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The Enigma of Reason Hardcover – April 17, 2017
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Reason, we are told, is what makes us human, the source of our knowledge and wisdom. If reason is so useful, why didn’t it also evolve in other animals? If reason is that reliable, why do we produce so much thoroughly reasoned nonsense? In their groundbreaking account of the evolution and workings of reason, Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber set out to solve this double enigma. Reason, they argue with a compelling mix of real-life and experimental evidence, is not geared to solitary use, to arriving at better beliefs and decisions on our own. What reason does, rather, is help us justify our beliefs and actions to others, convince them through argumentation, and evaluate the justifications and arguments that others address to us.
In other words, reason helps humans better exploit their uniquely rich social environment. This interactionist interpretation explains why reason may have evolved and how it fits with other cognitive mechanisms. It makes sense of strengths and weaknesses that have long puzzled philosophers and psychologists―why reason is biased in favor of what we already believe, why it may lead to terrible ideas and yet is indispensable to spreading good ones.
Ambitious, provocative, and entertaining, The Enigma of Reason will spark debate among psychologists and philosophers, and make many reasonable people rethink their own thinking.
- Print length408 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherHarvard University Press
- Publication dateApril 17, 2017
- Dimensions6.75 x 1.5 x 9.75 inches
- ISBN-100674368304
- ISBN-13978-0674368309
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Editorial Reviews
Review
“The Enigma of Reason is a comprehensive and well‐motivated overview of the contemporary scientific and philosophical literature on reasoning. This is especially timely as we struggle to make sense of how it is that individuals and communities persist in holding beliefs that have been thoroughly discredited.”―Darren Frey, Science
“Brilliant…Turns reason’s weaknesses into strengths, arguing that its supposed flaws are actually design features that work remarkably well…Timely and necessary.”―Julian Baggini, Financial Times
“As evolutionary psychologists, Mercier and Sperber ask what might have been adaptive for our ancestors and thus built into our brains. Some have argued for modules specialized for reasoning about particular topics. But Mercier and Sperber argue for a single module that can frame an argument and its conclusion: the former aids cooperation and the latter communication. So, the ultimate goal of reasoning is persuasion. It’s an extraordinarily ambitious theory presented with brilliant insights, profound scholarship, and entertaining anecdotes.”―Philip Johnson-Laird, Princeton University
“This is a terrific book. The best thing I have read about human reasoning. It is extremely well written, interesting, and very enjoyable to read.”―Gilbert Harman, Princeton University
“Original, persuasive, and deftly argued, The Enigma of Reason puts forward a new and rather surprising thesis that the proper (evolutionary) functioning of reasoning is to persuade others via argumentation. This book will challenge your preconceptions about the mind’s internal logic and why it exists. A compelling read and a novel contribution to the literature on reasoning.”―Clark Barrett, University of California, Los Angeles
About the Author
Hugo Mercier is a researcher at the French National Center for Scientific Research, working in the Cognitive Science Institute Marc Jeannerod in Lyon.
Dan Sperber is a researcher in the Departments of Cognitive Science and of Philosophy at the Central European University, Budapest, and in the Institut Jean Nicod at the École Normale Supérieure, Paris.
Product details
- Publisher : Harvard University Press (April 17, 2017)
- Language : English
- Hardcover : 408 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0674368304
- ISBN-13 : 978-0674368309
- Item Weight : 1.62 pounds
- Dimensions : 6.75 x 1.5 x 9.75 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #537,878 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #160 in Evolutionary Psychology (Books)
- #290 in Epistemology Philosophy
- #922 in Medical Cognitive Psychology
- Customer Reviews:
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I am a cognitive scientist working at the Jean Nicod Institute in Paris. I study human reasoning and communication, as well as cultural evolution.
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I agree that reason can be used for self-justification, and in fact it is hard to use it otherwise. Many thinkers, and lately psychologists, have demonstrated this. Methods of testing interior thought were developed over centuries to counter this self-justification. As we know, even in much of science, self-justification is still massively present.
I argue that science and the progress it enabled are also operated by the "module" the authors call Reason (no problem here, many capabilities are used beyond their evolutionary value), and that humans and many animals employ a built-in system to create and maintain social rules. To me this sounds like reason, in a couple of its many meanings. At least if I were looking for a module that went beyond self-justification I might start by postulating a social rules system.
