My two stars are indicative of my judgment that George and Tollefsen have written a clear and sincere book laying out certain reasons for the position they hold: that destructive interference in the development of the embryo from the time of conception, either for the purposes of stem cell research (the issue they focus on) or abortion (which as implied in their arguments, is morally wrong). My failure to give them more stars is based on my judgment that their arguments fail, and in my view the failure is quite apparent from any objective perspective.
Their first aim is to establish on the basis of scientific evidence that the zygote is a member of the human species. I will not quarrel with the conclusion that a zygote has a full compliment human chromosomes that has totipotency (that is, has the potential to become a fully functioning human being). If this is the minimal criterion that they wish to use for the status of being a human being, there's no room for quibbling. At times the authors seem to want to bolster their claim with points that appear irrelevant. For one, they claim that the zygote is distinct from the gametes that brought it about since the gametes have a function in human reproduction, whereas the zygote is simply an individual. But insofar as this suggests, and I think it is meant to suggest, that a zygote does not have a similar function, then clearly they are wrong. The zygote clearly has a reproductive function as well, albeit a different function: to develop into a fully functional human being. If the zygote did not so develop, clearly it would be dysfunctional as a stage of human reproduction. The authors also stress that the zygote is a "whole" human being. If all they mean is that it has the full compliment of human chromosomes, then yes indeed! But they never specify that this is all they mean, and of course there is a perfectly straightforward sense in which the zygote is not a whole human being-it lacks the differentiated organs, tissues, and structures of a fully functioning human being.
Next the authors argue that the human being, back to conception, is a "person" in a philosophical sense. I won't dwell overlong on this point, since it is an esoteric issue in the field of metaphysics, and settling this issue still does not address the critical moral issues involved. I would simply point out that none of the most compelling suggestions as to what constitutes personal identity in the literature on the issue is consistent with the authors' position. Furthermore, they at times seem to stumble in a fairly obvious way over their own position. At times they speak of a "person" as something that lives a "personal life." I would agree, but living a personal life clearly entails something more than simply having a full compliment of chromosomes and totipotency. It involves goals, attitudes, values, memories, etc. A house cat comes far closer to this than does a zygote.
The crux of their argument is found in one chapter where they offer their ethical justification for the claim that it is impermissible to kill an embryo, even from the earliest stage of the zygote. This is what I was particularly interested in, since I have for some 30 years read attempts to justify such claims on a secular basis, as the authors promised to do, and have always found the attempts seriously wanting, and typically seriously flawed. Thus I was interested to see whether there was anything new and novel in their arguments. In fact, there is not. The grounds of their arguments are indeed not only fail to be "cutting edge," but are very old indeed.
They first make an appeal to the end-in-itself formulation of the categorical imperative of Immanuel Kant, according to which one should always treat humanity, whether in the case of one's own person or any other, as an end-in-itself, never as a means only. They simply state that destroying an embryo for the sake of research is using it as a means only, and thus is immoral. What they fail to explain is Kant's rationale for his principle. For Kant, a human being has the capacity to "self-legislate," in other words, to make one's own decisions on rational grounds. It is precisely this capacity that we do not respect when we use a person as a means only. And this is a capacity that an embryo/fetus lacks. The authors appeal to the zygote's "radical capacity," in the sense that with time the zygote will develop into a thing that has the immediate capacity for rational decision. But this is a nonstarter. Kant was appealing to actual capacities, not potential ones. In this respect the zygote is no more relevant to Kant's reasoning than a rock.
The author's express some misgivings about the Kantian defense themselves, so they rest their final case on natural law theory. From the start this is suspicious. The authors began by expressing their intent of offering a purely secular defense of their position. They never talk about the background of natural law theory, and it seems for good reason, since natural law theory has firm historical grounds in religion. The fundamental justifications of the theory are based in theism, and the theory arose historically within Catholic theology. Today with few exceptions the only ethicists who use the theory are Christian ethicists operating in the context of Catholic theology, or at least Christian. And there is good reason for this. Natural law theory seems to lead to consensus only because of a prior consensus of those who use the theory to justify moral matters. Natural law theory has implications that are clearly inconsistent with an ethics that is not grounded in religious belief. And absent the prior consensus, natural law theory seems to lead to any conclusion one wishes to draw, since the counterexamples and typical replies to those counterexamples vitiates any notion that it provides definitive guidance. In short, this ethical theory is the most ambiguous, and ultimately worthless, of theories proposed historically.
There are many other faults with the book, including some research that the authors cite that could easily be used as a counterargument to their view that the embryo is an individual human being (if you want the details, then feel free to ask). In the end, the authors simply offer quite old and widely criticized arguments that have not proven at all convincing. There's simply nothing new here.
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Reviewed in the United States 🇺🇸 on October 20, 2008
Reviewed in the United States 🇺🇸 on April 7, 2008
Human life needs to be defended in all times and places, especially in this time of great violence in our society.
Reviewed in the United States 🇺🇸 on March 4, 2018
