TO THE FAREWELL ADDRESS

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

Contents

Chapter One

I

"We are as near to Heaven by sea as by land." These are the last known words of Sir Humfrey Gilbert, the first Englishman who conceived of a settlement of English people on the North American continent. In the name of his Great Queen, Sir Humfrey had taken possession of New Foundland, which, he hoped, would provide riches for himself, his family, his friends, and his country. On his return voyage to England, a storm swept away part of his fleet, leaving only the Golden Hind and Sir Humfrey's flagship, the tiny Squirrel. Before these two ships were torn apart by another storm, in which the Squirrel foundered with all on board, the men of the Golden Hind could see Sir Humfrey sitting on the quarterdeck of the Squirrel and reading. What he read excited him to this exclamation.

The book in Sir Humfrey's hands must have been the Utopia of Sir Thomas More, for it contains the thought which stimulated Sir Humfrey: "the way to heaven out of all places is of like length and distance." More's Utopia was a strangely fitting book for Sir Humfrey to read. Behind Sir Humfrey's plans for a settlement in New Foundland, there was not only the anticipation of gaining great wealth, but also the hope of creating an ideal life and society. Thus, the first Englishman who envisaged plantations of his countrymen on the North American continent was driven by two incentives which in the following centuries inspired the astounding growth of the English colonies. The promise of financial rewards and the belief in the possibility and necessity of constructing a more perfect social order were the two motives which led people to embark on the dangerous voyage to the New World. Different—almost contradictory—as these two motives were, they existed together, tightly intertwined in the development of the various English settlements on American soil.

Each motive implied one of two distinct and contrary attitudes to the Old World. The economic motive necessitated close ties with Europe. Great profits could result only from the cultivation and production of goods for export. Pursuit of these activities required bonds with England; business contacts with the London merchants and personal connections with members of the ruling aristocracy, who promoted colonial schemes in the expectation of quick enrichment, had to be maintained. The Utopian motive favored separation from European affairs. The hope of leading a more perfect life on the new continent formed a resistance to involvements with Europe. The attempt to realize a better social order presupposed a critical view of the values of the Old World and aroused a fear of ties which might spread the diseases of Europe to America.

In New England, where the settlers had entered into a covenant with God, so that this area might be preserved as the only center of true religion, the Puritan leaders felt themselves worlds removed from other colonies. They looked down with contempt upon the manners and customs which the riches from tobacco production were creating in Virginia. Nothing worse could be imagined than 'that New England might become "like the rest of the Nations, being grown into the same conformity to the World, with other Plantations."

It would be wrong, however, to accept the Puritans' own evaluation of New England's unique position. It should not be assumed that the religious plantations—Plymouth Colony, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island, and Connecticut—were fundamentally different from the rest of the English colonies on the North American continent. The power of the theocracy to subordinate worldly activities to the ideal of a society organized for the purposes of God weakened in New England even before the first generation of settlers had died. From the middle of the seventeenth century, the inhabitants of New England were frequently reminded by their ministers that "New England is originally a plantation of religion, not a plantation of trade." Admonishments against vanity and the sinfulness of luxury, and warnings against the danger of forgetting the true aims of life, increased in number and vehemence in the course of the seventeenth century. At last, it came to be admitted that wealth and prosperity might be a sign of God's special regard for the people of New England who lived under the covenant. It had not been possible to restrict economic activities to farming; trade with other colonies and with England had become more and more important. A merchant class, occupied with worldly concerns and far-flung interests, began to play the leading role in the social life of New England.

