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Gaming the Vote: Why Elections Aren't Fair (and What We Can Do About It) Hardcover – Bargain Price, February 5, 2008
At least five U.S. presidential elections have been won by the second most popular candidate. The reason was a “spoiler”—a minor candidate who takes enough votes away from the most popular candidate to tip the election to someone else. The spoiler effect is more than a glitch. It is a consequence of one of the most surprising intellectual discoveries of the twentieth century: the “impossibility theorem” of Nobel laureate economist Kenneth Arrow. The impossibility theorem asserts that voting is fundamentally unfair—a finding that has not been lost on today’s political consultants. Armed with polls, focus groups, and smear campaigns, political strategists are exploiting the mathematical faults of the simple majority vote. In recent election cycles, this has led to such unlikely tactics as Republicans funding ballot drives for Green spoilers and Democrats paying for right-wing candidates’ radio ads. Gaming the Vote shows that there is a solution to the spoiler problem that will satisfy both right and left. A system
called range voting, already widely used on the Internet, is the fairest voting method of all, according to computer studies. Despite these findings, range voting remains controversial, and Gaming the Vote assesses the obstacles confronting any attempt to change the American electoral system. The latest of several books by William Poundstone on the theme of how important scientific ideas have affected the real world, Gaming the Vote is a wry exposé of how the political system really works, and a call to action.
- Print length352 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherHill and Wang
- Publication dateFebruary 5, 2008
- Dimensions6 x 1.19 x 9 inches
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Editorial Reviews
From Publishers Weekly
Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Review
“Gaming the Vote is a must-read for anyone interested in the process and outcomes of voting. Poundstone gives a clear and remarkably accurate account of the rich theoretical literature. At the same time, his examples of voting anomalies in real elections are both lively and revealing.” —Kenneth J. Arrow, professor of economics (emeritus) at Stanford University and winner of the 1972 Nobel Prize in Economic Science
"In this masterful presentation William Poundstone sketches the history of voting systems, elucidates ideas such as Borda counts, Condorcet winners, and range voting, and shows how changing our system could make it less likely to yield paradoxical and unfair results. Ranging easily over material as disparate as Arrow's impossibility theorem and recent presidential elections, he makes it clear just how unclear is the question, "Who won?" The book has my vote." —John Allen Paulos, author of Innumeracy: Mathematical Illiteracy and Its Consequences and the forthcoming Irreligion: A Mathematician Explains Why the Arguments for Religion Just Don't Add Up
About the Author
Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.
As a student at Louisiana State University, Duke had studied German so that he could read Mein Kampf in the original. Each April 20, he celebrated Hitler’s birthday with a party. He draped his dorm room with swastika flags and wore a Nazi uniform around campus.
Duke was equally comfortable in the uniform of an ROTC cadet. One of his instructors praised Duke’s “outstanding leadership potential.” But then “we started receiving information on him from the Department of Defense . . . Here was a 19-year-old kid getting money from Germany.”
The money was for American Nazi activities. The Pentagon rejected Duke’s application for an advanced-training program and refused to commission him as an officer. That rebuff caused Duke to channel his leadership potential into the Ku Klux Klan. In just a couple of years, he rose to the Klan’s highest post, Grand Wizard, in 1975. This meteoric ascent was a matter of his being in the right place at the right time. The previous Wizard had just been gunned down in a motel parking lot.
Duke stood out in the Klan almost as much as he had at LSU. He preferred to appear in a crisp business suit and tie rather than a hood and robe. He adopted the corporate-sounding title “National Director.” One of his more surprising actions as Klansman was to write a book called African Atto (1973), under the pseudonym Mohammed X. He sold it by mail order, taking out ads in black newspapers with the heading when was the last time whitey called you ? The book was a martial arts manual. Duke told people that its real purpose was to compile the names and addresses of the blacks who ordered it—for Ku Klux Klan records.
In 1980 Duke abruptly left the organization. His story is that he realized the Klan would never be taken seriously as a political force. It was time for the defenders of the white race to get out of the cow pastures and into the hotel suites. People who knew Duke in the Klan have a different story. “We had to get David out,” explained Karl Hand, formerly Duke’s lieutenant. “He was seducing all the wives . . . He had no qualms about putting the make on anybody’s wife or girlfriend, and the flak always came back to me, because I was his national organizer.”
The immediate cause of Duke’s departure was his attempt to pocket a quick thirty-five thousand dollars by selling the top-secret Klan membership list to an enigmatic character named Bill Wilkinson. Wilkinson presented himself to Duke as a Klansman intending to set up his own splinter organization. In fact, he was secretly an FBI informant. Wilkinson videotaped Duke dickering over the price, then threatened to play the tape at a KKK meeting. Possibly the whole thing was an FBI sting—or possibly Wilkinson saw a freelance opportunity. Duke left the Klan after that.
