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El Dorado Canyon: Reagan's Undeclared War with Qaddafi Hardcover – December 7, 2002
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Stanik, a retired naval officer and Middle East scholar, provides a detailed account of the raid as well as an in-depth analysis of its causes and effects. He also describes three other hostile encounters between U.S. and Libyan forces during Reagan's presidency and details U.S. covert operations. From a bombing in Berlin, West Germany, to terrorism in the skies over Lockerbie, Scotland, from the halls of power in Washington to airbases in England and the decks of American warships in the Mediterranean, Stanik has woven a truly international thriller that is all too real and forebodingly relevant to current events. A study in diplomacy, strategy, high-level policy, deck-plate operations, and the unique challenges offered by a new brand of evil, this book is required reading for a better understanding of the ongoing war on terrorism.
- Print length308 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherNaval Institute Press
- Publication dateDecember 7, 2002
- Dimensions6.5 x 1.5 x 9.5 inches
- ISBN-101557509832
- ISBN-13978-1557509833
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Editorial Reviews
Review
"...an impressive work. It will stand for some time to come as the definitive study on the subject." -- The New York Militray Affairs Symposium Review
"..chilling similarities between U.S. foreign policy with Libya in 1986 and Iraq in 2003." -- Marine Corps Gazette
"A study in diplomacy, strategy, and the unique challenges involved when dealing with terrorists." -- Sea Power
"A valuable book... Highly recommended." -- Choice
From the Inside Flap
Stanik, a retired naval officer and Middle East scholar, provides a detailed account of the raid as well as an in-depth analysis of its causes and effects. He also describes three other hostile encounters between U.S. and Libyan forces during Reagan's presidency and details U.S. covert operations. From a bombing in Berlin, West Germany, to terrorism in the skies over Lockerbie, Scotland, from the halls of power in Washington to airbases in England and the decks of American warships in the Mediterranean, Stanik has woven a truly international thriller that is all too real and forebodingly relevant to current events. A study in diplomacy, strategy, high-level policy, deck-plate operations, and the unique challenges offered by a new brand of evil, this book is required reading for a better understanding of the ongoing war on terrorism.
From the Back Cover
About the Author
From 1989 to 1992, Stanik taught several history courses, including the History of the Middle East, at the Naval Academy, where he also served as the associate chair of the history department. Prior to his 1994 retirement from the Navy with the rank of lieutenant commander, he worked as a historian in the Naval Historical Center's Contemporary History Branch, where he wrote a monograph on the U.S. Sixth Fleet's confrontation with Qaddafi. In 2000 he participated in the Fulbright-Hays Seminars Abroad Program, traveling and studying in Egypt and Israel. Stanik now teaches social studies at the Walbrook Maritime Academy in Baltimore, Maryland. He lives with his family in Arnold, Maryland.
Product details
- Publisher : Naval Institute Press (December 7, 2002)
- Language : English
- Hardcover : 308 pages
- ISBN-10 : 1557509832
- ISBN-13 : 978-1557509833
- Item Weight : 1.46 pounds
- Dimensions : 6.5 x 1.5 x 9.5 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #2,342,428 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #5,375 in Naval Military History
- Customer Reviews:
About the author

Joseph T. Stanik is a retired U.S. Navy officer and veteran teacher of history at both the secondary and collegiate levels. He is the author of “Swift and Effective Retribution:” The U.S. Sixth Fleet and the Confrontation with Qaddafi (1996) and El Dorado Canyon: Reagan’s Undeclared War with Qaddafi (HC 2003, PB 2016). He is the co-author, with Youssef Aboul-Enein, of Middle East 101: A Beginner’s Guide for Deployers, Travelers, and Concerned Citizens (2019). He authored Chapter 21 “Twilight of the Cold War: Contraction, Reform, and Revival” in America, Sea Power, and the World, edited by James C. Bradford (2016). His article “Welcome to El Dorado Canyon” (United States Naval Institute Proceedings, February 1996) was recognized as Best Aviation Article of 1996 by the Association of Naval Aviation. He taught high school social studies in Baltimore City Public Schools for 23 years and is currently teaching the History of the Middle East at Anne Arundel Community College in Arnold, Maryland.
