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The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, Polarization, and American Democracy Paperback – January 25, 2011
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Renowned political scientist Alan I. Abramowitz presents a groundbreaking argument that the most important divide in American politics is not between left and right but rather between citizens who are politically engaged and those who are not. It is the engaged members of the public, he argues, who most closely reflect the ideals of democratic citizenship—but this is also the group that is most polarized. Polarization at the highest levels of government, therefore, is not a sign of elites’ disconnection from the public but rather of their responsiveness to the more politically engaged parts of it. Though polarization is often assumed to be detrimental to democracy, Abramowitz concludes that by presenting voters with clear choices, polarization can serve to increase the public’s interest and participation in politics and strengthen electoral accountability.
- Print length208 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherYale University Press
- Publication dateJanuary 25, 2011
- Dimensions5.88 x 0.53 x 8.92 inches
- ISBN-100300168292
- ISBN-13978-0300168297
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“Alan Abramowitz has produced a definitive work on the consequences of a divided electorate in elections, in policy making, and in the capacity for winners to govern. The Disappearing Center is a major contribution to the study of contemporary American politics.”―Thomas Edsall, author of Building Red America and Chain Reaction
-- Thomas Byrne Edsall“No one is better at analyzing the American voter than Alan Abramowitz. In this exceptionally revealing volume, Professor Abramowitz convincingly explains one of the most discussed phenomena of our time, political polarization.”―Larry J. Sabato, author of A More Perfect Constitution
-- Larry J. Sabato"Alan Abramowitz explains the most pressing political problem of the day―how Americans have grown so politically divided that they barely speak the same language."―Bill Bishop, author of The Big Sort: Why the Clustering of Like-Minded America is Tearing Us Apart
-- Bill Bishop"If you’re interested in getting beyond the standard handwringing and calls for bipartisanship, read this exceptionally clear and well-argued book.”―Ruy Teixeira, co-author of The Emerging Democratic Majority
-- Ruy Teixeira"Among all the academics who write on American politics, Abramowitz is one of the most original, interesting, and convincing, and one of the smartest....[he] has new things to say about polarization. His focus here on the engaged versus the unengaged is a nice move. Also, he organizes recognized material about the subject in a way that beats the competition.”―David Mayhew, Yale University
-- David Mayhew Published On: 2010-02-25“Thought-provoking.”--Publishers Weekly
― Publishers Weekly"[An] important and persuasive new book."--Ethan Porter, Wilson Quarterly
-- Ethan Porter ― Wilson Quarterly
"Abramowitz admirably tackles many dimensions of a complex debate. . . . the book is an important text for both new and old students of polarization in American politics."—Hahrie Han, Public Opinion Quarterly -- Hahrie Han ― Public Opinion Quarterly
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- Publisher : Yale University Press; 12/26/10 edition (January 25, 2011)
- Language : English
- Paperback : 208 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0300168292
- ISBN-13 : 978-0300168297
- Item Weight : 10.4 ounces
- Dimensions : 5.88 x 0.53 x 8.92 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #2,311,155 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #916 in Political Advocacy Books
- #1,567 in Political Parties (Books)
- #2,429 in Elections
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In writing my own book, I found similar results, though far more anecdotal, based, as they were, on my own experiment.
What I would have liked to see a bit more of was Abramowitz himself; why was he interested in this topic? What does he think his findings portend? Does he think that a disappearing center is a good thing?
Alan Abramowitz, a professor of political science at Emory University, is on the side of Washington as mirror of a deeply fractured electorate rapidly losing its political middle. His new book, "The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, Polarization, and American Democracy" is the story of how voters migrated to the extremes over the last five decades.
Essentially, four big, interlinked things happened. The first is that the parties "sorted" better. The second is that the number of safe districts and safe states increased. The third is that Americans as a whole became more educated. The fourth is that the engagement gap between strong partisans and political moderates widened.
In their 1960 plumage, Republicans and Democrats were both diverse species, loose-fitting labels that meant very different things depending on where you were from. Northern "liberal" Republicans and Southern "conservative" Democrats made up large minority factions, and both often found more common cause with their fellow "liberals" or "conservatives" across the aisle than their fellow partisans. In such an environment, bipartisanship was the norm, rather than the exception.
Then the tumultuous `60s shook the snow globe of American politics. The fight over civil rights broke the Democrats' hold on the "Solid South," turning Southern Democrats into Republicans. The Republican center of gravity gradually migrated deep below the Mason-Dixon line, taking on a much redder hue: much more socially conservative, more skeptical of government. Democrats, meanwhile, freed from the need to keep placate the conservative southerners, grew bluer: more socially liberal, and less skeptical of government.
