Hell: The Logic Of Damnation Paperback – August 31, 1992

Very pleased!!

As for books written from the traditional perspective on Hell, this philosophy book is a must read. However, because it is philosophy and not exegesis, I find the author relies more on Dante thing on scripture. However this is still the premier work of it's sort. I would also recommend you read at least one book from the Universalist perspective and one from the conditional perspective. Regarding the former, I highly recommend Reitan's "God's Final Victory", and for Conditionalism, the edited collection of essays (Date et. al.) entitled Rethinking Hell: Readings in Evangelical Conditionalism" is great reading.

Walls does an excellent job in this book in creating a coherent account of how an eternal Hell could obtain and still preserve (1) Human freedom, (2) divine foreknowledge, and (3) God's goodness. Although the account given by Walls is coherent, it needs to be developed a lot more from a biblical perspective. His account basically ends in a kind of modified Molinism. In Walls account, the only way that molinism could truly preserve 1-3 noted above, it would need to incorporate some kind of purgatory. From a philosophical perspective, I must say, this book is pretty awesome; however, the fact that I am not Catholic, or have ever read any work on the reasoning from the scriptures to a notion of purgatory makes it difficult for me to accept (not that there arent any such written works), and it would of just been nice if Walls would of given a little more background as far as that is concerned. Either way, it has encouraged me to study catholic theology which, in the end, can only lead to productivity, and a less ignorant/dogmatic understanding of scripture. Another point of concern which, to Walls credit, he acknowledges is the topic of, whether or not, counterfactuals of freedom can be true. Oh yea, and if your a calvinist, or just an ignorant individual, who believes that any doctrine that doesnt line up with what you believe is false, then this book definitely will not sit well. Either way, Calvinism is nothing more than the result of poor philosophy. Ill tell you one thing, at the day of judgement, the one thing I do not want to be found guilty of is for indicting God on his goodness. If in the end calvinians are going to do nothing more than just allude to mystery, then why not just move the mystery somewhere else, somewhere far away from Gods goodness, like, I dont know, perhaps, the mystery of how purgatory could obtain even though (According to you) it doesnt seem to be supported by scripture, or the mystery of how prophecy is possible if open theism is true. These are mysteries I would much rather not be able to explain, than the mystery of how God can and cannot be the author of sin, and ultimately, the author of our condemnation. I am not saying I buy into purgatory or open theism, however, what I am saying is that we should try a little harder to work through scripture, rather than, try as hard as some of us do to make scripture fit our desired systems. Blessings.

Jerry Walls is a professor of Philosophy of Religion at Ashbury Theological Seminary. He has also written Heaven: The Logic of Eternal Joy,Purgatory: The Logic of Total Transformation,Why I Am Not a Calvinist, and The Problem of Pluralism: Recovering United Methodist Identity.

He explained in the Introduction of this 1992 book, “I will look in more detail at the issues raised by the various views of hell, especially the traditional ones. My purpose, broadly speaking, is to show that some recognizably traditional views of hell are compatible with both the divine nature and human nature… we must also delve into a number of matters concerning human beings which relate to the idea of damnation, such as the nature of human freedom, the process of character formation, and so on.” (Pg. 14-15)

He notes, “In recent times… the assumption that God has absolute foreknowledge has been extensively challenged. In particular, it has been questioned whether God has foreknowledge of future free choices. The claim that God has such foreknowledge has been challenged in two different ways. In the first place, doubts have been raised as to whether there is an intelligible ground of such knowledge. In other words, it is entirely unclear HOW God could know future free choices. And second, there has been a vigorous renewal of the age-old debate over whether absolute foreknowledge is compatible with libertarian freedom, the sort of freedom we have if our actions are undetermined, and it is ‘up to us’ what choices to make.” (Pg. 34)