Although originally the prevalence of a self-sufficing village economy in the North and of large plantations producing tobacco for export in the South had given the social life of North and South a different pattern, this dividing line soon became blurred. Nor was there a separation between North and South because the settlement in these two regions had been undertaken for different motives. Not all the northern colonies were religious foundations, nor were all the southern colonies solely commercial enterprises. Maine and New Hampshire were proprietary colonies, settled primarily for profit and advantage. On the other hand, the hopes for economic gains which had led a group of London merchants to plant Virginia and had stimulated a number of British aristocrats to found the Carolinas were not the only inducements to settle in the southern part of the North American continent. Sir George Calvert's wish to find a refuge for English Catholics, William Penn's interest in creating a community in which Quakers could live according to their ideals, Oglethorpe's aim to ameliorate the situation of debt-prisoners—these motives, imbued with humanitarian, religious, and Utopian elements, lay behind the foundations of Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Georgia. Although the English promoters of American colonies might have been exclusively interested in the economic aspects of their enterprises, the men whom they persuaded to sail over the ocean and transform the wilderness into a productive land were often those to whom life in Europe had become unbearable and who, perhaps vaguely and almost unconsciously, carried into the New World the dream of a different, of a better, more just social order.

In all regions of the British settlements in North America, one could have found a strong feeling of material realism and a pervasive air of Utopian idealism and, consequently, two different attitudes regarding the Old World: attraction and rejection. This does not mean that out of these various elements there slowly emerged a mixture or synthesis which might permit us to speak of a general American view towards England or Europe in the colonial period. This is impossible because of the varying degrees in the original strength which the economic and Utopian elements had in each colony; each colony combined them only on a different level. Moreover, the decisive factor which prevents the assumption of a common view of the British colonies in North America, or even of the northern, the middle, or the southern colonies, towards Europe is that such an assumption would be an intellectual construction and have no justification in the reality of the colonial period. Each colony felt itself to be autonomous and independent, a world of its own.

A difficulty in grasping the full extent to which each colony was a separate unit lies in the manner in which charters and grants of the English monarchs, establishing the various colonies, divided up the whole region from latitudes 34° to 45° north. If the geographical data provided in these charters are drawn on a map, the entire North American continent, in a north-south direction from the Bay of Fundy to Cape Hatteras, in an east-west direction through unknown areas to the Pacific Ocean, is distributed among the promoters and founders of plantations. Each grant was contiguous with the territory of the next; in some cases the charters overlapped. The charters and grants, however, described only the areas in which the right to make settlements was given to the owners; they did not expect to populate and cultivate the entire area which had been assigned to them, or even large parts of it. In the first sixty years of English colonization in North America, settlements were restricted to the coast line and extended into the interior only along a few large rivers; the population was thin, and the inhabited areas of each colony seldom stretched along the entire coast line assigned by the charter. The settlements of one colony were usually far removed from the settlements of the next. This situation did not change fundamentally in the second part of the seventeenth century, when wider areas of the interior became settled and cultivated. Open spaces still remained between settlements belonging to different colonies. There was little danger of encroaching on the other's territory; the actual issue was whether single governments were able to control the settlements in the vast areas over which the charters had given authority. Connecticut became an autonomous colony in the area which the Massachusetts Bay Colony claimed. Settlements within the boundaries of the Carolina grant were made chiefly in the southern part; settlements in the northern portion became a separate colony —North Carolina. Nor was it possible to maintain the union which had been established between Pennsylvania and Delaware. Each plantation, set in what to the settlers appeared an infinite wilderness, was confronted by individual tasks created by the particularity of its physical surroundings and the character of the natives. Thus, each colony became accustomed to relying on its own resources and to pursuing its own policy. The colonies might derive their legal existence from the English Crown and to it owe allegiance; but on the American continent, they grew up in their own way.

In 1776, when the colonies became the United States of America and entered the field of foreign policy as an independent power, they had suddenly to assume a function which, previously, England had carried out for them. Yet they were still in the process of accomplishing the necessary preliminary step of developing a consciousness of the community of interest which would set them off as a unit within the state system.

II

In contrast to the colonies, each of which was anxious to chart its own course in the New World, the English government was inclined from the beginning to regard its plantations on the American continent as an entirety. When James I gave the first Virginia charter, he was concerned with the whole area on which Englishmen would settle in the course of the following century. The tendency to deal with the American colonies according to a common policy remained strong in London throughout the period in which the American colonies were part of the British Empire.

