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The Human Factor: Inside the CIA's Dysfunctional Intelligence Culture (Encounter Broadsides) Paperback – April 6, 2010
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The CIA is a broken, Soviet-style bureaucracy with its own agenda: to consume federal funds, to expand within the United States, to feign activity, and to enrich current and former employees. After 9/11, billions of dollars directed by Congress to increase the number of officers working under deep cover on foreign streets have disappeared without the CIA fielding a single additional, productive officer overseas.
The Human Factor makes the case for intelligence reform, showing the career of an accomplished deep cover CIA case officer who struggled not with finding human sources of secret information in rogue nations, but with the CIA’s bloated, dysfunctional, even cancerous bureaucracy. After initial training in the US, Ishmael Jones spent his career in multiple, consecutive overseas assignments, as a deep cover officer without benefit of diplomatic immunity. In dingy hotel rooms, Jones met alone with weapons scientists, money launderers, and terrorists. He pushed intelligence missions forward while escaping purges within the Agency, active thwarting of operations by bureaucrats, and the ever-present threat of arrest by hostile foreign intelligence services. Jones became convinced that the CIA’s failure to fulfill its purpose endangers Americans. Attempting reform from within proved absurd. Jones resigned from the CIA to make a public case for reform through the writing of this book.
Effective American organizations feature clear missions, streamlined management, transparency, and accountability. The CIA has none of these. While it has always hired good people, it wastes and even perverts employees. The CIA is not doing its job and must be fixed. Until it is, our lives and the lives of our allies are in jeopardy.
- Print length400 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherEncounter Books
- Publication dateApril 6, 2010
- Dimensions6 x 1.25 x 9 inches
- ISBN-10159403382X
- ISBN-13978-1594033827
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Editorial Reviews
Review
National Review
Scathing and unauthorized.”
Congressional Quarterly
"Controversial, eye-opening account"
Foreword Magazine
This book should be required reading for anyone who serves in our government or is served by it. But beware: Reading The Human Factor will make you very, very angry.”
Max Boot, Senior fellow in national security studies, The Council on Foreign Relations; author of The Savage Wars of Peace and War Made New
Jones (the cover name the Agency gave him during his first training course), a Marine who joined the Agency’s clandestine service and became a case officer in the late ’80s, paints a devastating and alarming picture of a vast bureaucracy he calls a corrupt, Soviet-style organization’.”
Michael Ledeen, National Review Online
Mr. Jones obviously believes that the United States deserves the best intelligence organization in the world. He believes passionately that every American taxpayer is being cheated because we are paying scores of billions of dollars for a bloated, ineffective, risk-averse organization that cannot perform the mission for which it was created.”
John Weisman, The Washington Times
Ishmael Jones represents an altogether uncommon breed of CIA officer, one willing to risk life and career in the pursuit of gathering better intelligence. If the CIA as a whole shared this one officer’s relentless pursuit of WMD sources, terrorists, and the rogue nations that support them, then we might find ourselves in a much safer world today. With his book The Human Factor, Jones relates the details of his extraordinary career with a notable lack of bravado and a tremendous amount of dry wit.”
Lindsay Moran, author of Blowing My Cover: My Life as a CIA Spy
The Human Factor is an enormously important book and a surprisingly accessible read. Hopefully, it will propel the reform debate beyond the usual tinkering . Call him Ishmael, or not, but I call him a patriot.”
David Forsmark, Frontpage Magazine
From the Inside Flap
American Presidents make decisions on war unaware that the human source intelligence provided by the CIA is often false or nonexistent. From Harry Truman during the Korean War to George Bush during the War on Terror, modern Presidents have faced their darkest moments as a result of poor intelligence. The CIA has assured Congress and the President that intelligence programs in hostile areas of the world are thriving, when they simply do not exist.
The CIA is a broken, Soviet-style bureaucracy with its own agenda: to consume federal funds, to expand within the United States, to feign activity, and to enrich current and former employees. After 9/11, billions of dollars directed by Congress to increase the number of officers working under deep cover on foreign streets have disappeared without the CIA fielding a single additional, productive officer overseas.
The Human Factor makes the case for intelligence reform, showing the career of an accomplished deep cover CIA case officer who struggled not with finding human sources of secret information in rogue nations, but with the CIA&;s bloated, dysfunctional, even cancerous bureaucracy. After initial training in the US, Ishmael Jones spent his career in multiple, consecutive overseas assignments, as a deep cover officer without benefit of diplomatic immunity. In dingy hotel rooms, Jones met alone with weapons scientists, money launderers, and terrorists. He pushed intelligence missions forward while escaping purges within the Agency, active thwarting of operations by bureaucrats, and the ever-present threat of arrest by hostile foreign intelligence services. Jones became convinced that the CIA&;s failure to fulfill its purpose endangers Americans. Attempting reform from within proved absurd. Jones resigned from the CIA to make a public case for reform through the writing of this book.
Effective American organizations feature clear missions, streamlined management, transparency, and accountability. The CIA has none of these. While it has always hired good people, it wastes and even perverts employees. The CIA is not doing its job and must be fixed. Until it is, our lives and the lives of our allies are in jeopardy.
