In respectful fashion, I offer a challenge to the author. He mentions in many places Angleton’s friend and former KGB Major Anatoliy Golitsyn, including one reference to the latter‘s 1984 book “New Lies for Old”. He gives a quick brush against one of Golitsyn’s analyses and predictions, namely that Solidarity was a false opposition movement that would eventually come to power. Other than this he repeats a pattern held by reviewers of this subject for the past 30 years—sidestepping Golitsyn’s predictions while attacking his character and stability.
So here is the challenge. Instead of sidestepping the predictions, BE THE FIRST TO ATTACK THEM HEAD ON. Golitsyn made 148 of them in his life, and according to intelligence author Mark Reibling was correct with 94% of them. That’s 139 predictions that came true. In addition, one or two of the remaining were accurate in their basic meaning but got one or two details wrong (i.e., liberalization occurring in Nicaragua instead of Cuba, the basic meaning being that the Soviets would permit a liberalization of an East bloc-aligned Latin American nation).
Now the author doesn’t have to address every single one, just maybe five or six. If the author for his research did read “New Lies for Old”, he knows very well what they are:
“Liberalization in Czechoslovakia would probably involve a return to power of Dubcek and his associates.”
Since all but seven pages of Golitsyn’s book were written by 1980, it is most likely that this prediction was made nearly a decade before it came true, long before there was any talk of a return to the 1968 Prague Spring. So, please explain how this prediction is an example of paranoia. Please address it directly.
“If it is extended to East Germany, demolition of the Berlin Wall might even be contemplated.”
This prediction wasn’t so spectacular. It could be talked about then as we talk about Korean reunification today. But an online review of the sheer idiocy of news reports back then supports the argument that the West was taken like blind sheep before wolves. Any review of photos at the time will clearly show that all demolition machinery was on the east side of the wall, and that such machinery could not have been brought in without authorization of the Stasi (hence the KGB). And the KGB had only one interest in mind—the creation of a neutral, socialist Europe. For that both the wall and German division had to go.
“Pressure could well grow for a solution of the German problem in which some form of confederation between East and West Germany would be combined with neutralization of the whole and a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union.”
Enough said on that one.
“Another important factor in the selection of Andropov was his leadership role in the preparation for the Czechoslovakian ‘liberalization’ in 1967-68 and the ‘liberalization’ in Hungary, which took place when he was the head of the Central Committee's department responsible for relations with communist countries until mid-1967. Therefore, the timing of the release of the Solidarity leader and the news of the appointment of Andropov confirm another point in the book: that the ‘liberalization’ will not be limited to the USSR, but will be expanded to Eastern Europe and particularly to Poland.”
Here Golitsyn addresses the fact that glasnost and perestroika, still several years away at the time of his writing, would not be limited to the USSR.
"’Liberalization’ in Eastern Europe on the scale suggested could have a social and political impact on the United States itself, especially if it coincided with a severe economic depression. The communist strategists are on the lookout for such an opportunity.”
Do we no longer remember the recession of the early 1990’s?
“The European Parliament might become an all-European socialist parliament with representation from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. ‘Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals’ would turn out to be a neutral, socialist Europe.”
The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact made the EU possible, even as there may yet be tensions with Russia. Given that Russia is a member of the larger, less imposing Council of Europe, it does not stretch credulity that it may at some level be more included in European affairs after Putin leaves.
“Political ‘liberalization’ and ‘democratization’ would follow the general lines of the Czechoslovak rehearsal in 1968. This rehearsal might well have been the kind of political experiment Mironov had in mind as early as 1960. The ‘liberalization’ would be spectacular and impressive. Formal pronouncements might be made about a reduction in the communist party's role; its monopoly would be apparently curtailed. An ostensible separation of powers between the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary might be introduced. The Supreme Soviet would be given greater apparent power and the president and deputies greater apparent independence. The posts of president of the Soviet Union and first secretary of the party might well be separated. The KGB would be ‘reformed.’ Dissidents at home would be amnestied; those in exile abroad would be allowed to return, and some would take up positions of leadership in government. Sakharov might be included in some capacity in the government or allowed to teach abroad. The creative arts and cultural and scientific organizations, such as the writers' unions and Academy of Sciences, would become apparently more independent, as would the trade unions. Political clubs would be opened to nonmembers of the communist party. Leading dissidents might form one or more alternative political parties. Censorship would be relaxed; controversial books, plays, films, and art would be published, performed, and exhibited. Many prominent Soviet performing artists now abroad would return to the Soviet Union and resume their professional careers. Constitutional amendments would be adopted to guarantee fulfillment of the provisions of the Helsinki agreements and a semblance of compliance would be maintained. There would be greater freedom for Soviet citizens to travel. Western and United Nations observers would be invited to the Soviet Union to witness the reforms in action.”
Here is Golitsyn’s general description of the domestic political, social, and artistic aspects of glasnost. Note how he describes how Sakharov could eventually be included in the government, which DID happen. In 1980 our CIA experts were also predicting something so relatively small and precise, right? RIGHT??
I could go on and on. Golitsyn also wrote in his second book “The Perestroika Deception”, how the media in the West would accept the changes in the USSR and Eastern Europe, how there would be calls for reductions in defense spending, and how the idea that Communism was dead “would be blown all out of proportion by the media” (predicted in a memorandum to the CIA in 1978).
