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Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq Hardcover – July 25, 2006
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- Print length496 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherPenguin Press HC, The
- Publication dateJuly 25, 2006
- Reading age18 years and up
- Dimensions6.46 x 1.59 x 9.5 inches
- ISBN-10159420103X
- ISBN-13978-1594201035
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Editorial Reviews
Amazon.com Review
Making a Fiasco
Thomas Ricks spent five tours in Iraq during the war, reporting for the Washington Post and researching and writing Fiasco. Like many of the officers he most admires, when he wanted to understand what was happening as American troops encountered stronger and longer-lived resistance to the occupation than expected, he turned to recent and classic accounts of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, from the U.S. occupation of the Philippines through the lessons of Vietnam, and he reports on his favorites for us in his list of the 10 books for understanding Iraq that aren't about Iraq. You can also get a glimpse into his writing process with a much different list he has prepared for us: the music he listened to while writing and researching the book, from Stevie Wonder and Joni Mitchell to Ryan Adams and Josh Ritter. And he took the time to answer a few questions about Fiasco:
Amazon.com: As military correspondent for the Post, you have made five trips to Iraq over the last four years. How has it changed over that time?
Thomas E. Ricks: It has been markedly worse each time, in terms of security. On my first trip, in April-May 2003, we would walk out on the streets of Baghdad at night, albeit with caution. Even on my second trip, in the summer of 2003, I would feel comfortable hopping in a car and driving 100 miles north from Baghdad to Tikrit. To do either of those things now would be suicidal. In January and February of this year, Baghdad felt worse to me Mogadishu did when I was there in 1993 or Sarajevo did when I was there a few years later. It appeared to me that there was no security, except what you provided for yourself with armed men and careful planning. One Army major described the city to me as being in "the pure Hobbesian state" in which everybody is fighting everybody.
By the way, contrary to what I see asserted occasionally, most reporters don't live in the Green Zone, the walled-off area in central Baghdad that is the headquarters of the American effort in Iraq. Reporters live out in the city, and I think generally have a better feel for what is going on than do people living in the Zone or on big American military bases. In the area of Baghdad I stayed in, I constantly heard gunfire and explosions. Yet an American colonel told me that my neighborhood was deemed "secure." I think that really meant that U.S. troops could drive through it while heavily armed--say, with a .50 caliber machine gun atop a Humvee--and usually not be attacked.
I worry that what the Americans measure are threats to U.S. troops and the killings of Iraqis. That neglects a huge spectrum of other significant activities--rapes, robberies, kidnappings, acts of extortion, and, most importantly, acts of violent intimidation.
Amazon.com: You cite many strategic errors in the planning and execution of the war, but perhaps the central one is that the U.S. military leadership failed to recognize that they were fighting an insurgency, and their methods of fighting in fact helped to create that insurgency. Can you explain those methods, and their effects?
Ricks: The U.S. military that went into Iraq in 2003 was the best military in the world for fighting another military. But it was woefully unprepared for the task at hand. For example, U.S. military culture believes in bringing overwhelming force to bear. Yet classic counterinsurgency doctrine calls for using only the minimal amount of force necessary to get the job done. U.S. soldiers and their commanders, untrained and unschooled in the difficult art of counterinsurgency, tended to improvise. So in the summer of 2003, some soldiers in Baghdad decided that the best way to deter looters was to make them cry--and they sometimes did this by threatening to shoot the children of looters, and even conducting mock executions.
More broadly, the Army in the fall of 2003 fell back on what it knew how to do, which was conduct large-scale "cordon-and-sweep" operations. These missions scarfed up thousands of Iraqis, most of them fence-sitting neutrals, and detained them. U.S. military intelligence officials later concluded that 85% of those detained were of no intelligence value. The detention experience frequently was humiliating for Iraqis, a violation of another key counterinsurgency principle: Treat your prisoners well. (Your readers who want to know more about this should read a terrific little book by David Galula titled Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice.)
