- Paperback: 404 pages
- Publisher: Oxford University Press; 1 edition (January 19, 1984)
- Language: English
- ISBN-10: 0198253885
- ISBN-13: 978-0198253884
- Product Dimensions: 5.4 x 0.9 x 8.5 inches
- Shipping Weight: 1.3 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
- Average Customer Review: 2 customer reviews
- Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #1,852,326 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
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Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy 1st Edition
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"Hart is an impressive scholar: careful and judicious, capable of close textual analysis but never preoccupied with trivialities, alive to constructive possibilities, always insightfully critical. His style is graceful, his manner gracious."--Times Literary Supplement
"No explorer would be so rash as to set out without first reading these essays and indeed the whole opus of the greatest of our modern British philosophers of law."--Times Higher Education Supplement
"This book of essays reaffirms...[Hart's] centrality to modern legal philosophy and will give aid to any reader interested in unraveling the complexities of the law's seamless web."--American Bar Foundation Research Journal
About the Author
H. L. A. Hart is at Oxford University (Emeritus)
Top customer reviews
Most of the essays are critical in nature and exemplify the kind of critical procedures through which Hart worked his way to his own analytical and normative jurisprudence. Hart always doggedly defended legal positivism as the better theory of analytical jurisprudence, but no one was a more acute critic of positivism than Hart himself was. Many of the essays herein reflect such criticisms (of Alf Ross, Kelsen, Jhering, and Holmes). On the other hand, Hart's normative jurisprudence has always rejected both of the normative perspectives characteristically associated with positivism, namely, either value skepticism or utilitarianism. Many of the essays herein reflect Hart's acute criticisms of utilitarianism and his constant search for appropriate deontological or rights-based constraints on utility maximization. But the essays reflect as well probing of American theorists, in both legal (Fuller and Dworkin) and moral (Rawls and Nozick) philosophy, who have offered legal and moral theories giving central place to such constraints. Such a range of essays brings out the degree to which the remarkable sanity, luminous clarity, and humane good sense of Hart's contributions to legal philosophy and theory presuppose the probing critical procedures abundantly contained in these essays.