So Mr. Morley, in sum Golitsyn predicted ahead of time that a “younger Soviet leader”, a “kind of Soviet Dubcek” as he wrote, would come to power, initiating all the above reforms and more, that this would spread to Eastern Europe, resulting in the coming to power of Solidarity, that Germany would be reunited, that all the Communist dominoes would fall, that all the Communists would suddenly declare themselves social democrats, that there would be large scale reductions in US and Western arms, and that the whole world would come to believe Communism was dead. And then it all happened. And this is an example of paranoia how? Please, explain how this was an example of mental illness or being incorrect.
Now, yes there is the example of the author who wrote about the “Titania” sinking years before the Titanic sank. But somehow I don’t think weird coincidence is involved here.
In fact, I was once so convinced of Golitsyn’s ideas that I became the only American to travel to post-Soviet Russia, posing as a language student at Moscow State University, to study the impact of KGB propaganda and deception on post-Soviet society. For that I traveled from St. Petersburg to Irkutsk, gauging the sensibilities of the Russian public as to the current state of affairs of their country. What I found was sadly disappointing and yet expected. The average Russian, while knowing much about daily life under the Soviet Union, knew little about the dialectical nature of Communism or the machinations of the KGB (does being an American make one an expert on the CIA?). Having studied Communism at the time for nearly 20 years, I knew more about its military, intelligence, and other aspects than they did.
So, Mr. Morley, please, I politely invite you to directly address Golitsyn’s predictions here. Please tell us all how he could surpass the CIA’s best analysts in forecasting the end of the Cold War and yet still be paranoid and completely wrong. I encourage you to directly address the predictions cited above, as well as any others you may wish to add, to bolster you’re argument (yes, I am aware he thought NATO would dissolve. This dealt with his greatest weakness, which was a lack of understanding of certain Western institutions and the causes of their creation and maintenance, especially since NATO long ago shed any semblance of anti-communism). Nevertheless, his successes were far beyond anything the CIA achieved.
Which, BTW, begs the question of one of the ultimate mysteries of the universe. Why, since the CIA was in possession of his predictions through his many memoranda to them over the years, did it act like the Soviet dissolution and end of the Cold War were real? Golitsyn discussed this with them at least since the 1970’s. They knew from him that the “collapse of Communism” was coming and that it was going to be fake, causing Communism to metastasize and become more dangerous than ever (Communist front groups and socialist ideas have made inroads in the US not possible in the Cold War). Why not a humble admission by CIA that it was wrong? Institutional pride? Not wanting to rock the boat? Something even worse? Maybe you can ask your contacts in the CIA why they prefer to continue to look so stupid to those of us who have known for nearly 30 years they are all wet?
The issue is especially important in light of the fact that the evisceration of Angleton’s CI division led to the Aldrich Ames case, which cost the lives of 20 CIA contacts in Moscow. The existence of a spy like Ames at the end of the Cold War could be seen from a million miles away, as the case followed the pattern of Soviet espionage history since World War II (every period of warm relations being accompanied by heightened espionage activity). Since US-Soviet relations were at their closest at the end of the Cold War, it followed naturally that the KGB’s espionage efforts would be the most intense, that there would have to be a high ranking officer or officers in the government effecting it, and that eventual exposure would cause shock in the intelligence community. This was incredibly easy to see using Golitsyn’s methodology years before the case broke, yet it took the CIA’s agents nine years to catch him because they no longer had people like Angleton. That is an embarrassment to the CIA.
Additionally, it is important because Golitsyn’s methodology remains highly relevant in the case of North Korea, China, and even Vietnam. Right now the Chinese are playing disinformation to the hilt along with these other countries. The media are all about North Korea’s nuclear weapons program while nobody speaks of the PLA 2nd Artillery Corps DF-41’s now deployed north of North Korea. With both MIRV and decoy capabilities these easily outmaneuver the US THAAD system, rendering the “denuclearization of the North Korean Peninsula” a joke, all the while limiting US ability to respond to Chinese provocations in the South China Sea, the real reason why China is stoking the North Korea issue. Deprived of good intel analysis of Communist nations, we do stupid things like send an aircraft carrier into port in Vietnam, telling the Chinese “Hey, look at us!” while both the Chinese and Vietnamese, having just concluded 83 separate agreements on control of said waters, laugh all the way to the bank at how we still treat Communist nations differently, always assisting one or the other. Not to be outdone, North Korean officials at the Singapore summit privately told US officials that they prefer American troops to remain in Korea since they are a balancing force to China, even though they ordinarily would have been shot for saying such things. And we have no idea if this was a disinformation move by China, for whom there would be advantages in inventing divisions with NK, because we don’t have anyone like Angleton or Golitsyn anymore to review information. But we did have our media, swallowing the line like always, as did US officials, because they all grew up in the West and don’t understand that in a totalitarian system things work differently.
Angleton was a rare breed who escaped that blindness.
So again, sir, getting back to the original subject, if you see this what is your response?
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Andrew Wilson
I was disappointed with its length
Reviewed in the United Kingdom 🇬🇧 on January 13, 2018
