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God, Freedom, and Evil by Plantinga, Alvin published by Eerdmans Pub Co (1977) Unknown Binding – January 1, 1994
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherEerdmans Pub Co
- Publication dateJanuary 1, 1994
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- ASIN : B00E32JFB6
- Publisher : Eerdmans Pub Co; 59446th edition (January 1, 1994)
- Language : English
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I have felt that Christian scholars and apologists have either not tried to answer this question or have provided poor arguments for it. This book, even though it is short, is extremely dense; I would say graduate or even doctoral level dense. Advice: you need to go very slowly through it and take notes. One of the positives of this book is that it is not for the "laymen." I often am annoyed by apologists for how they try and dumb things down, which leaves those of us who can understand complex philosophical concepts yearning for more. Plantinga does not do this. Everything in this book is complex and you need to be slow reading it.
2/3rds of the book (1-75) addresses the problem of evil and successfully makes the defense that there can be an all-powerful and all-good God with evil in the world. It is absolutely brilliant. Some of the best philosophy I have ever read. I will not share his arguments, as I do not want to spoil them for you. If you are by some chance not convinced by the arguments you must at least acknowledge that it is an outstanding argument. I have seen some pretty junior philosophical reviews that attempt to show that his argument isn't sound. This is simply untrue. Let me remind all of you that you can acknowledge an excellent argument while still not being totally convinced.
The last 1/3rd of the book (77-111) is his argument for the existence of God. This is the part of the book that I am somewhat less impressed with. While I still find his philosophical reasoning sound and on an expert level, it doesn't quite hit home the same way the first 2/3rds did. I also question why he felt the need to add this last 1/3rd. Plantinga takes on his reformed version of the ontological argument, and has a few objections that he refutes. I personally do not think that the ontological argument is the strongest argument for the existence of God, but he does a good job presenting it. Once again, I think he could have ended the book with simply the first 75 pages and it would have been sufficient. But I suppose perhaps he felt that it would be too short of a book, or maybe his publisher had some say in it (these are not facts, these are simply my thoughts. I could and more than likely am wrong).
To my atheist, agnostic and deistic friends, I would ask you to do a few things. Become Descartes and empty your mind of all biases before reading. Then, go slowly through it. Truly ponder what Plantinga is saying. Take notes. While I am a Christian (a former deist), I can acknowledge that accepting that an all-powerful and all-good God can exist with evil in the world does not necessarily mean that God himself exists. These are two different arguments in themselves; one of them acknowledges to a degree that God does exist, but argues that he is either not all-powerful or not all-good. The other question in itself does not begin with God even existing, but asking "Does God exist?" Please go into reading this book with this in mind.
Overall it is fantastic. I highly recommend.
Leibniz's Lapse: Contrary to Leibniz, there are possible worlds that God cannot actualize
Here's an informal proof.
Imagine a situation S in which Curley is free to take, or to refuse, a bribe. Suppose God wants Curley freely to refrain from taking the bribe in S. The most he could do to bring this about would be to make Curley free in S. Can God get what he wants? That depends on which of the following propositions is true. (Note that one of them must be true, and the other false,)
(t) If Curley were free in S, then Curley would take the bribe.
(r) If Curley were free in S, then Curley would not take the bribe.
(Terminological note: (t) and (r) are among Curley's "counterfactuals of freedom.")
If (t) is true and God makes Curley free in S, then Curley will take the bribe and God won't get what he wants. Only if (r) is true will Curley do what God wants him to do.
Now let Wt be a possible world in which God makes Curley free in S and Curley freely takes the bribe. And let Wr be a world in which in which God makes Curley free in S and Curley freely refuses the bribe. If (t) is true, then God cannot actualize Wr. If, on the other hand, (r) is true, then God cannot actualize Wt. Since either (t) or (r) must be true, it follows that God can't actualize one or the other of these worlds--there is at least one possible world which he cannot actualize.
TWD ("transworld depravity")
For each possible person, and for each situation in which that person might exist and be free, there is a complete set of true conditional propositions (like (t) and (r)) about what that person would do if she were free in that situation. We will call these a person's "counterfactuals of freedom."
Now the sad truth about Curley may be this: His counterfactuals of freedom are such that in no matter what situation God places him, if God gives him morally significant freedom in that situation, he would freely do at least one wrong action. He doesn't have to. Curley is free, after all. But God knows that he would. Curley suffers from TWD.
Of course, there are possible worlds in which Curley is significantly free and never goes wrong. But God can't actualize those worlds without Curley's help, and Curley's counterfactuals of freedom are such that God knows that such help is not going to be forthcoming. Paradoxically, it might be that only Curley can do what's required to actualize one of those worlds.
How the FWD solves the logical problem of evil
Remember? The problem was to show that the following propositions are logically consistent.
(1) God exists--and is omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good.
(2) There is evil in the world.
Plantinga supposes we can do this by finding a proposition implicit in the free will defense that is consistent with (1), and together with (1) entails (2). Now we can see what that proposition is. Here it is:
(3) God actualized a world in which there are free creatures who produce some moral goodness; AND all possible persons suffer from TWD, so that God could not have actualized a world in which there were free creatures who produced moral goodness and no moral evil.
It's possible that both (1) and (3) are true. Together they entail (2). it follows that (2) is consistent with (1). QED.
So why doesn't God just make different counterfactuals of freedom true?
Because then they wouldn't be counterfactuals of freedom. For God to fix your counteractuals of freedom for you would be tantamount to making do what he prefers.
God is stuck with the counterfactuals of freedom that happen (as a matter of contingent fact) to be true.
Does that mean that God isn't omnipotent?
Not at all. If the counterfactuals of freedom have a truth value at all, then for each possible person some complete set of counterfactuals must be true. Whichever set that is, no one, no matter how powerful, can make a completely different set of counterfacutals of freedom true.







