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The Gamble: General Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq Paperback – January 6, 2010
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The Amazon Book Review
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Amazon Best of the Month, February 2009: Anyone who read Fiasco, Thomas E. Ricks's superb, bestselling account of the Iraq War through 2005, and has followed the war since has likely noticed that many of the heroes of that devastating book, the officers and analysts who seemed to understand what was going wrong in the war when the rest of the political and military leadership didn't, have since been put in charge, starting with General David Petraeus, the cerebral officer who took command in Iraq and led what became known as "the surge." Ricks, the senior Pentagon correspondent at the Washington Post, has stayed on the story, and he returns with his second book on the war, The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008. As good (and influential) as Fiasco was, The Gamble may be even better, telling the remarkable story of how a few people inside and outside the Pentagon pushed the new strategy through against opposition across the political spectrum and throughout the military top brass, and then, even more remarkably, how soldiers put the difficult plan into action on the ground and managed to sharply reduce the chaotic violence in Iraq. But the story doesn't end there, and Ricks's bracing conclusion--that the American military, like it or not, will still have a necessary role in Iraq for years to come--makes it likely that this may not be the last book we have from him on the subject. --Tom Nissley
Questions for Thomas E. Ricks
We exchanged emails with Tom Ricks for a few weeks before the publication of The Gamble, a time which saw, among other things, the inauguration of Barack Obama and regional elections in Iraq. You can read the full exchange on the Amazon books blog, Omnivoracious.com. Here are some highlights:
Amazon.com: The Gamble is the history of what has become known as "the surge." What do you think the public understands about the surge, and how does that compare with what you've seen from up close?
Thomas E. Ricks: I think there are two big misunderstandings about the surge. The first is that the surge "worked." Yes, it did, in that it improved security. But it was meant to do more than that. It was supposed to create a breathing space in which Iraqi political leaders could move forward. In fact, as General Odierno says in the book, some used the elbow room to move backward. The bottom line is that none of the basic problems facing Iraq have been addressed--the relationship between Shia, Sunni and Kurds, or who leads the Shias, or the status of the disputed city of Kirkuk, or the sharing of oil revenue.
The second misunderstanding is just how difficult the surge was. People back here seem to think that 30,000 troops were added and everything calmed down. In fact, the first six months of the surge, from January through early July 2007, were the toughest months of the war. When troops moved out of their big bases and into little outposts across Baghdad, they got hammered by bombs and rockets. It took some time before being among the people began to lead to improved security, and during that time, a lot of top American officials in Iraq weren't sure the new approach was working. General Petraeus says in the book that he looks back on that time as a "horrific nightmare."
Amazon.com: Let's start with that second point. Because The Gamble is in many ways the story of a remarkable success: a minority of officers and analysts who pushed through a new plan for the war against opposition across the political spectrum and throughout the military leadership, and then, even more impressively, soldiers who put the plan into action on the ground and managed to stem a great deal of the violence in Iraq within a matter of months.
The new counterinsurgency approach to the war was one you had argued for in Fiasco, but in the most violent days of early 2007, how did you think it was going to turn out?
Ricks: I was very skeptical back in early 2007 about the surge. I think there were two reasons for this.
First, there was little evidence that the U.S. military was going to be able to operate differently, and more effectively. After all, they had been fighting there for longer than we fought in World War II, and the only thing we had to show for it was that in 2006, Iraq was going straight to hell.
Also, I didn't get out to Iraq in 2007 until May, on the first trip I did for this book. It was only then, five months into the surge, when I got on the ground there, that I sensed how different the American leadership was from earlier on. Everybody, and I mean everybody, in the U.S. military, was talking about counterinsurgency, and making protecting the Iraqi population their top priority. That was a huge change from earlier on in the war, when different units seemed pretty much to do their own thing--one outfit would be drinking tea with the sheikhs, another was banging heads.
