The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global 2nd Edition

The term Jihad is based on the Qur'an saying "...you who believe fight the unbelievers who are near to you." In practice this has been interpreted to mean defending Islam, including the Shari'a (Islamic Law), against internal and external threats. This interpretation has produced the concepts of the `near enemy' that is threats from within the realm of Islam (Dar al Islam) usually from secular or apostate rulers and the `far enemy' that is threats to Islam from non-Islamic States such as those of the West or Israel.

This is a way of introducing this most important book by Fawz A. Gerges. Its central thesis is that the concept of Jihad is far from monolithic, but has splintered into many separate movements with very different agendas. According to Gerges these include a relatively small movement that adheres to the far enemy ideology of Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda movement. This movement see the principal threat to Islam as coming primarily from the U.S. and Israel as well as the West in general. Gerges does not discount the threat posed by this movement, but does note that it is very much a minority movement within a much broader spectrum of Jihadist movements. The inference from Gerges book is that if al Qaeda is understood for what it is, a relatively minor group in a much wider Jihadist movement, it can be better combated.

As Gerges makes clear the concept of Jihad is a complex one and requires a good deal knowledge to understand the implications of Jihadist movements for U.S. National Security. This is not a perfect book and Gerges is at best a pedestrian writer. Yet, the attentive reader can extract a good deal of relevant information about the ideology and institutional structure of the perpetrators of the dreadful attacks of September 11 2001.

I spent most of my working life in Muslim countries ranging from Libya to Pakistan, with long-term stops in Turkey and Iran. I spoke Turkish well, could manage in Arabic and Urdu and was a flop at Farsi. I visited Morocco, Algeria, Saudi-Arabia and Oman. Most "explanations" of 9/11 left me completely underwhelmed. The Far Enemy provides the only rational explanation for 9/11 that I've heard or read. I strongly recommend the book to anyone who wants to think seriously about the opportunities and challenges America faces in dealing with disaffected Muslims

The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global
Well written. Very detailed. Some repetition. Very informative. Writer knows his subject. Should be required reading at the State Department.

I will admit, I stopped after reading the first 50 pages. It's very repetitive. After a 15 page prologue, the author offers a 25 page introduction. Maybe both should have been skipped. The main idea: up until the 1990s radical Muslims focused on fighting their own governments (the near enemy) and in the mid 1990s a small fraction of them decided to fight the U.S. and Western countries (the far enemy). Interesting, but in the first 40 pages, the author made this point at least ten times. Not only ideas and arguments, even whole sentences are repeated from one page to the other. For readers interested in this topic, I recommend 'The Next Attack' which I'll give at least four stars.

In this book Gerges' basic thesis is that for the majority of jihadists and Islamists regime change in their local governments has been and still is the main objective. He says that al-Qaeda is a minority within the jihadist movement, and that most main stream organizations and leaders see al-Qaeda, and other like minded organizations, as misguided if not outright detrimental to the goal of changing the Middle East. The author gives a large sampling of main stream voices who have been publicly critical of bin Laden and Zawahiri. He suggests that the Arab world, as well as the jihadists and Islamist, movement is not monolithic but is instead in constant flux.

During the 80s and 90s jihadists fought a bloody war against their secular and authoritarian governments. The main problem was they had no plans other than violent confrontation. They had no political, economic or social platform, instead all they had was deep motivation to violently remove these regimes and implement a top down societal overhaul. While the regimes they lashed out against were deserving of little sympathy, the jihadists lack of a rational and realistic political platform meant the people refused to get behind their movement because they offered the people only two options; the regime which offered stability, or extreme violence. Due to their failings the jihadists lost their battle in the 90s which created a rift between the movement. Some of these guys became introspective and began to look critically at their movement to see why they failed so miserably, and to see what changes should be implemented to change the patterns of failure.

What Gerges posits is that many decided a violent confrontation with a top down approach that ignores the people is one that is destined to fail. They have looked critically at themselves and their movement and moved to implement much needed reform. With that said there were others, like Zawahiri, who decided to change tactics and confront the far enemy under the diluted notion that this would rally all Muslims to their nihilistic organization and rejuvinate their movement. What Gerges' sources illustrate very well is the lack of introspection with these leaders, and how they are forced to constantly rewrite their own history to make their strategic failures appear as if they were the goal from the beginning.

What Gerges does well is show the debate that is going on within the jihadist and Islamist movements. A civil war of ideas is being waged in the Muslim world, and the outcome of this battle will determine where the Jihadists and Islamic world will go from here. Al Qaeda and other like minded organizations have no real platform. All they offer is nihilistic violence, death and destruction. While they can be devastatingly destructive like on Sept. 11, they are destined to failure, and it is important that the West helps win the war of ideas just as much as the actual fight against terrorism.

As for criticism, the book is poorly written. The author will introduce characters the same way every time he writes about them. One of the main characters is an Egyptian lawyer Montasser al-Zayat who was a jihadist and now defends prominent jihadists in Egypt. Every time the author mentions him he gives a pragraph long description of who he is that is verbatim the same as the very first introduction. He does with many people, and it quickly becomes annoying.

The other thing is that, while the book has shown itself to be prescient, it is a little dated especially after the death of bin Laden. Its focus on bin Laden and al Qaeda means that, while when originally written it hit the nail on the head, now the world is moving on to other organizations and looking at potential new leaders.

This is a very good book that uses the jihadists and Islamists as first hand sources in developing its thesis. This is important for readers because it gives them and inside look at movement that is at a crossroads. This book will inform and enlighten readers which is why I absolutely recommend this book.

Though the author seems to belabor the point at times, the end result is a study in the jihadist trends of the past 30+ years. In this book you will be introduced to the key players in this drama along with the historical background of how their thought and teaching developed. It will take some time to digest it all but do not rush the reading and you will be rewarded with a level of analysis lacking in most books and reporting on the subject. It is well written for such a complex and daunting study.