Fort Eben Emael: The key to Hitler’s victory in the West (Fortress) Paperback – May 8, 2005

This is another of Osprey's fine primers on fortifications. Although the book is only about 64 pages in length (about half of which are illustration) and can be read in about an hour and a half, it provides an excellent introduction to the fort and the operation it covers. The book starts off with a brief history of the forticiations and their value and operational role during the first world war in order to provide some perspective. Then it goes into the construction of the fort, its anatomy, how it fit into Belgium defense plans and the German operation itself to destroy the fort, with the primary emphasis, obviously, on the latter. The book does a good job at not only describing the operation from the German perspective but, suprisingly, also the Belgian side (something that few even much longer books do). This is particularly important as there were many factors on the Belgian side (i.e., fort commanders on the ground not being given enough decisiional latitude, mediocre Belgian officers, poor decisions and, of course, really bad luck [i.e., during the glider's landing they had accidently run into and destroyed most of the machine gun nests on top of the fort!], etc.). The book is also well illustrated with detailed high quality drawings of the fort as well as many contemporary black and white photos of the men invovled, the fort and equipment used. The discussion of the shaped hollow charges used to disable the turrets on the fort was most impressive. All and all an excellent introduction to the topic.

A wrestling coach of old was said to tell his wrestlers that there was no escape-proof lock, hold, or other technique in his sport. The same is true of military operations. Eban Emael was said to be impregnable--I forgot; was it politicians or newspapermen who made that claim? Germany exploited new techniques of war to conquer this Belgian fortress, and the Belgian Army appears to have provided less than adequate means to shore up this keystone of the Belgian defenses.

Most modern armchair generals claim that fortifications are holes in the ground that armies pour men and material into for no gain. Permanent fortifications are universally condemned, and even field fortifications are said to sap the offensive strength and morale of the defending armies. It was for this reason that the World War One French Army instituted the spirit of the assault--and suffered massive losses against German barb wire and German Spandau machine guns in 1914 and 1915. Simon Dustan establishes the rational for putting this hole in the ground in the first part of his book. Attempting to understand World War Two in isolation, without considering the bloodbath of 20 years prior, is to ignore reality. The first pages of Fort Eban Emael lay this out quite well, placing the concrete-lined hole-in-the-ground in context of the political and economic climate in Belgium. Note that Dunstan doesn't explore the alternatives to Fort Eben Emael--this is a book about what was, not what could have been.

Hugh Johnson's illustrations clarify how the fort was laid out. Battle is "organized chaos," with the emphasis on "chaos;" the neat diagram of the glider assault on page 50 clarifies how the Germans took the fort, and the text hints at the confusion among the Belgian defenders. Germany developed several new weapons that were first used in this attack: shaped charge demolitions, gliders capable of carrying the heavy equipment needed for reducing gun positions, glider infantry teams task-organized for this mission, and most importantly, the operation was integrated into the campaign. Simply completing a brilliant mission is not enough when that single mission does nothing else. On pages 42 and 43, Johnson's artwork shows how the Luftwaffe circumvented the Belgian wartime blackout (an air raid precaution) to land the glider troops under cover of darkness, and Dunstan's text explains the coordination so that maximum surprise was achieved by the glider assault and the necessary follow-up actions by the ground forces.

Just because the Germans found a countermeasure didn't invalidate the defensive capabilities of Eben Emael. Could the same number of half-trained troops, WITHOUT Eben Emael's powerful fixed artillery batteries, have withstood a German combined arms assault? Resources include men and material--the aircraft and tanks and field artillery used by the allies in 1940 were inferior to the German equipment, and the leadership and common soldier was less experienced and skilled than the German counterparts. I think Belgium was doomed from the moment that Hitler decided to use that small nation as a highway because Belgium couldn't muster resources enough to fight the entire German war machine, and the nation is small! Modern manuever warfare must have manuever room. Belgium tried to remain neutral--couldn't. It takes only one side to start a war. The only chance that Belgium had to remain uninvaded would have been to invade Germany during September of 1939, while most of the German war machine was mobilized for the Polish Campaign--a political impossibility. Besides, Belgium didn't have the mobile, "offensive army" this operation would have required--even if France and Britain would have had the political will and military might to seize the western parts of Germany.