The new candor and understanding in the Americans was striking. One that May 2007 trip, I went into Green Zone and got from David Kilcullen a really thorough and insightful briefing into the state of play in the streets of Baghdad. That was a big change from earlier on, when officials inside the Zone had no idea what was happening out there. I remember also one general, David Fastabend, an advisor to Petraeus, beginning a conversation then by saying, "We have done some stupid shit" in Iraq. There clearly was a new gang in town.
Amazon.com: And many of the people who had been put in charge, Gen. Petraeus first among them, were well known to readers of Fiasco as advocates for counterinsurgency. But one who wasn't turns out to be one of the crucial figures in your story: Gen. Ray Odierno, who early in the war was one of the ones banging heads. By the time 2007 rolls around, he's Petraeus's top commander in Iraq and he's a changed leader. What happened to him?
Ricks: The change in General Odierno is one I wrestled with throughout the reporting of this book. He seemed so different, so in sync with Petraeus on the counterinsurgency plan. And he was of almost no help in figuring it out. "General Odierno, you strike me as so changed from the guy I wrote about in Fiasco. I can't figure out how that happened." "Hey Tom: Your problem, not mine."
I think two major things happened to him between 2004, the end of his first tour in Iraq, and the end of 2006, when he came back for his second tour. First, his son was badly wounded in Baghdad, losing an arm to an RPG. Second, when he came back to Baghdad, he saw that the place was falling apart, and that the war could be lost on his watch. That has a way of concentrating the mind.
What he did then was kind of astonishing: He went around his bosses and basically cooked up the surge. He was the only officer in the chain of command who was for it. (Petraeus also was for it, but he hadn't yet arrived in Iraq.) I think he showed genuine moral courage in what he did. It was a huge risk, going against all his bosses. As I say in the book, he was the natural father of the surge, and Petraeus was the adoptive father. I have no problem saying that General Odierno is one of the heroes of this book.
Amazon.com: While we're talking about the surge, there's one basic thing to clarify: despite the name, as you say, "the surge was more about how to use troops than it was about the number of them." What did the new counterinsurgency tactics translate into on the ground, and why do you think they worked to the extent they did?
Ricks: This is a hugely important question, so I want to take some time on it.
There were two key aspect to the different use of troops. First, they had a new top priority: protect Iraqis. (Until February 2007, the top priority of U.S. forces in Iraq was to transition to Iraqi control.) Second, to do that, they had to move out into the population. Before this point, they were doing a lot of patrols from big bases, usually in Humvees. They would be in a neighborhood maybe one hour a day, and the other 23 hours of the day belonged to the insurgents. Now, they were living in the neighborhoods, and constantly going out on short foot patrols. They got a lot more familiar with the people, often visiting every single family, and conducting a census. In military terms, they were mapping the sea in which the insurgent swam. Familiarity made them far more effective, and also constrained the movements of insurgents.
For all that, there are other important factors in why Iraq changed, and they shouldn't be forgotten. First, by the time the U.S. military moved into the streets of Baghdad, the city was largely ethnically cleansed. Second, in the spring of 2007, in a huge policy shift, General Petraeus began putting the Sunni insurgency on the payroll--essentially paying them not to attack us. This split them off from al Qaeda in Iraq, and isolated the terrorist extremists.
Once the Sunni insurgency was seen to be on our side, even temporarily, the Shiite fighters under Moqtadr al Sadr went to ground. Otherwise, Uncle Sam would have been training all his firepower on them.
The problem is that all these arrangements are temporary, and could easily unravel. For example, the Sunni insurgents made a separate peace with the United States. They never have given up their objection to Shiite control of Iraq and of the Iraqi army. So what we may have done is simply delay that fight--and armed both sides in the meantime.--This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.
From Bookmarks Magazine
By and large, critics were less eager to assess Ricks's work as an author and more interested in his opinions about the success of the "surge" and the future of Iraq. But this is perhaps the book's greatest endorsement; whether they were liberal or conservative, American or British, critics viewed Ricks's facts as unassailable and his analysis as strong. They were impressed not just with his unparalleled access to the main actors in Iraq but also with his ability to integrate two commonly held but seemingly irreconcilable views -- that the war was a mistake and a catastrophe (as expressed in Fiasco) and that Petraeus and the surge represented an amazing turnaround. Thus, many critics found that although Ricks seems to express a consensus view, The Gamble is counterintuitive and challenging, refreshing yet sobering.Copyright 2009 Bookmarks Publishing LLC --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.
