A very insightfull book. If as suggested the administration is involved in petty spats. While are enemy plans new attacks.
It seams they were at again in Russia the other day
The following editorial was published in May of this year. I offer it as additional food for thought from what our Mr Anonymous has compiled for us. If we don't learn from history we shall repeate it. Over and over again
Will it be as it was?
BY
ALAN W. THEDERAHN
FROM THE HEARTLAND
Monday, May 31, 2004
"There is nothing new in the world except the history you do not know"(Harry S. Truman). The current armed uprising in Iraq is not a surprise to anyone familiar with the Iraqi revolt against the British military occupation in 1920. Resentment of the occupation led to the formation of a secret society, Haras al-Istiqlal (Independence Guard) led by Muhammad al-Sadr, (Grandfather of Moqtada Sadr, the leader of the current Iraqi uprising) a son of the prominent Shi'a mujtahid Ayatollah Hasan al-Sadr. Haras al-Istiqlal also had a close liaison with esteemed cleric Ayatollah Muhammad Tami al-Shirazi who in April 1920 issued a fatwa pronouncing that service in the British occupation administration was unlawful. By May there was active cooperation between Sunnis' and Shi'a against the British occupation. The armed uprising broke out in June, set off in part by the arrest of the son of Ayatollah al-Shirazi by British authorities. The response of Ayatollah al-Shirazi, the premier Shi'a cleric in Iraq, was to send out another fatwa appearing to encourage armed insurrection. British measures to pre-empt an uprising only resulted in the revolt breaking out and acquiring momentum. Inadequate British forces were compelled to regroup and the uprising was not suppressed until the end of October 1920 at a cost of lives of approximately 500 British and Indian soldiers and 6000 Iraqis.
If viewed from a time outlook of years rather than months the current American military invasion and occupation of Iraq shares conspicuous affinities with the campaign of the Roman emperor Trajan in the same geographic region between 113 and 117 A.D. In both instances political instability in the region jeopardized vital economic interests which motivated both America and Rome to attempt to impose a radical political solution upon the region by military conquest and de facto annexation. It is a noteworthy fact that in both cases this fundamental and far-reaching revision of previous established foreign policy was instigated by "War cliques" within the current American administration and the emperor's retinue. In both cases initial rapid and complete military success was followed by an occupation characterized by chaos, growing resentment, and ever more pervasive violence which served only to generate even more political instability in the region. Finally in both instances the military invasion and occupation produced enormous strains upon both the military capacity and financial solvency of both America and Rome. These costs could not be recouped from the economic exploitation of the occupied territory. A brief review of the main factors and sequence of events comprising Trajan's campaign and its aftermath clarify these four defining similarities with the present American position in Iraq.
The prudent moderation of Emperor the Augustus fixed the geographic limits of the Roman Empire within the Empire's military capacity to protect Rome's vital economic interests. These economic interests were essentially coterminous with the Commerce of the Mediterranean world. On its eastern frontier Rome had come to an arrangement in 66 A.D. with the Parthian Empire (the regions of present day Iran and Iraq) over the disputed buffer Kingdom of Armenia to the satisfaction of both Rome and Parthia. This modus vivendi produced conditions that fostered regular caravan trade which was a source of income for both powers. Such commerce yielded large customs duties to both empires Treasury's and brought prosperity both to Roman Syria and Parthian Mesopotamia. The arrangement permitted Rome to continue consolidation of its eastern frontier to promote the affluence of the Empire's urban middle and upper classes.
The diplomatic and commercial understandings between Rome and Parthia were ruptured in the reign of Emperor Trajan (98-117 A.D.). An irregular succession in the buffer Kingdom of Armenia and attendant disorders in that realm provided Rome with a pretext to place matters in the East on an entirely new footing. The death of Trajan's confidante L. Licinius Sura about 110 A.D. was an evil day for the Empire because it strengthened the influence of the military element in the emperor's entourage. From his experiences in the Dacian wars (105-108 A.D.) Trajan had acquired distaste for compromise which played into the hands of those who advocated an aggressive policy in place of the established traditional policy of Augustus. The end result was that Trajan determined to annex Armenia as a Roman province and end the threat posed by Parthia by occupying portions of its territory by military garrisons and appointing a Roman nominee as king of Parthia. This radical military solution would also entail a tremendous commercial coup for the conquest to of Iraq would eliminate Parthia from its middleman roll in the lucrative India trade leaving the caravan routes to Syria completely in Roman hands. Initial and complete military success attended Trajan's plans from 114-116 A.D. With the fall of the Parthian capital, near present-day Baghdad, and the emperor's advance to the Persian Gulf the war seemed over. Revolt quickly broke out to in the occupied areas of Iraq and Rome regain control only after extensive heavy fighting. However, the resources of Rome had been severely strained and it became a serious question of how much effort would be required from the Roman Army to preserve the bulk of Trajan's conquests with Parthian military forces still very much present and active.
With the memorable failure of the Roman Army before the key caravan city of Hatra in Iraq in 116 A.D. and the death of Trajan in 117 A.D., his successor Hadrian was left to wrestle with the formidable legacy Trajan's radical policy had bequeathed to him. The new emperor, who had served on the Army staff in the recent campaigns, was deeply impressed that Trajan's conquests were a severe political miscalculation and that it was unsafe to attempt any extension of the Empire's eastern frontiers beyond the boundaries Augustus established 100 years previously. The discretion of Hadrian recognized that in the East there were alien and indissoluble cultural structures that might well exhaust the energies of the Empire to provide the institutions and laws which characterized the pax Romana. He also fully appreciated the extent to which the Roman army had been stretched in the recent fighting and for the preservation of the Army it was necessary to disengage the troops from Iraq. The first acts of Hadrian were to evacuate the new conquests in Iraq, to reestablish the former arrangement with Partha over Armenia, and to withdraw the legions within the traditional line of the Euphrates. The wisdom of these measures was quickly demonstrated when the withdrawal of the legions made available extra military forces for the suppression of an extensive insurrection which had broken out among the Jewish Diaspora in the possessions of the Empire Hadrian itself while Trajan had been campaigning in Iraq. In his actions on becoming emperor demonstrated a political courage that enabled him to reject a failed radical policy, and in doing so save the Army and restore peace within the Empire. The present American position in the occupied Iraq leaves unanswered the critical historical question: Will it be as it was?
Download the free Kindle app and start reading Kindle books instantly on your smartphone, tablet, or computer - no Kindle device required.
Read instantly on your browser with Kindle for Web.
Using your mobile phone camera - scan the code below and download the Kindle app.
Discover the latest buzz-worthy books, from mysteries and romance to humor and nonfiction. Explore more
What do customers buy after viewing this item?
Page 1 of 1 Start overPage 1 of 1
- Lowest Pricein this set of products
- Most purchased | Highest ratedin this set of products
About the author
Follow authors to get new release updates, plus improved recommendations.
Top reviews from other countries
y-fujikawa001
Let's take time and think about why they can't be beaten.
Reviewed in Japan on March 6, 2006Hud
But the Politicians say we are winning!
Reviewed in the United Kingdom on September 10, 2004