Not every unit was ineffective or counterproductive. I was struck at how successful the 101st Airborne was in Mosul in 2003-04. And some units showed remarkable improvement--the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment had a mediocre first tour of duty in Iraq, but when it went back in 2005 for a second tour, it did extremely well. Col. H.R. McMaster, the regimental commander (and author of a very good book about the Vietnam War, Dereliction of Duty) told his troops that, "Every time you disrespect an Iraqi, you are working for the enemy." I was especially struck by how his regiment handled its prisoners--it even had a program called "Ask the Customer" that quizzed detainees when they were released about whether they felt treated well. This recognized the lesson of past wars that the best way to end an insurgency is to get its leaders to put down their guns and enter the political system, and to get the rank-and-file to desert or switch sides. But it will be harder to discuss the sewage system with the new mayor next year if your troops beat him in his cell when he was your prisoner last year.
Amazon.com: But today's military leadership was formed in Vietnam, when all of those lessons of counterinsurgency were supposedly learned before. Why didn't that experience translate into a preparation for the current conflict?
Ricks: Military experts, such at Andrew Krepinevich (The Army and Vietnam) and Lt. Col. John Nagl (Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife) say that after that war ended, the Army washed its hands of the entire experience and essentially concluded that it was never going to do anything like that again. It was almost as if the very word "counterinsurgency" was banned from official Army discourse.
In Iraq, there was a tiny minority of American soldiers early on who understood how to win the occupation. These generally were civil affairs officers and other Special Forces types. But their wisdom often was disregarded. "What you are seeing here is an unconventional war being fought conventionally," one Special Forces lieutenant colonel glumly commented one day in Baghdad.
Amazon.com: You've been writing about the military for the Post and the Wall Street Journal for years now, and Fiasco is built from the testimony of a remarkable array of sources up and down the chain of command, some off the record but many more on the record. Can you talk about your sources? Is this level of public criticism of a war from within the military precedented??
Ricks: Yeah, reporting the book was a pretty emotional experience. Even having covered this war as it unfolded, I was taken aback by the rage that some officers felt toward the Bush Administration, and especially toward Defense Secretary Rumsfeld. And also toward Paul Wolfowitz, who was then the no. 2 guy at the Pentagon. I think the rage is probably like what the military felt about Robert McNamara during the Vietnam War. What is unprecedented, I think, is that many officers had doubts about the wisdom of invading Iraq, especially in the way we did it.
The emotions also hit me pretty hard at times, especially when I was writing my chapter 13, about how widespread abuse was by American soldiers in 2003-04, often because they hadn't been trained for the mission they faced. I have spent more than 15 years covering the military. I tend to like and admire these people. So when I learned about a 4th Infantry Division soldier shooting an unarmed, handcuffed Iraqi detainee in the stomach, and the investigating MPs saying the soldier should be charged with homicide, and instead the commander simply discharged the soldier from the Army--well, that bothered me.
Another thing that struck me with sources was the mountain of information that was available. I read over 30,000 pages of documents for this book. At the end of one interview a guy gave me a CD-ROM with every e-mail he had sent to Ambassador Bremer, who ran the civilian end of the first year of the occupation. Other people showed me diaries, unit logs, official briefings, and such. Also the ACLU did a great job of obtaining and releasing piles of official U.S. military documents related to abuse--so I could see the time stamp on an e-mail in which an intelligence officer stated that "the gloves are coming off" in interrogations, and one soldier recommended blows to the chest while another wrote back recommending low-level electrocution.
Unfortunately the Army wouldn't release the details of citations for valorous acts by soldiers, which means that the Pentagon made it easier for me to learn about the sins of soldiers than about their acts of bravery. The Marine Corps did give me those "narratives" that support the bestowing of medals, which I really appreciated. Those documents really brought home to me the fierceness of the two Battles of Fallujah, in April and November 2004--probably the toughest fighting American troops have seen since Hue and Khe Sanh in the Vietnam War.