Duke had never held a regular job and was not keen to start. Naturally, he turned to politics. Plastic surgery and a blow-dryer transformed him into something resembling a game show host. Starting in 1975, he began running for local offices in Louisiana. In 1980 he founded his own organization, the National Association for the Advancement of White People. He discovered that there was good money to be made in fringe nonprofits. After Duke and some Klansmen were arrested at a demonstration in Forsythe County, Georgia, he raised nineteen thousand dollars from white supremacists nationwide to pay a fifty-five-dollar fine.
In 1988 Duke ran for president of the United States, entering several primaries as a Democrat. No one took him seriously except for writers of offbeat feature articles. He then ran as a Populist and got 47,047 votes.
In 1989, Duke downsized his ambitions to run for the Louisiana legislature. Not only did he win, but he won against former Republican governor Dave Treen. This coup encouraged Duke to run for the U.S. Senate in 1990. He lost. Then in 1991, he decided it was time to try for governor of Louisiana. Edwin Edwards “plays the system like a violin. He had an uncanny knack of charging headlong to the brink and knowing exactly where to stop . . . and he doesn’t even try to cover his trail, he’s that cocky.” These were the words of U.S. Attorney Stanford Bardwell, Jr., one of the many prosecutors who indicted Edwards and saw him wriggle off the hook. Some called Edwards the most corrupt politician in a corrupt state.
Edwards was born dirt-poor in an cypress-wood farmhouse his father built with his own hands. He attended Louisiana State University and became a successful trial lawyer in Cajun country. Entering politics as a populist Democrat, he made a successful run for governor in 1972, winning on an alliance of the Cajun and black vote. In the governor’s mansion, so close to the flow of money and power (the two great aphrodisiacs), he was like a kid in a candy store.
His plump patrician face, ruddy nose and cheeks, graying hair, and salacious wit perfectly fit the part of an aging roué. “Two out of ten women will go to bed with you,” ran one of Edwards’s maxims, “but you’ve got to ask the other eight.” Edwards inherited the Louisiana tradition of influence peddling and used it to live lavishly. His most expensive habit was gambling. The New Orleans Times-Picayune reported that Edwards
is granted up to $200,000 casino credit at the stroke of his pen . . . He is classified by his favorite hotel-casino—Caesars Palace—among the 0.25 percent of its customers whose importance as gamblers makes the company unwilling to share credit information with other casinos. Caesars even waives its maximum bet limit when Edwards steps to the table . . . He eats his meals on the casinos’ tab in the Strip’s poshest restaurants. He sunbathes on casino-owned yachts at Lake Tahoe. He glides around town in casino limousines, and he and his entourage stay at luxury suites in the most popular hotels. All for free.
What can Edwards get from the Vegas casinos? “Anything he wants,” a former Caesars Palace employee said.
“I like to gamble,” Edwards admitted. He was able to get away with all he did because of a good ol’ boy charisma that charmed journalists, voters, and grand juries alike. A reporter once asked Edwards if it wasn’t illegal for him to accept a reported twenty-thousand-dollar bribe from South Korean lobbyist Tongsun Park. Edwards replied, “It was illegal for them to give, but not for me to receive.” Or as Edwards asked another time: “What’s wrong with making money?” One of Edwards’s most puzzling contributions to Louisiana politics was the open primary, more evocatively known as the jungle primary. Candidates of all parties run against one another in a no-holds-barred primordial contest. The two candidates with the most votes go on to a runoff election for the office.
The open primary, proponents say, gives more power to voters and less to decision makers in smoke-filled back rooms. That was the part that mystified the pundits. It defied belief that such a consummate player as Edwin Edwards would have backed a high-minded reform without considering what was in it for him.
In 1972, Louisiana’s registered Democrats outnumbered Republicans twenty to one. That made the primary system used in other states ludicrous. The real fight was for the Democratic nomination. The final Democrat-versus-Republican election was a formality, a waste of time and money. With the open primary, both the primary and the runoff were meaningful, hard-fought elections.
No one believed that this rationale was sufficient to outweigh an obvious negative: Edwards was a Democrat, and his jungle primary would help the Republican Party.
A slew of Democrats would run in each primary. There would probably be only one Republican. The Republican would automatically corner the conservative vote, while each Democrat would have to scratch and claw for a scrap of the liberal vote (and for liberal campaign money). That would almost guarantee that the Republican made it to the runoff. The Republican could spend his campaign dollars where they counted—on the runoff election.
So what was in it for Edwards, a liberal Democrat? The only theory that made sense was worthy of Machiavelli. Under Louisiana law, the governor cannot run for a third consecutive term. Edwards, who was reelected in 1976, was out of the game when his second term expired in 1980. The law did not preclude a third term (or more), as long as it wasn’t three in a row.
According to this theory, by backing the open primary Edwards was looking several moves ahead, to 1984. Believing it would be easier to beat an incumbent Republican than a younger, less baggage-encumbered Democrat, Edwards knew (made sure?) that there would be no heir apparent in the Democratic Party. With the open primary, the Democratic vote would be more fragmented than usual, and Edwards could therefore count on the split Democratic vote to lead to the election of a Republican—someone to house-sit the governor’s mansion for him. Then, in 1983, he would reunify the Democrats and sail to an easy third victory.
