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Keynes: The Return of the Master Hardcover – September 14, 2009
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- Print length240 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherPublicAffairs
- Publication dateSeptember 14, 2009
- Dimensions6.75 x 1.25 x 10 inches
- ISBN-101586488279
- ISBN-13978-1586488277
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Editorial Reviews
Review
“An important contribution at a time of soul-searching, a must read even if one doesn’t fully accept its conclusions…. This is a wonderfully stimulating book, one that reflects the author’s unparalleled erudition. We’re living in the second Age of Keynes—and Robert Skidelsky is still the guide of choice.”
Richard A. Posner, The New Republic
“Skidelsky’s summary of what is distinctive in Keynes’s theory is excellent.”
Roy Hattersley, Guardian (UK)
“Wonderfully lucid…. Ought to be considered required reading for every prospective minister.”
BusinessWeek
“Explaining the present-day relevance of [Keynes’] theories is executed superbly by Skidelsky…. Skidelsky’s book excels. It’s a passionate polemic that makes a strong case for economists and policymakers to reread their Keynes.”
Charles R. Morris, Commonweal
“A profound and beautifully written meditation on the dangers of bad ideas, readily accessible to anyone who isn’t mystified by the headlines in the Wall Street Journal or the Economist .”
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- Publisher : PublicAffairs; 1st edition (September 14, 2009)
- Language : English
- Hardcover : 240 pages
- ISBN-10 : 1586488279
- ISBN-13 : 978-1586488277
- Item Weight : 15.2 ounces
- Dimensions : 6.75 x 1.25 x 10 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #1,732,594 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #894 in Macroeconomics (Books)
- #1,737 in Theory of Economics
- #3,369 in Economic History (Books)
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This book is one that speaks directly to the burning economic question of the moment, and the next few years: is it the size of the federal deficit and debt which are the problem, or the inadequate government spending and the shortfall in private demand/investment that has taken the nation, and Europe, to the brink of a double-dip recession - or worse, as Paul Krugman has indicated in his column from June 28th, "The Third Depression?" Once again, it is a citizen of Great Britain, Robert Skidelsky, Keynes' biographer, and a member of the House of Lords, who has supplied the public with a bold assertion, "Why, Sixty Years After His Death, John Maynard Keynes is the Most Important Economic Thinker for America," the statement on the front cover of his book Keynes, Return of the Master, published in 2009. This is the "popular," if not populist version of Skidelsky's acclaimed three volume biography of Keynes, an ultra brief version which nonetheless, reads like a long essay, not Cliff notes.
Yet, despite its brevity, this is a book not just about Keynes the economist, but also Keynes the philosopher, and the place of Keynesianism in the history of economic thought, relevant now to the "intellectual failure of economics," which Skidelsky believes is "the root cause of the present crisis." The organization of the book tells the story, with Part I covering the crisis and what the author believes went wrong, and the present dismal state of economics. Part Two is a brief history of "The Rise and Fall of Keynesian Economics," which is perhaps most interesting for its discussion of the distortions which Keynes underwent at the hands of both liberals and conservatives in the U.S. in the period 1945-1975 and even later. That's because the American Right, although it would deny it, has developed its own form of ersatz "Keynesianism": tax cuts and increased defense spending. And Part III, "The Return of Keynes," gives us, in keeping with what has become Skidelsky's own take on economics, Keynes' view of the "ethics of capitalism," and a chapter on his politics, and finally, what he believes is most relevant for our situation today.
Keynes: Hijacked by the Left and the Right
Readers will be surprised to learn that Keynes was not an advocate for running continual budget deficits, and took seriously the given preoccupation of conservatives with the state of "business confidence." Keynes was a remarkable thinker, defying neat categories, despite the deep varnish laid upon him as a man of the left and of massive government intervention - a view which most of the Right has far too simplistically promoted. Yet if conservative Bruce Bartlett tried to correct some of that in his August 14, 2009 piece in [...], "Keynes Was Really a Conservative," at [...], Skidelsky paints the far more nuanced picture of him: neither socialist nor uncritical capitalist, an atheist with deep ethical convictions and a "religious" sense about means and ends in life; an early free trader who became, in the 1930's, a critic of the free trade world of 1914; a withering critic of the gold standard of the 1920's and early 1930's whose functionally equivalent idea was defeated by the U.S. at Bretton Woods in 1944 i.e., his attempt create a mechanism to deal with exactly the problem facing the international trading system today, the great imbalances generated by a glut of savings by trade surplus nations; a some-time speculator like George Soros, who none-the-less wrote to explain the difference between risk taking, a proper activity for capitalists, and uncertainty, the appreciation of what is unknowable and beyond the risk models of even the most advanced mathematical formulators: "Uncertainty pervades Keynes' picture of economic life. It explains why people hold savings in liquid forms, why investment is volatile, and why the rate of interest doesn't adjust saving and investment."(Page 83.)