Amazon.com: In the last section of the book, you project a variety of possible scenarios for the next 10 years in the Middle East, mostly grim ones, and just in the past two weeks the sudden violence between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon is leading to talk of a wider regional conflict. Where do you think those events are leading us?
Ricks: We are really in unexplored territory. We are carrying out the first-ever U.S. occupation of an Arab nation. This is also almost the first time we have engaged in sustained combat ground war with an all-volunteer force. (I think the suppression of the Philippines insurrection might count as a small precedent.)
Even more significantly, I think the Bush Administration doesn't really like "stability" in the Middle East. In its view, "stability" has been the goal of previous administrations, but pursuing it led to 9/11. It is not the goal, it is the target. So they are for rolling the dice, both in Iraq and in Lebanon. I think the big worry is those wars spilling over borders. Fasten your seat belts.
From Publishers Weekly
Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
From Bookmarks Magazine
Copyright © 2004 Phillips & Nelson Media, Inc.
Review
About the Author
Thomas E. Ricks is The Washington Post's senior Pentagon correspondent, where he has covered the U.S. military since 2000. Until the end of 1999, he held the same beat at The Wall Street Journal, where he was a reporter for seventeen years. A member of two Pulitzer Prize-winning teams for national reporting, he has reported on U.S. military activities in Somalia, Haiti, Korea, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Kuwait, Turkey, Afghanistan, and Iraq. He is the author of Making the Corps and A Soldier's Duty.
From The Washington Post
So who's to blame? It is fast becoming established wisdom that it was the Pentagon's political leaders -- especially Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, his neoconservative first-term deputy Paul Wolfowitz, and the cocksure chief of their policy shop, Douglas J. Feith -- who, above all, led us down the road to disaster in Iraq. But it's too neat to pin the culpability on the Defense Department's pinstripe-wearing civilian leaders and ignore the blunders of the uniformed top brass or, for that matter, the rest of the U.S. government; as they did in Vietnam, the nation's military and civilian leaderships share the responsibility for what's gone wrong. In his compelling and well-researched book, Thomas E. Ricks, a Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter for The Washington Post, painfully but clearly reveals an important truth about the Iraq debacle: It has a thousand fathers.
As the title implies, Fiasco pulls no punches. Sure enough, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and Feith come off badly in Ricks's account. But so do most Democratic members of Congress (whom Ricks labels not doves but "lambs" for their failure to oversee the executive branch) and the media, particularly the New York Times, which failed miserably to probe the Bush administration's war justifications and postwar planning. Ricks is also particularly scathing toward L. Paul Bremer, who led the civilian occupation authority in Iraq in 2003-04. Ricks quotes one colonel who described the efforts of Bremer's Coalition Provisional Authority as "pasting feathers together, hoping for a duck."
Troubling as these failures are, they are by now reasonably familiar; what's far less well-known is the bungling of the senior military leadership. With devastating detail, Ricks documents how U.S. generals misunderstood the problems they faced in Iraq and shows how poorly prepared the Army was for the unanticipated danger of a postwar Sunni rebellion. For ignoring the risks of an insurgency after Saddam Hussein's fall, Gen. Tommy Franks, the head of U.S. Central Command, "flunks strategy," Ricks writes; the war's commanding general designed "perhaps the worst war plan in American history." Gen. Richard Myers, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the invasion, and his deputy, Gen. Peter Pace (who's since been promoted to take Myers's old job), come off as smiling yes-men who went along with amateurish impulses from the Bush administration's political leadership and who forsook their duty to offer detached, professional judgments, acting instead as administration flacks in both private and public.
As a result of the lapses of the top brass and the haughtiness of Rumsfeld's men, the U.S. military came into Iraq inadequately prepared -- and hard-pressed to adapt. From the start, it failed to recognize that ensuring public order was the key to postwar success. As one general puts it, "I was on a street corner in Baghdad, smoking a cigar, watching some guys carry a sofa by -- and it never occurred to me that I was going to be the guy to go get that sofa back."