Top customer reviews
A very honest straight forward book.
The author spends some time on the failures of the Bush adminstration and its generals to carve a successful first few years after the 2003 invasion. Not surprisingly, President Bush plays a reduced role here as this is a book that is much more about the new wave of generals and their thinking outside the box than it is about the "old guard". Besides General Petraeus, General Raymond Odierno, once thought of as heavy-handed in his approach to the war, is figuratively resuscitated and becomes one of the "good" guys.
The overall curve of "The Gamble" describes the willingness of the American military to get out among the Iraqi people, learn about them more and sometimes make deals with those who killed American soldiers. Why this wasn't done in the early stages of the war remains not so much a mystery but a lost opportunity. Strategies are discussed at length, but Ricks's keen eye lets him take us to the politics of the situation....Iraqi president Nouri al-Maliki and his government, the U.S. Congress, public opinion both in America and Iraq and, of course, the politics among the generals, themselves. That comprehensive presentation is the best part of the book.
Ricks underscores the fact that putting the right people in the right positions at the right time is critical to success. But he also points out that he is not optimistic about a total withdrawal from Iraq. We will be in Iraq for years, he suggests, if not decades. "The Gamble" is a sobering look at the past two years of a war that is inconclusive as we begin our seventh year there.
Pre-COIN, the US forces were generally housed in large Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) from which they would conduct mechanised patrols. This physical isolation fostered a dehumanization of the other side by both the Iraqis and the Americans.
For the Iraqis the Americans were simply temporary foreign invaders who moved around in fast moving machines encased in protective steel. Psychologically, it is a lot easier to kill a machine than a human being. Similarly Iraqis could see little benefit in helping the transitory Americans, when the real enemy would come and kill them once the Americans had passed through.
For the US soldier the physical isolation from the population encouraged him to dangerously generalize about all Iraqis being the enemy. Generalization prevents you from knowing your enemy; from accurately identifying him, from discerning his motivations, and thus ultimately from accurately assessing the best means to combat him. Generalization also leads to depersonalization which in turn leads to the excess in Haditha with which the books opens.
The COIN strategy was a hugely courageous gamble. It was politically courageous to ask for many more troops at a time that Iraq was going downhill fast. It was professionally courageous. If it didn't work then Petraeus, Odierno and everyone else closely associated with it could kiss their careers goodbye. But most of all it took enormous courage by every soldier who had to implement COIN on the ground. Living amongst the population also meant living closer to the enemy. Being selective as to whom to engage required more fortitude than simply eliminating an entire building through massive firepower.
Once COIN took hold the advantages became palpable. From an Intelligence viewpoint it was a virtuous circle. With Iraqis knowing and trusting the Americans the virtually non-existent HumInt increased dramatically. The better targeting allied to the increased number of surge troops put huge pressure on the enemy which resulted in literally putting them on the run. Forced to become more mobile necessitated greater use of electronic communication, which in turn proved a bonanza for US SigInt.
Better targeting resulted in less innocent victims, which proved a big force multiplier. It decreased the number of families who felt the need to revenge an unnecessary death. Furthermore it gave an increasing number of Iraqis the idea that the Americans had a real investment in the outcome and therefore that they may benefit from aligning themselves against the real enemies.
Fortunately for the Americans, but most of all for the average Iraqi, COIN proved about as successful as any strategy could have been given the chaos that Iraq was in before its implementation. Iraq is still a powder keg, but at least it has been given the chance not to blow up.
There is so much more to this fascinating book which leaves the reader with a better appreciation of the intelligence of the American system of waging war. They may make a lot of mistakes, but they do have the ability to re-evaluate and repair themselves in order to approach the problem in a new way.