hate us and our culture. But that’s not true. They simply hate what they consider our occupation of large swaths of the Middle East. I saw this most clearly when making a documentary about suicide bombers in southern Lebanon a couple of years ago. Hezbollah, an Iranian proxy whose name means “party of God” in Arabic, had invited us to film at its martyrs’ school in Nabatiyah, to see how their next generation was turning out—Allah’s little soldiers.
Nabatiyah itself holds a celebrated place in the history of Lebanon’s Shia. On October 16, 1983, on the Muslim holiday of Ashura, an Israeli patrol tried to cut through a procession of Shia faithful. Rocks flew, and the Israelis fired back, killing two Lebanese. The incident sparked what came to be known as the Islamic resistance, an insurgency the Israelis couldn’t put down no matter what they threw back at it.
Eighteen years of unforgiving war followed, until the Israelis finally pulled their troops out of Lebanon in May 2000. This was a critical turning point, the first time that Israel was forced to cede land under fire. The Middle East suddenly discovered Hezbollah, which emerged stronger than ever, both politically and militarily. For many Arabs, Nabatiyah was Hezbollah’s Boston Tea Party; Israel’s forced departure from Lebanon was its Waterloo. But Iran knew the fighting wasn’t over, and it built the school in Nabatiyah as an incubator for a new generation of suicide bombers, for the next war.
As we pulled up to the three-story school building, perched on a bare hill, I was struck by the eerie silence. The only sound was the mean, thin wind that cut across the jagged limestone escarpment.
Classes were in session, but there was none of the laughing or shouting you’d normally hear at an American school. There were no students out front. No cars or even a bicycle in sight—the students all walk from their homes in Nabatiyah. The grounds were immaculate, from the raked gravel walks to the avocado exterior and the whitewashed classrooms. The school was a model of order and cleanliness. But that’s something I’d noticed in the last twenty-five years about Iran and its proxy Hezbollah: they manage to impose order where there was none before.
Product details
- Publisher : Crown (August 18, 2009)
- Language : English
- Paperback : 288 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0307408671
- ISBN-13 : 978-0307408679
- Item Weight : 8 ounces
- Dimensions : 5.2 x 0.6 x 8 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #1,096,040 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #422 in Iran History
- #796 in International Diplomacy (Books)
- #1,887 in Middle Eastern Politics
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About the author

ROBERT BAER is the author of two New York Times bestsellers: Sleeping with the Devil, about the Saudi royal family and its relationship with the United States; and See No Evil, which recounts Baer's years as a top CIA operative. See No Evil was the basis for the acclaimed film Syriana, which earned George Clooney an Oscar for his portrayal of Baer. Baer writes regularly for Time.com and has contributed to Vanity Fair, the Wall Street Journal, and the Washington Post. He is considered one of the world's foremost authorities on the Middle East.
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The book's greatest value lies in the broader points that Baer makes -- specifically, the need to move past our preconceptions and recognize that the Iran of 2008 is not the same country that the Shah fled in the midst of a theocracy-led rebellion. It's also valuable to recognize the degree to which our other preconceptions -- that nation states shape identity because being American is at the core of our personal identities -- may distort our ability to negotiate and act in our collective best interests internationally, where very often allegiances have little to do with being a member of a nation-state. Iran is a nation state that is ruled by the clergy -- but it is a Shia nation, with a history stretching back millennia to the days of the Persian emperors, and one whose boundaries stretched over large swathes of territory that myriad other Middle Eastern nations. That past has shaped their world view, just as our battle for liberty from Britain shaped ours -- and we should not fail to recognize the fact and its implications.
There are those who will argue (and have argued in some reviews on this page) that Baer is an apologist for Iran. On the contrary. I don't see any evidence that he is turning a blind eye to Iran's excesses and absuses -- rather that most of those outright terrorist or military aggression lies in the past. (And in his eyes, the regime has lots of popular support at home.) "Iranians murdered my CIA colleagues in Beirut in cold blood," he notes, adding they probably would have killed him as well had they laid hands on him. Unusually, Baer rises above those personal considerations to focus instead on what is possible and achievable, and what is in the best interests of the United States.
