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The Great Stagnation: How America Ate All The Low-Hanging Fruit of Modern History, Got Sick, and Will (Eventually) Feel Better: A Penguin eSpecial from Dutton Kindle Edition
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America has been through the biggest financial crisis since the great Depression, unemployment numbers are frightening, media wages have been flat since the 1970s, and it is common to expect that things will get worse before they get better. Certainly, the multidecade stagnation is not yet over. How will we get out of this mess? One political party tries to increase government spending even when we have no good plan for paying for ballooning programs like Medicare and Social Security. The other party seems to think tax cuts will raise revenue and has a record of creating bigger fiscal disasters that the first. Where does this madness come from?
As Cowen argues, our economy has enjoyed low-hanging fruit since the seventeenth century: free land, immigrant labor, and powerful new technologies. But during the last forty years, the low-hanging fruit started disappearing, and we started pretending it was still there. We have failed to recognize that we are at a technological plateau. The fruit trees are barer than we want to believe. That's it. That is what has gone wrong and that is why our politics is crazy.
In The Great Stagnation, Cowen reveals the underlying causes of our past prosperity and how we will generate it again. This is a passionate call for a new respect of scientific innovations that benefit not only the powerful elites, but humanity as a whole.
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherDutton
- Publication dateJanuary 25, 2011
- Reading age18 years and up
- File size933 KB
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Editorial Reviews
Review
“The most debated nonfiction book so far this year...As Cowen makes clear, many of this era’s technological breakthroughs produce enormous happiness gains, but surprisingly little economic activity.”—David Brooks, The New York Times
“One of the most talked-about books among economists right now.”—Renee Montagne, Morning Edition, NPR
“Tyler Cowen may very well turn out to be this decade’s Thomas Friedman.”—Kelly Evans, The Wall Street Journal
“Cowen's book...will have a profound impact on the way people think about the last thirty years.”—Ryan Avent, Economist.com
About the Author
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Product details
- ASIN : B004H0M8QS
- Publisher : Dutton; 0 edition (January 25, 2011)
- Publication date : January 25, 2011
- Language : English
- File size : 933 KB
- Text-to-Speech : Enabled
- Screen Reader : Supported
- Enhanced typesetting : Enabled
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- Word Wise : Enabled
- Sticky notes : On Kindle Scribe
- Print length : 128 pages
- Best Sellers Rank: #648,944 in Kindle Store (See Top 100 in Kindle Store)
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About the author

Tyler Cowen (/ˈkaʊ.ən/; born January 21, 1962) is an American economist, academic, and writer. He occupies the Holbert L. Harris Chair of economics, as a professor at George Mason University, and is co-author, with Alex Tabarrok, of the popular economics blog Marginal Revolution. Cowen and Tabarrok have also ventured into online education by starting Marginal Revolution University. He currently writes a regular column for Bloomberg View. He also has written for such publications as The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, Forbes, Time, Wired, Newsweek, and the Wilson Quarterly. Cowen also serves as faculty director of George Mason's Mercatus Center, a university research center that focuses on the market economy. In February 2011, Cowen received a nomination as one of the most influential economists in the last decade in a survey by The Economist. He was ranked #72 among the "Top 100 Global Thinkers" in 2011 by Foreign Policy Magazine "for finding markets in everything."
Bio from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
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I. The low-hanging fruit we ate
..A. Examples in the United States
....1. Free land (Homestead Act, etc.)
....2. Technological breakthroughs (electricity, motor vehicles, telephone, radio, television, computers etc.)
....3. Smart, uneducated kids (who were made productive through excellent public education).
....4. This is a partial list; clearly other candidates can be proposed, e.g. cheap fossil fuels.
..B. Examples in other countries ("catch-up growth")
....1. Leveraging the technological breakthroughs of the West (e.g. China, India)
....2. Smart, uneducated kids (e.g. China, India)
..C. MEDIAN income growth in the U.S. has slowed notably since 1973.
....1. Decline in household size is not the cause.
....2. Unmeasured quality improvements (think electronic gadgetry) are not a counter (because there is
...... also unmeasured quality degradation, think traffic jams and AIDS)
..D. Rate of technical innovation has declined notably since 1873 and even more since 1955
....1. Innovation is getting harder; the low fruit has been picked.
....2. Recent innovations have slight marginal benefits
..E. Recent and current innovation is more geared to PRIVATE goods than to PUBLIC goods.
