Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time Paperback – March 17, 2014

There have been thousands of books written on Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal. Instead of focusing on the executive branch, Katznelson shifts the focus to the Congress, particularly the southern Democrats who dominated the caucus and chaired the major committees. The author convincingly demonstrates that when the southerners were with him, Presidents Roosevelt and Truman got what they wanted. Conversely when the southerners opposed the Adminstration, the New and Fair Deals floundered. It is here where Katznelson makes an important contribution to our understanding of the New Deal and the early postwar era.

With respect to domestic policy, Katznelson views the approach the southerner took through the prism of race. Specifically where the southerners feared the underpinnings of the Jim Crow south were under attackl they backed away from Roosevelt. Although I largely agree with that thesis, the major failing of the book in my opinion, is that Katznelson ignored the Jacksonian roots of the southern Democrats then sitting in Congress. At its founding the Jacksonian Democrats were both racist domestically and hawkish with respect to foreign policy. Thus while the southerners, opposed Roosevelt dometically after 1938, they stood by him and later Truman in supporting the foreign and defense polcies of the emerging national security state.

I would recommend "Fear Itself..." to both serious students of American history and the casual reader interested in how much the the institutions we now take for granted came into being.

David Shulman

In "Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time", Ira Katznelson argues, “The New Deal – the designation I use for the full period of Democratic Party rule that begins with FDR’s election in 1932 and closes with Dwight Eisenhower’s two decades later – reconsidered and rebuilt the country’s long-established political order.” (pg. 4-5) To this end, Katznelson “examines the fringes of liberal civilization and the ways in which illiberal political orders, both within and outside the United States, influenced key New Deal decisions.” (pg. 7) Unlike previous histories of the New Deal era that focus on the executive branch and President Roosevelt, Katznelson primarily focuses on the legislative branch of government. Crucially, Katznelson refocuses on the conflicting role of the South in the New Deal. He writes, “The failure to place the special, often determining role of the Jim Crow South front and center, I believe, has had much the same effect as the ‘willful critical blindness’ about race that Toni Morrison has identified so tellingly.” (pg. 22)
Katznelson uses fear as a discursive tool to understand the actions of the legislature in passing extensive New Deal legislation; compromising with fascists early on, the Soviets later, and Southern racists throughout; and in the arms buildup at the beginning of the Cold War. Discussing the fear of the Great Depression, Katznelson writes, “Intense uncertainty, the kind that makes the usual sense of the term status quo virtually irrelevant, became a source of fear.” (pg. 48) Discussing the ease with which U.S. policymakers overlooked the crimes of other governments and the racism of their own Southern representatives, Katznelson writes, “A willingness to countenance horrendous human rights violations in the name of realism, which would become even more apparent in 1938 with Kristallancht, thus already was evident in the aftermath of this aggressive Italian war” in Ethiopia. (pg. 69) Describing the role of the Southern legislators, Katznelson writes, “Fusing white supremacy with American nationalism, most white southerners, including most politicians, saw little conflict between systematic racism and liberal democratic government. This combination controlled how the region stayed within the ambit of national politics through the instrument of the Democratic Party.” (pg. 160) This further ensured a Southern blockade of civil rights legislation. In order to avoid a one-sided narrative, Katznelson writes of the South’s role in successful mobilization for war, “Without the South, strict neutrality would have persisted, aid would not have followed so readily to U.S. allies, and no person would have been subject to conscription for longer than one year.” (pg. 281) Katznelson described the fear facing Americans in the face new dictatorships, writing, “Americans had reason to worry that their frail and undersized federal government lacked effective means to exercise global power, revive capitalism, or calm the widespread disquiet of the American people. The rise of the dictatorships along with the means they had adopted to address economic problems and rebalance international might and power revealed that familiar policies would no longer suffice.” (pg. 114) In discussing the power of the legislative branch during the first one hundred days, Katznelson writes, "In placing the recovery program almost entirely in the president’s hands, Congress did flirt with what might be thought of as a functional Enabling Act. But flirt though it did, the institution also did not cross the line. Congress kept, and increasingly asserted, its legislative prerogatives. Even during the Hundred Days, the legislature dealt with the economic emergency through ordinary legislation, however novel and far-reaching, rather than by yielding lawmaking to the executive branch or declaring a state of exception." (pg. 125) Fear reasserted itself after the end of the war. Katznelson writes of postwar legislation, “The frantic pace of all this planning and legislation was propelled by anxiety. If the war had brought an end to the Depression conditions of investment and employment, what would happen when this unprecedented federal investment and spending, not to mention price controls and active manpower policies, were finally withdrawn?” (pg. 369) Discussing the role of fear in creating the national security state during the Cold War, Katznelson writes, “Hugely motivated by fears of Communism, congressional decisions were guided by a more bipartisan approach to foreign affairs than had existed before Pearl Harbor, particularly those related to the control of atomic energy and the organization of the armed services.” (pg. 422) This fear led to the creation of the CIA and concentration of powers in the executive branch, though Katznelson argues it was with the legislature’s consent. He writes, “Nuclear fear was fueling lasting changes to the American state.” (pg. 441)
Katznelson primarily interacts with the previous work on the New Deal by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Bernard Bailyn, and Richard Hofstadter. He extends the boundaries of the New Deal beyond the 1940s and into the early years of the Cold War, tracing the growth of government during that period to the process begun in the 1930s. Most interestingly, Katznelson avoids the congratulatory note that typifies New Deal history, instead focusing on conflicts of interest and moral bargaining.

As one of the early boomers FDR was an icon that was place before us as we were growing up. Reading this history of the period, I got to see the convoluted reality of what really happened, and didn't happen, during the FDR administration through Truman up to Eisenhower.

The narrative isn't 100% linear so be prepared for more than a few sudden time-shifts. Also be prepared to be surprised at the way our government worked then, and largely still works now.

A valuable addition to the extensive research on how the New Deal has shaped the current day, with emphasis on racial politics, challenges to liberal democracy, and the evolution of the national security state. While Katznelson is an obvious admirer of the New Deal and of FDR, he doesn't skirt their defects. In fact, the fears he exposes go to their defects, which may have been unavoidable but are nonetheless revealing of the who and what we have become.

It's the 3 books together: "Fear Itself" (Ira Katznelson),"FDR & The Jews" (Richard Breitman) and "Those Angry Days"(Lynne Olson), that provide a wonderful perspective, not only on those times (WWII), but on how the U.S. operates on the basis of
its democratic structure (the Constitution). Together, these works illuminate, in depth, what this country can and cannot do to solve
urgent problems in the short run.
I'm convinced that "gridlock", for one, requires first and foremost, electoral reform. It's a sine qua non.

Well wriiten and pleasure to read. Have never read the central thesis-centrality of race and region-as setting the limits on thd New Deal. If you think the New Deal was the beginng of the end for America, you will disagee with the analysis. The latter part of the book -- the US emergence of the national security state -- I found less interesting. I teach at a university and do research on politcal development. This book comes with that genre and is an excellent contribution to the field.