I enjoyed this book because of the details of the fort's layout and construction. The text covered the German countermeasures to the fort's defensive strengths. Eben Emael's communications failed on May 10, 1940, and so the German Luftwaffe glider troops seemed to have had a cakewalk--but Dunstan's text shows that wasn't the case. The issue was in doubt until motorized pioneers arrived to help "mop up" the defenses. It wasn't an easy victory for the Germans.

what i was looking for.

Excellent

Simon Dunstan's Fort Eben Emael is probably one of the best of Osprey's Fortress series volumes produced to date. Rather than just a discussion of dirt and concrete, Dunstan details both the Belgian quest to build an impregnable fortress to protect their eastern border and the German plans to seize the fort in a coup de main. The story of Fort Eben Emael is a dramatic episode in the history of warfare and Dunstan's narrative brings it vividly to life. There is also a subtle cautionary tale in these pages about how expensive weapons programs can be undone by a bold and determined enemy. Indeed, the dramatic capture of Fort Eben Emael by only 85 German paratroopers was, as Dunstan writes, "one of the most remarkable feats of arms in the history of warfare."

Dunstan begins the volume with an 8-page introduction that traces the German threat to Belgium beginning before the First World War and lessons learned from the defense of the Liege forts in 1914. After the First World War, the Belgian Government decided to allocate substantial financial resources to construct a new series of forts around Liege and the Albert Canal to inhibit any future German invasion. The centerpiece of this new fortified line was Fort Eben Emael, which was built at the junction of the Meuse River and the Albert Canal in 1932-35. As Dunstan notes, the fort incorporated all the lessons learned to date about fortress warfare and was designed to resist attack by artillery, ground assault and aircraft. Dunstan describes the fort in great detail, with sections on blockhouses, gun emplacements, armored doors, the underground caserne, observation posts and the garrison. The text is complemented by numerous B/W photos of the fort in the 1940s as well as color photos of the fort as it looks today. The volume has two 2-D maps (the Sichelschnitt Plan of 1940; locations of Belgian forts around Liege) and six color plates (overhead view of Fort Eben Emael; a gun casemate; fields of fire of the fort; hollow charge explosives; the flight path to Eben Emael; glider landings and objectives), all of which assist the reader in understanding the Belgian plan of defense and the German attack plan. Dunstan also provides an appendix which lists all 85 German paratroopers involved in the assault by name, as well as their fate.

The middle part of the volume discusses the German Case Yellow plan for the offensive in the West and the necessity of seizing Fort Eben Emael quickly. Dunstan discusses the formation of Storm Group "Koch" to deal with the Belgian forts as well as the German secret weapons - hollow charges and gliders (probably one of the few occasions in military history where "secret weapons" lived up to initial expectations in combat). Readers should also note the involvement of Adolph Hitler in the tactical details of the operations. After outlining German preparations to seize the fort, Dunstan describes the woeful state of readiness at Fort Eben Emael. Dunstan writes that, "through a combination of manpower shortages, poor moral, inefficient communications and political interference, the strength of the most powerful fortress in the world was seriously undermined..." Although the Belgian High Command issued a war alert five hours before the German attack, many critical positions at Fort Eben Emael were still unmanned and ammunition not issued when the German gliders began to land on top of them. Dunstan notes that the Belgian anti-aircraft machineguns should have decimated the nine German gliders - but they lacked ammunition. Within 30 minutes, the German paratroopers boldly disabled the fort's artillery and observation posts and sat back to await relief. Despite a 10-1 numerical superiority, the Belgian garrison sat passively in their bunkers, completely surrendering the initiative to the Germans. However, the German plan almost came unglued when the destruction of a vital bridge delayed the relief force and the German paratroopers had to spend an anxious night atop the fort, awaiting a counterattack that never came. When the German relief force finally arrived, the demoralized garrison surrendered post haste.

Dunstan also contrasts the aggressive leadership style of the German paratroopers against the passive Belgian command style, which he cites as a major factor in the capture of the fort. When the German officer in command failed to reach the fort due to a glider accident, a senior German NCO assumed command and led the initial assault. Meanwhile, a Belgian artillery NCO failed to use a stairway to carry ammunition by hand to his guns when the electric shell hoist failed. Dunstan makes it clear that in evaluating the value or effectiveness of fortifications, that the relative efficiency of the garrison is a crucial determinant.