Download the free Kindle app and start reading Kindle books instantly on your smartphone, tablet, or computer - no Kindle device required. Learn more
Read instantly on your browser with Kindle for Web.
Using your mobile phone camera - scan the code below and download the Kindle app.
Follow the Authors
OK
Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals' Abuse of Science Hardcover – December 1, 1998
| Price | New from | Used from |
- Print length300 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherPicador USA
- Publication dateDecember 1, 1998
- Dimensions5.75 x 1.25 x 8.75 inches
- ISBN-100312195451
- ISBN-13978-0312195458
The Amazon Book Review
Book recommendations, author interviews, editors' picks, and more. Read it now.
What do customers buy after viewing this item?
- Highest ratedin this set of products
Cynical Theories: How Activist Scholarship Made Everything about Race, Gender, and Identity―and Why This Harms EverybodyHardcover - Lowest Pricein this set of products
Irrational Exuberance: Revised and Expanded Third EditionPaperback
Editorial Reviews
Amazon.com Review
In Fashionable Nonsense, Alan Sokal, the author of the hoax, and Jean Bricmont contend that abuse of science is rampant in postmodernist circles, both in the form of inaccurate and pretentious invocation of scientific and mathematical terminology and in the more insidious form of epistemic relativism. When Sokal and Bricmont expose Jacques Lacan's ignorant misuse of topology, or Julia Kristeva's of set theory, or Luce Irigaray's of fluid mechanics, or Jean Baudrillard's of non-Euclidean geometry, they are on safe ground; it is all too clear that these virtuosi are babbling.
Their discussion of epistemic relativism--roughly, the idea that scientific and mathematical theories are mere "narrations" or social constructions--is less convincing, however, in part because epistemic relativism is not as intrinsically silly as, say, Regis Debray's maunderings about Gödel, and in part because the authors' own grasp of the philosophy of science frequently verges on the naive. Nevertheless, Sokal and Bricmont are to be commended for their spirited resistance to postmodernity's failure to appreciate science for what it is. --Glenn Branch
From Publishers Weekly
Copyright 1998 Reed Business Information, Inc.
From Library Journal
Copyright 1998 Reed Business Information, Inc.
Review
This book may have little effect on its actual subjects, who long ago parted ways with rational debate. But it should be read by every college president and trustee, to better understand how deeply the postmodernist rot has affected their institutions, undermining the very purpose of a university: the search for truth. -- The Wall Street Journal, Heather Mac Donald
From the Publisher
In Fashionable Nonsense, Sokal teams up with Belgian physicist Jean Bricmont to assemble and analyze a series of texts illustrating the physico-mathematical mystifications perpetuated by Jacques Lacan, Julia Kristeva, Luce Irigaray, Bruno Latour, Jean Baudrillard, Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, and Paul Vivilio. They show that, behind an imposing jargon and an apparent scientific erudition, the emperor is naked.
Praise for Fashionable Nonsense:
"No doubt there exist thoughts so profound that most of us will not understand the language in which they are expressed. And no doubt there is also language designed to be unintelligible in order to conceal an absence of honest thought. But how are we to tell the difference? What if it really takes an expert eye to detect whether the emperor has clothes? In Fashionable Nonsense, Sokal and Bricmont give us the background information that should convince any reasonable person that the hoax was earnestly needed and richly justified. A splendid book." --Richard Dawkins, author of Climbing Mount Improbable and The Blind Watchmaker
"The modern sciences are among the most remarkable of human achievements and cultural treasures. Like others, they merit--and reward--respectful and scrupulous engagement. Sokal and Bricmont show how easily such truisms and recede from view, and how harmful the consequences can be for intellectual life and human affairs. They also provide a thoughtful and constructive critical analysis of fundamental issues of empirical inquiry. It is a timely and substantial contribution." --Noam Chomsky
"Take the most hallowed names in current French theoretical thinking, divide by one of the sharpest and most irreverent minds in America, multiply by a half-dozen examples, render in good, clear English--and you have a thoroughly hilarious romp through the postmodernist academy. Two years ago, Sokal struck a devastating blow against intellectual obscurantism with his famous Social Text parody, and Fashionable Nonsense delivers the perfect coup de grace." --Barbara Ehrenreich, author of Blood Rites and The Snarling Citizen
About the Author
Jean Bricmont is a theoretical physicist with the Universite de Louvain in Belgium.
Product details
- Publisher : Picador USA (December 1, 1998)
- Language : English
- Hardcover : 300 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0312195451
- ISBN-13 : 978-0312195458
- Item Weight : 1.1 pounds
- Dimensions : 5.75 x 1.25 x 8.75 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #408,650 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #1,316 in History & Philosophy of Science (Books)
- #10,129 in Philosophy (Books)
- Customer Reviews:
About the authors

Discover more of the author’s books, see similar authors, read author blogs and more

Discover more of the author’s books, see similar authors, read author blogs and more
Customer reviews
Customer Reviews, including Product Star Ratings help customers to learn more about the product and decide whether it is the right product for them.
