Benjamin G. Bishin, University of California, Riverside
"[This book] makes a rigorously argued case that partisan gerrymandering - unrestricted after Vieth v. Jubelirer (2004) - has emerged as a serious problem for democratic representation and proposes to solve it through an innovative legal strategy, rooted in social choice theory, designed to persuade courts to reconsider the issue from a new perspective. It is easily the most original and important work on partisan gerrymandering to appear since the Court's ruling."
Gary Jacobson, University of California, San Diego
"Translating votes into a fair division of seats is a fundamental challenge of democracy. The authors powerfully demonstrate how the Supreme Court's 5-4 decision in Vieth v. Jubelirer (2004) set the stage for at least a decade of partisan gerrymanders and systematic bias in favor of Republicans."
Matthew Lebo, Stony Brook University
"McGann et al. explain how partisan gerrymandering allowed a minority of voters to elect a majority of the US House of Representatives in 2012 and created a virtual Republican lock on the institution until 2020. The authors make a provocative argument about the signal sent by the Supreme Court's Vieth v. Jubelirer decision, which they claim encouraged state legislatures to maximize partisan advantage in competitive states ... This book represents the best of social science research by addressing a relevant topic, embracing normative implications for democratic theory, and offering guidelines to ensure popular sovereignty."
T. Lynch, Choice