He observes, “God’s foreknowledge that Mary will resist grace and be damned is due to the fact that God has chosen to create Mary in circumstances in which he knows she will resist grace. Consequently, questions about God’s goodness remain. For instance, why should God create Mary in circumstances in which he knows she would resist grace if God does not intend for her to be damned? … the connection between foreknowledge and intention cannot simply be assumed. Nevertheless the question naturally arises whether it would be better to create Mary in a different situation, or maybe not even create her at all?... Molinism does not seem to be as bad off as Calvinism in this regard, but neither does it provide an immediate solution to the problem of evil.” (Pg 40-41)

He points out, “one’s views on hell cannot be isolated from one’s views on foreknowledge…. one’s account of foreknowledge imposes certain limits on the ways one can consistently conceive of hell, just as one’s conception of hell may entail certain claims about divine foreknowledge.” (Pg. 55)

He asserts, “When libertarian freedom is consistently maintained, it will be recognized that God’s ability to bring about certain states of affairs is contingent upon the choices of free creatures. In view of this, perhaps God cannot create a world in which everyone is saved, as the universalist supposes. Nor is it the case if some are lost, it follows that God is unwilling to save them. For God could be willing to save everyone, but unable to do so, while remaining properly omnipotent. It could be that he loves everyone and enables all of them to receive grace and be saved. If so, everyone would have a genuine opportunity to be saved. However, some might choose to continue in evil and be forever separated from God’s love. It is of the essence of the doctrine of hell that this possibility is actually realized in our world.” (Pg. 41)

He summarizes, “the doctrine of eternal hell is compatible with God’s perfect goodness. This task might be relatively easy if one assumed that God’s goodness is fundamentally different from our ordinary conception of goodness. I have, however, assumed a strong account of divine goodness which I believe accords with our own deepest moral intuitions. In particular, I have affirmed… that God’s goodness entails that he loves all creatures, impartially desires that all of them be happy, and is willing to do whatever he can, short of overriding freedom, to give happiness to all. If my argument is sound, and at least some traditional accounts of hell are compatible with God’s goodness as construed in this chapter, then the moral problems we have noted are not beyond resolution.” (Pg. 110-111)

He argues, “There is, then, no single type of damned character… The only common feature of the damned… is the consistency of their evil. If such consistency does not altogether rule out the possibility of returning to good, it does make intelligible why some persons may never do so. Such persons have closed off every apparent avenue by which good may enter. At every point at which grace could have been accepted, evil was preferred. Where such consistency is achieved, evil gains sufficient potency that the possibility of repentance is all but foreclosed. The person for whom this is true may be accurately described as thoroughly immune to the grace of God.” (Pg. 123-124)

He suggests, “I want to agree that those who choose evil, and ultimately hell, are indeed deceived. I want to insist, however, that the deception is self-inflicted. Those who prefer hell to heaven have convinced themselves that it is better. In their desire to justify their choice of evil, they have persuaded themselves that whatever satisfaction they experience from evil is superior to the joy which God offers. At the very least, they see some advantage to be gained in the choice of evil.” (Pg. 129)

He further explains, “even when the choice is thus narrowed, some may elect eternal hell… [However] the claim that such a choice is possible strains credibility. I have addressed this perplexity by trying to show that an intelligible account can be given not only of what it means to choose evil decisively, but also of the motivation involved. My case hinged crucially upon the notion that a person can co deceive himself into believing evil is good, or at least holds sufficient advantage to be gained, that he comes to the point where he consistently and thoroughly prefers evil to good. I will be satisfied if the case I have argued has made even partially comprehensible the remarkable claim that some may likewise come to prefer hell over heaven.” (Pg. 138)

This is an interesting take upon the doctrine of Hell---from a “philosophy of religion” standpoint. Those looking for biblical exegesis of terms such as “Sheol,” “Hades,” Gehenna,” etc., will need to look elsewhere. But for those interested in defense of traditional Christian doctrines in “philosophical” terms (e.g., Alvin Plantinga), this book will be of great interest.