From the Back Cover
American Presidents make decisions on war unaware that the human source intelligence provided by the CIA is often false or nonexistent. From Harry Truman during the Korean War to George Bush during the War on Terror, modern Presidents have faced their darkest moments as a result of poor intelligence. The CIA has assured Congress and the President that intelligence programs in hostile areas of the world are thriving, when they simply do not exist.
The CIA is a broken, Soviet-style bureaucracy with its own agenda: to consume federal funds, to expand within the United States, to feign activity, and to enrich current and former employees. After 9/11, billions of dollars directed by Congress to increase the number of officers working under deep cover on foreign streets have disappeared without the CIA fielding a single additional, productive officer overseas.
The Human Factor makes the case for intelligence reform, showing the career of an accomplished deep cover CIA case officer who struggled not with finding human sources of secret information in rogue nations, but with the CIA’s bloated, dysfunctional, even cancerous bureaucracy. After initial training in the US, Ishmael Jones spent his career in multiple, consecutive overseas assignments, as a deep cover officer without benefit of diplomatic immunity. In dingy hotel rooms, Jones met alone with weapons scientists, money launderers, and terrorists. He pushed intelligence missions forward while escaping purges within the Agency, active thwarting of operations by bureaucrats, and the ever-present threat of arrest by hostile foreign intelligence services. Jones became convinced that the CIA’s failure to fulfill its purpose endangers Americans. Attempting reform from within proved absurd. Jones resigned from the CIA to make a public case for reform through the writing of this book.
Effective American organizations feature clear missions, streamlined management, transparency, and accountability. The CIA has none of these. While it has always hired good people, it wastes and even perverts employees. The CIA is not doing its job and must be fixed. Until it is, our lives and the lives of our allies are in jeopardy.
About the Author
Product details
- Publisher : Encounter Books (April 6, 2010)
- Language : English
- Paperback : 400 pages
- ISBN-10 : 159403382X
- ISBN-13 : 978-1594033827
- Item Weight : 1.34 pounds
- Dimensions : 6 x 1.25 x 9 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #376,602 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #469 in National & International Security (Books)
- #605 in Political Intelligence
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Please allow me to make a few comments that might contribute to Robert Steele's excellent review.
Although the term "spy" is bandied about to sell books, for example, Valerie Plame's book, "Fair Game: My Life as a Spy...", case officers are not spies -- they handle, administer, and manage spies. As such Plame was not a spy, yet her career is typical: four years of training in the US, two years in an embassy overseas under diplomatic cover gathering tidbits at cocktail parties, four more years of training in the US, possibly a couple of months as a NOC (Non-Official Cover) case officer where she was not involved in any positive intelligence operations, (it takes years to become truly productive, if at all), and then ten more years in the US doing bureaucratic functions. I leave it to the reader to decide whether the taxpayer got his money's worth.
I do not mean to pick on Plame, but her story is typical. Very, very few case officers are effective, and when they are, it is in violation of policies and procedures from headquarters and only after taking extreme risks, both with regard to their physical safety and their career. Ishmael was willing to do this, and over time had to be eliminated in spite of his production because he; 1) made others look bad, 2) forced lazy bureaucrats to do even a modicum of work, and 3) was viewed as a loose cannon that someday would cause an intelligence flap. Another norm was "Suspenders", always looking good and making others feel good, but in reality contributing nothing.
The reader should be shaken to the core over the activities and bloated bureaucracy of the Agency within the US. The brief of the Agency is to provide intelligence ONLY on Foreign countries and agencies. The FBI is charged with providing domestic intelligence. So why are 90% of Agency personnel living it up in the US? Because it's comfortable, and that's what bureaucracies do.
The author's presentation of the approval process is not only accurate, but incomprehensible to a case officer. In my day operations could and were mounted within weeks (& that was without computers). If anyone watching a Hollywood movie where things happen with the velocity of light, please consider that approximately 80% of a case officer's time is taken up with paperwork (now computerized), 15% in support activities (travel, etc.) and maybe 5% in operations (if he is active, willing to by-pass procedures, and is willing to take risks.) Gathering human intelligence is not an easy job, and literally everyone above the case officer is against him, one way or the other.
In short we have "paralysis by analysis," and in the Agency this is furthered by bureaucratic "paralysis by approvals."
The author's accurate depiction of the problems in husband/wife teams in the bureaucracy should be taken to heart. They are essentially ALWAYS dysfunctional. The veteran reader should consider the situation where a husband and wife are officers together in the same infantry company and the problem is readily visible. But not to the Agency.
Another startling statistic is that the Agency is now 1/2 female. I wonder how many, if any, are successful case officers. I can't imagine any of my agents allowing themselves to report to a female. (Sorry, folks, but there is a lot of agent/case office bonding required.)
I was also startled to discover that case officers are paid $100,000 or more per year, plus all sorts of allowances and expenses. Ishmael's estimate that a case officer cost hundreds of thousands of dollars per year was incredible, particularly considering that most produce nothing. So what does run-of-the-mill human intelligence cost? $100,000 per page? And that doesn't count the bloated bureaucracy. This is truly a broken organization.
