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The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States Paperback – January 27, 2011
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- Print length575 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- Publication dateJanuary 27, 2011
- Dimensions5.5 x 1.44 x 8.25 inches
- ISBN-101610390415
- ISBN-13978-1610390415
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Editorial Reviews
Review
"Slate," December 2010
"With those books, you'll never need to read anything that emerges from the FCIC. But if you do, read the good stuff: the interviews in which it grilled executives from Wall Street and the housing industry. The commission called in the loan-makers and bankers that caused the crisis and forced them to answer questions about their businesses all for the public record. (It also subpoenaed thousands of pages of documents from Wall Street firms, though it is not clear if it will make those public.) There's no need to get the narrative from the FCIC. But if you want, say, to hear former Lehman CEO Dick Fuld try to defend himself, that's the place to go.
"NPR s Morning Edition"
The majority report reads a lot like a book, and a bit of a potboiler at that. The commission conducted hundreds of hours of interviews, with industry insiders, policymakers, whistle-blowers and regulators. And the pages of the majority's report are strewn with quotes from these interviews foreboding, eye-popping quotes. "New York Times," February 2, 2011
The report is full of fascinating information, rich detail and fine documentary evidence. "New York Times," January 30, 2011 The report still makes for compelling reading because so little has changed as a result of the debacle, in both banking and in its regulation. "Minneapolis"" Star-Tribune," January 29, 2011 At 662 pages, the FCIC report amounts to a sweeping forensic examination of a crisis that the commission says could have been avoided. The conclusions are written with style and infused with an appropriate tone of outrage, buttressed by more than 700 interviews (including one with Minnesota lawyer Prentiss Cox) and millions of documents. "New York Times," February 13, 2011
full of fascinating detail "
New York Times," February 17, 2011
Actually, the report and the online archive of testimony, interviews and documents that are now available is a treasure trove of invaluable information about the causes and consequences of the Great Recession. "New York"" Review of Books," April 28, 2011 The most comprehensive indictment of the American financial failure that has yet been made The definitive history of this period. "Forbes," April 18, 2011 The report is very comprehensive, is well written and provides study material for much more extensive analysis.
"CHOICE," August 2011 Anyone interested in studying the causes of the financial crisis that reached a critical mass in 2008 must read this report It is a Herculean research effort that deserves recognition. "
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Product details
- Publisher : PublicAffairs; Authorized ed. edition (January 27, 2011)
- Language : English
- Paperback : 575 pages
- ISBN-10 : 1610390415
- ISBN-13 : 978-1610390415
- Item Weight : 1.28 pounds
- Dimensions : 5.5 x 1.44 x 8.25 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #243,952 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #232 in Banks & Banking (Books)
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The members do not go too far, and they do not delve too deeply. What needs to remain hidden remains hidden? Deals are struck on both sides that allow the Republicans to bury what they need buried, and the Democrats get the same tradeoff. The guilty are protected because the guilty may have been responsible for millions of dollars in contributions to the sitting politicians or their organizations. I am telling you this, so you do not go into the document blind, which most readers will. The aforesaid represents the dark side of politics, and as Americans if we look for it, and know that it exists, we will be better served in our decisions as to how the government should govern, and what we can expect from our elected officials.
Now let's explore the results of the Commission's findings. The main conclusions are the following:
* WE CONCLUDE THIS FINANCIAL CRISIS WAS AVOIDABLE
* WE CONCLUDE THE GOVERNMENT WAS ILL PREPARED FOR THE CRISIS
* WE CONCLUDE THERE WAS A SYSTEMIC BREAKDOWN IN ACCOUNTABILITY AND ETHICS
* WE CONCLUDE THE FAILURES OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES WERE ESSENTIAL COGS IN THE WHEEL OF FINANCIAL DESTRUCTION
Now there were other conclusions involving the breakdown in accountability and ethics, as well as collapsing mortgage-lending standards. We also know that over the counter derivatives were a big factor in the crisis. I have read the 450 pages of narrative, and this was done by underlining, and annotating in the margins. The report was very well done, and it is in depth. It is also highly readable, and there is very little gibberish, doublespeak, or confusing jargon. I believe that the conclusions are generally right and spot on accurate. There are five parts to the document. They are:
I Crisis on the Horizon
II Setting the Stage
III The Boom and Bust
IV The Unraveling
V the Aftershocks
There were also dissenters to the Report, and this is very common. It is very difficult to get universal agreement and even congeniality among such a disparate group of individuals with differing experiences. There is also the issue of the government's behavior in launching an attempt to drive Bear Stearns into bankruptcy and then forcibly merging it into Morgan Chase, while then subsequently forcing Lehman into total liquidation. With Bear you give comfort to the markets that the government stands ready to save institutions, and then with Lehman, you take the comfort completely aware. The question that should be asked is what was the real deal here? I always ask who BENEFITS? Even better yet as they said in Watergate - FOLLOW THE MONEY.
