What really happened during Israel's War of Independence? Ilan Pappé attempts to answer this question in "The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine," which is, without a doubt, the most controversial book I have read in my life. In it, Pappé presents the...
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What really happened during Israel's War of Independence?
Ilan Pappé attempts to answer this question in "The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine," which is, without a doubt, the most controversial book I have read in my life. In it, Pappé presents the controversial thesis that Palestine has been subject to a systematic ethnic cleansing policy pre-dating Israel's Independence Day on May 14, 1948. This policy, Pappé argues, continues up to the present day.
For this review, it is important to note, and Pappé clarifies right off the bat, that he is not using the phrase ethnic cleansing in the colloquial sense in which it is a synonym for genocide. Instead, Pappé refers to formal definitions in which ethnic cleansing's goal is to rid a geographical area of people of a specific, often ethnic, group. This contrasts with genocide, in which the goal is to wipe them out of existence. Pappé notes that although the goal of ethnic cleansing is different, it is also generally accompanied by massacres to scare the population into fleeing. Pappé argues this is precisely what happened in Israel/Palestine during the 1947-8 War. Indeed, in the epigraphs preceding most chapters, there is a running comparison to Serbian ethnic cleansing in the 1990s.
A Cleansing Plan Pre-Dating the 1947 UN Partition Resolution?
Before the late 1980s, there was a notion in much of the West that the answer to the question of where all the Palestinian refugees came from was that they were told to flee their homes around the time Israel's Arab neighbors invaded on the very day of Israel's independence. Pappé is one of Israel's "new historians" who was granted some access to the IDF's archives from the 1947-8 War and began to challenge the notion that those fleeing generally did so voluntarily at the request of Arab leaders. Some more moderate historians, like Benny Morris, found evidence of massacres of Palestinians by Jewish force but did not feel there was a systematic plan behind them and the forced expulsions. Pappé, by contrast, disagrees. Pappé concluded that there was a systematic plan centering around Plan Dalet by considering other sources such as the diaries of key Israeli leaders, interviews, and other oral history.
According to Pappé's research, Zionist leaders, especially Ben-Gurion, had decided well before 1947 that they should try to capture much more of Mandatory Palestine than was likely to be offered. Pappé describes how the planning included detailed Jewish intelligence on every village following the 1936 uprising in preparation for this effort.
The Zionists' main fear, Pappé writes, was having too small a majority in Israel to protect Jewish interests. This was because, at the time of the 1947 resolution, the Jewish state had about 60% Jews, while nearly all the rest were Arabs. Pappé quotes Ben-Gurion saying that 80% Jews was needed for stability. Pappé further argues that while Ben-Gurion publically accepted the UN partition plan, he only did so knowing Arabs would reject it. This, he realized, would allow Israeli leaders to not recognize Palestinian land as other than "disputed."
Pappé further recounts how Ben-Gurion felt it was a problem that Arabs did not react violently enough to the 1947 partition plan. Indeed, they just resigned themselves to living under another "foreign" ruler as they had adapted to others for centuries before. According to Pappé, Ben-Gurion and a cabal called "The Consultancy" worked to increase provocations against Arabs, hoping for reactions that could be used as pretexts for attacks, expulsions, and inevitable massacres. Pappé portrays this as not having the success hoped for initially, thus leading Israeli forces to become increasingly aggressive in their strategies and tactics, often deliberately crossing the line into war crimes.
My Evaluation
Evaluating this book is, unfortunately, rather difficult. The two main reasons are:
1. There is disagreement between Pappé and fellow new historian Benny Morris as to the proper historical methodology. Pappé criticizes Morris for confining his conclusions to IDF archives and treating them as gospel (or, perhaps, rather, Tanakh?) Morris, in turn, criticizes Pappé for over-reliance on oral history. Since Pappé, unfortunately, does not dive deeply into the methodological questions, it is hard for a non-professional to weigh the merits and detriments of the different approaches.
2. Much of Pappé's source material is not readily available, at least to non-professionals. This is either because it is IDF archival material, books that no longer appear to be in print or interviews.
Fortunately, there is much that Pappé and Morris, who draws more conservative conclusions, agree on. The main points are:
1. Many Palestinians only left their homes involuntarily in 1947-8; Israeli forces were definitely pushing many of them out
2. Jewish forces did commit war crimes
One thing Pappé and Morris disagree on significantly is the number of Palestinians massacred. Morris puts the figure around 800, whereas Pappé has it around a few thousand. Even more significant, however, is whether it was all part of a systematic plan or not. Pappé's quotes, especially from Ben-Gurion's diary, do seem compelling, however. With regard to the massacres, Pappé admits there is no smoking gun in official documents regarding a central directive. Instead, he argues that it was implicitly understood that they would be tolerated and necessary in the case of stubborn resistance. Pappé points out how those involved were generally careful not to leave a paper trail behind.
Is a Systematic Plan Believable?