This book takes a more forward looking perspective than Baer's two previous non-fiction works. Sometimes he struggles with his multiple roles and identities -- if he is acting as a journalist, he should be able to attribute or provide some evidence for some of his more startling assertions (one example -- that Iran is poised to buy Russian surface-to-air missiles and the two countries are just waiting for Washington to be "distracted" by something to complete the deal). We may be benefitting as readers from Baer's access to sources that few journalists would have -- but we have to take the information he provides on trust. Certainly, this is a book to prod others into discussing the topics that he raises rather than one that can be trusted to provide authoritative answers.
I have given this book four stars rather than three because of the importance of his fundamental argument (versus the sometimes overwrought analysis that accompanies it). Baer is the ultimate pragmatist here: drawing on his knowledge of the region and its players, and an equally pragmatic assessment of our own propensities, he concludes that turning a cold war with Iran into a hot war would be disastrous -- for us. Winning the war is one thing, as he points out in the discussion of Iraq in this book -- winning the peace is far more difficult and something at which, with the possible exception of World War II and the Marshall Plan, we have historically failed at. Even when we have been on the winning sides of a military conflict, our lack of attention to soft power issues harms us. Yes, we drove the Soviets out of Afghanistan -- and in their wake, due in part to our lack of attention and in part to our own lack of understanding of the region and the issues, we helped to create the Taliban. Baer is spot-on in his assessment of what has happened in southern Iraq in the wake of the defeat of Saddam Hussein; while American troops focused on military issues, Iran's emphasis on soft power -- on the Shia identity that they share with residents of Basra and Najaf -- won the loyalty of Iraqis.
Baer's assessment of Iran's actual objectives may be accurate or wobbly, but it is at its core a pragmatic one. "It's time not to surrender, but t rather to deal." If the policy debate can revolve around what is, and what is possible, rather than ideals, as a nation we may all be much better off. He makes a reasonable argument that Iran has shown a willingness to abandon ideology in favor of pragmatic compromises (such as with Sunni groups that share common objectives); why shouldn't we? Even Iran's past terrorist attacks had an element of pragmatism about them, he argues -- they were designed to achieve a policy goal, not random terror for terror's sake.
So where does the utopian come into the picture? Well, at heart, Baer is a utopian, in part because of his belief that such a foreign policy debate based on pragmatism can thrive. And he is a dreamer; perhaps he is looking for some kind of positive outcome to decades of chaos and bloodshed in the region. Why, he muses, couldn't Iran serve as a counterweight to Russia or China throwing their weight around in what is likely to become an increasingly multipolar world? Going further, he wonders, why not turn Jordan into a Palestianan state? Encourage Iraqi Sunnis in Anbar Province to federate with Saudi Arabia, where they have tribal ties? Give Gaza back to Egypt? Hold a referendum in Bahrain, and have it returned to Iran as a province?
It's hard to argue with the fact that the growing array of problems in the Middle East appear to be the most intractable and potentially the most dangerous -- or with the idea that a pragmatic approach is the one that is most likely NOT to end by excacerbating the situation. And Baer's advocacy of that, coupled with his inside knowledge of the region and the intelligence world, is what makes this a valuable read.
Though some facts and figures require updating, the work still provides a compelling account, informed by Baer’s seasoned observations and insights of Iran’s present circumstances. Baer, a former CIA operative, fluent in several of the critical languages, mines his contacts and leverages his decades-long experience to provide a cogent, part anecdotal, part analytical account of the transformative period following the 1979 revolution.