As the insurgency deepened, the Pentagon's military and civilian leaders first ignored it, then worsened it by using wrongheaded tactics. By emphasizing killing the enemy rather than winning over the people, the U.S. military made new enemies more quickly than it eliminated existing foes. Mass arrests and other attempts to intimidate Iraqis backfired, swelling the insurgents' ranks. U.S. units and troops deployed to Iraq turned over quickly, shuttling in and out of the country with little attempt to build a coherent intelligence picture of the situation on the ground or to sustain hard-won relationships with the local Iraqi officials trying to make their country work. Cities such as Mosul and Fallujah were liberated from insurgents and then abandoned; inevitably, the insurgents took over again. Such mistakes are depressing but not entirely surprising: The U.S. military has forgotten many of the lessons of counterinsurgency warfare that it learned bitterly in Vietnam and elsewhere. Having neglected counterinsurgency in the military's training and education programs, we should not be shocked that we are ill-equipped to wage it.
Indeed, the picture Ricks paints is so damning that it is, at times, too charitable to say that the military and civilian leadership failed. Fiasco portrays several commanders as misguided but trying their best, but others -- particularly the hapless Franks -- appear not to have tried at all. Worse, the overall war and occupation effort lacked the high-level White House coordination essential to victory, allowing Bremer to operate on his own, making major decisions without consulting the Pentagon or the National Security Council, let alone his counterparts on the military side of the occupation.
These failures feel particularly raw given the sacrifices, grit and determination of the heroes of Ricks's book: the junior and noncommissioned officers risking their lives in Iraq's streets, as well as the few innovative senior officers, such as Lt. Gen. David H. Petraeus, who have shrewdly tried (as the New Yorker's George Packer has put it) to win "over the civilian population by encouraging economic reconstruction and local government." Whether getting supply convoys past insurgent strongholds, identifying ways to defeat the rebels' dreaded IEDs (improvised explosive devices) or deciding whether to cow or charm local leaders, creative officers often invented new tactics and strategy on the spot. When they succeeded, they frequently did so in spite of their leaders. Interviews with such gallant soldiers, as well as their e-mails, blogs and private reports, form the core of Ricks's reporting.
And that reporting is impressive indeed. News on Iraq usually comes in blaring headlines, with little sense of trends and context, but Ricks's work allows us to fit seemingly disparate events into an overall pattern. Take the moral and political catastrophe of the abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib; Ricks shows the cruelty as not only a failure of command and discipline by the overmatched unit running the prison but also the result of obtuse higher-level decisions about how to fight the insurgents. Several army units, he reports, indiscriminately arrested Iraqis, making no attempt to separate the few who might know something about the insurgents from the many who were simply in the wrong place at the wrong time. The detention system as a whole was chronically understaffed and overwhelmed by the thousands of detainees pouring in, Ricks writes. That did not make the depravity of Abu Ghraib inevitable, but it did make accidents far more likely to happen.
Ambitious as it is, Fiasco does not offer a comprehensive picture of Bremer's occupation authority or the shadowy insurgency itself. It concentrates on the first year of the occupation, often addressing the subsequent two years of struggle largely as a contrast to the occupation's early days. Beyond this narrow focus, Ricks's penetrating book has perhaps only one other weakness: He is too optimistic about how much the Army has done to embrace a Petraeus-style, hearts-and-minds-based counterinsurgency doctrine today. Ricks is right to note positive U.S. moves such as revamping training programs and changing leadership, but the Army is still too focused on winning battles against individual insurgents and not focused enough on providing security for the Iraqi people as a whole, which is the key to undermining the insurgents.
But these limits do not detract from the value of this powerful book. Ricks begins Fiasco with the ancient strategist Sun Tzu's admonition about how to achieve victory: "Know your enemies, know yourself." Clearly, those who took us to war in 2003 knew neither. The question today is whether they can learn.
Reviewed by Daniel Byman
Copyright 2006, The Washington Post. All Rights Reserved.
