| Digital List Price: | $72.99 |
| Kindle Price: | $54.99 Save $18.00 (25%) |
| Sold by: | Amazon.com Services LLC |
Your Memberships & Subscriptions
Download the free Kindle app and start reading Kindle books instantly on your smartphone, tablet, or computer - no Kindle device required. Learn more
Read instantly on your browser with Kindle for Web.
Using your mobile phone camera - scan the code below and download the Kindle app.
An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design 1st Edition, Kindle Edition
| Price | New from | Used from |
- eTextbook
$54.99 Read with Our Free App - Hardcover
$69.07 - $71.36Other new and used from $61.20
A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself as well as the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. Börgers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.
- ISBN-13978-0199734023
- Edition1st
- PublisherOxford University Press
- Publication dateMay 1, 2015
- LanguageEnglish
- File size14470 KB
Customers who read this book also read
Editorial Reviews
Review
"Tilman Borgers offers the first book-length introduction into the theory of mechanism design. Written in a very personal and masterful style, he carefully covers the main developments in theory of mechanism design-the theory of how to choose the rules of the game-over the past decades. It will be
an ideal textbook for advanced undergraduate and graduate courses for many years to come."
Dirk Bergemann, Douglass and Marion Campbell Professor of Economics and Chair, Yale University
"Tilman Borgers gives a beautifully lucid and elegant development of mechanism design in this wonderful book. His masterful exposition provides a unified and cohesive treatment of modern mechanism design, starting from first principles and working through topics at the leading edge of the research
frontier. This book is a delight and an invaluable resource for those new to the field and experts alike."
Chris Shannon, Richard and Lisa Steiny Professor of Economics and Professor of Mathematics, University of California, Berkeley
"This book provides an integrated treatment of the theory of mechanism design by a leading practitioner in this area. It covers the core theory together with chapters on recent developments in robust mechanism design and dynamic mechanism design. The core theory is built up in an original and
pedagogically successful way, starting with screening in chapter 2 and immediately using those tools to develop leading applications of Bayesian mechanism design-auctions, bilateral trade, and public goods-in chapter 3. These results can then naturally be adapted to dominant strategies in chapter 4.
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 then deal with the general theories of incentive compatibility, Bayesian mechanism design, and dominant strategy mechanism design.
The first seven chapters of the book focus on the quasi-linear environments studied in most economic applications, with more general environments ('non-transferable utility') postponed to chapter 8. This ordering of material reflects not the historical development of the subject but a natural and
effective path to learn the material. Borgers develops a unified treatment of core material without attempting to be exhaustive. Valuable endnotes at the end of each chapter then explain the historical context and relation to the literature more broadly. It will serve as an excellent textbook for
graduate students and advanced undergraduates, and an invaluable reference for researchers."
Stephen Morris, Professor of Economics, Princeton University
--This text refers to the hardcover edition.
About the Author
Tilman Börgers is Samuel Zell Professor of the Economics of Risk at the University of Michigan. Before coming to Michigan in 2005, he was Professor of Economics at University College London. He holds a PhD in economics from the London School of Economics.
Daniel Krähmer is Full Professor of Economics in the Department of Economics at Universität Bonn, Germany.
Roland Strausz is Full Professor and Chair of the Institute for Economic Theory at Humboldt-Universität Berlin, Germany.
--This text refers to the hardcover edition.
Product details
- ASIN : B00X0WP2NK
- Publisher : Oxford University Press; 1st edition (May 1, 2015)
- Publication date : May 1, 2015
- Language : English
- File size : 14470 KB
- Text-to-Speech : Enabled
- Screen Reader : Supported
- Enhanced typesetting : Enabled
- X-Ray : Not Enabled
- Word Wise : Enabled
- Sticky notes : On Kindle Scribe
- Print length : 263 pages
- Page numbers source ISBN : 019973402X
- Best Sellers Rank: #1,699,597 in Kindle Store (See Top 100 in Kindle Store)
- #129 in Game Theory (Kindle Store)
- #151 in Econometrics
- #551 in Game Theory (Books)
- Customer Reviews:
About the author

Tilman Borgers is a Samuel Zell professor of the economics of risk at the University of Michigan. His PhD in economics is from the London School of Economics. Before coming to Michigan, he was professor of economics at University College London. His research interests are game theory, mechanism design, welfare economics, the theory of voting, and microeconomics in general.
Customer reviews
Customer Reviews, including Product Star Ratings help customers to learn more about the product and decide whether it is the right product for them.
To calculate the overall star rating and percentage breakdown by star, we don’t use a simple average. Instead, our system considers things like how recent a review is and if the reviewer bought the item on Amazon. It also analyzed reviews to verify trustworthiness.
Learn more how customers reviews work on Amazon-
Top reviews
Top reviews from the United States
There was a problem filtering reviews right now. Please try again later.
Top reviews from other countries
I subtract two stars because of the following: The typeface is hideous. If a publisher tried to ruin a book, he would print it exactly the way this book is printed. I had got some preprint pdf of the book before it was published and this pdf looked way better! The content has two smaller weaknesses: First, I would have preferred a few more exercises. Second, the first chapter uses quite advanced mathematics to derive the optimal monopoly pricing scheme. My students have not seen much of this and get unnecessarily scared in week one. The unfortunate part of this is that some of the math machinery is not even necessary: The usual integration by parts trick, for example, would have made it unnecessary to argue via "extreme points" of a set of functions.