To calculate the overall star rating and percentage breakdown by star, we don’t use a simple average. Instead, our system considers things like how recent a review is and if the reviewer bought the item on Amazon. It also analyzed reviews to verify trustworthiness.
Learn more how customers reviews work on Amazon-
Top reviews
Top reviews from the United States
There was a problem filtering reviews right now. Please try again later.
The following comments are based on notes I took while reading the book. Kindle locations are given in brackets [].
[905] I have an objection to this line of thought - “We never have direct access to the world; we have direct access only to sensations.” This is accepted in the authors answer to “solipsism and radical skepticism.” I do not concede this to those that hold this position. We do have direct contact with the world. We see things because of light (made of photons) impinging on our nervous system; we touch many things directly; we smell because of contact with chemical molecules; we taste because of touch and chemical reactions, and we hear because of sound waves that enter our ears.
[1003] “In a sense, we always return to Hume’s problem: No statement about the real world can ever literally be <i>proven</i>; but to use the eminently appropriate expression from Anglo-Saxon law, it can sometimes be proven beyond any <i>reasonable</i> doubt. The unreasonable doubt subsists.” (authors italics). I have been saying this for some years. If I hold a belief that is <i>beyond a reasonable doubt</i>, I should be willing to act on it, and for me a belief is not a belief until it is <i>beyond a reasonable doubt</i>. Otherwise, for me it is just a thought or feeling, something I think or feel about, but that I am not completely sure of, and when I write I say “I think or I feel.”
[1644] Within in a quote by Irigaray is “Neitzsche also perceived his ego as an atomic nucleus threatened with explosion,” trying to argue some fantastic idea. Neitzsche also was mentally ill, and finally cracked (or went insane) at the end of his life. Maybe that atom nucleus did explode.
[1785] “Finally, it is hard to see what relation, besides a purely metaphorical one, fluid mechanics could have with psychoanalysis. Suppose tomorrow someone were to come up with a satisfactory theory of turbulence. In what way would (or should) that affect our theories of human psychology.” Brain fluid turbulence, maybe :-)
[2307] Within a long quote by Baudrillard it says: “It combines in effect an inflation, a galloping acceleration, a dizzying whirl of mobility, an eccentricity of events and an excess of meaning and information with an exponential tendency towards <i>total entropy</i>.” (my italics) Besides the authors critique, I would add that besides its meaninglessness, if total entropy were reach there would be no reason to continue chuntering on. And, then: “It would seem that there will be no end . . .” Total entropy would be the end. Further on [2316] in the same quotation, there is this “. . . the potential hurricanes which end in the beating of a butterfly’s wings?” Should not this be the beginning if he is trying to use the popular analogy?
[2388] From a quote by Deleuze and Guattari: “. . . they [endoreferences] are not relations but numbers, and the entire theory of functions depends on numbers.” First, I have no idea what “endoreferences” in brackets are. Second, functions depend not just on numbers; they are really relations of variables with the numbers occurring in them as constants that do not vary. It is okay if a functions have no constants at all, like: f(x) = y + y.
[3494] Here is a sentence in a quote by Aronowitz: “Surely, the earth [sic] evolved long before life on earth.” First, the Earth does not evolve itself (at least not in the Darwinian sense as life does). Second if as stated previously in the quote: “natural objects are also socially constructed,” how can the earth (evolving or not) be anything other than a social construct, which as such could equally be socially constructed to not exist to be consistent?
[4475] Note 52 states: “Bertrand Russell . . . tells the following amusing story. ‘I once received a letter from an eminent logician, Mrs. Christine Ladd Franklin, saying that she was a solipsist, and was surprised that there were not others.” This is somewhat a surprising thing to say if you are a solipsist because if you hold to such a belief there are no others to be solipsists, since as a solipsist you must hold that only you exist.
[4507] Note 62 partially says: “Our [the authors] analysis in this section [‘Epistemology in Crisis’ in chapter four.] is inspired in part by Putnam (1974), Stove (1982), and Laudan (1990b). . . . Tim Burdon drew our attention to Newton-Smith (1981), where a similar critique of Popper’s epistemology can be found.” I am not sure how similar Susan Haack’s opposition to Popper in her <i>Putting Philosophy to Work</i> is with these others, but it could very well go on the list as well.
The book was okay, but repetitive and way to many lengthy quotes. I tended to enjoy the authors “Intermezzos” on different common problems with postmodernist writers, but how much gobbledygook can one take. I mean it felt like I was drowning in it—give me some air please. As you can see from my comments I found other qualms other than what the authors provided, so in this case it was a little fun. Remember, it seems like I get my jollies (though not in a mean way, at least not ordinarily) figuring out critiques with what others’ think.
If you are interested in critiques of postmodernist thought in the academy, you should enjoy the book, given my caveat above, but if you enjoy a dizzy head you may not have any issues with it. I think it would help if you are already familiar with some of the postmodernists’ positions to understand the book better.
Note - <i> and <i/> indicate the beginning and end of italics.