Product details
- Publisher : Penguin Press HC, The (July 25, 2006)
- Language : English
- Hardcover : 496 pages
- ISBN-10 : 159420103X
- ISBN-13 : 978-1594201035
- Reading age : 18 years and up
- Item Weight : 1.9 pounds
- Dimensions : 6.46 x 1.59 x 9.5 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #272,371 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #31 in Iraq History (Books)
- #192 in Iraq War History (Books)
- #2,208 in American Military History
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Because of the title itself, I expected Ricks' book to be a bit of a diatribe. I was in the main,wrong. Although he clearly believes, based upon General Anthony Zinni's assessment, that Saddam Hussein was contained, and the invasion unnecessary, Ricks, formerly a Pentagon correspondent at the Washington Post and a thoughtful liberal now working on defense issues at a think tank, is careful to give detail to his story. And except for an unpardonable cheap shot at Bush 43 in which he compares him to the old Yuppie Jerry Rubin, he is fair, even if he disagrees with others. He gives everyone their say if he interviewed them. For example, there is plenty of criticism of the rough tactics of the 4th Infantry Division, led by General Ray Ordierno. But he interviewed Ordierno and allowed the now Army Chief of Staff to air his views. Importantly, too, Ricks has great respect for the military, even a certain reverence, which is why it must have distressed him to point out so many flaws in its strategy and tactics.
While only covering 2003 through 2005, the book's theme is clear. Civilian and military leadership failed for a number of reasons, personal arrogance, lack of strategic planning, poor tactics and a misunderstanding of the type of war the military was fighting. Not only was the National Intelligence Report on the question of WMD dubious as to the existence of such weapons, there was no understanding of how Operation Desert Fox, a four day bombing campaign in 1998, crippled Iraq's ability to make chemical weapons. There is a small, although I think important sentence about the NIE. Neither the President nor Condoleeza Rice read the full 92 page report. That the President relied on a 5 page summary is not surprising. Some people absorb more through auditory learning, as did FDR. And presidents have a plethora of people with whom to consult on issues of national security. But the National Security Adviser relying on the same 5 page report? I find that astonishing.
General Shinseki's belief that 300,000 troops would be needed to invade and occupy Iraq was dismissed by Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz on the theory that all the troops had to do was depose the dictator, conquer Baghdad, and the rest of Iraqi society would welcome us with open arms. Speed would trump the concept of overwhelming force, commonly known as the Powell Doctrine. But Colin Powell was running the State Department, and felt he had to tread lightly over the field of military strategy.
According to Ricks, the suits at the Department of Defense were making their own war plans, never mind that is what the military is trained to do.The military itself thought it a conventional war similar to World War II, the same mistake made in Vietnam. The top brass never understood this war was different. There were exceptions like Generals Patraeus and Batiste and Colonel McMaster, now a major general, and the only one of the three remaining in the military. But they, highly educated and holding doctorates were exceptions. Most in command never understood the concept of winning the hearts and minds of the people. And of course, there were the terrible abuses at Abu Ghraib, another example of poor planning, which left the prison overcrowded, the staff overwhelmed.
So many failed, Rumsfeld, through his arrogance, which caused many in the military to dislike him, his Deputy Secretary,Wolfowitz, the quiet chief theorist who thought it necessary to create a democracy in Iraq, and Douglas Feith, who ran the policy shop. Tommy Franks was detached and uncaring, like many others, about an occupation strategy to pacify the country. He and Feith were particularly obtuse after the initial invasion.Perhaps the greatest mistake, personnel-wise was making Paul Bremer the head of the Conditional Provisional Authority. Much like the key Defense Department honchos, he refused to listen to others, not so much a diplomat, but an autocrat. Bremer decided to tear up the Iraqi military, police force and entire government structure, figuring he could rebuild them from scratch, never mind the population needed foundations to rally around. Of such mistakes are insurgents made. Unbelievably, during the occupation, there was no unity of command, a first principle of war. Bremer had certain powers, as did General Rick Sanchez, autocratic himself but a good man in over his head. And according to Ricks, they detested each other and stopped talking to one another.