This outlook was produced and maintained by political trends, administrative necessities, economic interests, and considerations of power policy. Royal authority was the source of all the enterprises undertaken on American soil. Although the King had little or no part in the organization of the settlements, the Stuart monarchs were concerned about upholding their claims to final authority; and so at appropriate moments, they interfered in the affairs of their colonies. It was no less natural that the special committees and commissions created to handle problems inherent in the existence of colonial possessions—matters of immigration, finance, and defense—would follow a general line and adopt a uniform policy. Furthermore, England's primary interest in her colonies was the regulation of their trade in such a manner that foreigners were excluded and the English merchant would benefit; this led unavoidably to the development of a policy for the colonies as a whole. The trend towards subjecting the colonies to the uniform policy of a central authority in London was not exclusively dependent on the will of the Monarch; therefore, this policy was continued when the absolutist Stuarts had fallen from power. A special committee to determine colonial policy and to enforce it was established by Parliament during the Civil War and the same system for administering the plantations was adopted under the Commonwealth.

These unifying tendencies received a more energetic impulse and a more systematic form after the Restoration of the Stuarts. The changes resulting from this centralizing policy were, however, of short duration on the North American continent. The climax of this policy, the "Dominion of New England," lasted barely three years. The attempt to form one great province, extending from Maine to the Jerseys under one Governor-in-Chief appointed by the King, collapsed with the "glorious revolution." Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Maine, New York and the Jerseys—which had lost their charters and had been deprived of their legislatures—reemerged as political identities. The administrative changes which Charles II introduced in the colonial bureaucracy in London had lasting significance. All the issues connected with the colonies were placed under a special committee within the Privy Council called the "Lords of Trade and Plantations." Although the particular form of organization devised by the Stuarts did not survive their fall, the centralizing principle which had inspired the establishment of the Lords of Trade and Plantations was adopted and continued by the succeeding rulers.

The "Board of Trade" which was created in 1696 and continued to function throughout the eighteenth century had less power than the Lords of Trade and Plantations which the Board replaced. The former had possessed executive authority, while the Board of Trade had only investigating and advisory functions; it collected information about the colonies and made policy recommendations. Thus, the appointment of colonial officials and the execution of policy were left to traditional office-holders, especially the Secretaries of State. Nevertheless, the existence of an English government agency working steadily and exclusively on colonial affairs was an important factor in producing in London an attitude which opposed colonial particularism in favor of a general imperial interest and which placed colonial affairs within the general framework of English foreign policy.

To the members of the Board of Trade, the struggle against Louis XIV reinforced the need for overcoming colonial independence and for coordinating the policy of the various colonies on the American continent. At the beginning of the War of the Spanish Succession, the Board of Trade complained that these colonies do not take "due care for their own defence and security against an enemy" and maintained "that this chiefly arises from the ill use they make of the powers entrusted to them by their charters and the independency which they pretend to, and that each government is obliged only to defend itself without any consideration had of their neighbours, or of the general preservation of the whole." The great political conflict in which England had become involved not only accentuated the need for a unified imperial policy in London, but also aroused the idea in America that the colonies were tied together by common interests which demanded cooperation and common action. This feeling, however, was by no means general. New York, in the interest of an undisturbed fur trade, refused to take any steps which Canada might regard as provocative and managed to remain neutral during the first half of the War of the Spanish Succession. But New England and South Carolina, which had to bear the brunt of the attack which the allied Bourbon powers of France and Spain directed from the north and from the south against the English possessions in North America, felt that more was involved than their individual fate. South Carolina, so the Governor proclaimed at the time of the outbreak of the war, was "the fronteere Colony of all her Ma. Plantations on the Main in America." The threat against the North induced the governors of all the colonies above New York to combine their efforts and to agree on a common offensive strategy against the heart of the French possessions, although the inglorious outcome of the campaign against Quebec in 1711 hardly corresponded to the labors which had been necessary to bring about this concerted action. The "particular interests" of each colony began to be opposed to a "national interest" —to use the terms which appear a few years later in a report of the Governor of Pennsylvania.

(Continues...)

Excerpted from TO THE FAREWELL ADDRESSby FELIX GILBERT Copyright © 1961 by Princeton University Press. Excerpted by permission of PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS. All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
Excerpts are provided by Dial-A-Book Inc. solely for the personal use of visitors to this web site.