In his chapter on Keynes' politics, Skidelsky portrays him steering a course through the ideological minefields of his - and our day - and, surprisingly, please witness the appearance of conservative economist Friedrich von Hayek, with whom Keynes corresponded and "shared epistemological positions" - but with whom he disagreed on the dangers of "planning:"
Keynes certainly did not believe that government knew, or could know, more than `society.' But he did believe that it was in a position to take precautions against the consequences of uncertainty which private individuals or even informal social arrangements could not do. The `conventions' which society erects to guard against uncertainty break down in moments of great stress. Hence a full-employment policy was not the thin end of the wedge to serfdom, but a prudent precaution against a situation developing which would destroy the values which he and Hayek jointly shared....We know enough to have a rational belief that `moderate planning' will be an improvement on laissez-faire; we have no basis for saying that it will inevitably lead to serfdom or slavery further down the line. (Page 162.)
Keynes, Labor and the Crises of Capitalism
It is hard not to think about the similarities between the complex, nuanced Keynes and the political biography of his biographer, Lord Skidelsky, and to put them both in the context of the 1930's, measured against our own times. Skidelsky has moved from the Labor Party to the now evaporated Social Democrats, and then to the Conservative Party in the early 1990's, from whence he has departed to become a "cross bencher." His essay, The Crisis of Capitalism: Keynes vs. Marx, from February of 2010, offers a strong clue to providing a compass heading for this migration, and the difference between the two eras, 60 years apart. It sounds like the 1970's fiasco of Labor in Britain left a lasting impression, and found resonance in the life of Keynes: "Trade Unions, in Great Britain at least, threatened to become the prevailing power. Labor Government programmes in the early 1970's envisaged an economy run by the government and the trade unions, with only a minor role for private business. Thatcherism was the political reaction to this."
Impression indeed; there is no mention of Trade Unions, or Labor, in the Index of Keynes, Return of the Master. And Keynes, according Bartlett's piece in Forbes, was very tough on the Trade Unions' brand of Fabian Marxism. Yet if Keynes was not fond of the trade unions and Skidelsky himself thinks that they overstepped the limits of a mixed, yet still quite capitalist British society in the 1970's, it is clear that he feels that in turn, "Globalization" has now carried the war against labor too far, just as John Grey does:
Globalization was the business response to the declining rate of profits which Marx predicted. It was seen as the master key to overall improvement in the position of the business class. It increased corporate profits, reduced prices of consumer goods, and made possible a huge influx of outside money into the western banking system. But, most important, it was used as a bludgeon to frighten workers and to emasculate their economic and political powers. (The Crisis of Capitalism: Keynes vs. Marx, at [...])
In Search of the `Harmonious Society'
It's a glimpse into an economic world whose operating principles have eroded, if not consumed, the broader civic society in which it rests. That is what John Grey meant when he wrote that "Markets are made to serve man, not man the market." Keynes saw that the capitalism of the 1930's was going to destroy middle class society, and the working class as well, if more stabilizing and equitable arrangements were not made, and Skidelsky writes in a similar vein of capitalism's troubles today, with adjustments for a less extreme situation - for now, at least. Yet the economics profession of our day, as in the 1920's and 1930's, has no broader vision of where it is going or what constitutes the good life, other than to urge that society continue to give the business world all the particulars it has been asking for since the mid-1970's, once the emergency repairs and regulations of 2009-2010 have finished their stabilization task. On the next to the last page of Keynes, The Return of the Master, we are given a glimpse of the world that the great economist-philosopher was hoping for, "that of the `harmonious society.'" Social harmony will be built upon "full employment at home by means of investment and income redistribution..." which would "take the pressure off foreign trade, slow down the pace of globalization, and ease the social tensions arising from it. A Clearing Union for international payments would bring to an end global macroeconomic imbalances, automatically creating a more plural world." (Pages 190-191."
