Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919–1941 (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs)

This is an extremely important book for any student of the Pacific War and Japanese-American relations leading to it.

The major contribution of Barnhart is to have very carefully waded through a true maze of archives on both sides of the Pacific. This is especially valuable with respect to Japan. Barnhart reveals how Japan's policy makers sought to make Japan self-sufficient in resources and materials so it would be able to win a protracted (future) war. Japan's predicament in being resource-poor and the lessons it drew from observing Germany's defeat in World War I, appeared to call for remedying this problem by expanding production capacity and acquiring resources, especially in Manchuria. Eventually, conflict withing Japan's military (army vs navy) as well as an ongoing and expanding war in China, subverted and ultimately upended these goals. In pursuing self-sufficiency, Japan became less and less self-sufficient in the course of the 1930s, imposing increasingly painful restrictions on civilian consumption, while never really resolving the constant fight for supremacy between army and navy in allocation of scarce and diminishing resources. Japan's increasing belligerence during the 1930s was a product of that inter-service rivalry as well as a siege mentality that never really allowed for questioning of basic assumptions and re-examination of priorities.

With respect to policy in the US, Barnhart demonstrates a remarkable (and regrettable) lack of clarity in policy objectives. Different groups of officials within the State Department (esp. Cordell Hull and Stanley Hornbeck), within Treasury (Morgenthau) as well as FDR himself, did not clearly articulate objectives to US policy with respect to Japan. While WW II unfolded in Europe, it seems that the only consensus within the US government was a distaste and a repudiation for Japan's behavior in East Asia, and especially in China. But there was never an attempt to foresee Japan's ultimate goals, never a serious effort to clarify American goals with respect to Japan. For a while, there was hope that economic problems would discourage Japan from further aggression. When that did not happen, many steps were taken that seemed to send contradictory signals to the Japanese government. On one hand, FDR determined to keep MOST of the Pacific Fleet at Hawaii (as opposed to sending a substantial part of it to the Atlantic), perhaps in the hope that its mere presence would serve as a deterrent to further Japanese aggression. On the other hand, for most of the 1930s the US continued to supply Japan with oil and other vital materials which were immediately applied in the ongoing Japanese war in China -- as if the US did not really mind what Japan was doing there. The US continued to act in the misguided hope that a civilian (and peaceful) group of Japanese politicians, temporarily evicted from power, were about to come back and introduce dramatic, peaceful changes to Japanese policies.

Ultimately, Barnhart's greatest achievement here is to highlight the fundamental misunderstanding that persisted between Japan and the United States for most of the 1930s. Japan, continually seeing in the US a model for itself, but also a dangerous rival in the Far East. Japan, moreover, which continually misread American policies -- seeing support in continued trade relations, or outright hostility in American demands to evacuate China. America, on the other hand, appears as lacking well-considered policy objectives. Both Joseph Grew, American Ambassador to Tokyo, and a group within the State Department, continued to hold out hope that a pacifist political elite was just below the surface of Japanese politics and that America's objective was to not make its return to power more difficult. Americans at a fundamental level did not have an understanding about the rivalry between Army and Navy in Japan. And, American policy makers never managed to perceive how different policies affected Japanese perceptions or Japanese intentions.

Barnhart offers a rather pessimistic view. He argues that the conflict between Japan and the United States was virtually impossible to prevent once certain conditions obtained. Certainly, after 1937, and especially after the German attack on the Soviet Union, he believes the Pacific War could not have been prevented. This is both because Japan and the United States held very different visions about the future of East Asia, and also because there were fundamental flaws in how the two sides viewed each other and (mis)interepreted each other's actions. This study is, indeed, an eye-opener with respect to how nations approach their vital interests and how an inability to understand the other side leads directly to missteps, and, ultimately, war. Very highly recommended

Barnhart examines how the search for economic security influenced the actions of Japan during the interwar period. A modified version of his doctoral dissertation, Barnhart's study is heavily supported by self-translated research conducted in Japanese archives. Challenging the assumption that Emperor Hirohito and Tojo were the most influential players in the decisions leading up to war with the United States, the author outlines the complex internal workings of a state seeking economic self-sufficiency.

Looking to avoid the same fate as Germany during World War I, Japan's "total war" officers sought domestic reforms with hopes of achieving state autarky. However, unlike the United States, Japan held few natural resources, forcing the nation to heavily rely on international trade. Recognizing that this reliance would prove detrimental should future war break out, Japan sought to be dependent on no one. As Barnhart writes, "a nation that could not supply all of its own needs in wartime, a nation that was vulnerable to economic pressure from other nations, would be neither truly secure nor truly sovereign." In order to achieve self-reliance, Japan needed to conquer resource rich neighboring territories; however, this objective was at odds with a United States "committed to a world with fewer barriers to international trade and political liberalism."

Japan was caught in a predicament, requiring the absence of conflict to amass the necessary resources for economic independence, but needing to engage in conflict to obtain those very resources. The Diet held little sway over the military, which was split between an army and navy that rarely agreed on an appropriate course of action. Barnhart argues that inter-service politics--including disagreements over resource allocation (specifically steel)--managed to overwhelm a coherent imperial strategy of autarky. A major point of contention highlighted in the book was the army/navy split on whether to focus their efforts on driving north or south. The army, concerned with the possible coming conflict with the Soviet Union, directed its efforts to the conflict in China. Meanwhile, the navy sought a southward advance for resources and materials. This inter-service rivalry adversely affected Japan's ability to effectively engage in long-term planning.

In addition to providing an overview of internal differences within Japan, Barnhart highlights disagreements within the US government. The author provides a detailed synopsis of the debates occurring between civil servants within State, Treasury, and the White House. Specifically, he spends a good deal of time on the thoughts of Stanley Hornbeck and Joseph Grew, who attempted to decipher the empire's motives while constructing an appropriate response. It is revealed that decisions to economically sanction Japan--be it steps taken before the embargo or the embargo itself--were far from uniform, and often reached due to reliance on available intelligence (which was not always accurate).

Barnhart's study does a fantastic job of outlining the internal disputes and motives that ultimately drove Japan to engage in southward expansion. However, the book would have been enhanced by the inclusion of an additional concluding chapter that tied these motives to the decision to strike Pearl Harbor. In fact, the author refrains from mentioning the attack during his conclusion, which is surprising considering the amount of research and analysis that went into explaining Japanese courses of action during the interwar period. Perhaps if the author had shed a light on the internal debates that surrounded this particular tactic, his work would have benefited. With that said, this study offers an important contribution to the understanding of how prewar Japan's search for autarky resulted in a substantial inter-service rivalry, influencing an aggressive foreign policy that made conflict with the United States inevitable.

This volume tells a very important part of the story of the Japanese Army and its part in dragging the nation into a catastrophic war. It is well and clearly written and generally quite strong in its sources. It is not the first book one should read about interwar Japan and its march to war, since it really does not present a rounded view of Japanese politics and the army as an institution. But for someone who understands the general background, it is fascinating and useful.
One caution: in common with many books written by specialists in Japanese history, it presents a very distorted picture of the mindset and actions of the Roosevelt administration. The central problem is an implicit assumption that Japan was the central concern when in fact its importance to FDR and his lieutenants lay in its relationship to the problem of Hitler. Deprived of this context, the actions of the administration are truly inexplicable.
Will O'Neil

Excellent analysis of political and military environment that lead Japan to start an unwinable war. Shows how blinders formed by history and prejudice can lead men and nations to take irrational actions with devastating consequences.

Well researched detailed argument. The author explains Japan's seArch for autarky. Starts withe the aftermath of world war 1 and goes to pearl harbor.

Excellent book