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Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong Paperback – May 17, 1991
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J. L. Mackie
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J. L. Mackie
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Print length256 pages
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LanguageEnglish
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PublisherPenguin Books
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Publication dateMay 17, 1991
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Dimensions5.12 x 0.62 x 7.74 inches
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ISBN-109780140135589
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ISBN-13978-0140135589
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Product details
- ASIN : 0140135588
- Publisher : Penguin Books; 49307th edition (May 17, 1991)
- Language : English
- Paperback : 256 pages
- ISBN-10 : 9780140135589
- ISBN-13 : 978-0140135589
- Item Weight : 6.7 ounces
- Dimensions : 5.12 x 0.62 x 7.74 inches
-
Best Sellers Rank:
#237,246 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #1,032 in Philosophy of Ethics & Morality
- Customer Reviews:
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Reviewed in the United States on October 14, 2020
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The title of the book says it all. Definitely worth giving it a read if it piques your interest at all.
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Reviewed in the United States on February 4, 2011
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This book is regarded as the classic statement of moral error theory - the idea that there are no objective moral values. For this reason, anyone seriously interested in moral philosophy must grapple with this book. But the important part of the discussion, the attempted refutation of moral realism, only occupies a single chapter of the book. As such, it's not entirely satisfying. Mackie marshals two arguments in favor of his position, the arguments from relativity and from queerness. While I won't go into detail on either, the first seems flatly wrong and the second does not work against the Aristotelian position Mackie considers. And notably, Mackie does not claim it does either.
Much of the rest of the book is devoted to expounding his subjective theory of moral rightness. I found it somewhat interesting (he decries factory farming way back in 1977!), but philosophically, I was unsure of its value. I'm not sure how we actually argue for moral principles, if we grant Mackie's metaethics. An argument that is, in principle, not rationally resolvable seems not like one a philosopher qua philosopher should take part.
Much of the rest of the book is devoted to expounding his subjective theory of moral rightness. I found it somewhat interesting (he decries factory farming way back in 1977!), but philosophically, I was unsure of its value. I'm not sure how we actually argue for moral principles, if we grant Mackie's metaethics. An argument that is, in principle, not rationally resolvable seems not like one a philosopher qua philosopher should take part.
13 people found this helpful
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Reviewed in the United States on April 6, 2016
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A seminal classic in the ethical naturalist cannon.
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Reviewed in the United States on January 3, 2011
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J. L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, Penguin 1977.
Some thinkers hold that moral principles can be deduced from reason and introspection, while others hold that moral principles can be deduced from a careful examination of the varieties of human behavior observed across space and through time. The first might be called "objectivists" because moral principles, like mathematical principles, for these thinkers, are "out there" to be discovered. The second, by contrast, might be called "behaviorists" because they consider moral truths to be discovered in about the same way as we discover linguistic regularities: by observing how and when groups taken certain moral principles to be true, and by analyzing the commonalities and differences in the conception of morality in different societies. They may also be termed "evolutionary" because they invariably explain the commonalities and differences in moral principles in terms of the gene-culture coevolutionary process that lies at the basis of our development as a species.
There is no doubt in my mind but that the objectivists in the above sense are profoundly misled and misleading, and the behaviorists approach the study of morality correctly. In my view it is obvious that ethics should be studied scientifically, and those who propose to justify moral principles through Introspection or Reason are on the wrong track. Because most moral philosophers resoundingly reject my behaviorist/evolutionary position (the recently deceased Philippa Foote and the American David Chan being significant exceptions), I have been looking around for a philosophical critique of ethical objectivism. J. L. Mackie's well known book came to mind.
It is clear from the subtitle of this book that Mackie is not a behaviorist/evolutionary moralist. Indeed, the behavioral/evolutionary moralists are generally deeply critical of the notion that all moralities are possible and we can simply "invent" and socially instantiate the one that we prefer, as propounded by what John Tooby and Lida Cosmides have termed the "Standard Social Sciences Model." However, I thought he might have developed a cogent critique of objectivism even if his alternative is not acceptable. I was wrong. Mackie's arguments are, to my mind, extremely weak and not at all persuasive.
Mackie begins by defining ethics as "objective" if values are "part of the fabric of the world." But, both objectivists and behavioral/evolutionary moralists, in the sense defined above, believe that values are part of the fabric of the world, differing only on how we are to discover moral rules and their relation to empirical social practices. My objectivists care no more about what people say about ethics than a physicist cares about what people say about gravity. The physicist's skill and training trump anything folk-physics has to say about the subject. Behavioral/evolutionary ethicists, by contrast, value objectivist philosophical reasoning only when it gives insight into regularities concerning human moral principles and behavior.
Mackie's critique of objectivism, which he considers to be a critique of a moral skepticism sort, is based on two arguments. The first is the "relativist" argument that because people can vehemently and permanently disagree about the content of morality, and because there is not objective process of adjudicating disagreements of this sort, it is unlikely that morality is "part of the fabric" of the world. This argument, to my mind, has no weight at all. Language, for instance, is surely an objective part of human experience, but there are many highly distinct languages and linguistic structures.
The second of Mackie's critiques of objectivism is "the argument from queerness." He says that if morals are objective, then our way of knowing morals is different from that of knowing any other aspect of the fabric of the world (p. 38). But this is false. There are a hundred books on morality from the standpoint of traditional science, including arguments about the development of moral principle in species through Darwinian evolution.
So, my search for a philosophical critique of objectivist ethical theory goes on. Perhaps I should read the critiques of Foote and Chan to uncover the philosophical bases of objectivist ethics. Well, that should give me something to do on days that the Boston Celtics aren't playing.