From the perspective of the summer of 2010, the "harmonious society," has a cruel, sardonic edge to it, thanks to the state of American politics, which is not the way Keynes intended it. Instead, a "Society without solidarity," might be closer to the reality of our situation. Far from having too much power, as British labor did in the 1970's, American labor has seen its legislative priorities put in the freezer, if not deep-sixed. There is no "balance of forces" in society that can enact a comprehensive reform program to cure the economic troubles of our day, and despite increased conversation and agenda sharing at the international level, we are no where close to achieving Keynes' "Clearing Union," and a new Bretton Woods arrangement for the world's dangerous and unstable international economy. Nations can't agree on the shape of banking reform or even the propriety of a Financial Transactions Tax - which ought to be the lowest common denominators, given the catastrophe of the private financial casino and its creation of a good share of the public deficits here and in Europe. Today "Keynesianism" is waved about by the Right as if it were the equivalent of the bloody flag of full blown governmental socialism and "interventionism", intervention of a scope that is only allowable for nation building far, far from home, like that undertaken by Paul Bremer in Iraq, in the fall of 2003 (speaking of social engineering).
Public Choice theory, another school of thought which leans to the Right, is covered by Skidelsky in Chapter Five, which asks whether the Keynesian Revolution was a success or failure. He gets to Public Choice Theory right after a heading for the New Classical Synthesis, which he earlier covered with brief, illuminating little portraits of the rational expectations hypothesis (REH), real business cycle theory (RBC) and the efficient financial market theory (EFMT), which "together...lie at the heart of contemporary economics." We might also observe that together they add up to a world view that says markets can pretty much take care of themselves once up and running, so that government can put the idea of major interventions back on the shelf labeled the 1920's, along with public jobs programs. Skidelsky says that public choice theory is actually a "theory of `government failure." It shares with rational expectations a "methodology of modeling public policies as the solution to individual maximization problems." That takes us back, way back, to the 18th century "inspiration of economics, which juxtaposed the efficiency of markets with the failures of government." (Pages 110-111.)
Keynes, Capitalism and the Good Life
This strategy on the Right to deprive the American people of even the possibility of a neutral government serving the public interest is very important. It seems as if it is designed to take away, if not destroy, hope itself - a hope that it denies exists beyond that generated by the all powerful private marketplace. And that is why we are going to close with a couple of thoughts about a passage from Lord Skidelsky's book, from Chapter 6, "Keynes and the Ethics of Capitalism." It is an answer to the contemporary Right's confusion of capitalism as an end, not a means, and its related problem of mistaking one 19th and 20th century interpretation of Christianity with a much older tradition - and understanding.
What if any ethical value, Keynes often asked, was to be attached to a life of `moneymaking and bridge'? Business life was at best only good as a means, but even as a means Keynes ranked it below public service, which at least was concerned with the public good. This was because business life overturned the correct hierarchy of values, teaching society to value `love of money' above love of goodness. Keynes's characterization - and condemnation - of capitalism as based on `love of money' echoes the biblical statement `the love of money is the root of all evils' (I Timothy 6:10). (Pages 141-142).
Now if Keynes were writing during the formal Social Gospel era in the United States, at the turn of the century, he might have let matters rest right there. But he wasn't; he was writing, in 1930, what Skidelsky calls a "futuristic" essay, Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren, just at the time when the psychological insights of modern life were beginning to penetrate scholarship of all sorts. So that "love of money" from the Bible becomes "the engine of capitalism...driven by a neurosis which he called `love of money.'" Keynes was looking forward to the day when the compulsions of capitalism and its Protestant Ethic, would ease off, resting on the great abundance they had helped create: "With the economic problem solved, mankind would face its permanent problem, how to live `wisely, agreeably, and well,' by which Keynes meant that people would be able to shed their pathological `purposefulness' and `love of money' and trade even higher incomes for more leisure and enjoyment of life." (Page 144.)
Well... it's 2010 now, and with the dominance of neoliberalism, we're still living with the neuroses and the pathological purposefulness of capitalism - and how. The mechanisms of abundance are even more impressive today than they were in the 1920's and 1930's, yet the "wisely, agreeably and well" hopes sound entirely utopian, as pensions and savings evaporate and the concept of a career, and even that of a job, are now formally obsolete. But the need for incomes from the employment from those careers is looming larger than ever, in one of the greatest contradictions ever to face capitalism.
Meanwhile, over at Goldman Sachs, we can tell you how Lloyd Blankfein and his firm face the contradictions. Subjecting most of their employees to daunting work schedules and relentless personal evaluations, the idea is to make their millions by an early age, and then to pursue Keynes' triad, mixing in charitable and governmental work amidst all that leisure. Although Blankfein called it doing God's work, in some ways, one could also call it a parody of what Keynes meant, because in fact the Wall Street syndrome has contributed the added irony, and cruelty, of demolishing Keynes' dreams for much of the rest of society.
The choices facing American society are becoming clearer and clearer. We are either going to work out our own good, modern version of social democracy leaning towards Keynes' fondest hopes, or we are going to plunge into an new era of ugly Social Darwinism, one that will make the first one look enchanting.