I found the first part of the book challengingly readable. The authors carefully explain that some words they will use (such as reason and intuition) are defined in a different ways in regular conversation, in psychology, and in philosophy (and reason is defined again, in a very different way, in logic). These clarifications were very useful. Then the authors use each word in more than one of its definitions in the same paragraph, with no signaling of which Reason they mean.
After awhile the "formal logic speak" takes over and we have repeated repetitions of Mary and her research paper mixed with stories from psychological experiments. I would recommend reading only as much as you can tolerate of this section and then skipping ahead to the what the authors are trying to affirm. There are useful tidbits here, but for me the thoughts were jumbled and did not build a good base for the premise. I see that some reviewers praise the book, possibly because they were in tune enough with these fields to follow the argument. Even the authors seem to lose attention. In the umpteenth rendition of why Mary did not study at the library (the paper is due the next day, but the library was closed), the roommates offer her a glass of wine. I suppose even the authors forgot about the Mary's paper.
The opening paragraph in section III, Rethinking Reason, states the author's premise in a very clear way: as a way to come to conclusions about ourselves that are free of logic. They compare it in this way to the echolocation used by bats. This was a head-scratcher for me. The next chapter, How We Use Reasons, was good. I do not agree with the next chapter, Could Reason be a Module? The supporting argument, to me, kept mixing intuition and reasoning. Which one is supposed to be the module? Then they proceed to argue that at least most animals do not reason. They don't call out any that do, but they don't close the door. Here the authors set up Clever Hans as a straw horse (thanks for the picture) as do not describe the cognitive abilities of animals as science has shown they are.
I think that beings without complex language almost certainly have less complex needs to reason. They build their relationships and their individual and group rules on gestures and their expectations on past behaviors. They respond to another animal misunderstanding them by either telling them they are wrong (putting their ears back, charging, growling, making the sort of attack that you may have seen in dogs correcting pack behavior or mother cats dissuading their young from repeating what has just happened) or by just running away. Animals create and use social rules. The authors ignore this in describing why they do not "reason." I would argue that many animals engage in self-promotion, whether this is reason or not. Most of this chapter does not even speak to the question that titles it.
I read the rest of the book and I think the authors are correct in that at least one function of reason is to justify ourselves. Many people have pointed this out before over centuries. It is common currency in regular conversation ("He's a blowhard"). I think reason (something less abstract than intuition) matters in establishing rules and social order. To have rules means some being thought some things were the right thing to do, acted that way and sought to lead or enforce the behavior of others. They may have intuited the "reason" for the rules, but the rules themselves are social.
Given that the word Reason has such a vast meaning it is as useless as Belief in describing anything -- a lot of misunderstandings arise because a speaker has not said what she means by either word. Both of these concepts, in all of their meanings, arise entirely from inside minds and do not describe anything outside the mind -- even to Descartes, who wondered if all of it was in the mind of a butterfly. I also did not appreciate the flybys of Roger Bacon, who was one of the many to notice the disconnect between interior thoughts against exterior reality. He took a step, although it was up to his relative Francis Bacon, who added the hypothesis to construct the Scientific Method, a means of testing thought against reality as we can best observe it.
Near the end of the book I realized that I was missing the scientific evidence because the authors were approaching the topic entirely from the runway of philosophy. Did they consider its absence a feature, not a bug? See paragraph above for why that did not work for me. I see it as misguided to talk about inbuilt modules, waving the examples of fear of snakes and hot stoves, without involving science.
I love the wonderful cover cartoon by Saul Steinberg. That, and the positive reviews, were what kept this book on my future reading list for such a long time, and kept me slogging through it hoping the next chapter would be the one I was waiting for.
I was just expecting a better-argued and more coherent book. I think the cover cartoon illustrates the book in a way that the authors did not intend.
Though I am now retired, in my career as an engineer I spent many years engaged in risk assessment and decision making. I have been through Stanford's "Strategic Decision Group" training, as well as numerous qualitative and quantitative risk assessment training courses. I spent decades developing and applying these skills, and my most profound realization was that people are ill equipped to make good (objectively justified) decisions about complex issues in the modern world. I became an amateur student of psychology, reading broadly in behavioral economics, evolutionary psychology, developmental psychology and their practical application (sales, decision making, etc.).
I am an engineer, not a researcher. I apply models, or metamodels, to achieve an end. We engineers have a saying: all models are wrong, some models are useful - within limits. Until this book revealed its interactionist model of reasoning, I've been very limited in application of what I've learned about reasoning. I've been using tools that work (mostly), but why they work has been a mystery. Until now. The interactionist model of reasoning appears to integrate a suite of tools for application in the real (non-academic) world. This could have huge impact if additional research confirms the remaining areas of uncertainty.