Some thinkers hold that moral principles can be deduced from reason and introspection, while others hold that moral principles can be deduced from a careful examination of the varieties of human behavior observed across space and through time. The first might be called "objectivists" because moral principles, like mathematical principles, for these thinkers, are "out there" to be discovered. The second, by contrast, might be called "behaviorists" because they consider moral truths to be discovered in about the same way as we discover linguistic regularities: by observing how and when groups taken certain moral principles to be true, and by analyzing the commonalities and differences in the conception of morality in different societies. They may also be termed "evolutionary" because they invariably explain the commonalities and differences in moral principles in terms of the gene-culture coevolutionary process that lies at the basis of our development as a species.
There is no doubt in my mind but that the objectivists in the above sense are profoundly misled and misleading, and the behaviorists approach the study of morality correctly. In my view it is obvious that ethics should be studied scientifically, and those who propose to justify moral principles through Introspection or Reason are on the wrong track. Because most moral philosophers resoundingly reject my behaviorist/evolutionary position (the recently deceased Philippa Foote and the American David Chan being significant exceptions), I have been looking around for a philosophical critique of ethical objectivism. J. L. Mackie's well known book came to mind.
It is clear from the subtitle of this book that Mackie is not a behaviorist/evolutionary moralist. Indeed, the behavioral/evolutionary moralists are generally deeply critical of the notion that all moralities are possible and we can simply "invent" and socially instantiate the one that we prefer, as propounded by what John Tooby and Lida Cosmides have termed the "Standard Social Sciences Model." However, I thought he might have developed a cogent critique of objectivism even if his alternative is not acceptable. I was wrong. Mackie's arguments are, to my mind, extremely weak and not at all persuasive.
Mackie begins by defining ethics as "objective" if values are "part of the fabric of the world." But, both objectivists and behavioral/evolutionary moralists, in the sense defined above, believe that values are part of the fabric of the world, differing only on how we are to discover moral rules and their relation to empirical social practices. My objectivists care no more about what people say about ethics than a physicist cares about what people say about gravity. The physicist's skill and training trump anything folk-physics has to say about the subject. Behavioral/evolutionary ethicists, by contrast, value objectivist philosophical reasoning only when it gives insight into regularities concerning human moral principles and behavior.
Mackie's critique of objectivism, which he considers to be a critique of a moral skepticism sort, is based on two arguments. The first is the "relativist" argument that because people can vehemently and permanently disagree about the content of morality, and because there is not objective process of adjudicating disagreements of this sort, it is unlikely that morality is "part of the fabric" of the world. This argument, to my mind, has no weight at all. Language, for instance, is surely an objective part of human experience, but there are many highly distinct languages and linguistic structures.
The second of Mackie's critiques of objectivism is "the argument from queerness." He says that if morals are objective, then our way of knowing morals is different from that of knowing any other aspect of the fabric of the world (p. 38). But this is false. There are a hundred books on morality from the standpoint of traditional science, including arguments about the development of moral principle in species through Darwinian evolution.
So, my search for a philosophical critique of objectivist ethical theory goes on. Perhaps I should read the critiques of Foote and Chan to uncover the philosophical bases of objectivist ethics. Well, that should give me something to do on days that the Boston Celtics aren't playing.
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Reviewed in the United States on April 12, 2017
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product arrived as described
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Reviewed in the United States on May 21, 2014
This book is the father of all error theory books. He originates some of the central critiques of moral thought and discourse that guys like Richard Garner rely on (see also:
Beyond Morality
). They think there is something bizarre about morality's commitment to categorical reasons (things that you ought or ought not to do regardless of what your desires happen to be). They think moral properties are queer because he says that don't fit into a naturalistic worldview and because they are thought to supervene on non-moral properties (i.e. the moral properties "fix" the moral facts... so the non-moral fact of kicking a puppy is always accompanied by the property of wrongness).
As you may notice, the theory presented in this book does not agree with me. Error theory argues that morality is systemically erroneous... what do we do with moral thought and discourse then? If Mackie thinks supervenient relationships are flawed, exactly how do ordinary natural facts determine the moral facts? He argues for conservationism (rather than eliminativism) because he recognizes the instrinsic vlue of morality, although I don't see that working. I agree more with the ideas of David Boonin, David Enoch, and Michael Huemer.
As you may notice, the theory presented in this book does not agree with me. Error theory argues that morality is systemically erroneous... what do we do with moral thought and discourse then? If Mackie thinks supervenient relationships are flawed, exactly how do ordinary natural facts determine the moral facts? He argues for conservationism (rather than eliminativism) because he recognizes the instrinsic vlue of morality, although I don't see that working. I agree more with the ideas of David Boonin, David Enoch, and Michael Huemer.
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Five Stars
Reviewed in the United Kingdom on December 9, 2018Verified Purchase
Good for A level Phiosophy
Jenny D
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Five Stars
Reviewed in the United Kingdom on March 28, 2015Verified Purchase
Excellent
Cai Pearce
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Solid Stuff
Reviewed in the United Kingdom on February 4, 2013Verified Purchase
If you are studying or have an interest in philosophy this is a really interesting read and solid insight into contemporary meta-ethics. Worth buying for the open question argument alone
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5.0 out of 5 stars
Grande título da metaética
Reviewed in Brazil on December 30, 2016Verified Purchase
Clássico da teoria do erro. Bem argumentado e perturbador, por ao mesmo tempo não aceitar que existam valores objetivos, mas propor que enunciados éticos são crenças.
Amazon Customer
1.0 out of 5 stars
I would recommend to purchase another edition
Reviewed in Canada on October 21, 2017Verified Purchase
Nothing against the content per se, but the book is awfully printed. The characters are all blurred and the reading is very difficult. I would recommend to purchase another edition.
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