One of the areas that the Committee did not explore is whether or not there was foreign intervention in the actual crisis whereby America's weakness at a specific moment was exploited to potentially bring down the economy. This may sound conspiratorial and sinister, but this is world power politics we are talking about, and when countries are competing for supremacy, you must leave no stone unturned in determining what went down. At any moment in time a well funded group outside the United States could have engineered a massive shorting that would basically have gone undetected, and remain so. The national security apparatus would have eventually found out, but there are reasons to leave certain truths in the dark. It simply does not serve a political expedient at this time.
It is my suggestion that Americans take a serious look at this official report. It is chockfull of vital information that you need to make informed decisions about. This includes the actions and lack of actions by our government at a moment of crisis that could have easily led to our economy going over the cliff into the abyss. So much of America is reliant at the current moment on the good faith of each party for transactions that amount to hundreds of billions of dollars on a daily basis.
As an example we now know for the first time that the American investment banking model has failed. Firms like Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns can never be again. The investment banking model on which they were based is now deemed to be flawed. They were financing their operations using leverage approaching 40 to 1 with overnight borrowings. Such borrowings were and remain subject to immediate interruption or even rescission, and that is what happened in each case. You will remember that after their fall, the FEDERAL RESERVE WINDOW which means the ability to borrow billions at very low to no interest rates was OPENED IMMEDIATELY to all remaining investment banks. You have to ask WHY, WHY, AND WHY AGAIN? Who picked the timing? Why were Bear Stearns and Lehman destroyed rather than saved. More importantly why was Bear forced into JP Morgan Chase, and Lehman's remnants went to Barclay's Bank? Who are the players behind the players? These are questions and answers which we must ferret out the answers to, individually by ourselves. They are not forthcoming.
CONCLUSION
In a democracy it is up to us the people to dictate the will of the government. In our founding documents, it begins, "We the people", not we the government. These values are still worth fighting for and dying for. This book, "The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report" is an important document that every American should take a look at, and read if they can find the time? The stakes are high, and we have barely averted a potential DEPRESSION causing crisis once. We survived the crisis. It does not mean there will not be others, because at the moment the politicians on both sides lack the political will to be upfront with the American people about our challenges and the potential solutions. Good luck to all of us, and thank you for reading this review.
Richard C. Stoyeck
For example, the Commission carries on about what it wasn't asked to do - referencing TARP, the Transportation Safety Board, etc. It would have been sufficient to say "Congress did not ask the Commission to offer policy recommendations."
The crisis was caused, as has always been the case, by persons taking unreasonable, even illegal, risks in a quest for quick wealth. The impetus to pursue that quest arose from the Federal Reserve's easy money policy, not with standing the FCIC's protests to the contrary. They were allowed to take those risks, and allowed to infringe on the law, by recent administrations and by the US congress, who dismantled or thwarted prior regulations and their enforcement, and failed to adapt and enforce new regulations appropriate to new financial chicanery. The failures of administrations and congress were a consequence, in some cases, of pursuit of misguided ideologies, and, in others, simply the pursuit of office.
That is what the Commission should have concluded, and perhaps did, more or less, but you don't need 500 plus pages to do the job.
A English teacher from back in the day when we taught Latin and Greek in high school would give the report a D minus for composition. Well, we probably don't deserve any better.
What the Commission should have added, but didn't, is that it is not productive to fault those who took unreasonable or even illegal risks in their quest for wealth. They have made their character clear for millenia. They make no oath to behave otherwise. It is well established moral latin that we are obliged to take that character into account in dealing with them. Which we do by choosing representatives and executives, who do take an oath of office, to develop and enforce appropriate laws. It is our representatives and executives who failed us; who violated their oath of office. Of course, we put them in office. Nevertheless, the Commission wails about failure of corporate governance. Really.
