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Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs) Paperback – September 3, 2015
| Joshua Rovner (Author) Find all the books, read about the author, and more. See search results for this author |
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What is the role of intelligence agencies in strategy and policy? How do policymakers use (or misuse) intelligence estimates? When do intelligence-policy relations work best? How do intelligence-policy failures influence threat assessment, military strategy, and foreign policy? These questions are at the heart of recent national security controversies, including the 9/11 attacks and the war in Iraq. In both cases the relationship between intelligence and policy broke down―with disastrous consequences.
In Fixing the Facts, Joshua Rovner explores the complex interaction between intelligence and policy and shines a spotlight on the problem of politicization. Major episodes in the history of American foreign policy have been closely tied to the manipulation of intelligence estimates. Rovner describes how the Johnson administration dealt with the intelligence community during the Vietnam War; how President Nixon and President Ford politicized estimates on the Soviet Union; and how pressure from the George W. Bush administration contributed to flawed intelligence on Iraq. He also compares the U.S. case with the British experience between 1998 and 2003, and demonstrates that high-profile government inquiries in both countries were fundamentally wrong about what happened before the war.
- Print length280 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherCornell University Press
- Publication dateSeptember 3, 2015
- Reading age18 years and up
- Dimensions6.12 x 0.62 x 9.25 inches
- ISBN-101501700731
- ISBN-13978-1501700736
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Editorial Reviews
Review
"Fixing the Facts is an insightful exploration of how relations between intelligence officers and policymakers too often go sour. Joshua Rovner convincingly shows that politicization has been a persistent phenomenon and that many of the best-known errors and controversies involving intelligence are rooted in politics and in efforts by leaders to sell their policies to the public."
(Paul R. Pillar, Georgetown University, former senior CIA official)"Does intelligence shape policy, or do policy and politics shape intelligence? Joshua Rovner's careful theorizing and in-depth historical studies provide a comprehensive and systematic analysis of the complex relationships among intelligence, policy, and politics. Fixing the Facts is essential reading for theorists, historians, and the intelligence and policy communities."
(Jack S. Levy, Board of Governors' Professor, Rutgers University)"If leaders are free to disregard unwelcome intelligence estimates, why would they pressure analysts to alter their reports? Joshua Rovner answers this question by identifying how intelligence can empower officials facing domestic political pressures and constraints. Fixing the Facts advances our theoretical and practical understanding of intelligence politicization by highlighting the politics at the heart of the intelligence-policy nexus."
(James J. Wirtz, Dean of the School of International Graduate Studies, Monterey, California)"In this rigorous and penetrating examination of the oft-mentioned but virtually opaque mystery of how politicization affects intelligence work, Joshua Rovner accomplishes more―even furnishing a taxonomy of the genus―than anyone in decades. No interested reader or intelligence professional can afford to miss Fixing the Facts."
(John Prados, author of How the Cold War Ended )"Intelligence should inform policymakers without pandering to them. In practice, it proves easy to honor either one of these aims but surprisingly hard to accomplish both at once. Joshua Rovner's careful study of the subtle dynamics of this balancing act is a model of intelligent, balanced, and policy-relevant scholarship."
(Richard K. Betts, Director, Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University)Review
"Intelligence should inform policymakers without pandering to them. In practice, it proves easy to honor either one of these aims but surprisingly hard to accomplish both at once. Joshua Rovner's careful study of the subtle dynamics of this balancing act is a model of intelligent, balanced, and policy-relevant scholarship."
-- Richard K. Betts, Director, Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia UniversityAbout the Author
Joshua Rovner is the John Goodwin Tower Professor of International Politics and National Security at Southern Methodist University, where he also serves as Director of Studies at the Tower Center for Political Studies.
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Product details
- Publisher : Cornell University Press; Reprint edition (September 3, 2015)
- Language : English
- Paperback : 280 pages
- ISBN-10 : 1501700731
- ISBN-13 : 978-1501700736
- Reading age : 18 years and up
- Item Weight : 14.4 ounces
- Dimensions : 6.12 x 0.62 x 9.25 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #1,511,819 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #746 in Canadian Politics
- #2,869 in Political Intelligence
- #2,943 in National & International Security (Books)
- Customer Reviews:
About the author

Joshua Rovner is the John Goodwin Tower Chair in International Politics and National Security at Southern Methodist University. He is also associate professor of political science and Director of Studies at the SMU Tower Center for Political Studies. Rovner is the author of the multiple-award winning Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence (Cornell, 2011), and he writes widely on intelligence, national security, and nuclear weapons. Rovner holds a Ph.D. in political science from MIT.
Customer reviews
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Rovner provides an excellent theoretical background to guide his examination of specific case histories that he has chosen to illustrate the relationships between strategic intelligence and policy. Ideally intelligence analysts should be able to operate without interference to produce strategic intelligence reports that are honest, objective, and supported by the best information available. Again ideally policy makers should be free to challenge such reports. Finally both analysts and policymakers should be able to hold rational discussions over differences in interpretation and conclusions in which the supporting evidence is considered objectively. Unfortunately this ideal is often thwarted by what Rovner calls "the pathologies of intelligence-policy relations." He has identified three such `pathologies': 1) neglect-policy makers ignore intelligence that does not fit their assumptions; 2) politicalization-the most egregious of the pathologies and one that has several different forms; and 3) excessive harmonization - intelligence analysts and policymakers are in such close agreement that they fail to critically scrutinize their conclusions. In the course of his discussion, Rovner also makes an interesting observation about secrecy. Secrecy he notes can be used by intelligence agencies as a source of power and as a means to support dubious analysis. Policymakers can use secrecy to support dubious policy decisions by implying that there classified evidence supporting their conclusions.
In any event Rovner provides case studies from the Vietnam War, the ongoing controversy of Soviet Military capability and intentions, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. These case studies accurately illustrate the pathologies hampering of productive intelligence-policymaker relations. Rovner does not assign blame but explains how this relationship got off track.
Originally, U.S. Strategic intelligence was largely produced by the Office of National Estimates (ONE) of CIA from 1947 through 1972. ONE was an in house CIA operation whose main analytic arm was the powerful Board of National Estimates (BNE) under the legendary Sherman Kent. BNE actually produced very good strategic intelligence which was often ignored by policymakers. For example as the U.S. moved toward ever greater commitments in South Vietnam based on the so-called "domino theory", it BNE that produced two estimates pointing out that this theory was hopelessly flawed. They were ignored, but were nonetheless presented good intelligence. President Nixon decided that ONE was too independent and ordered it disbanded and replaced with the more politically pliable National Intelligence Council (NIC) and a system of National Intelligence Officers who could be political appointees. This began the long process of decline of the U.S. ability to produce accurate strategic intelligence.