Now for the bad news. I think this book is a tough read. For a popular audience, the writing is good, but not brilliant, tending to the verbose. Even as fast as I read, I often had to flip back a few pages to re-establish context before proceeding. I would have been greatly aided by some diagrams to indicate relationship between concepts, rather than a thousand words describing the relationship. Coming from the practical side of the world, a list at the beginning or end of each chapter summarizing the key points would have been fantastic. The focus of the book is on a new model for reasoning so if you have read previous popular books on the subject you will recognize much of the material from other books as the authors build their case from the ground up. The concluding chapter of the book is a nice change of pace, as it cleanly summarizes the main points in just a few pages.
In short, if you are a student of human nature, you need to read this book. Don't give up, even when the going gets tough. I predict the model will eventually see broad application in practical decision making, and it certainly gives you a different perspective on your daily social interactions.
Top reviews from other countries
Ces deux perspectives sont irréconciliables avec une explication évolutionnaire de la raison : une capacité ne peut être sélectionnée pour ses défauts, ni l'être en vertu de caractères ou de traits d'une nouveauté entière et sans commune mesure (sans homologie) avec sa/ses devancière(s).
Une super-capacité fautive et fruit de l'évolution forme une énigme. Mercier et Sperber entreprennent de la démonter en défendant cette proposition centrale :
Le raisonnement est un mécanisme inférenciel intuitif dont le domaine propre comprend l'évaluation et la production des raisons comme justifications et comme arguments pour convaincre autrui.
Ce que les psychologues expérimentaux tiennent pour des défauts et des erreurs de l'intuition et de la raison sont en réalité des caractères adaptatifs, adéquats à la coordination sociale, à la préservation de la réputation individuelle, à la communication et au renforcement des normes et engagements mutuels, de manière tel, par exemple, que le partage de croyances au sein d'un groupe et la capacité d'anticiper les objections possibles renforcent la portée et la qualité du raisonnement individuel; tandis que l'absence de cet arrière-plan et d'objection anticipables appauvrie le raisonnement. Ces motifs font que le même Newton a atteint des sommets dans le raisonnement mathématique (auditoire dense) et s'est égaré dans les spéculations d'alchimie (auditoire faible).
Les organismes vivants possèdent une variété de mécanismes cognitifs inférenciels, produisant des informations nouvelles à partir d'informations actuelles (par exemple: la direction du retour au nid déterminée à partir de la position du soleil et du décompte des pas ou emjambées chez Cataglyphis fortis , une variété de fourmis).
Les intuitions sont des informations nouvelles auxquelles un système cognitif parvient sans représentation ni accès aux raisons ou raisonnement qui la précédent, il s'agit d'un mécanisme non conscient.
Les mécanismes inférenciels sont modulaires, spécialisés pour le traitement d'un domaine d'informations, et pour la production d'une sortie, spécifiques.
Les mécanismes inférenciels cognitifs n'opèrent pas sur des entrées formatées en représentations langagières articulées logiquement (du type modus ponens , si P, Q ), ils exploitent plutôt des régularités fiables dans leur environnement sans produire une représentation de la transformation qu'ils en font.
L'erreur à la base des énigmes de la tradition de pensée sur la raison viennent de ce que celle-ci est entendue comme un mécanisme de formation de croyances et de décisions objectives, impartiales et supérieures chez le penseur solitaire, alors que la raison permet de justifier, argumenter, évaluer et convaincre.
Les tenants de la raison individualiste sont incapables d'expliquer pourquoi nous nous avérons, d'un côté, si prompts et persévérants à tenir et à tirer orgueil de jugements faiblement étayés, mais si minutieux et détaillés, de l'autre, dans l'évaluation des raisons des autres; ils sont également peu loquaces sur la forme de la discussion, du débat et de justification que revêt la formation solitaire de nos décisions. Nous raisonnons en réponse à des objections et à des demandes de justification virtuelles, prochaines ou imaginaires. Enfin et surtout, les partisans de la raison individualiste sont incapables d'expliquer pourquoi un groupe d'individus qui discutent, argumentent et justifient leurs décisions parvient, confronté à des tâches logiques exigeantes, à des résultats supérieurs à la moyenne des réponses de ses membres, et supérieurs au résultat individuel des meilleurs d'entre eux. Dans le même ordre d'idée, tandis que des étudiants des meilleures universités américaines ne réussissent aux tâches de sélection Wason (quelles cartes tourner pour vérifier la justesse d'une règle de type Si P, Q) à guère mieux qu'à 20 à 25% des tâches, les groupes y parviennent jusqu'à 70 ou même 80% des cas. Un résultat aussi formidable, qui est l'équivalent d'un groupe de coureur dont les vitesses respectives s'additionnent plutôt que de demeurer parallèle, a jusqu'ici reçu aucune attention digne de ce nom.
