This book is an incredible account of the role Executive Outcomes played in Africa in the late 80's. After reading the account from a soldier on the ground (Four Ball, One Tracer: Commanding Executive Outcomes in Angola and Sierra Leone), seeing these events from the perspective of the CEO added quite a bit of depth to the entirety of what was going on. After reading many accounts making accusations against EO and their involvement in these countries, seeing Eeben detail his sources and the events around them definitely lends one to believe that much of that was propaganda against EO. If you read much or watch reports about the events during this time period you will see many of the names appear that Eeben talks about in his book (especially many of the so called "experts" on Africa). I highly recommend this book for anyone interested in the role of PMC's and the conflicts in Africa.

its hard to improve on what the reviewers have said above. Barlow changed the way 'mercenary' outfits run. I do not like that word for an organization such as his and believe his causes were just and legal. There are always bad apples in a group that size who went on to do some shady things but EO saved lives and gave a new model for military operations that more African Govts should take advantage of. I especially enjoyed Barlow's personal history in 32 Battalion. He has a great blog on the internet as well and has a forthcoming book. Prices here are high but if you can find it, get it.

D.R. Tharp
Author of Task Force Intrepid: The Gold of Katanga

The world sure could use them now - stuff of legend!!!!

"Executive Outcomes: Against All Odds" is primarily an account of the iconic South African private military company (PMC) Executive Outcomes that operated in Africa in the 1990s by its founder Eeben Barlow, a veteran of South African Defense Force's (SADF) 32 Battalion Reconnaissance Wing, South Africa's Military Intelligence, and the controversial and secretive Civil Co-operation Bureau (CCB). Barlow begins with his SADF career, which began in 1974, before moving on to his career in intelligence, then the creation, evolution, and the major contracts of Executive Outcomes. I read the 2008 edition of this book, which is the second edition. It included some corrections to the 2007 edition. A forth revised and updated edition will be published later this year (2017), so interested readers may want to wait for that instead of trying to find a rare copy of an earlier edition.

Eeben Barlow left SADF after 16 years of service with little money and the company Executive Outcomes (EO) to his name, which he had ironically created to fund his CCB operation in Europe. EO developed training programs for South African Special Services. Eager to turn the company into an income generator, Barlow took EO in the direction of security and related equipment. It was only a strange set of circumstances that turned EO from a private security company into a private military company. Barlow was approached by former British SAS Tony Buckingham for help in retrieving oil-drilling equipment belonging to Buckingham's company from the docks in Soyo, Angola, which was under the control of the opposition group UNITA, formerly an ally of South Africa in its Border War. EO was to send a team to provide security for the Angolan Army's recovery operation. South African intelligence services had ties to UNITA and objected to the operation so warned UNITA, necessitating a military offensive instead of what would have been a security job. EO was born as a PMC.

Barlow had a low tolerance for office politics and interagency rivalries when he worked in intelligence, so you can imagine how much he appreciated the South African government's relentless media campaign against his company and its jeopardizing the lives of his men. Memoirs give authors the opportunity to grind their axes and skewer their enemies, and Barlow takes every chance he gets to accuse South Africa's military intelligence (MI) and Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) of duplicity, treachery, sanctions-busting, and attacking EO with an over-the-top disinformation campaign. If half the stuff he accuses MI of is true, it boggles the mind, but I learned long ago not to believe what's written in the papers, especially where war is concerned. Barlow's accounts of EO are alternated with his growing anger at the treatment the company receives from MI and the press in South Africa, which may be been motivated by the financial interests of small number of individuals.

Barlow includes descriptions of EO's major military operations, on the ground and in the air: Angola 1993-1996 (pages 94-314), under the command of Nic van den Bergh, Sierra Leone 1995-1997 (pages 315-388) under the command of Bert Sachse, and a hostage crisis in Indonesia (pages 411-421). Barlow was not present during these operations, so I assume he got the blow-by-blow details from those who were. There is limited information about EO's security contracts. Barlow does discuss the subcontract that EO had for Sandline International to train Special Forces in Papua New Guinea that blew up in both companies' faces. And he offers his view of the aftermath in Angola and Sierra Leone, both of which EO was forced to leave prematurely for political reasons. Eeben Barlow resigned from Executive Outcomes in 1997. EO closed its doors on 31 December 1998.

I found this book very readable. I enjoyed it. It contains more detail than necessary in some places and feels repetitive when it catalogs every volley fired at EO in the press. But I excused those flaws, as this is Barlow's opportunity to document what happened, and sometimes the documentation takes precedence over the reader's attention span. After the United States invaded Iraq and Afghanistan, the use of PMCs proliferated, and virulent condemnation of them in the press went out of fashion, at least in the US and UK, who employ a lot of PMCs. Executive Outcomes was unfortunate to make a big splash in Africa when PMCs were anathema to the UN and to most journalists and to do it on the side of the Angolan civil war that was not supported by South Africa, the United States, or any Western government. So the condemnation came. Barlow is self-aggrandizing at times and much aggrieved at the treatment he received, but it's his book, so the tone is not unexpected.

Today the role of private defense contractors, private military companies, private security and advisory companies and similar organizations have become well known through the employment of Blackwater in Iraq. Prior to the legitimacy that Blackwater brought to the business in Iraq there was a long period where such organizations, staffed mostly by white ex-military professionals, gained a great deal of bad press as `mercenaries' in Africa and elsewhere doing the dirty work that locals were either incapable of doing or that foreigners wanted done. Executive Outcomes (EO) and its story from 1989/1993 to 1999 represents a mid-way point between the over-professionalization of these types of companies and the more rambo-derring do of a previous era.

This story is intertwined entirely with the life of Eeben Barlow, the author, who was born in Rhodesia and joined the South African Defense Forces in 1974. He rose through the ranks, eventually commanding 32 Battalion's elite reconnaisance unit. Eventually he was recruited by the Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB) and from there through his operations, made contact with other men who would become integral to EO such as Tony Buckingham and Simon Mann. His first missions involved Angola and the civil war there between MPLA and UNITA. When EO became operational and more involved in 1993 it ended up confronting the very movement, UNITA, that South Africa had actually worked with before.

Barlow details the widening area of operations of EO and its recuritment of ex-SADF personell, especially from elite units such as Koevoet and other people involved wit counter-insurgency. More surprising is that it also received applications from former members of the ANC military wing. Eventually EO was tasked with supporting the Angolan governments attempts to recover territory and natural resources, including diamond mining areas from UNITA and by 1994 it had achieved its objectives of forcing UNITA into a ceasefire. Barlow details many of these operations and provides excellent analysis of the `blood diamonds' question and the resolution of the conflict.

In 1995 as EO's reputation grew it was hired by Sierra Leone to stop the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)'s attempt to take over the country. This successful mission was concluded when the diamond areas, controlled by the RUF, were re-captured. Other missions followed but in general EO's greatest days were behind it. Disinformation, spread by numerous governments and the press, focused negative attention on the `mercenaries' and their supposed attempt to `re-colonize' Africa, an irony considering they were influential in helping African governments that had hired them and that the EO inclucded black Africans in its ranks. In the end Barlow details the duplicity of the UN and the international community and the fact that numerous African countries were allowed to be destroyed by genocide, such as in Rwanda, while governments did nothing and at a time when the EO could have done much.

An excellent book with numerous maps, documents and color photographs. A must read for anyone interested in Africa in the 1990s and also in the role of `mercenaries' in conflict. This is no dry read, but the best in storytelling and furthermore it is all true.

Seth J. Frantzman