....**This is the driver of the Great Stagnation.
....1. Extracting resources from the government (subsidies for solar power, farm products, other junk;
.....useless construction; useless government employees; legal services, etc.) by lobbying.
....2. Extreme protections of intellectual property (e.g. by ridiculous patent laws that grant monopolies for
...... incandescently obvious ideas, enabled by our retarded judiciary)
....3. Recent financial innovations (CDO's, derivatives, etc.) that benefit Wall Street at public expense.
....4. THESE ALL RESULT IN INCREASED INCOME INEQUALITY.
II. Our New (not so productive) Economy
..A. Most recent productivity gains in the private sector have been achieved by cutting out dead wood
....("discovering who isn't doing much and firing them").
..B. GDP statistics are flawed because they value expenditure at cost; actual value of the expenditure is
.... unknown in sectors where market forces do not operate.
..C. Underperforming sectors where valuation at cost is a big problem:
....1. Government.
......a. The marginal value of government, even if positive, falls as government grows larger.
........(1) Basic expenditures deliver high value. e.g. police, basic infrastructure, national security)
........(2) Ancillary expenditures deliver less value (e.g. bridges to nowhere, urban renewal boondoggles,
......... salaries for school administrators and federal drones
......b. Because government contribution to GDP is valued at cost, the larger the government grows,
........ the more GDP growth and living standards are overstated.
....2. Health care
......a. No bloody clue what things are actually worth; they are valued at cost.
......b. America currently spends 17% of GDP on health care, with outcomes worse than countries
....... that spend far less.
......c. Disproportionate spending on end care for the elderly.
......d. David Cutler's study: health care productivity growth 1995-2005 was negative.
....3. Education
......a. 6% of GDP at present.
......b. No improvements in student reading or math performance since mid 70's.
......c. But we are spending (constant dollars) twice a much now per student as we did then.
......d. High school graduation rate peaked at 80% in late 60's.
......e. Government claims of 88% graduation rate are nonsense.
......f. 20% of all new high school credentials each year come from passing equivalency tests.
..D. INNOVATION MUST OCCUR IN THESE UNDER-PERFORMING SECTORS
... This is where Cowan fails to state solutions clearly, which may disappoint readers, but his point is that
... these are areas where innovative thinking is required and good solutions need to be developed. My summary
... and suggestions:
....1. "If you can't measure it, you can't manage it." Use market approaches, intelligently ascertain value by
..... other means, and if measurement fails, arbitrarily force cuts in low-performing sectors (as a last resort).
....2. Government: 10% staff cuts. Strict spending limits pegged to per-capita government spending during a
.... benchmark period.
....3. Education: Standardized tests, charter schools, e-learning, vouchers (all of course resisted by the
..... education lobby).
....4. Health care: determine what works and pay only for that. Extending the life of an 90-year-old terminally
..... ill person for one month at a cost of $200,000 is not something that works.
III. Does the Internet Change Everything?
..A. Similar to early years of industrial revolution (advances made by amateurs)
..B. Hard to measure its productivity because its value lies largely in the mental dimension; most stuff on the
... internet is free.
....1. Traditional activity does occur (advertising, sale of goods). eBay, Amazon, Craigslist, ads on Google.
....2. While a public good, benefits of the Internet skewed to the intellectually curious.
....3. GDP is understated to extent it does not include the value of free internet pleasures.
..C. As an innovation, the internet has generated few jobs and revenue, compared to earlier innovations.
... (Example: Google employs 20,000, Twitter 300)
..D. Internet has also destroyed jobs in the music industry, book stores, and other forms of entertainment.
..E. So we're getting away from materialism, but it really hurts and people are yelping about it.
IV. The Government of Low-hanging Fruit
..A. Days of government largess are past; we can't slop the public trough like we used to.
..B. We won't be getting real income growth of 2% to 3%. We'll be lucky with 1%.
..C. Tax cuts without spending cuts (right wing approach) are untenable in the long term.
..D. Taking from the rich is also untenable in the long term; top 5% already pays for 43% of the federal
... government; top 1% for 27%.
..E. As real growth stagnates, demands from interest groups (corporations for tax breaks, K-12 teachers for job
... security, medical device makers for Medicare payments, public employees for pensions) will grow more
... strident. Expect more vociferous arguments about how to divide up the stagnant pie.