La raison interactionniste, au contraire, genère et confirme des hypothèses sur chacun de ces fronts. Les lacunes et les anomalies de l'ancienne conception cartésienne semblent combler ou en voie de l'être. La raison est destinée à la consommation sociale; l'inégalité de nos capacités d'évaluation de nos propres décisions et jugements et de ceux d'autrui assure une sain division du travail cognitif (je donne des raisons faibles mais auxquels je crois et 'évalue tes raisons, et toi les miennes). Le pari est tenu.
Forces du livre
Mercier et Sperber recourent à un éventail d'exemples et de supports à leur thèse dont la richesse et la variété sont remarquables. La culture scientifique, historique et littéraire dont ils font montre agrémente la lecture et convainc d'autant. Plutôt que de recourir exclusivement aux études entreprises avec des sujets étudiants des campus universitaires et de tomber sous les critiques de non-représentativité de ce genre d'échantillon (communément nommés les WEIRD : White, Educated members of Industrialised, Rich and Democratic countries), nous avons des exemples stupéfiants des défauts ainsi que des lumières du raisonnement à l'aide de figures clefs, allant de Bertillon, à Linnus Pauling et Thomas Jefferson (préservation du "myside bias" malgré de faibles raisons empiriques et l'existence de contre-exemples solides, "overconfidence" et polarisation), chez Newton, chez des tributs amazoniennes, maya, indiennes de temps reculés.
Faiblesse du livre.
Il peut sembler que la contribution qu'apporte le passage sur la modularité des mécanismes inférenciels à l'avancement de la thèse soit faible. J'ai cru que ce concept, après une critique comme celle de Jesse Prinz (Is the Mind really modular, in Stanton ed. Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science), était tombée en désuétude pour cause de sur-estimation de son pouvoir explicatif - il ne serait rien d'autres que l'affirmation banale de la différenciation fonctionnelle des aires du cerveau. Il se peut que Sperber, qui a étrenné ce concept contre vents et marées sur le long terme, ait voulu administrer la preuve du bien-fondé son parti-parti, un cas de belief perseverance . Il ajoute une certaine lourdeur pour le non-initié (auquel ce livre ne s'adresse clairement pas de toutes façons).
La morale de l'histoire modulaire tient largement en ceci: la spécificité de domaine est compatible avec la production d'une généralité virtuelle. Le module de la raison a le domaine des raisons comme justification et arguments; étant donné que ceux-ci portent sur un nombre incalculable de sujets, la raison traite une nombre incalculable d'objets. Plus exactement, et la subtilité de cette construction est importante : le sentiment de justesse des intuitions auxquelles nous cherchons des raisons après coup (backward inférence) est également un sentiment de justesse à propos de ce sur quoi porte l'intuition . Mon intuition qu'il pleuvra dans une heure, sans que je sache comment j'en arrive à le penser, me procure le sentiment d'être justifié, non seulement d'avoir cette intuition, mais également d'agir dans un monde où il pleuvra. La justesse de l'intuition cognitivement opaque est compatible avec la production d'une conclusion réflective sur le monde auquel se rapporte l'intuition (et auquel nous accédons par-dessus l'épaule de celle-ci). Ici réside, largement, non seulement la livraison de cette promesse que la modularité semblait incapable de livrer (spécificité et généralité), mais également l'angle par lequel Mercier et Sperber réfute la perspective d'une discontinuité entre raison et intuition (Système 2 vs Système 1).
Dans l'ensemble comme dans le menu, cet ouvrage est admirable et hautement recommandé. Il nous rend plus intelligent et confiant, notamment, dans le potentiel, sous des conditions adverses d'accroissement démographique des groupes humains, de l'exercice du raisonnement à produire ce qu'il a de plus fécond : c'est-à-dire des croyances, jugements et décisions supérieurs à ce que chacun peut atteindre isolément.
Le tournant coopératif dans la théorie évolutionnaire de la cognition avance d'un autre grand pas.
This book offers a bold attempt to explain confirmation bias. It has far reaching implications, and should be read by anyone interested in psychology.