If this really was Edwards’s plan, it was a bigger gamble than the ones he was making at the craps tables. No Republican had been elected governor of Louisiana since Reconstruction.
This “theory” describes exactly what happened. In 1979, five Democrats ran, and only one Republican. The front-running Democrat, Louis Lambert, was the most liberal of the group. Under the old, party-controlled system, the Democrats surely would have chosen someone more moderate than Lambert. As it was, Lambert ran in the runoff against Republican...
Product details
- ASIN : B002SB8OMA
- Publisher : Hill and Wang; First Edition (February 5, 2008)
- Language : English
- Hardcover : 352 pages
- Item Weight : 1.35 pounds
- Dimensions : 6 x 1.19 x 9 inches
- Customer Reviews:
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About the author

William Poundstone is the author of two previous Hill and Wang books: Fortune's Formula and Gaming the Vote.
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The book could benefit from some additions, firstly an overall model of the voting process. Voting does not usually occur suddenly and unexpectedly but in an iterated cycle of discussion, expression of preference, and vote counting, in phases: self-selection into groups (e.g. cliques, voting districts or parties), nomination, runoffs, and final selection. The early phases occur with some expectation of the later phases, and certainly with historical awareness, so the system evolves continuously (e.g. via gerrymandering).
One of those early phases is establishing a constitution, but this gets no mention. Because even the technically fairest election can produce evil results ("Democracy is when two wolves and a lamb vote on what to eat for dinner"), we typically have constitutions to set the voting rules, e.g. limiting the range of questions that can be voted upon. Behind a "veil of ignorance" as to the details of future votes, we can agree on voting rules so that votes will inflict minimal harm. The book mentions Social Choice theory often, but Public Choice only once, and merely as the journal where voting theorist Donald Saari happened to publish an article. Saari gets practically a whole chapter, but Gordon Tullock and Nobel Prize-winner James Buchanan, the authors of Public Choice theory's landmark work "The Calculus of Consent" are completely missing. CALCULUS OF CONSENT, THE (Tullock, Gordon. Selections. V. 2.)
Poundstone attributes much of the current election evil to the rise of political consultants, who consciously coordinate negative publicity, spoilers, and other unfair shenanigans. He does not mention that their rise may be not a cause but a result of the increased government spending and power that began with FDR (the book focuses instead on the other Roosevelt). As the stakes grow higher, so do the campaign budgets. "As long as there is power to be bought, there will be money to buy it."
Proportional voting is mentioned only briefly, but surely deserves more. Under what conditions it is more appropriate than single-winner elections? Some decisions are made only once, while others (e.g. for a legislature) are for representatives who themselves will vote repeatedly. Even for the seemingly one-off cases of choosing a restaurant or a movie, if the same group of friends sees many movies together, surely they would want a voting system that occasionally acknowledges the minority preference? Achieving *consensus* is important for any group that wants to stay friends. Contrast this with modern American politics, with its polarization and ongoing bitterness.
It is ironic that voting theorists still disagree vehemently on the proper voting system for a given set of circumstances. It is doubly ironic that Range Voting is a simplified version of the Comparison Matrix, which is used to evaluate candidates in just such situations when people are emotionally attached to their favorites. Comparison matrices remove some of the emotion by having evaluators (voters) assess each candidate against a weighted set of criteria. The weighted scores are averaged to producing a single score: a range vote. The book would benefit from the addition of such a matrix summarizing how various voting schemes satisfy various fairness criteria.
I bought Poundstone's book rather than some others on the same general topic, because I was told it covered real historical examples and not just the math. It does, but not very evenly: the historical chapters are indeed interesting in places, but have a different feel from the theoretical chapters, more polemical and sometimes partisan. In mentioning the Great Figure-Skating Flip-Flop of 1995, Poundstone says "Trust me -- there wasn't [anything funny about the scoring system]. If I explained the whole voting system, you would nod your head and say, That sounds fair." Maybe so, but I'd rather you did take the time to explain it and let me nod for myself, and spend fewer pages on Lee Atwater and negative campaigning, of which I already know all I need to and more than I want to, and isn't exactly the point of the book.
Note that Poundstone is concerned almost exclusively with "voting systems" in the mathematical sense, he doesn't get into things like tampering with electronic voting machines at all. Similarly, for all the times he refers to the presidential election of 2000 it's to discuss Nader's role as a spoiler, not butterfly ballots or hanging chads, nor the disconnect between the popular vote and the electoral college. Not just OUR system, in other words, but the very theory of voting in general (albeit with virtually all examples and illustrations taken from US history)
As far as the "What We Can Do About It" part of the subtitle goes, there's not really very much about that. Poundstone has his clear favorite system (Range Voting) but admits it isn't likely to get much traction, maybe Instant-Runoff Voting is the best we can work for. He says there's not much point in writing to incumbent politicians, because they're too vested in the current system, but if you do want to he recommends writing to Senator McCain or Senator Obama -- this alone makes the book feel dated beyond its years.
Interesting, very readable, explains things I hadn't understood before; good notes, excellent bibliography. But all that said, it fails to change my life.