..F. Because government cannot continue to grow under current conditions, Liberals have become the new
... conservatives, supporting the status quo of handouts, bribes, and squandering.
V. Why did we have such a big financial crisis?
..A. Eight words: "WE THOUGHT WE WERE RICHER THAN WE WERE".
....1. We made plans expecting continued 3% productivity growth and the asset prices such growth would bring.
....2. We were lulled by successful handling of prior crises (e.g. the S&L bust and real estate bubble in the
..... 80's) into believing all risk could be managed effectively.
....3. Overconfidence was the problem. For everyone. Borrowers, investors, bankers, politicians, regulators.
..B. Markets and government failed miserably in estimating risk.
..C. Government encouraged risk by taking by overlooking accounting scandals (Freddie and Fannie) and promoting
... home ownership for everybody.
..D. Short-term response to stagnant incomes was to borrow against appreciated assets (home equity loans,
... mortgage refis), foolishly expecting continued asset appreciation. From 1993 through 2005,
... homeowners extracted equity equal to 11.5% of GDP.
..E. Fiscal stimulus in 2009 was inadequate, but a larger stimulus would not have helped. Problem is not lack of
... aggregate demand, but lack of revenue-generating innovation.
..F. Replacing private debt with public debt solves nothing. Sooner or later you have to pay the piper.
..G. The internet, by giving people much to do for free, may be exacerbating the current stagnation.
VI. Can we fix things?
..A. Promote favorable trends
....1. India and China
......a. Science and engineering interest in India and China: should yield innovations we can exploit.
......b. Offloading unskilled labor abroad gives us more time to pursue innovation (if we are smart enough).
......c. Consumers in China and India can offer a market for our innovations.
....2. Internet may do more for revenue generation in the future
......a. Promotes scientific learning and makes science more of a meritocracy; ideas rapidly shared and improved.
........ (Archaic intellectual property laws will need to change if we are to take advantage of this)
......b. Promotes self-education; a lot better than watching TV.
......c. These should all yield productivity gains.
....3. Improvements in K-12 education
......a. Majority of electorate no longer sides with education lobby.
......b. School choice, charter schools, incentives, better monitoring are now in favor.
....4. Raise the social status of scientists
......a. Science is what fuels economic growth, yet we reward law, medicine, and finance.
......b. [Aside: this is not the case in China and India, where engineers and scientists are more highly
....... esteemed, and occupy the highest offices in government. Here, we have poli sci graduates running things.]
......c. Culture of science is what drove the industrial revolution.
......d. We should not trust individual scientists uncritically, but we should respect science at the higher
....... level (a lot more than law or finance)
..B. Avoid unfavorable trends
....1. Cool the rhetoric, avoid useless strife.
....2. Stick to facts. Educate yourself. Don't demonize those you disagree with.
....3. A prolonged period of slow growth need not be bad -- Japan has tolerated it very well.
..C. Final Word
....1. The next low-hanging fruit may pose dangers. Be vigilant and quick to respond.
....2. Axis and Communist powers turned new technologies to destructive and oppressive ends.
....3. Balance of power can be upset.
These theses are obviously meant to be provocative, all the more so as delivered a a short e-book that's almost an abstract of a potential tome that would fill in the conspicuously lacking evidence. For me, however, the exercise provoked considerable skepticism on key points:
1) I'd question whether we're living in an era in which transformative technological innovation is in short supply. Cowen does allow "the Internet" as the great exception, but points out that the leading-edge tech companies employ relatively few people, and that Internet innovation has been notoriously difficult to monetize. He is strangely silent, though, about the impact of interactive technology computer technology more generally on production and commerce of all kinds -- just-in-time factory production, product customization, bar coding, all the incredible efficiencies of large-scale retail operations that wring out large profits on tiny margins -- and on interactive technology's role in globalizing production. He also doesn't consider transformative technologies hiding in plain sight: personal computers themselves (never mind the Internet) and cell phones. It's true, as Cowen says, that the basic physical components of middle class life in America don't look that much different than they did in the 1960s. But they *are* much different. And the differences have generated a lot of wealth, even if the U.S. middle class hasn't garnered as large a share as it did in the previous generation.
2) Part of our problem in this era of allegedly relatively modest technological innovation, Cowen says, is that "A lot of our recent innovations are 'private goods' rather than 'public s.' (sic)" That is,
"Contemporary innovation often takes the form of expanding positions of economic and political privilege, extracting resources from the government by lobbying, seeking the sometime extreme protections of intellectual property laws, and producing goods that are exclusive or status related rather than universal, private rather than public; think twenty-five seasons of new, fall season Gucci handbags."