There are some weaknesses here. Ricks believes that the war was a product of neoconservative philosophy, the foreign policy school that government, based on moral principles, should do large things. It is not that simple an answer. People can view issues from different perspectives and reach the same conclusion. Nor is it clear just when the effects of Desert Fox were understood by the military or the civilian leadership, before or after the invasion. Ricks relies on statements by the civilian leaders, he does not interview Bush, Dick Cheney, Rumsfeld, and other key government players, for some of which he has obvious contempt They were perhaps too busy to grant him audiences, but it is not clear what the Commander-in-Chief was being told. He omits entirely the statement made to Bush by CIA Director George Tenant that it was a "slam dunk" that Saddam had WMD, a glaring omission. Also, at an event at which retired General Zinni attended, Dick Cheney made the absolute assertion that Saddam had WMD. Ricks lays blame at Cheney's feet for making the war a certainty. But we really do not know the basis of Cheney's declaration. But his history was one of a man immersed in detail. So the question arises as to what the intelligence agencies were showing him, too. Vice Presidents after all, do not go out in the field and acquire intelligence themselves. True, Zinni says he almost fell off his chair at the statement, for he had kept his clearance to view highly classified information, and there was no such indication, but there is no showing he saw or was told the exact things Cheney might have seen or was told.
Much of the time, Ricks relies on Washington Post stories written by others. The book drifts a bit aimlessly after Bremer and Sanchez are replaced by better men, John Negroponte and General George Casey, who worked well together, although Casey himself was later replaced by Patraeus. Perhaps Ricks had a deadline to meet and could not shape the final chapters as he might have. Fiasco, focusing on a limited time period, does not cover the Surge, which was in fact the essence of strategic counterinsurgency, and brought a temporary victory, and what could reasonably be called a calm to Iraq. But given its scope, and the difficulty of obtaining information, Ricks has done an outstanding job.
But I wish Amazon would find an alternative phrase for a 5 star rating other than "I loved it." It seems inappropriate to classify books about real war and real death in the same way one might enjoy Rebecca of Sunnybrook Farm.
Ricks has put together an amazing compilation of the information and attitudes characteristic of the mid-war period. As such, his book contains insight into the angst felt by many prior to adoption of a more successful strategy. We all must consider the impact these attitudes have on America's ability to wage protracted wars.
Since that time the situation has improved on the ground. Our armed forces now better understand the necessity of a counter insurgency (COIN) approach, and more Iraqis have decided their future is better protected by our army (and marine corps).
Ricks provides very extensive information on what went wrong as the insurgency grew in 2003-2006. His book was widely read and no doubt influential in shaping attitudes for implementing a more appropriate approach to counter the insurgency. For this reason alone the book is well worth reading.
As Ricks did not have information on the strategic planning that occurred in Washington, he found fault without knowing the options considered. Douglas J. Feith's book "War and Decision" provides a useful companion and contrast to Ricks' work since it provides this insider's view, and a clear historic record of the decision processes leading up to and pursuing the initial portion of the Iraq war.
In retrospect it is easy to fault the President and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld for failing to push the Army to adopt a counterinsurgency strategy at an earlier date. Earlier replacement of Bremer (head of the Coalition Provisional Authority) and General Sanchez (Coalition military commander) would have been appropriate. It appears that both the President and the Secretary of Defense over-reacted to the disastrous experience of a President and Secretary of Defense micromanaging the Vietnam War. Possibly because of this unfortunate history they were extremely reluctant to reverse decisions made at the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and Regional Command (Centcom) level. (Ricks also points out that the Army unfortunately repressed or forgot the lessons in counterinsurgency for which they had paid so dearly in Vietnam).