William R. Neil
Rockville, MD
August, 2010
Part 1 is an overview of where the economy is at and how it got there. To anyone following the current economic disaster this is somewhat redundant but for a book which I believe will have lasting value it places the immediacy of the topic in a good light. On page 23 he recalls the well know fact that bankers profited at an extraordinary level for their success but did not suffer for the losses. The quote from the British Liberal Treasury spokesperson of "Bring back the guillotine!" may have merit. For consider a financial regulatory regime where there is no regulation on the top side but only one regulatory rule on the bottom side. Namely you can make as much as you want but if you lose anyone's money then you get executed. I wonder how bankers would function in such a regulatory environment? The may a point to be made here, if reinterpreted.
In Chapter 2 he goes over the current state of economics reviewing the various schools and the various underlying premises. The three premises are the rational expectations hypothesis (REH), the real business cycle theory (RBC) and the efficient financial markets theory (EFMT). The REH assumes everyone has perfect knowledge. The RBC theory he explains rests upon the strong version of the REH which is markets always clear, a statement I have used from time to time, to my dismay, since they don't, and they don't in real time. The EFMT is the final leg of the three legged stool and it states that prices of all financial instruments or securities reflect all the risks that may affect them at any time. Well we have seen that this is not the case. He mentions one of the classic issues, herd mentality, and refers to a second, the stickiness of markets.
There is a third effect. That is that financial market makers, the bankers, will always find ways to work around obstacles and regulations, and in so doing they create new instruments and new techniques, to make more money. The bankers have, by nature, the instinct to look at any road block, any danger sign, as an opportunity to overcome it. Thus I would argue that it is this "counter gaming" phenomenon that provides a significant alternation to the markets and is an effect that Keynes had not considered. In many ways it is akin to the "spy-versus-spy" mentality of the cold war. This is a difficult mechanism to medel, albeit an element of game theory.
The author then goes onto to try and explain the problems inherent in Gaussian statistics. Yet the world has the long tailed distributions and distributions of just plain large random jumps. These are too difficult to model, yet perhaps easier to regulate.
Part II deals with Keynes and his life and ideas. Keynes was an idea man who actually did something. He ran his own investments and he had a first hand understanding of what went into making and losing money. The latter is a critical element of insight. Yes his classic is difficult, as are most writings from the Brits at that time. But is was a work first of ideas and secondarily of equations.
Chapter 4 is the best of the chapters in that it reviews and summarizes Keynes economics and these ideas. Keynes had written on probability as a younger man and had struggled with the definition of probability. In economics the issue of applying probability is more complex. Keynes struggled with thes issue of the very meaning of a probability. The author does an excellent job at describing this despite the inherent complexities involved.
On p 80 he discusses the issues regarding the business cycle. The question is; what causes a business cycle? Is it something predictable and thus controllable or is the cycle an inherent instability which we must just live through. The author's comment that "...Keynes came to reject the Newtonian schema..." is a telling statement. For he continues with Keynes own words, "...economics is ...a moral science...it deals with introspection and with values...". Perhaps that and even more. Economics is akin to the dynamics of an organic system, like the growth of cells, like what we see in developmental biology and epigentics. The system keeps growing and changing, it is not some inherently stable system which we can control, it is a system where new factors and epi factors keep arising and get activated and result in spurts of change. Imagine if macro-economists thought the way systems biologists think.
On p 83 is the most telling statement of all, he says, "Uncertainty pervades Keynes's picture of economic life". That to me is the most powerful statement in the book. It is not the uncertainty of the Gaussian process it is the inherent uncertainty of not really knowing enough. The discussion on p 88 regarding econometrics is also quite telling. Keynes did not like econometrics. One all too often can correlate anything with anything. Yet there must be some underlying reality in this set of relationships, there must be a "law of nature", repeatable and verifiable, which one can rely upon, otherwise the econometrics is worthless.
Chapter 5 is an excellent review of the application of the principles. The discussion on p 111 on the differences with Keynes and the current theorists is worth a long and detailed read.
Chapters 6 thru 8 are worth the read in that they details some of Keynes thoughts regarding Capitalism and other issues. They are in many ways a summary of Keynes as the man and less as the thinker.
This is a superb book, worth the read, and worth returning to from time to time. Yes it lacks a single equation, but at times ideas count.
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Three years of monetarist policy later, the deficit is growing, the UK has lost its Aaa rating from Moody's, employment is high but wages and productivity are scraping the undersides of the barrel, investment is anaemic, the banks aren't lending and RBS is still a basket case. But Skidelsky cautions against the scapegoating of bankers, the government, and various others, comparing it to pogroms, witch hunts and human sacrifice in the face of harvest failures in years gone by. For starters, he points out, the problem with slamming bankers for lending irresponsibly is that they stop lending altogether.