No doubt -- but is this a new phenomenon? Since when have innovators not sought private advantage, or not catered to the luxury market? Electricity was a luxury good until government rate regulation forced utilities to make it affordable. I doubt that early trains were packed with common folk, either. And on the other end of the scale, as Cowen himself emphasizes, Internet-related innovations are so egalitarian as to severely crimp profit opportunities. I would need to hear much more to be convinced that "the 'rise in income inequality' and the 'slowdown in ideas production' are two ways of describing the same phenomenon, namely that current innovation is more geared to private goods than to public goods."
In complaining about the proliferation of "private goods," Cowen is thinking largely of the financial industry, the innovations of which, he notes, have primarily benefited hedge fund managers (and presumably traders and Wall Street execs). No question that the financial sector has grown bloated, become a great talent suck, exacerbated raising income inequality -- Cowen emphasizes the vast gap between hedge fund managers and Fortune 500 CEOs -- and created products that did not help allocate capital to productive sources. But it strikes me as at least possible that the malformation in the financial industry is more a product of rapid technological innovation -- the ability to gather and crunch huge amounts of data and trade in nanoseconds, generating high-stakes Darwinian competition among top math minds -- than it is a matter of rent-seeking driven by a dearth of innovation.
Poor regulatory decisions, executed under both parties but driven by Republican free market fundamentalism (with too much Clintonian Democratic buy-in) doubtless also played a part. I don't buy Cowen's claim that since euphoria was so widespread -- shared, for example, by a hypothetical over-enthusiastic museum director -- no one was to blame. Regulations and regulators exist to quell euphoria when it crosses over into fraud -- and regulators who shared Cowen's apparent affection for Ayn Rand seem to have taken it as an article of faith that it rarely does.
3) I would also question Cowen's assertion that diminishing returns are the rule for new government initiatives in a developed society with a legacy set of safety net services. He complains, "when measuring GDP, we treat each dollar of government spending as if it is equal in value to the previous dollars that were spent. We're valuing dollars spent on highway extensions as if they worth as much as the dollars we spent on building the core roads that link major cities."
Granted -- and of course, one new government expenditure may be more efficient than another -- say sewer line repair, or high speed rail, instead of that highway extension. But Cowen also seems to think that new government initiatives cannot be "core" and are inherently inferior to older ones. He puts forward this axiom (his italics):
"The larger the role of government in the economy, the more the published figures for GDP growth are overstating improvements in our living standard."
That's assuming that there will never again be a highly efficient government initiative, worthy of being considered "core" by future generations. I think that's a highly dubious assumption in a country that lacks universal healthcare, not to mention services yet undreamed of (subsidized settlement of far-off planets, anyone?). If the U.S. could devise a healthcare delivery system as efficient as that of France or Japan -- admittedly a big if -- we could cut the per capita cost of healthcare as a share of GDP in half. Cowen is dubious about the likely efficiency of the Affordable Care Act, but he does not really engage the issue in the brief space of this book. What if Atul Gawande is right, and the ACA's experiments in accountable care organizations, efficiency incentives for hospitals, outcomes research (inhibited by a bar on using the data to determine what Medicare will pay for) and a host of other experiments has an effect comparable to the Department of Agriculture's seeding of innovations in farming in the early 20th century? And from a different direction, if the U.S. could muster the political will to accord government the sole power to set pricing and coverage rules for medical procedures-- then ,again, government spending on health insurance would likely reduce the real cost of healthcare.
Cowen himself implicitly admits that new government spending in the right places can have an outsized effect on GDP when he lists recent approaches to education reform as one of the hopeful signs that we are on track to get off the plateau:
"we now see a critical mass in the American electorate favoring concrete steps to bring greater quality and accountability to K-12 education, whether through better incentives, school choice, charter schools, better monitoring, or whatever works...President Obama has opted for an education policy that, on the whole, teachers' unions strongly dislike. We haven't yet seen much in the way of results, but the tide is turning in a positive direction, and over time I expect this to produce results."
Here as in his discussion of health care, we must take it on faith that Cowen has read and thought deeply about the issue on which he expresses a perfunctory policy preference. In any case, it would seem that he believes that the right kind of spending on education as he defines it would have an outsized impact on GDP, "government spending" though it be.