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Well researched, easy to read and interesting throughout.
The author tries to explain painstackingly the rumblings in the Reagan administration which may be boring to some readers who wants the action immediately. But his efforts to cover all the ends should be appreciated. To some extent, he is brave enough to point out the goof ups made by Reagan administration and very rare from a western author. Reading this book one can relate how the US went to war without any allies(it could be a thesis subject about how the so-called allies are not sharing the war efforts with US but other green pastures) support.
Overall a very good book to know about the attack, US' military power and Reagan's administration's activities during that time.
One was supporting the termination of the Iran-Iraq war, which was usefully keeping two of our worst enemies preoccupied. The other was what Joseph Stanik calls Ronald Reagan's undeclared war with Muammar Qaddafi, the Libyan murderer.
It was a sitzkrieg, a phony war. As soon as he entered office, Reagan started talking tough about fighting terror and particularly about Libya, which at the time was supporting indiscriminate violence in more than 50 countries.
But Reagan never interrupted his serial napping long enough to instruct the government to do anything. And until George Shultz was appointed secretary of state, the Cabinet was divided between the timid and the temporizers.
Stanik traces a history not of vigorous and forthright action against terrorism but of vacillation, inattention and confusion.
The CIA floated its usual cockamamie plots, several of which were terminated by leaks from within the administration; but no serious action was proposed. At the highest policy levels, study after inconclusive study was done while Libya escalated its murders of Americans continuously.
Meanwhile, in the Mediterranean Sea, the Navy was winning some skirmishes with Libya's military over freedom of navigation claims.
Stanik confuses these freedom of the seas operations with antiterrorism, but despite this "El Dorado Canyon" is still a useful template for evaluating current events.
After years of pushing, Shultz finally persuaded Reagan to authorize a small military strike -- code-named El Dorado Canyon -- to punish Libya for one of its many terrorist attacks.
It was a punchless gesture. Although Reagan had made his reputation by scorning the gloves-on incrementalism of Democratic administrations in Vietnam, his answer to Qaddafi limited the United States to a single, small air strike that did no material damage to Libya.
The Air Force component was a disaster, only one of 18 planes hitting its target. Nearly half the planes had technical failures. The Navy strike was more successful but the weight of ordnance was too light to be effective.
Stanik unaccountably describes this demonstration as an operational success that showed the capability of weaponry and the skill of American warriors. Skill they had, but their weapons didn't work.
Nearly half the F-111F planes never managed to drop their bombs, the targeting systems failed to work in combat conditions and the Aegis radars were unable to discriminate targets -- the last a portent of a much more consequential failure the next year when Aegis shot down an airliner in the Persian Gulf.
The strike did persuade Qaddafi, apparently, that he was doomed if he provoked the United States into a determined attack, but it did not dissuade him from terrorism. He went on blasting airliners out of the sky, but he did pull back from his extravagant support of "liberationist" movements around the world.
Stanik credits the American attack for this, which would have been the only gain it could have shown for a decade of effort; but it is just as likely that Qaddafi pulled in his horns because he lost the support of his arms supplier, the decaying Soviet Union.
Reagan administration leaders, and Stanik, were well satisfied by their little slap at terrorism, but they had misjudged who the enemy was. It was not just Libya.
While Qaddafi, unable to compete at all militarily with the U.S. Navy, may have learned circumspection, a very different lesson was being learned in the rest of the Koran Belt.
What Islamic revolutionaries saw was that you could attack the United States repeatedly and suffer only pinprick responses at intervals of several years -- the United States used military force against Islamic terrorists in 1986, 1991, 1993, 1998 and 2001, but its enemies launched successful attacks in every year since 1979.
No wonder the Islamists concluded that the United States lacked resolution and courage.
They also noticed that the Third World was too weak and Europe too cowardly to take part in even the spastic American efforts. They noticed that collective security is a myth and that the United Nations is a joke -- Stanik is able to write about international terrorism spanning two decades without mentioning the U.N., which shows how useful it has been.
"El Dorado Canyon" is an odd book. On the first page, Stanik states the obvious: "He (Reagan) did not act." The rest of the book seems devoted to obfuscating that simple truth.
Five stars for a lousy book because of what it reveals to those who can read between the lines