Although Ricks never points it out, it is important to remember that the chain of command goes from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the regional commander (Centcom's Tommy Franks handled the invasion of Iraq). The Centcom commander can (and regularly did) react negatively to any suggestions for change that did not come directly from the President or the Secretary of Defense.
The Pentagon staff and the Joint Chiefs provide support and advice only, and are not in the chain of command. Thus, Wolfowitz, Feith and General Myers in the Pentagon could only make suggestions to Rumsfeld and the President. These advisors supported the President's world-wide vision of the terrorist threat with policies designed to reduce that threat. They did not narrow their vision to only Afghanistan, as many have recommended.
Some of the Pentagon's suggestions were adopted and others were not. Unfortunately (in my opinion) one that was adopted by the President was effectively countermanded on the ground by the head of the CPA Paul Bremer III. Bremer did not follow the plan to turn the Iraqi government over to Iraqi's as rapidly as they showed the ability to handle the ministries. He opted in favor of a longer American occupation to reduce the influence of exiled Iraqis in favor of a new indigenous political class. He also cut deeply into the available ministerial talent pool by excluding all high ranking former Baath Party members. The delay alienated many Iraqis and made the recruitment of Iraqis easier for the insurgents.
Also, because the CPA did not report to the Centcom commander, we had divided leadership with questionable lines of command. Rumsfield, the boss of both men, can be faulted for accepting this situation and failing to remove Bremer promptly when he deviated from the President's policy.
Ricks appears to forget that America usually goes into its wars with the wrong tactics and/or strategy. Early mistakes are almost a foregone conclusion since your enemy has studied your previous tactics and made adjustments to counter them. We usually bumble along, adjust and eventually get tactics that work inside the enemy's decision-response time (Serious students of strategy and tactics must read the theories of American strategic genius John Boyd).
Our superb non-commissioned officers and thinking soldiers have given us a real adaptation advantage over every foe except the Civil War Confederates. Tactical changes can occur in the field, but adjusting strategy is done with much greater care and requires careful communication to all levels. This takes time and can be seriously impeded by unclear or unrealistic goals. Although General Franks can be faulted for Centcom's weak Phase IV planning, his successors at Centcom and the CPA deserve more blame for hindering the pace at which we reacted to the growing insurgency.
After we achieved our initial goal, overthrowing Saddam, our strategy for dealing with the insurgency was unclear and unrealistic. Ricks' criticism of the delays in adopting the correct strategy are well founded, although his eagerness to assign blame tends to prevent a cool-headed assessment. His description of the demoralization and confusion that attended this period contains a valuable lesson for the next war. Ricks' book provides further evidence that although patience is required to succeed in these endeavors, it is not an American virtue.
The character and history of the Iraqi people also accounts for some of their refusal to support early American initiatives. It always takes time to convince the population of a conquered country that we will provide for their safety and progress. The cultural change and learning that occurred to generate the Anbar Awakening may not have occurred earlier. The purported religious affinity with Al Qaeda gave that group an entry until the Anbar tribal sheiks found any religious value overcome by their cruelty and depravity.
Our present success in Iraq may not have been possible several years ago even if the troop surge had occurred then and General Petraeus had been the boss.
Thomas Ricks has produced a must-read book that shows clearly the difficulties of the mid-war situation. He should be commended for his contribution to our eventual success! It is also a warning of how slowness to adapt can lead to discouragement and war weariness.
We have achieved many of our goals in Iraq, but only history will decide if our decision to invade was a disaster that created new generations of terrorists or a brilliant initiative to inspire and remake the Middle East. One can hope as Iraqi Member of Parliament Mithal Al-Alousi said recently: "By Allah, we will build a strong Iraq, which will be an ally of the West. Let Iran and all those foolish Arab countries listen carefully. Iraq will be the ally of the West, and will progress more than the Emirates and Singapore, and all the rest will come looking for work in Iraq."
If the MP's wish becomes the case, we can look back with appreciation at the decision to invade and the many sacrifices made to start the Middle East on a path toward a better future.
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