From Library Journal
If the Vietnam War was conducted by politicians in Washington, the war for Kuwait was, according to New York Times correspondent Gordon and retired general Trainor, our "generals' war." The authors astutely conclude that President Bush understood what his predecessors never did. Neither Johnson nor Nixon, nor for that matter National Security Council adviser Henry Kissinger, allowed the military to wage a winning war. The lesson was well learned by the savvy Gen. Colin Powell, chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who directed his subordinates to lash out against the Iraqis with everything we had save for nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Kuwait was not Vietnam, however, and the unmotivated Iraqis were not the Vietcong. Aggrandized as "the world's fourth largest military," the enemy fizzled away within hours when confronted with the world's premier military force. Thus, it came as no surprise that Washington won the battle, but with Saddam Hussein still in power four years after hostilities ended, has it won the war? This cogent analysis provides several disturbing answers worthy of our attention. Recommended for informed lay readers and specialists.
Joseph A. Kechichian, Rand Corp., Santa Monica, Cal.
Copyright 1994 Reed Business Information, Inc.
This inside view of the battle between high U.S. command officers in the conflict with Iraq is a fascinating and sustained analysis of the friction that takes place in real warfare. Writer Gordon teams with retired Marine general Bernard Trainor to record the struggles of the generals of the combined services in their endeavor to plan and execute the massive 500,000-troop movement that achieved the short and stunning victory over Iraqi forces. An important question is posed: Why didn't the generals press on to dismantle the Republican Guard of Saddam Hussein, and what were the consequences of their decision against such an act? The Air Force strategy called for constant precision bombing in the heart of Baghdad. Over 30 days of bombing weakened but did not finish off the enemy. The land attack, whose success was clearly foreshadowed, was concluded too soon and allowed Hussein to keep the Republican Guard intact. The authors believe that the cautious philosophy of General Colin Powell and the eagerness of General Norman Schwarzkopf to get out with an Army victory, combined with the decision of President Bush and his advisers, led to the unfortunate staying power of Saddam Hussein. The final conclusion is undeniable--the gate had not been closed in Iraq, and this book explains why. Eugene Sullivan