Skidelsky's verdict on the crash that led to all this is that the powers that be were guilty of a terminal case of groupthink, believing in the sustainability of the boom, trusting in only half-understood systems and market theories of self-correction. The failure, he says, quoting Keynes, was in the "ideas" of economists, some of which he then singles out as particularly misleading if not fully understood, such as rational expectations theory and real business cycle theory which between them led some to believe that "the future was certain, that unemployment was voluntary and that numbers could substitute common sense". But some of the risk models upon which the boom was built had very short memories, factoring in the good times and factoring out the bad.
The problem is, the austerity-based policies now being pursued are based upon the premise of self-correction, whilst what is needed, Skidelsky says, is a stimulus in demand: Paul Krugman has argued for fiscal stimulus based on government spending; monetary policy is riven with uncertainty and in the face of a drought in spending there is insufficient confidence in the market for business investment. Skidelsky takes this argument back to the early 19th century debates between Ricardo and Malthus, in which Ricardo stresses his focus on the long term, with short-term fluctuations effectively noise - things turn out for the good in the end - a position Malthus rejected in practical terms - people live in the here and now, not in the future. Most of us know Keynes's view of the long term.
Overall, Skidelsky's positions are well-argued, and he summarises well some of the main Keynesian principles upon which he bases his arguments, and does the same for some of the neoclassical models with which he takes issue, though sometimes he is quite ruthless in his put-downs, as he does for example with Friedman's theory that workers will voluntarily make themselves unemployed if they think they are being underpaid and wait for a better offer to come along. They don't. Sometimes they sit it out and suffer, sometimes they join a union and go on strike (though not so much nowadays), and sometimes they get a better offer and then they quit. Some of course take a second job, or even a third, and maybe a tiny minority turn to crime. Very few will opt for unemployment as an alternative.
On a few points I would take issue (though very respectfully, of course). The author describes the crash of 2007-8 as a black swan, that is, totally unexpected and unpredictable. As Nouriel Roubini has pointed out, there were plenty of signs things would go and were going wrong. Several years before its error came to fruition, for example, The Economist flagged the perils of HSBC's purchase of a US bank founded on lending to sub-prime customers, based on its low opinion of such businesses. He also makes rather too much, in my opinion, of Keynes's aversion to global trade, a genie which is way too far out of the bottle now. Paul Samuelson, a Keynesian, is on record as describing the principle of comparative advantage (developed by Ricardo, it has to be said) as one of economics' true contributions to social science in helping us understand the benefits of globalisation.
Additionally, he advocates a shift from economics as a glorified branch of maths - like Keynes, apparently, he isn't a fan of econometrics - prompting in me the old joke about there being three kinds of economist, those who can count and those who can't. Instead he suggests combining economics with philosophy and various other subjects. Isn't that called PPE? And isn't that what George Osborne did? I'm currently studying for a Social Sciences with Economics degree, and the economics is very shallow.
Regrettably, whilst the substance of this book is excellent, it has been highly ill-served by the proof-readers. There is throughout a tendency for words to go missing, for letters to go missing from words, and for punctuation to go awry, such as quotations being closed without being opened. Some sentences are so badly mangled that a minor textual analysis is necessary to make sense of them, which detracts from the logical flow of the arguments, and at one point Edmund Burke is made to look only semi-articulate. And the typos are appalling: macroeconomic policy becomes macropolicy policy; on the same line on one page we have a "surfiet" and a "surfeit" (difficult to type as my autochecker corrects the bad one), and two lines down we have "reducation"; elsewhere there is "abudance"; Olivier Blanchard of the IMF becomes Oliver and, in the coup de grâce, the master himself becomes "Keynese"!
When I was at school a Penguin book was the ultimate trust object. This one doesn't deserve to be allowed within three miles of an educational establishment, unfortunately, for fear of the damage it could do to literacy, until it is reissued in recognisable English. Once it is, it will make a very good primer, though from a Keynesian perspective, on the present state of economics.
There is a rich and multifaceted quality flowing through these pages both in Skidelsky's articulation of the master, but most notably, from the intellectual and historical heritage which incubated Keynes' ideas and spurned him to synthesise some of the most profound insights into political economy of any economist, either before or after. That Keynes is little known outside of economic circles remains a blight on our national self identify, as he was so much more that just an economist. Read this and feel the power of real intellect soaking through the pages, you wont regret it.