A major portion of the book is given over to reproductions of original 'postmodernist' sources that ramble for pages on end, with trifling comments by the authors on how the different scientific concepts have been misinterpreted or misused. However, the long barrage of academic verbiage is such manifest nonsense to begin with that there is little left for the sagacity of Sokal and Bricmont to say.
There are only so many ways to call a fraud a fraud, so many ways to point to a syntactic confusion of adjectives and say, 'this is gibberish.'
The reason for the extensive quantity of quoted material, the authors explain, is that they do not want to be accused of misrepresenting the sources, or cherry-picking their quotations. This may be an admirable intention but it does not make the situation any less painful for the reader who is forced to slog his way through the sentences.
If a reader is not convinced of the absurdity of the postmodern examples within the first two sentences of a quotation, they probably so completely lack the discriminating facility that another twenty pages will not do them any more good.
Much more instructive were the sections between the criticisms of the individual postmodern authors, that dealt more broadly with the roles of science and reason in the humanities and politics. Despite what other reviewers have said, there is nothing in these parts which does not seem to me to be thoroughly reasonable and correct.
Most incomprehensible is how anyone could have ever taken these postmodernist authors seriously in the first place - how entire segments of the academic world could have so completely taken leave of their senses as to give even one of these imposters an academic post - let alone legions of them spanning several generations.
By sheer chance, I recently ran into this comment by Jonathan Swift which seems to have some bearing on the situation:
"There are certain common Privileges of a Writer,
the Benefit whereof, I hope, there will be no Reason to doubt;
Particularly, that where I am not understood, it shall be concluded,
that something very useful and profound is coucht underneath." (1704)
Top reviews from other countries
ところが、ここでやり玉に挙がっている人たちは何一つ名誉を失っていない…ように見える。ポストモダンを指弾したテリー・イーグルトンも、「文学とは何か」でラカンを高く買っているようだ
どうしたことかと思って改めて読んでみた感想は、大陸哲学に親しんできた人をこれで説得することは無理だな、というもの
もちろんポストモダンが正しいというつもりはさらさらない。ソーカルたちの指摘もいちいち尤も。しかし敵を引き入れるだけの力がないと思う
今読むと、この本で重要な部分は、明らかな書き方をしていないところ、すなわち「これほどでたらめを書く人の著作が全体として信用できるか?」という、通奏低音のごとき暗黙の問いかけであろう。侮蔑的な口調がそれを示している。もう少し明示的に誘導してほしかったなという気がするが、それをやると反論の隙を作って、挙句グダグダになってしまうのかな
むろんのこと、これでこの本の批判とするつもりはないし、価値は変わりない。ただ、いかにも理系と文系の思考法の違いと取られてしまう結果に終わったことが残念だし、そのように読むように書かれている
なお、当のアメリカでは、ソーカル、ブリクモンという保守派がリベラル側に仕掛けた攻撃、というとらえ方をされたらしく、政治的な文脈での批判も多い。日本のポストモダン擁護派が、この本を批判するだけの勇気もないのは、やはり思想がファッションにすぎないからだろうな
Die Einleitung rekapituliert die Sokal-Affäre inklusive Antworten auf seinen Zeitschriftenbeitrag und seine Auswirkungen.
Im Hauptteil des Buches untersuchen Sokal und Bricmont verschiedene ausgewählte Texte u.a. von Jacques Lacan, Julia Kristeva, Bruno Latour und Luce Irigaray. Dabei werden die mißbrauchten wissenschaftlichen Konzepte in ihren Grundzügen erläutert, zudem verweisen die Autoren auf weiterführende wissenschaftliche Literatur. In Zwischenkapiteln gehen die Autoren auf bestimmte wissenschaftliche und philosophische Konzepte des Postmodernismus ein und werfen Licht ein einige Mißverständnisse, die im Umgang mit wissenschaftliche Konzepten, die zu Schlagwörter geworden sind, existieren.
Obwohl die Autoren die Grundzüge der mißbrauchten (natur-)wissenschaftliche oder mathematischen wie oben angemerkt Konzepte erläutern, ist ein tieferes Verständnis dieser Konzepte, die teilweise weit über den Schulstoff hinausgehend, durchaus hilfreich. Dieser Teil des Buches ist für die flüssige Nebenbei-Lektüre wenig geeignet, ein Durchackern und sei es einzelner Kapitel ist jedoch in jedem Fall lohnenswert.
Im Anhang befindet sich u.a. der vollständige Text des Artikels ("Transgressing the Boundaries: Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity"), den Sokal 1996 in der Zeitschrift Social Text veröffentlicht hat sowie eine vollständige Bibliographie.
Das Buch sollte Pflichtlektüre für jeden sein, der sich auch nur entfernt mit Wissenschaftstheorie auseinandersetzt, also eigentlich jeden Studenten.
Bei dem Punkt, als er "Wahrheit" mit "Nützlichkeit" verwechselt hat, habe ich die Lektüre abgebrochen.
In der Philosophie kennt sich Sokal halt einfach nicht aus - sollte die Finger davon lassen