4. Finally, on the core assertion that our economic woes stem from a slowdown (or rather, a "plateau") in productive innovation, Cowen owes us a bit more explanation of two periods of sustained economic growth that he acknowledges to have taken place since we reached the alleged plateau around 1970: the mid-to-late eighties and the Clinton years. I imagine that he might explain the Clinton-era prosperity as in large part a technology bubble -- burst by the failure of Internet innovation to generate revenue and jobs. I suspect that that's only partly true, and that, again, Cowen pays insufficient attention to innovations in business processes that have wrought much creative destruction -- job losses as well as value gains. And that points to a broader question: perhaps more recent technological innovations, including those enabling increased globalization, destroy jobs more quickly than earlier innovations did.
5. Cowen's chief policy recommendation to get us back on the track of innovation is comically inadequate. It's to "raise the social status of scientists" (his italics):
"When it comes to motivating human beings, status often matters at least as much as money. I would like to see both incentives pointing in the right direction. Right now, scientists do not earn enough status and appreciation. While scientists are not, in American society, a low-status group, neither are they thought of as especially high status either. Science doesn't have the cache of law, medicine, or high finance. Few women or men dream of dating or marrying a scientist. Yet, upon reflection, are we not capable of finding Leonardo da Vinci the scientist as sexy and exciting as Leonardo da Vinci the artist?"
Win the future: seduce a scientist. There is a germ of truth here: finance has probably attracted too much talent in the last two decades (though doctors, increasingly, are scientists and innovators, as Atul Gawande notes in his commencement speech at Harvard Medical School today). But it's hard to credit that science suffers from a lack of incentives. The top scientific minds, of the sort that lay the ground for technological breakthroughs, would likely never be attracted to other fields -- at least those whose minds are not wasted in the first place by lack of educational opportunity. And practically or commercially oriented scientists have ample opportunity to turn their creativity to gold in industry, from computer science to biotech to alternative energy and a host of less obvious industries. Being part of a startup team has plenty of cache, and there are plenty of scientists, broadly defined, in U.S. startup companies.
This book's simplicity and brevity are part of its appeal. But it deserves a longer final chapter. In fact, the whole thing needs to be at least two or three times as long to have a real impact on those who don't share many of Cowen's assumptions.
A somewhat different version of this review is posted at my blog, xpostfactoid.
Top reviews from other countries
The ebook is presented in a short format - easy to read, and gives a very readable summary of the academics
Cowen's analysis of historical trends in technological innovation reveals a plateau since the 1970s in the adoption and wide dissemination of useful new technologies: i.e. like in the 1970s we still drive cars powered by gasoline, and use refrigerators and TVs; they're just incrementally improved but not radically different in concept. Now they're made elsewhere in the world by newly industrialised economies which have imitated the industrial practices of the US and Europe, and are imported rather than home-produced. The newer technologies like the internet and cell phones are for communications, and don't need a lot of workers to run them.
The author goes on to analyse the incremental value of increasing spend on education, which he sees as offering diminishing economic returns, and writes an excellent section analysing healthcare spending - again, beyond a certain point doubling spending offers smaller and smaller incremental returns in health benefits. Cowen uses a graph to demonstrate that although every major European country has a total healthcare expenditure per capita of less than half that of the USA, they all have longer life-expectancy and lower infant mortality - so it's not to do with money per se, but how things are done and how the money is used.
The author's fix-it ideas include raising the social esteem in which scientists are held: well, amen to that, but is that really going to make a big difference? The biggest earners in the USA are now in the financial sector. Trading credit default swaps, derivatives and securitised financial products may enrich the tiny part of the workforce concerned with such chimera, but they tend to relatively impoverish everyone else and do not spread wealth around as in the industrial age, when millions of people were employed in designing and making real, useful things which improved people's lives and which everybody wanted. Cowen predicts we might be in for a longer and deeper economic recession before new scientific innovations can renew society again, and that the rate of progress will remain uneven and people might "look back to the current era with a gloss of nostalgia" - hardly an optimistic prognosis.
The text of this hardcover was originally an e-book, printed to take in new audiences and offer a more permanent artefact than an online blog. Despite its shortcomings its 89 pages present punchy, lucid arguments and make for an easy read of a few hours, brevity and clarity among its chief recommendations.