There are so many faults with the report that it is hard to know where to begin.
For example, the Commission implied that monetary policy was not a cause. They said "Low interest rates and widely available capital were prerequisites for the creation of a credit bubble, and created increased risks, but did not need to cause a crisis." But, they failed to explore the connection between low interest rates and the desire for investors to find safe substitutes for US Treasuries. Wall Street came up with the supposedly safe substitutes, but they wouldn't have done that without a market. There is some discussion of the impact of low interest rates in one of the dissents, but it reflects poorly on the Commission as a whole that the subject wasn't thoroughly discussed in the body of the report.
Not that there was much thorough discussion of anything. Someone characterized the Report as a "clip job" and they are not entirely wrong.
As another fault, the Commission concludes that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac "contributed to the crisis, but were not a primary cause," and that "they followed rather than led Wall Street." So, it was Wall Street's fault? What the Commission didn't pursue is that the ultimate cost to the taxpayer for Fannie and Freddie's behavior will run into the hundreds of billions - look it up - dwarfing the net taxpayer bailouts of everyone else.
The Report is more a smokescreen than a whitewash, but despite its many faults, the Report provides a collection of material that, with substantial additional research, analysis and most of all organization, yields an understanding of who did what to whom and why. If you really want to grasp the material, download the PDF, use Acrobat Full Version to break it into manageable pieces, and to convert them into word. Use the web site to follow up on the footnotes.
In the end, when we clear our way through the smoke, we find Congress at the root of the problem. And they still are - read the just released "Reforming America's Housing Finance Market." Then call your Senator.
The primary reason I bought the book was to learn about some of the market mechanisms that were in play. The book tells us about such esoterica (to me, anyway) as CDOs, CDOs-squared, why the rating agencies rated a derivative made up of slices of BBB rated mortgages as AAA, what's a Credit Default Swap and how do they work, etc. I've read a lot about the collapse of 2008, but none of the other books brought it all together as this one does.
And, as explained in other reviews, there is an historical section that tells a day-by-day story of the collapse of Bear Stearns, Lehman, etc., but this kind of narrative was done in more detail in other books.
The reason I gave it 4 stars instead of 5 is that the writing is sort of bureaucratese (if you'll pardon my coining that adjective), and the copy that I had did not have an index. Also, I think the Commission didn't give anywhere near enough weight to the primary reason for the collapse, and that is the fact that there were millions of mortgages granted by people who had nothing to lose if the mortgage ended up in default.
For a person such as myself, with a great interest in the collapse of 2008 but very little knowledge of the ins and out of real estate investing and the conversion of mortgages to securities, it was a great textbook. I used the better part of one Hiliter on my copy, and I'm going to keep it as a reference. It was a great eye opener, and, as a bonus, cheap.
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Reviewed in the United Kingdom 🇬🇧 on March 17, 2021
Im Vorwort finden sich folgende Schlussfolgerungen:
- die Finanzkrise war vermeidbar
- schlechte Regulierung bzw. Deregulierung destabilisierten das Finanzsystem
- der wichtigste Grund lag in schlechtem Risikomanagement
- während Transparenz fehlte, wurden exzessive Verschuldung und Risiken angestrebt
- die Regierung war auf die Finanzkrise schlecht vorbereitet und ihre inkonsistenten Rettungsmaßnahmen sorgten für Unsicherheit bzw. Panik
- Verantwortung und Ethik waren erodiert
Als kritische Komponenten des Finanzsystems erwiesen sich aus Sicht der Kommission:
- sinkende Standards für Hypotheken sowie Verbriefungen
- Derivate (besonders CDS)
- Ratingagenturen
Als eher unwichtige Faktoren gelten demnach:
- billige Kredite bzw. die amerikanische Geldpolitik
- quasi-öffentliche Hypothekenfinanzierer (die GSEs Fannie und Freddie)
- öffentliche Wohnungsbauförderung
Der Bericht beschreibt dann nach einem kurzen Überblick die einzelnen Phasen der Finanzkrise. Im Anschluss auf eine Darstellung der Ausgangssituation nach der Internetkrise von 2001 werden die Voraussetzungen der Finanzkrise diskutiert (System der Schattenbanken, Sicherheiten und Verbriefungen, Deregulierung, Risikokredite). Die weiteren Kapitel zeigen, wie sich das Finanzsystem immer mehr auf Hypotheken und Verbriefungen konzentrierte; dadurch stiegen die Provisionen, während Qualität und Dokumentation nachließen. Die Ereignisse in 2007 und 2008 mit der heraufziehenden Finanzkrise und deren "Bewältigung" durch die amerikanische Regierung nehmen besonders breiten Raum ein. Zum Schluss wird der aktuelle Stand (etwa Jahreswechsel 2010 / 2011) dargestellt.
