An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design 1st Edition

by Tilman Borgers (Author), Daniel Krahmer (Contributor), Roland Strausz (Contributor)

9 ratings

ISBN-13: 978-0199734023

ISBN-10: 019973402X

Why is ISBN important?

Share <Embed>

Other Sellers

from

Other Sellers

See all 2 versions

Only 3 left in stock (more on the way).

Ships from and sold by Amazon.com.

Available at a lower price from other sellers that may not offer free Prime shipping.

List Price: $66.00 Details

Save: $10.01 (15%)

FREE delivery Thursday, January 27

Or fastest delivery Tuesday, January 25. Order within 1 hr 13 mins

Available at a lower price from other sellers that may not offer free Prime shipping.

What is the best way to auction an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Börgers addresses these questions and more through an
exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design. Mechanism design is reverse game theory. Whereas game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, the theory of mechanism design goes a step further and selects the optimal rules
of the game.

A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself as well as the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem
on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. Börgers also provides an
examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.

Customers who viewed this item also viewed

Page 1 of 1 Start overPage 1 of 1

Noam Nisan
19
Hardcover
32 offers from $32.90
Vijay Krishna
17
Hardcover
19 offers from $34.46
Tim Roughgarden
21
Paperback
26 offers from $31.19
Paul Milgrom
7
Paperback
28 offers from $18.05
Leonid Hurwicz
2
Paperback
10 offers from $39.04
Rakesh V. Vohra
4
Paperback
16 offers from $23.09

Editorial Reviews

Review

"Tilman Borgers offers the first book-length introduction into the theory of mechanism design. Written in a very personal and masterful style, he carefully covers the main developments in theory of mechanism design-the theory of how to choose the rules of the game-over the past decades. It will be
an ideal textbook for advanced undergraduate and graduate courses for many years to come."

Dirk Bergemann, Douglass and Marion Campbell Professor of Economics and Chair, Yale University

"Tilman Borgers gives a beautifully lucid and elegant development of mechanism design in this wonderful book. His masterful exposition provides a unified and cohesive treatment of modern mechanism design, starting from first principles and working through topics at the leading edge of the research
frontier. This book is a delight and an invaluable resource for those new to the field and experts alike."

Chris Shannon, Richard and Lisa Steiny Professor of Economics and Professor of Mathematics, University of California, Berkeley

"This book provides an integrated treatment of the theory of mechanism design by a leading practitioner in this area. It covers the core theory together with chapters on recent developments in robust mechanism design and dynamic mechanism design. The core theory is built up in an original and
pedagogically successful way, starting with screening in chapter 2 and immediately using those tools to develop leading applications of Bayesian mechanism design-auctions, bilateral trade, and public goods-in chapter 3. These results can then naturally be adapted to dominant strategies in chapter 4.
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 then deal with the general theories of incentive compatibility, Bayesian mechanism design, and dominant strategy mechanism design.

The first seven chapters of the book focus on the quasi-linear environments studied in most economic applications, with more general environments ('non-transferable utility') postponed to chapter 8. This ordering of material reflects not the historical development of the subject but a natural and
effective path to learn the material. Borgers develops a unified treatment of core material without attempting to be exhaustive. Valuable endnotes at the end of each chapter then explain the historical context and relation to the literature more broadly. It will serve as an excellent textbook for
graduate students and advanced undergraduates, and an invaluable reference for researchers."

Stephen Morris, Professor of Economics, Princeton University

About the Author

Tilman Börgers is Samuel Zell Professor of the Economics of Risk at the University of Michigan. Before coming to Michigan in 2005, he was Professor of Economics at University College London. He holds a PhD in economics from the London School of Economics.

Daniel Krähmer is Full Professor of Economics in the Department of Economics at Universität Bonn, Germany.

Roland Strausz is Full Professor and Chair of the Institute for Economic Theory at Humboldt-Universität Berlin, Germany.

Start reading An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design on your Kindle in under a minute.

