The Guns of August Mass Market Paperback – August 3, 2004

The Guns of August may be the single most influential popular history of the origins of the First World War. It has convinced generations of readers that the war stemmed from a series of rivalries, which in turn lead to an uncontrollable escalation of events which ultimately results in an unintended conflict which sweeps up the most of the continent in a war that no one wanted. To the extent that President Kennedy is reported to have stated that this thesis influenced his thinking during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Guns of August takes on an additional level of historical importance which goes far beyond its merit as an interpretation of history. This book didn't just interpret history; it influenced history. It may have even helped to prevent a nuclear war. As such, it is an important book. This is why I've assigned it three stars; the book is historically important.

The great big screaming problem is, as a history, from the very day it was published, its basic thesis of war by miscalculation was already untenable on the basis of available scholarship.

The root of the problem is that while Tuchman does provide a brief overview of the historical tensions that provide a background to the war, she spends all of ONE long paragraph discussing what actually transpired between the assassination on June 28 and the July 23 publication of Austro-Hungary's ultimatum to Serbia (i.e. the crossing of the threshold that establishes that a decision for war has been made and opens the door to the further expansion of the conflict). This is a STAGGERING omission. If you're not going to spend any appreciable time looking at the specific actions of the participants during the crisis period, how can one possibly advance a thesis on the war's origin or who was or was not responsible for it's outbreak!

Here we need to cut through some bland nonsense. The war does not break out simply because of a set of longstanding bitter rivalries. Those rivalries were just that... longstanding. They are historically relevant background, but they are ONLY background. Crises came and went in the preceding years without leading to general war. The point is that even in a time of genuine crisis, something more is required to transform a crisis into a war. What is required is a specific set of choices, made by a specific set of decision-makers, occurring within a specific timeline. Tuchman's one paragraph treatment of the crisis period is a completely inadequate examination of what the key actors were actually doing during this critical period.

The irony is that for many people, Tuchman's "Guns of August" tends to be their first introduction to the history of the outbreak of WWI, despite the fact that far more scholarly and thorough works had been available for decades. The Carnegie Endowment translated and published quite a bit during the 1920s. Pierre Renouvin's Immediate Origins of the War became available in English in 1928, followed by Luigi Albertini's landmark 3 volume study, The Origins of the War of 1914 (3 Volume Set) which, by virtue of its extensive primary source documentation remains as valuable a reference as it was on the day of its publication. To these one could add Fritz Fischer's Germany's Aims in the First World War, which was published in German the year before GoA, and the subsequent War of Illusions: German Policies from 1911 to 1914 which came out several years later. All of these works dug into primary source evidence to painstakingly reconstruct the nuts-and-bolts details of the timeline of what went on at the top levels of decision-making. The evidence makes it clear that Tuchman's thesis was all wet. The war was not one of accidental, unintended escalation, nor were all parties more-or-less equally responsible. Decision-makers in Imperial Germany and Austro-Hungary made a specific set of deliberate choices that guaranteed the threshold to war would be crossed. While they may not have expected or intended the world war that they got, they were aware of the risks of escalation, and they very early on chose to accept those risks and opt for a punitive military strike against Serbia in preference to the pursuit of redress by diplomatic means. In contrast, prior to the issuance of Austro-Hungary's ultimatum to the Serbs, no other power took any steps which would have precluded the peaceful resolution of the assassination crisis. These other powers may share some responsibility for their role in background rivalries of the day, but they do not share equal responsibility for transforming an assassination into a war, which then had every possibility of expanding into a world war. Unfortunately, none of this comes out if one relies on Tuchman's one paragraph treatment of everything that happens between the assassination on June 28, and the ultimatum on July 23.

As Tuchman's Guns of August is historical important, I can't recommend that readers ignore it. However, I stress that it is essential to aware of its flaws. I can also recommend some remedies.

If you're not particularly familiar with the crisis period or the cast of characters, a good introductory work to start with is Europe's Last Summer: Who Started the Great War in 1914? It's well organized and a fairly easy read. The documentation is not great, but Fromkin's book provides an excellent layout of the key players and the crisis timeline. When you get through Fromkin, move on to Albertini or Fischer's works cited above. These are not such easy reads, but they are scholarly, and very heavily documented. You'll need to spend some time with them, but if you invest that time, you'll emerge with a much more detailed understanding of the crisis period. You'll also be far better equipped to assess some of the new books which are coming out in connection with the war's anniversary.

John F. Kennedy averted Nuclear war with Russian in the 1963 Cuban Missile Crisis from lessons he learned from this book .... namely that people...nations frequently just stumble into war because of mistakes....not intention. This book is a must read for all that hope to understand the stupidity and absurdity that was the hallmark of WWI. This book garnered Dr. Tuchman her first of two Pulitzer prizes. It is full of the personal info of the key generals and players in the horrible war; full of details as to terrain, strategy, timing, and explanations as to how mistakes were continually made that lead to the protracted war of inches in trenches. This book is not a quick read and suited for those that want quick answers or insights. It is to be read, studies, reflected upon...then re-read several times.

For a more simple view of one of the many insights into WWI I recommend you first read "The Zimmerman Papers" It is written in such a manner that the reader, you, will want to turn the page to see what happens next. Then you should read her book: " The March of Foley " . In this book Dr. Tuchman develops the three causes for great mistakes that Rulers / Statesman repeatedly make. In fact one of her stories, Pedicarus, was made into a feature length movie staring Sean Conner...called "The Wind and The Lion" There you will learn of why President Teddy Roosevelt coined the phrase "Pedicarus alive, or Rasauli Dead" . Here again, is a tale of total blunders by Governments that almost lead to War.

After reading these two books you will be sufficiently imbued with deep sense of respect and most importantly, patience, to begin the journey of discovery and reflection that will occur when you read "The Guns of August"

An excellent history of the first five weeks of the Great War, when the Germans expected to roll into Paris, the French expected to rollover the Germans an push them back to Germany and the British were a reluctant ally, not seeing that they had any first hand interest, but only fighting because of the invasion of neutral Belgium and an alliance with the French. The delusions and fears of the chief military men on both sides is well presented, as is the difference between war as seen from HQ and as seen from the ground. There is a bit about the suffering of ordinary soldiers and civilians, but the focus here is on the politics of the war, governmental and military, rather than the social history. Winston Churchill makes an appearance as First Lord of the Admiralty (Secretary of the Navy), credited with saving the British fleet by a shrewd move just before the war began. The downside for anyone who doesn't have a military background or fondness for military history is the amount of time spent on technical descriptions of battles.