Im Anschluss an den Bericht werden zwei Minderheitsvoten abgedruckt.
Das erste Minderheitsvotum zeigt, dass die Finanzkrise weltweit ähnlich verlief; deshalb können weder die (angebliche) Deregulierung in den USA noch die dortigen Verbriefungen deren hauptsächliche Ursache sein. Es ist vielmehr so, dass es weltweit mehr Liquidität gab (vor allem in China und den OPEC-Staaten). Möglicher Weise trägt die amerikanische Zentralbank entgegen der Darstellung im Bericht doch eine gewisse Verantwortung für die Finanzkrise, weil sie die Zinsen zu lange zu niedrig hielt (Prof. Taylor meint dies bewiesen zu haben, während US-Zentralbankchef Bernanke widerspricht). Darüber hinaus kann eine Immobilienblase auch vernünftige Ursachen haben und es muss keine böswillige Absicht dahinter stehen; deshalb ist auch der Begriff des Systems der Schattenbanken unsauber und erklärt gar nichts. Ein besonderer Augenmerk dieses Minderheitsvotums gilt der Unvermeidbarkeit des Bankrotts von Lehman Brothers. Dieser war jedoch entgegen der Darstellung im Bericht nicht der alleinige Auslöser der Krise; in dieser Zeit kamen mehrere negative Faktoren (u. a. Unsicherheit wegen der Rettungsaktionen der Regierung) zusammen.
Das zweite Minderheitsvotum betont darüber hinaus die Rolle des öffentlichen Wohnungsbaus. Eine entscheidende Ursache der Finanzkrise war demnach die Regulierung der Hypotheken; diese verursachte die sinkende Qualität, um so den Wohnungsbau zu stimulieren. Der Bericht irrt deshalb, indem er einseitig alles auf die angebliche Deregulierung schiebt und alle Fakten ignoriert, die mit dieser vorab gefassten Meinung nicht übereinstimmen. Darüber hinaus gibt es eben keinen einzigen Beweis, dass CDS und andere Derivate besonders stark zur Finanzkrise beitrugen (Der Fall von AIG war die einzige Ausnahme). Warum ist dieses Minderheitsvotum notwendig? Der Bericht kam unter massivem Zeitdruck zu Stande; darum konnte er nicht mehr diskutiert werden. Die Agenda der Kommission war vor ihrem ersten Treffen fertig und es gab ständige Kommunikationsprobleme. Der Bericht ist nicht objektiv (z. B. wurde eine wichtige Studie über Risikohypotheken und die Rolle der Wohnungsbaupolitik ignoriert) und stellt nur durch Interviews unterlegte Fakten dar, während eine Analyse fehlt.
***
Mit hat der Bericht teilweise gut gefallen. Dazu tragen Begriffserläuterungen, Tabellen, Grafiken und Zusammenfassungen am Ende jedes Kapitels bei. Besonders die Erläuterungen zu den einzelnen Verbriefungen (CDS, CDO, MBS usw.), die Risikobewertung der Banken, das Vorgehen der Ratingagenturen und die Diskussion der GSEs waren sehr aufschlussreich.
Oftmals liest sich der Bericht (auch wenn er etwas trocken und wissenschaftlich geschrieben ist) wie ein Krimi. Die Darstellung bezieht immer die Aussagen der beteiligten Personen bzw. von Experten ein. Das wirkt besonders während der Rettungsaktionen sehr dramatisch, wenn beispielsweise die Zentralbank dem Vorstand und Aufsichtsrat einer großen Bank mit Entlassung wegen Unfähigkeit droht.
Man gewinnt beim Lesen den Eindruck, dass die Regulierungsbehörden der USA nicht gut zusammen arbeiten. Oft gibt es Wettbewerb um die zu regulierenden Unternehmen, weil diese die Behörden finanzieren. Meist werden unterschiedliche Bereiche eines Konzerns von unterschiedlichen Behörden reguliert, sodass niemand einen Blick auf das Ganze hat. Dabei haben die Regulierungsbehörden selbstredend andere Schwerpunkte, was die Beurteilung eines Unternehmens sowie die Zusammenarbeit erschwert.