BUY AND READ THIS BOOK!
p.s. I can't believe Ishmael fronted the Agency up to $300,000 out of his own pocket. In my day such debts never went over a thousand dollars or two.
The author uses broad sweeping generalizations. For example, while discussing the Cuban failure (pg 35), the author states “No promotion or award was ever rescinded, no accountability every enforced”. How would he know? He was hired about the time, or shortly after, the Cuban failure and would not have been privy to all of the investigations and counterintelligence studies, to include the actions of the CIA personnel. Nor would he have been privy to any sanctions placed against any CIA personnel. He would have learned about the Cuban fiasco as part of his training but that is the final analysis and does not include specifics about sanctions. A lot of information is also available in the public record to include how a defector revealed the Cuban double agent operation but the author provides none of the facts.
The author clearly has an ax to grind as he uses terms, such as “Agency mandarin” refering to senior managers, that by their consistent overuse become derogatory. He wrote on page 76 that “several Agency mandarins attended our [class] graduation…. [had been] taken aback that the U.S. military had begun the [Gulf] War”. Really? The Congress, the President, the CIA, DOS, FBI, NSA, the Pentagon and many other “mandarins” were fully aware of the Gulf War start because they all had different responsibilities related to the War. Public record and common sense.
The author states that he was careful not to reveal any classified information but at the same time the CIA Publications Review Board (PRB) blacked out most of his book. In the end is the “black out” of this book the result of PRB edits or because the author is lacking in details. Because he does not even provide meager public record details that would probably make it through the PRB, the chapters become mush with a negative tone.
Most egregious is a lack of accuracy and objectivity; and the authors violation of his own recommended suggestions for improving the CIA, actually doing away with the CIA, found on page 356, where he exhorts “Create a Cultural Statement: Do not lie, cheat, or steal unless required to do so in an intelligence operation”. This is an unwritten rule in the Agency that the author, by his own admission, violated when chasing Dr. B (pg 4-5) and concealing and lying to his CIA managers about how he was doing the job.
He states “Few at HQS had ever met a rouge state weapons scientist. HQS didn’t even realize how approachable they were.” There is no possible way for the author to know every rogue state actor who was ever met by the CIA because of compartmentation and “need to know”. Further the reason he had been placed in the assignment where DR. B- was a potential target is because someone at HQS probably understood that people are often more approachable in the United States. But the author, to complete his mission violated one of the cardinal rules by placing an international call to the home of target in a rogue state (another country)…then lying about it and claiming Dr. B- called him.
The author was selected for a special CIA program therefore I know that he is an intelligent man but intelligence does not always equate to common sense, objectivity or knowledge. Although he has an extensive bibliography (some of which are also gripe books), he also did not appear to do his research or to seek accuracy. He just had a lot of gripes, many of them subtle, but gripes nonetheless.
For example, on page 68 the author discussed the use of the polygraph, the Box, and how ineffective it is. I won’t even go into the less than accurate discussion of the polygraph. What bothered me the most was the specious description of Edward Lee Howard, the only CIA officer to volunteer to the KGB and seek asylum in the Soviet Union. The author writes “Edward Lee Howard, one of the first of the CIA’s turncoats, admitted during a Box that he had stolen $12 from the purse of a woman sitting next to him on the airplane. Howard was fired.” The way this is written the author appears to believe, or wants others to think that Howard was unjustly fired. If the author had done a simple internet search and read several sources, to include Howard’s own rendition of events, it is clear he was not fired for stealing $12.
During Howard’s pre-employment polygraph and security investigation he admitted to a number of minor crimes as well as cocaine and marijuana use. He was hired because it was considered minor. He was cautioned not to use illegal drugs or steal. Every employee has a three year probation period which is followed by another security investigation and polygraph. Howard was fired because he had continued using illegal narcotics and continued theft. The facts are out there. Skewing them as the author has done only lends credence to my initial assessment that he has an ax to grind against the Agency.
Despite all of this, I agree with some of his recommendations. The CIA does need to define the mission but…that is dependent on Congress and the President.
There are too many layers of management and the establishment of the Office of the National Director (ODNI) only made it worse. The ODNI was established by former President Bush and Congress post 9/11.
More money and more people are not the answer to the counterterrorism question. And….the mission of the CIA is NOT just counterterrorism. There are multiple missions as defined by Congress and the President.
There are multiple management issues in the CIA, just as in any bureaucracy, but the author’s recommendation to break the CIA apart and transfer overseas collection efforts to the U.S. military is not the answer. The Pentagon and military have their own bloat problems but they also have a different mission.
All I can recommend is that readers, to include book reviewers, become critical thinkers when reading books like this. Don’t just accept everything as fact. This book could have been much shorter if it had been more focused. If I had seen his recommendations right up front, followed with why he thinks they are important, with details and objective analysis, I might have found this to be a more important and thought provoking book. I will finish it but I didn’t get much past the first chapter before I put it in the “personal gripe book” category.
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