I do believe that Pappé makes a compelling case that there was a systematic plan. Pappé's discussion of how Palestinians were treated after the war adds to the believability of his argument. Much of this post-war treatment is more open to verification. Remaining Palestinians were moved from their homes; the property of those who had fled was confiscated through some extraordinary legal machinations; those of Arab descent did not receive equal treatment under Israeli law; Palestinian history was systematically erased.
However, even if things were not part of a Zionist grand strategy to permanently claim 80% of Mandatory Palestine, it is remarkable that they worked out, in practice, as if that were the plan all along. Sympathizers of Israel will argue that Israel simply wanted to live in peace, but their Arab neighbors kept attacking them unprovoked for no good reason. After reading this book, however, especially the parts most open to verification, and considering Israel's treatment of the Palestinians and denial of their right to return (or, if no longer practical, monetary compensation in lieu of it), the credibility of Israeli claims regarding history fell into even greater doubt for me.
The Book's Style and Weaknesses
A little over two-thirds of the book is highly engaging reading. Nevertheless, the book took me about twice as long to read as expected. Part of the reason this is a difficult book to read is that it is a very somber subject. Nor is it so far removed from the present as to provide the usual degree of detachment that studying more distant history allows. That contribution to making the book difficult is inevitable, given the subject.
However, some of Pappé's choices made the book difficult and were not inevitable. For instance:
- The Jews seemed very concerned about Arab aggression, given what happened in 1936. Pappé does not detail 1936 enough to understand why they were worried.
- Too many massacres are detailed even once one gets the gist of what happened overall. Likely, Pappé is trying to ensure that the victims are not forgotten. Still, unfortunately, it leads to an emotional numbing and time spent here that could have been better spent on issues such as what happened in 1936 and discussing the debate over methodology.
Finally, Pappé is clearly biased. For instance, he correctly states that Palestinians objected to Israel being given the majority of the land in the 1947 resolution, even though they were only one-third of the population. What Pappé omits is the Jewish position that they needed more land because of the large number of immigrants into Israel expected. Pappé also, although he does not omit it altogether, spends scant time discussing massacres by Arabs, for example, as retaliation for Deir Yassin.
Conclusion
Given the current war in Gaza, this book is vital reading to understand how we got to this point and what may lie ahead. Readers will be better able to evaluate whether the accusations of ethnic cleansing, genocide, and apartheid leveled against Israel are fair. At the same time, however, it is essential to check what sources Pappé uses, compare with others, and look up contrary interpretations of history, such as Benny Morris's.
What really happened during Israel's War of Independence?
Ilan Pappé attempts to answer this question in "The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine," which is, without a doubt, the most controversial book I have read in my life. In it, Pappé presents the controversial thesis that Palestine has been subject to a systematic ethnic cleansing policy pre-dating Israel's Independence Day on May 14, 1948. This policy, Pappé argues, continues up to the present day.
For this review, it is important to note, and Pappé clarifies right off the bat, that he is not using the phrase ethnic cleansing in the colloquial sense in which it is a synonym for genocide. Instead, Pappé refers to formal definitions in which ethnic cleansing's goal is to rid a geographical area of people of a specific, often ethnic, group. This contrasts with genocide, in which the goal is to wipe them out of existence. Pappé notes that although the goal of ethnic cleansing is different, it is also generally accompanied by massacres to scare the population into fleeing. Pappé argues this is precisely what happened in Israel/Palestine during the 1947-8 War. Indeed, in the epigraphs preceding most chapters, there is a running comparison to Serbian ethnic cleansing in the 1990s.
A Cleansing Plan Pre-Dating the 1947 UN Partition Resolution?
Before the late 1980s, there was a notion in much of the West that the answer to the question of where all the Palestinian refugees came from was that they were told to flee their homes around the time Israel's Arab neighbors invaded on the very day of Israel's independence. Pappé is one of Israel's "new historians" who was granted some access to the IDF's archives from the 1947-8 War and began to challenge the notion that those fleeing generally did so voluntarily at the request of Arab leaders. Some more moderate historians, like Benny Morris, found evidence of massacres of Palestinians by Jewish force but did not feel there was a systematic plan behind them and the forced expulsions. Pappé, by contrast, disagrees. Pappé concluded that there was a systematic plan centering around Plan Dalet by considering other sources such as the diaries of key Israeli leaders, interviews, and other oral history.
According to Pappé's research, Zionist leaders, especially Ben-Gurion, had decided well before 1947 that they should try to capture much more of Mandatory Palestine than was likely to be offered. Pappé describes how the planning included detailed Jewish intelligence on every village following the 1936 uprising in preparation for this effort.
The Zionists' main fear, Pappé writes, was having too small a majority in Israel to protect Jewish interests. This was because, at the time of the 1947 resolution, the Jewish state had about 60% Jews, while nearly all the rest were Arabs. Pappé quotes Ben-Gurion saying that 80% Jews was needed for stability. Pappé further argues that while Ben-Gurion publically accepted the UN partition plan, he only did so knowing Arabs would reject it. This, he realized, would allow Israeli leaders to not recognize Palestinian land as other than "disputed."