Meines Erachtens hat Prof. John Taylor Recht, wenn er die Hauptschuld an der Finanzkrise der amerikanischen Zentralbank zuschiebt und der Regierung eine Verunsicherung der Finanzmärkte durch inkonsistente Rettungsmaßnahmen vorwirft. Die Minderheitsvoten liegen mit ihren Hinweisen auf die internationale Liquidität also nicht falsch, aber sehen nicht, dass die Liquidität erst von den Zentralbanken geschaffen werden muss.
Der Bericht ist somit eine wahre Fundgrube von Fakten, Zitaten und Anekdoten. Die Gewichtung der Argumente durch die Mehrheit der Kommission erscheint jedoch als fragwürdig.
Hinweis: In der mir vorliegenden Authorized Edition hat die Kommission die Länge der Minderheitsvoten beschränkt; in der Official Government Edition ist dies nicht der Fall. Bei beiden Versionen fehlt das Stichwortverzeichnis, welches man sich aus dem Internet herunter laden muss. Auf der Webseite der Kommission ([...]) gibt es neben den Berichten weiter führende Dokumentationen.
The detail of the testimony provided and additional insights provided within the book are clearly well above the narrative provided by the many first hand participants and journalists who have since attempted to spin their own stories of the events that shook the financial world.
After watching the many hours of testimony on television the account of the proceedings is equally accurate in print as what the impartial observer saw on CSPAN or the nightly news.
The mandate of the Commission to provide an account not solutions of what happened is overcome with the conclusions presented at the very beginning of this report. The dissenting opinions at the end of the report provides a contrasting and useful summary that in large measure reflects the continuing stalemate of building consensus across party lines in Congressional budget debates.
Overall for the economic historian the volume provides a useful history of events that should provide future generations dealing with similar economic meltdowns useful parallels of how quickly financial markets can collapse. It also reinforces that government regulators generally are the last to know but the first group looked to for answers. The lack of foresight by those who were supposed to regulate the dealings of the financial firms is clearly developed as one reads the findings and many pages in the report.
The employment backgrounds of the key regulators and industry participants responsible for the mess clearly show that the regulators themselves played as equally a prominent role as the industry participants in the breakdown of the financial safeguards in place. Simply what were the regulators doing? Should regulators be industry trained or be lawyers with no industry experience?
The insights of the industry participants is also highlighted throughout and the sworn testimony given is more damming given that the key CEO's responsible surely had much greater information on the going's on within their firms than was often admitted to during testimony given. Corporate America really is brought to account for a culture of deceit that after reading the report only someone awaking from a 30 year coma would believe the many CEO's appearing before the committee that the financial crisis and depth of the downfall could not have been foreseen or preventable.
As with any Congressional account of the crisis, the only bias seems to be analysis devoid of how the legislators themselves failed to recognize the evolving nature of financial instruments and credit markets. Couple this with non-transparent dealings outside the oversight of the regulators and expectations that ethics were the same as the grandparents of the financial participants shows legislators equally blind to their own excesses and contradictions of moral character. The damming admissions of Greenspan both at and after the hearings of being fooled, only highlights further the age old question of who was overseeing the the financial markets if anyone at all?
The assumption that every banker acted as Mr. Mooney or Mr. Drysdale surely could not have been one for which the ideology of free markets embraced by the congressional majority of the time had any merit given the equally damming revelations coming out at the time preceding the meltdown on the very conduct of congressional members themselves and their excesses of personal indulgence at the expense of taxpayers.
Simply this report provides timely information and sober reading about the demise of a financial system and participants for which no further prosecutions have occurred. Not surprisingly for the very many who appeared before the committee they were subsequently rewarded for their actions with even bigger bonuses for their participation in the financial meltdown.
As for future financial crisis interventions, perhaps the biggest lession learned from the report is that government once again failed to control by legislation human nature and the greed created where money and sanctioned oligopolies inherently interchange the cast of players seamlessly between industry and the Administration in the US government. The only question not answered in the report is would Bear Stearns or Lehman Brothers still be operational had their ex-CEO's been running the Treasury Department at the time of the crisis.