Reading the book is prompted by the present disproportionate preoccupation with the current nuclear arms agreement negotiations, as this myopic focus displaces consideration of broader more fundamental issues about our relationship with Iran. One is the recognition that entirely apart from the potential danger of a nuclear Iran, are the immediate challenges arising from a non-nuclear Iran. It is this vacant space the Obama administration and Congress have ignored, failing to even entertain discussion of the formation of a comprehensive and coherent foreign policy. Baer’s book provides a point of departure for consideration of the broader issues, which by implication should enlighten any discourse on the merits of the proposed nuclear agreement as well.
The Devil We Know rectifies this distortion by identifying Iran’s historical perception of itself as an ancient civilization, an empire for sustained periods of time, and presently a modern nation state with imperial imperatives. Baer explains Iran’s ambition to assert significant influence in the Middle East and the regime’s craving for recognition, realistic objectives justifiably consistent with its military power, strategic geography, size, and political stability.
The book’s second major contribution is Baer’s nuanced description of Iran’s transformation from a radical, revolutionary terrorist entity to a stable, calculating rational state actor. Baer posits that if we do not adjust our perception of our adversary and appreciate the changes that have occurred; if we continue to demonize Iran, we deprive ourselves of the objectivity necessary to evaluate existing dangers more accurately, and as importantly, seize opportunities for improved relations.
Baer believes that as long as we characterize Iran as an implacable and permanent enemy and avoid broad engagement, and cling to the view that military action is the best prescription for the region’s problems, we will remain enthralled in a cycle of squandered resources and needless destruction, and consequentially thwart our viable political objectives.
The work contrasts Iran favorably with our vulnerable Sunni allies, Saudi Arabia, and others and the fragile Gulf states with whom we are enmeshed; and whose interests we unquestioningly promote while eschewing engagement with the pivotal actor in the region.
This is not to suggest in any Panglossian way that Iran is a sheep not a wolf, but as the chapter, “Memories That Don’t Fade: What Iran Really Wants,” demonstrates, Iran’s aims are rooted in what they consider its core national interests (a perspective we share, in terms of creating our own foreign policy). Baer distinguishes Iran’s behavior, as a state certainly ready to use military force when necessary and one quintessentially manipulative, from the irrational and nihilistic conduct of the Sunni outliers such as ISIS and Al Qaeda, and the enabling Sunni state sponsors who have provided the support and encouragement that have spawned numerous acts of terror against the U.S. and other Western targets.
Before prematurely concluding that a process of normalization and détente is not an option, Baer urges we examine each of the objectives adumbrated in the chapter, evaluating them on their merits to see if there is enough daylight to begin talking.
Finally, as a corollary, the Epilogue articulates in broad terms the policy choices available to the U.S. in dealing with Iran, which range from aggressive and hostile actions that would involve the U.S. in protracted military conflict, to the politically unpalatable but rationally compelling possibility of “holding one’s nose”, and “settling” by negotiating on a number of issues, where a potential exists for compromise and agreement.
Baer supports his position by nine specific steps that could be taken to diminish tensions with Iran that would be mutually beneficial bilaterally and for the region at large. Several are controversial and will spark immediate objection, but should be examined and considered nonetheless.
While this book provides an advantaged starting point for those trying to work through the fog obfuscating an understanding of the present climate of hostility and distrust, my hope is that Baer will soon revise this fine work, and bring current his well seasoned and pragmatic insights, as they will certainly contribute to a more intelligent and enlightened appreciation of our critical relationship with this regional hegemon.
Top reviews from other countries
In short, the premise of this book is that US foreign policy in the Middle East has largely been one huge failure, compounded by an unwillingness to understand both the Arabs and the Persians and a botched up war from 2003 - 2009. Through the book, Baer essentially advances the argument that the United States have sided with the wrong people in the Middle East (the Sunni Arabs and Saudis) but instead should have looked to forge diplomatic relationships with Iran and its Shia'a population,.