Pappé further recounts how Ben-Gurion felt it was a problem that Arabs did not react violently enough to the 1947 partition plan. Indeed, they just resigned themselves to living under another "foreign" ruler as they had adapted to others for centuries before. According to Pappé, Ben-Gurion and a cabal called "The Consultancy" worked to increase provocations against Arabs, hoping for reactions that could be used as pretexts for attacks, expulsions, and inevitable massacres. Pappé portrays this as not having the success hoped for initially, thus leading Israeli forces to become increasingly aggressive in their strategies and tactics, often deliberately crossing the line into war crimes.
My Evaluation
Evaluating this book is, unfortunately, rather difficult. The two main reasons are:
1. There is disagreement between Pappé and fellow new historian Benny Morris as to the proper historical methodology. Pappé criticizes Morris for confining his conclusions to IDF archives and treating them as gospel (or, perhaps, rather, Tanakh?) Morris, in turn, criticizes Pappé for over-reliance on oral history. Since Pappé, unfortunately, does not dive deeply into the methodological questions, it is hard for a non-professional to weigh the merits and detriments of the different approaches.
2. Much of Pappé's source material is not readily available, at least to non-professionals. This is either because it is IDF archival material, books that no longer appear to be in print or interviews.
Fortunately, there is much that Pappé and Morris, who draws more conservative conclusions, agree on. The main points are:
1. Many Palestinians only left their homes involuntarily in 1947-8; Israeli forces were definitely pushing many of them out
2. Jewish forces did commit war crimes
One thing Pappé and Morris disagree on significantly is the number of Palestinians massacred. Morris puts the figure around 800, whereas Pappé has it around a few thousand. Even more significant, however, is whether it was all part of a systematic plan or not. Pappé's quotes, especially from Ben-Gurion's diary, do seem compelling, however. With regard to the massacres, Pappé admits there is no smoking gun in official documents regarding a central directive. Instead, he argues that it was implicitly understood that they would be tolerated and necessary in the case of stubborn resistance. Pappé points out how those involved were generally careful not to leave a paper trail behind.
Is a Systematic Plan Believable?
I do believe that Pappé makes a compelling case that there was a systematic plan. Pappé's discussion of how Palestinians were treated after the war adds to the believability of his argument. Much of this post-war treatment is more open to verification. Remaining Palestinians were moved from their homes; the property of those who had fled was confiscated through some extraordinary legal machinations; those of Arab descent did not receive equal treatment under Israeli law; Palestinian history was systematically erased.
However, even if things were not part of a Zionist grand strategy to permanently claim 80% of Mandatory Palestine, it is remarkable that they worked out, in practice, as if that were the plan all along. Sympathizers of Israel will argue that Israel simply wanted to live in peace, but their Arab neighbors kept attacking them unprovoked for no good reason. After reading this book, however, especially the parts most open to verification, and considering Israel's treatment of the Palestinians and denial of their right to return (or, if no longer practical, monetary compensation in lieu of it), the credibility of Israeli claims regarding history fell into even greater doubt for me.
The Book's Style and Weaknesses
A little over two-thirds of the book is highly engaging reading. Nevertheless, the book took me about twice as long to read as expected. Part of the reason this is a difficult book to read is that it is a very somber subject. Nor is it so far removed from the present as to provide the usual degree of detachment that studying more distant history allows. That contribution to making the book difficult is inevitable, given the subject.
However, some of Pappé's choices made the book difficult and were not inevitable. For instance:
- The Jews seemed very concerned about Arab aggression, given what happened in 1936. Pappé does not detail 1936 enough to understand why they were worried.
- Too many massacres are detailed even once one gets the gist of what happened overall. Likely, Pappé is trying to ensure that the victims are not forgotten. Still, unfortunately, it leads to an emotional numbing and time spent here that could have been better spent on issues such as what happened in 1936 and discussing the debate over methodology.
Finally, Pappé is clearly biased. For instance, he correctly states that Palestinians objected to Israel being given the majority of the land in the 1947 resolution, even though they were only one-third of the population. What Pappé omits is the Jewish position that they needed more land because of the large number of immigrants into Israel expected. Pappé also, although he does not omit it altogether, spends scant time discussing massacres by Arabs, for example, as retaliation for Deir Yassin.
Conclusion
Given the current war in Gaza, this book is vital reading to understand how we got to this point and what may lie ahead. Readers will be better able to evaluate whether the accusations of ethnic cleansing, genocide, and apartheid leveled against Israel are fair. At the same time, however, it is essential to check what sources Pappé uses, compare with others, and look up contrary interpretations of history, such as Benny Morris's.
Once the decision was taken, it took six months to complete the mission. When it was over, more than half of Palestine’s native population, close to 800,000 people, had been uprooted, 531 villages had been destroyed, and eleven urban neighbourhoods emptied of their inhabitants.Destacada por 903 lectores de Kindle
