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The book is very wonkish, which means that if you are a real nerd, this is perfect. If you are more interested in personalities and who-knifed-who, this is not your book.
The book has excellent maps. It also has excellent "staff college" diagrams. That is, if one has a certain front to defend against attacks of all types (from cattle raids to major invasions), how does one use the features of the landscape to build a defensive system, with limited troops? Luttwak goes through the staff-college analysis and provide illustrative diagrams, mostly theoretical ones but also some which are actual maps of actual Roman deployments.
In several places, he provides lists of how many legions were in each province, so there are 4-5 periods of time when you can see the high-level deployment scheme.
He is also very interesting on the system of having "client states," "friends of Rome," and buffer states. It is not necessary, and sometimes not advisable, to conquer an area outright if you can designate a local ruler to act as puppet. The puppet ruler is a local who knows the people, knows who is important, and can control the area's internal affairs much better than a parachuted-in Roman official could. Once Rome became a hegemon, its neighbors would often do as they were told because they knew that Rome could march in whenever it became displeased.
The reservations? Well, the very name of the book is a simplification because there is no evidence that the Romans sat down and developed a grant strategy. They never had a "general staff" or a "staff college." At times the defenses were designed (when an area was first taken over, or when an emperor reviewed the situation as Hadrian did.) Most of the time, the system remained as it had already been set up, and sometimes evolved as the provincial commander made adjustments.
Also, he talks about the placement of legions and when they did (or did not) constitute a mobile reaction force. I find most of that discussion to be moot. They generally placed legions well forward because that is where they might do some good. Movement was agonizingly slow, so the focus should be on limiting the distances to be marched. If an enemy came in thru a gap, then the nearest legions would move sideways to either seal the gap or attack the invading force. The permanent deployment was very far forward, with the best lateral roads they could build. If the threat was too large for nearby forces, they would take whatever legions were nearest, even if that meant a march from Hispania to the Rhine; therefore they built long roads from the interior to the frontier.
- Paperback: 272 pages
- Publisher: Johns Hopkins University Press (January 1, 1979)
- Language: English
- ISBN-10: 0801821584
- ISBN-13: 978-0801821585
- Product Dimensions: 6 x 0.5 x 9 inches
- Shipping Weight: 12.8 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
- Customer Reviews: 45 customer reviews
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Amazon Best Sellers Rank:
#964,353 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #1628 in Ancient Roman History (Books)
- #2198 in Military Strategy History (Books)
- #1572 in Ancient History (Books)
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