Baer advances his arguments rationally on both a geopolitical and more personal level describing how he has interviewed members of Hizballah, the ruling elite in Iran and other countries facing the Arabian Gulf. Baer believes that the United States have won the war in Iraq, but lost the peace (as well as Southern Iraq to Iran) and that the US will lose much more unless they do something about it now. 90% of the population around the Gulf are Shia'a but held outside influence through a combination of tame democracy and dictatorship. With Iran's successful annexation of Southern Iraq, they essentially control the price of oil as well as global output levels. The recommendation is for the United States to forge a strategic alliance with Iran.
This could potentially be a very significant book and though his target audience is American, it is so clear in its conclusions that most people should read it. The book will never be serialized in Foreign Affairs as it is not academic enough in its style or presentation. There is a difference between analyzing the Middle East from a university campus office and actually working on the ground as Baer has done for most of his life.
As much as I liked this book, it also has some short comings. The book covers a huge topic area and is only 250 pages long. In other words, it is short and therefore fails to analyze some of the more subtle points. In fact, the book more or less completely implodes on itself in the last chapter, where Israel is dealt with for the first time i.e. how does the US reconcile being allied with Iran AND Israel at the same time? Baer seems to suggest that this is not a problem and would solve it with a Sykes-Picot redrawing of the regional map on the back of a packet of cigarettes. I beg to differ. The US would have to chose and as the enemy disappears with Iran AND Iran has lots of oil, I would be worried were I Israeli.
Baer's conclusion bugged me as it is too light weight for a man of his intellect and insight, but then again he is a pragmatist. Suggesting that America has backed the wrong horse for 30 years and should now back Iran is one thing. Admitting that the US de facto lost the war in Iraq is another. Getting those two messages across, whilst at the same time suggesting that the US should drop Israel in it from a huge height is probably a camel too large for most US readers to swallow.
The disgust with Saudi is manifest, its links to 9.11 very clear to see. Israel is becoming a liability to American interests in the new Middle East, no longer as relevant in the post Soviet space. Iran located between Iraq, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan and Turkey has become of critical importance. Baer makes it clear the failing to grasp the post Cold War changes have cost the West dearly.
This book addresses the change of times with a Field Officers eye and needs serious analysis by those Policy Makers, who having been fed in the late 90's on Huntingtons Clash of Civilisations, now must rethink their whole approach to the Middle East. As is becoming clear- and America has a long history of ditching allies, in the face of pragmatic interests- Iran is of such importance to American interests for so many reasons, that Israel and Saudi are in serious danger of being the liability that America can no longer afford to bear.
Baer falls short of grappling with this issue in depth, but his final chapter has it quite implicit, that there is writing on the wall for Israel,and real forces for changes in the Middle East, that will significantly redefine its landscape in the coming decades.
It is a wonderful page turner, as he unfolds the story of how the Iranians have managed this historic rebirth. He actually carries you with him to look at Iran not in fear but in wonder, at the wisdom and intelligence and the single minded determination with which they are carrying out this historic enterprise. Best of all, he tells how it would be better to work with this old/new empire rather than attempting the almost pointless task of opposing it. The Iranians/Persians did not rule over the ME for 3000 years merely by good fortune. They were in fact the fountain of civilisation for most of that time. And now that Western pretenders and opponents have come and gone, and the Arab world prepares to accommodate them, they are returning to reclaim their rightful place in history. Whether the West likes it or not, they are here to stay... `We' had better get used to it...
It reminds me in his Style on franco-german journalist legend Peter Scholl-Latour, a man who clearly saw and described in many books and TV productions through the 90ies and the 2000s what we know now as Islamism.
Baer and P. S.-L. used own First Hand Impressions to give the reader a picture of everyday Iran and its long term strategy. "The Devil we know" again comes with scenes from the authors life with the CIA which i find especially interesting because those scenes seem to be authentic, which ist why i believe they come as close to reality in modern times espionage authorities of western democracies as one can get. being far from an expert i can only state that Baers description is logically structured and as it ist now 10 years old, still not proven wrong by history.