Don't have a Kindle? Get your Kindle here, or download a FREE Kindle Reading App.

Product details

Publisher ‏ : ‎ Oxford University Press; 1st edition (June 1, 2015)
Language ‏ : ‎ English
Hardcover ‏ : ‎ 264 pages
ISBN-10 ‏ : ‎ 019973402X
ISBN-13 ‏ : ‎ 978-0199734023
Item Weight ‏ : ‎ 1.1 pounds
Dimensions ‏ : ‎ 9.3 x 0.9 x 6.2 inches

Best Sellers Rank: #1,109,333 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #286 in Game Theory (Books)
- #361 in Economic Theory (Books)
- #390 in Econometrics & Statistics

Customer Reviews:
9 ratings

About the author

Follow authors to get new release updates, plus improved recommendations.

Tilman Borgers

Brief content visible, double tap to read full content.

Full content visible, double tap to read brief content.

Tilman Borgers is a Samuel Zell professor of the economics of risk at the University of Michigan. His PhD in economics is from the London School of Economics. Before coming to Michigan, he was professor of economics at University College London. His research interests are game theory, mechanism design, welfare economics, the theory of voting, and microeconomics in general.

Customer reviews

5 star		84%
4 star 0% (0%)		0%
3 star		16%
2 star 0% (0%)		0%
1 star 0% (0%)		0%

How are ratings calculated?

Top reviews from the United States

There was a problem filtering reviews right now. Please try again later.

Thomas

"It may seem that we have gone to considerable length ...

Reviewed in the United States on June 21, 2015

Verified Purchase

"It may seem that we have gone to considerable length to derive a disappointing result, namely, a result that does not oer the seller any more sophisticated selling mechanisms than we are familiar with from elementary microeconomics. However, apart from introducing some technical tools that we use later in more complicated contexts, the reader should appreciate that we have uncovered a rather sophisticated rationale for a familiar everyday phenomenon. This is perhaps analogous to invoking Newton's law of gravity as an explanation of the fact that apples fall o apple trees. The fact is familiar, but the explanation is non-obvious. "

10 people found this helpful

Helpful

Vanessa Ma

Five Stars

Reviewed in the United States on October 12, 2015

Verified Purchase

Cannot be more useful for a economics phd.

3 people found this helpful

Helpful

Rosina Rodriguez

Five Stars

Reviewed in the United States on June 18, 2015

Verified Purchase

2 people found this helpful

Helpful

Amazing textbook for grad students

Reviewed in the United States on June 25, 2019

Very nice reference for a field course or even the first-year sequence.

One person found this helpful

Helpful

Top reviews from other countries

VWL-Student

I like the content of the book

Reviewed in the United Kingdom on October 2, 2015

Verified Purchase

I like the content of the book. It is --to my taste-- the only good textbook on mechanism design. It covers not all topics within mechanism design but exactly those that I personally would like to be covered. It is well written and the derivations are done step by step.
I subtract two stars because of the following: The typeface is hideous. If a publisher tried to ruin a book, he would print it exactly the way this book is printed. I had got some preprint pdf of the book before it was published and this pdf looked way better! The content has two smaller weaknesses: First, I would have preferred a few more exercises. Second, the first chapter uses quite advanced mathematics to derive the optimal monopoly pricing scheme. My students have not seen much of this and get unnecessarily scared in week one. The unfortunate part of this is that some of the math machinery is not even necessary: The usual integration by parts trick, for example, would have made it unnecessary to argue via "extreme points" of a set of functions.

DiogenesCFG

Good introductory book

Reviewed in Mexico on February 23, 2019

Verified Purchase

This is a great book to introduce advanced undergrads or grad students to mechanism design. It makes a good reference to prepare a section of a market design class.

See all reviews

An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design 1st Edition

Frequently bought together

Customers who viewed this item also viewed

Editorial Reviews

Review

About the Author

Product details

About the author

Tilman Borgers

Customer reviews

Top reviews from the United States

There was a problem filtering reviews right now. Please try again later.

Top reviews from other countries