- Publisher: Classworks; 4 edition (June 1986)
- Language: English
- ISBN-10: 0935005226
- ISBN-13: 978-0935005226
- Product Dimensions: 0.8 x 6 x 9 inches
- Shipping Weight: 15.2 ounces
- Average Customer Review: 5.0 out of 5 stars See all reviews (7 customer reviews)
- Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #16,710,859 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
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Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue Hardcover – June, 1986
Top Customer Reviews
This gem is today very long forgotten, and as the saying goes, ... we are doomed to repeat history by that fact. Chapter XIV "Crusade in Retrospect" is recommeded as the starting point in this text, and bears witness to this surmise. Of course, Chapter XI "Poland: The Great Betrayal" and Chapter IX "The Munich Called Yalta: War's End" only bring even more depth.
Some other nuggets include, for example:
Pages 340-341, as taken from Marshall's "Report on the Winning of the War in Europe and the Pacific":
"No evidence has yet been found that the German High Command had any over-all strategic plan ...
When Italy entered the war Mussolini's strategic aims contemplated the expansion of his empire under the cloak of German military success. Field Marshall Keitel reveals that Italy's declaration of war was
contrary to her agreement with Germany. Both Keitel and Jodl agree that it was undesired ...
Nor is there evidence of close strategic coordination between Germany and Japan;. The German General Staff recognized that Japan was bound by the neutrality pact with Russia but hoped that the Japanese would tie down strong British and American land, sea, and air forces in the Far East.
In the absence of any evidence so far to the contrary, it is believed that Japan also acted unilaterally and not in accordance with a unified strategic plan.
Not only were the European partners of the Axis unable to coordinate their plans and resources and agree within their own nations how best to proceed, but the eastern partner, Japan, was working in even greater discord.Read more ›
"Was it really worth while to fight a destructive war so that Poland might be the victim not of Hitler but of Stalin, so that there might be a Soviet empire, not a German empire, in Eastern Europe, so that we should face not Japan but Stalin's henchman, Mao Tse-tung, in the Orient? War and postwar emotionalism have inhibited a frank facing of these questions." [Note in particular the last sentence.]
What makes this book so amazing are primarily two things, both based on the fact that the book was published in 1950 (a mere 5 years after the end of WWII): (1) the author's access to documents that controvert the current populist history of U.S. involvement in WWII (i.e., as being some kind of a moral crusade); and (2) the author's courage in coming forward with an opinion (remember, in 1950) that the U.S. had no business being involved in this war (or at best, that the U.S. sold out their moral motives for getting into the war). With respect to the second item I'm sure that, after the sacrifice of 400,000 American lives, and the expense (in current dollars) of over a trillion dollars, no one wanted to hear (in 1950, and perhaps even now) that the U.S. was duped into a war by FDR for purposes still unknown, but obviously NOT for the moral purposes espoused at the time.Read more ›
On pages 103-104 of "America's Second Crusade" Chamberlain states that the beginning of the war in Europe made it possible for the Roosevelt administration to attempt to eliminate the undesired arms embargo. Roosevelt called a special session of Congress on Sept. 21, 1939, and argued that repeal of the embargo provisions of the Neutrality Act was a means to keep the United States at peace. Roosevelt's exact words were:
Let no group assume the exclusive label of the "peace bloc." We all belong to it....I give you my deep and unalterable conviction, based on years of experience as a worker in the field of international peace, that by the repeal of the embargo the United States will more probably remain at peace than if the law remains as it stands today....Our acts must be guided by one single, hardheaded thought--keeping America out of war.
Many members of Congress disagreed with Roosevelt's viewpoint. Sen. William E. Borah recalled that Secretary of State Hull had once said that the purpose of the Neutrality Act was to keep us out of war. Borah commented: "If the purpose of the Embargo Act then was to keep us out of war, what is the purpose of repealing it: to get us into war?" Sen. Robert M. LaFollette, Jr., argued that "repeal can only be interpreted at home and abroad as an official act taken by our Government for the purpose of partial participation in the European war.Read more ›
Most Recent Customer Reviews
Published initially in 1950, this book remains excellent reading for anyone interested in America's involvement in WW II. Read morePublished 5 months ago by Charles R. Most
A sensational book and an absolute must for the serious student of the 20th century. I will give a word of warning, do not buy this book if you are uninterested in the absolute... Read morePublished 13 months ago by Ricky Herring