Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis Subsequent Edition

by Graham Allison (Author), Philip Zelikow (Author)

127 ratings

ISBN-13: 978-0321013491

ISBN-10: 0321013492

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One of the most influental political science works written in the post World War II era, the original edition of Essence of Decision is a unique and fascinating examination of the pivotal event of the cold Cold War. Not simply revised, but completely re-written, the Second Edition of this classic text is a fresh reinterpretation of the theories and events surrounding the Cuban Missle Crisis, incorporating all new information from the Kennedy tapes and recently declassified Soviet files. Essence of Decision Second Edition, is a vivid look at decision-making under pressure and is the only single volume work that attempts to answer the enduring question: how should citizens understand the actions of their government?

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Editorial Reviews

Review

"A lively updating of a classic, in many ways superior to the original." -- Richard K. Betts, Columbia University

"A page turner-the review of relevant literature is comprehensive, thoughtful, and original." -- Diane Vaughan, Boston College

"More than a revised edition, this is a new book, with the most recent empirical material and sophisticated theorizing. Important as it was, the original Essence of Decision now appears to have been a first draft; this version was worth waiting for." -- Robert Jervis, Columbia University

"The revised edition updates both the theory and the history in a compelling manner. It is an impressive achievement." -- Scott Sagan, Stanford University

Product details

Publisher ‏ : ‎ Pearson P T R; Subsequent edition (January 1, 1999)
Language ‏ : ‎ English
Paperback ‏ : ‎ 416 pages
ISBN-10 ‏ : ‎ 0321013492
ISBN-13 ‏ : ‎ 978-0321013491
Item Weight ‏ : ‎ 14.2 ounces
Dimensions ‏ : ‎ 5.5 x 0.75 x 8.5 inches

Best Sellers Rank: #240,893 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
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127 ratings

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Vic Galfano

Great book - I learned a lot about the players ...

Reviewed in the United States on June 10, 2016

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Great book - I learned a lot about the players and times. The authors evaluate three decisions (to place missiles in Cuba, to blockade and to withdraw the missiles) in terms of three theories of decision making (individual actor, as an organization and as a political outcome) all of which have implications for current issues. I would highly recommend this for both students of history and decision-making.

2 people found this helpful

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michael kelly

Required reading

Reviewed in the United States on September 6, 2020

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It was on time and in new condition.
Just like the one I bought almost 50 years ago for my American foreign policy course at the u of Minnesota, but could not find it in my basement library. I was hoping my name was in it. I got it for my Jamaican son in law who is interested in the Cold War-due to a current video game!!!!
Makes me shudder to think of our current administration in such a crisis.

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Hector Horace Munro, PhD

One of the Top Ten Books In Political Science

Reviewed in the United States on December 2, 2014

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One of the seminal books in International Relations/Public Administration/Political Science. Illustrates how different perceptions of similar events are created by positions/locations in government. Illustrates limitations of different levels of analysis. Underscores the roots of bureaucratic behavior.

