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Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia Paperback – April 1, 2001
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Gorodetsky substantiates his argument through the most thorough scrutiny ever of Soviet archives for the period, including the files of the Russian foreign ministry, the general staff, the security forces, and the entire range of military intelligence available to Stalin at the time. According to Gorodetsky, Stalin was eagerly anticipating a peace conference where various accords imposed on Russia would be revised. But the delusion of being able to dictate a new European order blinded him to the lurking German danger, and his erroneous diagnosis of the political scene—colored by his perennial suspicion of Great Britain—led him to misconstrue the evidence of his own and Britain’s intelligence services. Gorodetsky highlights the sequence of military blunders that resulted from Stalin’s determination to appease Germany—blunders that provide the key to understanding the calamity that befell Russia on 22 June 1941.
- Print length384 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherYale University Press
- Publication dateApril 1, 2001
- Dimensions5.73 x 1.27 x 8.86 inches
- ISBN-100300084595
- ISBN-13978-0300084597
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Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of RussiaProfessor Gabriel GorodetskyHardcover$3.99 shippingGet it Jan 27 - Feb 4Only 1 left in stock - order soon.
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- Reviewed in the United States on June 27, 2015This is an excellent, well-written, well-sourced history of 1940-1941, prior to the German invasion of Russia. I can't add much to the description of the book in other reviews, so I'll just mention a couple of things about the book:
1) While it should be obvious from the topic of the book, this is not a military history per se (war had not broken out yet), but rather a diplomatic history. The fighting in France, Yugoslavia, Greece, etc. is covered briefly to provide context, but nothing more.
2) This book does not cover the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, only its aftermath.
3) While apparently this book was written in response to claims that the USSR was planning a pre-emptive attack in 1941, don't expect a point-by-point rebuttal as I've seen in other books; rather, the author lays out the facts (as he's been able to document them) and then simply concludes that there is no truth to the pre-emptive attack theories.
4) The author does an excellent job of describing the diplomatic moves/counter-moves/reactions during 1940-1941--the period was very tumultuous, with various annexations, invasions, wars, etc., each of which "reshuffled the deck" (in the author's words). Stalin's complacency after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was shattered after the Germans' smashing victory in France, prompting Russian moves into the Baltics and Bessarabia, prompting German moves into Yugoslavia and Greece, etc.
5) The author also does an excellent job describing why Stalin trusted the Brits even less then he did Hitler, how various British maneuvers played into this distrust, and how it played into his (mis)calculations.
6) This book gives an excellent description of the intelligence received by Stalin--what he knew, when he knew it, how it was presented to him, and usually, why he didn't believe it. Very interesting...
- Reviewed in the United States on October 5, 2011Strangely, contrary to direction one might expect, military histories of the 30s, 40s, and 50s, rather than becoming more "disciplined" from an American standpoint--insofar as they follow the expectations, rules, and requirements of profesional academia, particularly in the area of citation and presentation of evidence--seem to becoming less structured, less clearly cited, and more haphazard. Maybe I'm reading the wrong materials, or maybe I'm just overly pessimistic. In any case, Gorodetsky's work here, at least, is a much needed deviation from this unfortunate trend, based less on emotional appeals, attractive, even romantic notions and popular culture that seems more than a little pervasive in Second World War histories, particularly in the Eastern Front, and more on an extremely indepth, analytical view based on access to very numerous archives in, from what I've seen, multiple states.
I don't expect 'Grand Delusion' to serve as a rallying cry for any of the political "sides" concerning the Eastern Front--it's too rational, too deliberately methodical and expositional to do that, especially compared to its competition, it's language reserved and tempered by comparison. That could be a strike against Gorodetsky, but I personally don't think it detracts from it in its intended purpose. It does historical personalities little in the way of favors, but greatly interests the interested reader.
On a side note, I had a chance to speak with Dr. Gorodetsky about his book, very briefly--he mentioned the unfortunate fact that the designer for the book's cover cut off part of the photograph, removing part of the sign that would have otherwise indicated the German's proximity to Moscow (if memory serves correctly). Another case of a cover messed-up for aesthetics, I guess.
- Reviewed in the United States on October 7, 2021I've studied with professor Gabriel Gorodetsky, and have read his books and articles. As well as the books and articles of many other historians who studied and researched WW-II.
I love the arguments of the people here who gave this book one star rating though!
The first one says Gorodetsky fails the Occam razor, without understanding what Occam's razor actually means, and that it certainly DOES NOT mean that EVERY simpler explanation is better. Actually, Occam's razor is: "a principle of theory construction or evaluation according to which, other things equal, explanations that posit fewer entities, or fewer kinds of entities, are to be preferred to explanations that posit more.", and this guy obviously doesn't quite get the "OTHER THINGS EQUAL" part.
The second one says that: "A valid judgment of any work of refutation depends upon a comparison of that refutation and the work being refuted. The establishment suppression of Viktor Suvorov's "Icebreaker" (the book attacked by Gorodetsky) means that no comparative analysis can be made in this case". Wow! Where do you live, man? The "Icebreaker" is suppressed? It actually sold millions of copies worldwide, including Russia. And millions of people talk about it freely, including Russia, and including other PROFESSIONAL historians who completely refuted the myth-making of "Viktor Suvorov" (not his real name either) - this former employee of KGB that ran away to the West to make some money and a name for himself as an author of what is called "Pulp Fiction".
The third one is no better. He (completely seriously) asks how can it be that Soviets and Russians gave Gorodetsky a chance to enter USSR and Russia and a chance to go through their archives if he is a Jew, and how did they actually allowed him out. Indeed, a serious pondering...
The fourth one says: "So when Hitler claimed that he invaded Russia because Stalin was about to invade him, and Viktor Suvorov supports it in his brilliant book ICEBREAKER, Gorodetsky finds it necessary to dispute the idea. Otherwise, I guess, G. couldn't condemn the Nazis' mass murder in Russia.". Hmm... indeed, how can ANYONE DARE to ACTUALLY DISPUTE the book written by Suvorov, if it is a truly "BRILLIANT BOOK"? A good ol' question! Got a point there! If Hitler+Suvorov say something - how can anyone dispute that?
Ahahah, love you guys to death! Seriously.