Once upon a time, congressional districts were highly competitive, and a Democrat (or Republican) had to be sensitive to the concerns of voters in the competing party to maintain a seat. Even as late as the 95th Congress (1977-1978), only 24 percent of Democrats and 27 percent of Republicans were in "safe" districts; By the 108th Congress (2004-2005), 49 percent of Democrats and 40 percent of Republicans were in "safe" districts. The consequence: they were far more likely to be worried about fending off extreme challengers in their primaries than about winning the general election by moving to the center. Thus, more extreme politicians replaced more moderate ones.
In 1976, the eight most populous states were all battleground states in the presidential election, and the average winning margin among them was 3.1 percentage points. In 2004, only four of the eight most populous states were battlegrounds, and the average winning margin in the eight states was 9.3 percentage points. Thanks to both realignment and demographic change, Abramowitz writes, "Red states, counties, and congressional districts have been getting redder while blue states, counties, and congressional districts have been getting bluer."
At the same time, the American public got a whole lot better educated. In 1956, 37 percent of Americans had only a grade school education, and just 19 percent had some college; in 2004, only three percent of Americans had just a grade school education, and 61 percent had at least some college.
This matters, Abramowitz argues, because "College-educated citizens are generally more interested in politics, more politically active, and better informed about candidates and issues than high school-educated citizens. This is especially true with regard to one important form of political engagement: ideological awareness."
So: the parties got better sorted into distinct camps, districts became less competitive, and an increasingly educated electorate was better able to pick up on the differences and to respond accordingly, sorting themselves likewise into the appropriate categories. Abramowitz notes that especially among the better educated, there has been increased "partisan-ideological polarization" - that is, that high-information liberals are indeed reliably liberal across all issues, and high-information conservatives are reliably conservative across all issues.
All of this polarization has actually been good for political engagement generally. Abramowitz cites numerous measures of a public that now cares more about politics, follows it more closely, and talks about it more to their friends - partly because they are more educated, and partly because if the parties are highly polarized, the stakes of political victory are significantly greater (high stakes are a terrific motivator.)
But, at the same time, a certain slice of the electorate has been left behind: "The American public appears to be increasingly divided into two groups," writes Abramowitz, "the politically engaged, who view politics in ideological terms, and the politically disengaged, who do not."
For example, 56 percent of strong liberal or conservatives reported being politically engaged in 2004, as compared to 36 percent of those who "lean" liberal or conservative, and just 20 percent of those who say they are moderate, or of no ideology. In the 1950s, this gap did not exist.
To Abramowitz, the story of the disengaged moderates is mostly a story about less-educated, less-engaged citizens who don't know or care enough about politics to pick a side. Were they to get wealthy and educated, like the partisans, they would presumably then know enough to pick one of the two distinct teams in American politics. But lacking the means or the will to pick a side, they call themselves moderate, feel disengaged and disenchanted by politics, and try to get on with the business of making a living.
On the descriptives, The Disappearing Center is a terrific compendium to what's happened. The parties have pulled apart, and in particular strong partisans on both sides are further apart than ever before. There are fewer competitive states, fewer competitive districts, and politicians who dare to compromise are increasingly punished. Nor is this likely to change: "A coalition of moderates is no longer possible because the center is a shrunken remnant of what it was forty or fifty years ago," concludes Abramowitz. The forecast is for more partisan rancor, far as the eye can see.
But the analysis lacks in a few areas. For one, Abramowitz doesn't engage with the possibility that political moderates have become less engaged out of frustration with extremism; his preferred explanation is that they remain moderate only out of an ignorance of the stakes involved. More frustratingly, his analysis is based heavily on reported self-identifications, rather than actual issue positions, and the issues he choose to measure polarization tend to be particular hot-button issues, like abortion and the Iraq war. More thorough issue-based measuring of public opinion (see, for example, Morris Fiorina's Disconnect, or Joseph Bafumi and Michael C. Herron's research on leapfrog representation) has found a much more moderate public on the issues, a public that has been left behind by two increasingly extreme parties.
The book's strength is its use of a large number of simple and easy-to-use charts and graphs. Based on some of the author's comments about data collection methodology, the data on which these excellent graphics are based make this book a useful applications supplement for an undergraduate inferential statistics course. This data is also the source of one of the book's narrative flaws which is mind-numbing and hard-to-follow listing of quantitative information as text. Most of this detail could have been eliminated and replaced with simple summations of the trends, correlations and other points the author makes. It would also result in a considerable shortening of the book to dissertation (which is what this may be anyway), monograph or even journal-article length.
In summary, this interesting book does a good job of highlighting the Balkanization of American politics since the 1950's but it reaches the unexpected conclusion that this may be a good thing with the very significant (and totally unrealistic) qualifier that the electorate is educated, engaged and knowledgeable.