3 people found this helpful

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Buce

The Great Non-Event

Reviewed in the United States on February 8, 2004

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Reading "Essence of Decision" resonates with Kurosawa, or maybe Stoppard. We have a central story - one of the great non-events in human history, the moment when the Soviet Union and the United States "came eyeball to eyeball" (as Dean Rusk is said to have said) before someone blinked. We hear it three times: one, from the standpoint of the "rational actor;" second from the internal logic of organizations; and third, from the perspective of politics where people more or less rub along together.
It's an event that bears retelling and, with qualification, the device works. The upshot is that we get some insight into the missile crisis. But not at all incidentally, we get some insight into the academic study of politics (I resist calling it "political science"), and a whiff of what it might have to offer for our better understanding of the world.
Aside from the Kurusowa effect, there is another structural innovation. We have, in a sense, two books interleaved, like Faulkner's "Wild Palms." The even-numbered chapters tell (and retell) the basic story. The odd-numbered chapters offer a framework of "theory."
I suppose you might read just the even-numbered chapters - indeed the authors themselves suggest as much, though rather half-heartedly. And indeed, the odd-numbered chapters can be heavy going. One cannot help recalling the old canard about the sociologist as a person who gets a government research grant to find the bordello next door. You are tempted to say that their theory is what sophisticated people know anyway, and the clueless will probably never figure out.
But there is an answer to this dismissal. That is: most (or at least) a lot of history gets told from the standpoint of the "rational actor." A survey of the competing approaches makes it clear just what this approach leaves out. And if the polyphonic approach is so obviously superior to the single narrative line, then why have historians from Thucydides to Henry Kissinger been willing to do without it? One answer might be: for all their talents, they simply haven't learned the way to tell a story in any other way.
So on the whole, retelling works. But not, perhaps, as well as it might. Another reviewer has said that this isn't really a case to illustrate "organization" theory here because this is not a case that highlights organizations - rather, at least for the United States, the response to the Cuban missile crisis was the work of a small group of men, working together in close cooperation. There is some merit to this view: concededly, you do not get the clash of bull elephants that you might have got at another time when Defense makes war on State, and both work together to fend of Intelligence. But you get a taste of it: we find that the Joint Chiefs were most hospitable to an invasion; that State thought that maybe we could talk it through; and that John McCone from the CIA was the one person who most clearly anticipated the threat. Moreover, you see the "organization" problem in a somewhat different light, when you see how the President's orders were massaged or modified by the military (sometimes, even, within the military).
But perhaps in any event, I need not get too distracted by the framework. Along the way, there are any number of nuggets that stand pretty well on their own. I liked in particular, for instance, the discussion of the role of committee work. We tend to stick up our nose at any project done by committee. But, argue our authors, in World War II it was Churchill, high-handed as he was, who worked through committee-and virtually always followed the committee's advice. The "strong leader" who kept things close to his vest, was Hitler.
But more generally - I was already an adult at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, and I remember it well. Specifically, I remember how frightened were so many people in my surroundings. I wasn't that frightened; I figured that one way or another, we would rub along. In the end, of course, I was right - we did rub along. But I think in retrospect, it was I who was kidding myself and the Nervous Nellies who had the right attitude. We did rub along, but as Wellington said about the Battle of Waterloo, it was a near thing. I particularly like Robert Kennedy:
"The fourteen people [in the American inner circle] were very significant-bright, able, dedicated people, all of whom had the greatest affection for the U.S. ... If six of them had been President of the U.S., I think that the world might have been blown up."
[Final technical note: one or more of the other reviews appear to be discussing the first edition of this book. The (current) seocnd edition is not a mere cosmetic update, but substantially a new book].

20 people found this helpful

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Kevin C. Rohrer

Excellent Read

Reviewed in the United States on March 3, 2013

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This is not a detailed history of the Cuban Missile Crisis; it is an overview of the Crisis from a leadership standpoint. Nevertheless, it is an excellent companion volume to any detailed history of the event you choose to read. I read this book during a grad school leadership course and thoroughly enjoyed it.

3 people found this helpful

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Martin C.

Nothing by praise.

Reviewed in the United States on February 3, 2011

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I have never seen the different concepts of organizational behavior put into a books this clear.

A must-read for anyone who has to understand why organization end up doing what they do.

A must-read for anyone interested in the missile crisis.

The only nitpick is that I think the title is not chosen well. This book does so much more than what the title implies.

One person found this helpful

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Jae W. Oh, CFP

Incredible book

Reviewed in the United States on August 8, 2015

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I cannot think of a single more important book, in any discipline, that has helped me understand another party's point of view and decision-making.
It's application to real-world situations is almost without limit: incredible that even a topic as important as the Cuban Missile Crisis is almost pushed to the background.
Oddly, the models of decision-making are so universal, the extra historical information added to the earlier edition, which I read decades ago, are almost a distraction. If that is a "criticism" of the book, then you can take it that way, but it is only when compared to the universality of the principles of decision-making stated.

One person found this helpful

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BKat

It is very discusses a lot of theory yet is easy to understand and enjoy

Reviewed in the United States on December 10, 2014

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I read this book for a class and was really dreading having to read about the cuban missile crisis...
I was pleasantly surprised. Essence of Decision is really well written. It is very discusses a lot of theory yet is easy to understand and enjoy! I read it in a hurry for class, but I think I'm now going to go back and read it again for fun.

3 people found this helpful

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Michael Whelan

Five Stars

Reviewed in the United Kingdom on December 2, 2016

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Classic study in decision making more relevant now than ever

tyke

Three Stars

Reviewed in the United Kingdom on May 12, 2016

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Fit for purpose

Ferdinando Galassi

Autopsia della Decisione

Reviewed in Italy on February 4, 2018

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Al di là dell’evento storico in se, il libro scopone ed analizza la “Decisione” nell’ambito di un’organizzazione complessa con tutti le ombre ed processi ad essa correlati. La realtà spesso non è poi così razionale come spesso il nostro cervello tende a semplificare.

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Leitor

Excelente

Reviewed in Brazil on November 28, 2017

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Quase impossível de conseguir no Brasil, esse livro é obrigatório para quem se interessa por tomada de decisão e estratégia. Ótimo.

One person found this helpful

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Steven Hubbard

As advertised

Reviewed in Canada on October 12, 2018

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Required for my course. This book is pretty dry and boring.

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