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Killing in War (Uehiro Series in Practical Ethics) Reprint Edition
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- ISBN-10019960357X
- ISBN-13978-0199603572
- EditionReprint
- PublisherOxford University Press
- Publication dateMarch 22, 2011
- LanguageEnglish
- Dimensions0.6 x 5.3 x 8.4 inches
- Print length272 pages
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- Publisher : Oxford University Press; Reprint edition (March 22, 2011)
- Language : English
- Paperback : 272 pages
- ISBN-10 : 019960357X
- ISBN-13 : 978-0199603572
- Item Weight : 2.31 pounds
- Dimensions : 0.6 x 5.3 x 8.4 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #1,243,414 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #451 in Philosophy of Good & Evil
- #3,413 in Political Philosophy (Books)
- #4,329 in Philosophy of Ethics & Morality
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Other important findings include: 1. That many of us are likely far more culpable and responsible for the unjust actions of our government in war than we often (would like to) believe and that this has important consequences for our moral standing. 2. That not all combatants, both within just groups and within unjust groups, share equal moral standings (some are far more culpable and responsible than others). 3. That some civilian non combatants are (though rarely) justifiably liable to be attacked by just combatants, and here McMahan gives a contemporary example and a historical example of non combatants that fits this criteria for this kind of moral liability.
Where I felt the book could have done a little better was that there were some parts of it that was quite philosophically convoluted. Though still well written, these parts could have used some (preferably real) examples sprinkled in between the arguments. Very complicated moral nuances are distinguished and discussed between the different kinds of rights and circumstances that are relevant. They are examined in depth from every direction possible but the lack of examples in some parts makes those sections dry and seem too "ivory tower." But this is a minor quibble as the work is quite well written in general.
McMahan (here and elsewhere) argues from analogy (as many just war theorists do) between the morality of personal self-defense and that of war. Much of his argument depends on a close analogy but I would also have liked for McMahan to talk more about the glaring dis analogy between the rare (perhaps only hypothetical presently) cases of military occupation without intent or reasonable likelihood of deaths or serious bodily injury to anyone on the just side. McMahan agrees that occupation of one's ancestral lands offer sufficiently good moral reason to kill potential or actual unjust occupiers. But if that seems to be at tension with laws and their moral foundation in self-defense for no state (except maybe Texas, Florida and a few other states) allows killing to defend property alone but only if the perpetrator intentionally threatens someone's life or gives reasonable threat of serious bodily injury is lethal self-defense allowed. If a foreign unjust power decides it only wants some other nation's land to occupy, perhaps for the resources on that land, but has no intent to physically harm any of the citizens of that land, then what is the reasoning behind allowing the citizens of that land to use deadly force to defend against the occupation? The import is that this could open up room for a defense of a weak kind of pacifism which McMahan does not discuss in depth. This question I think could be answered competently by McMahan or other just war theorists while maintaining the general analogy but it is one minor lacuna that kept me unsatisfied.
Anyone seriously interested in the just war tradition is wrong not to be familiar with Jeff McMahan's work on the topic. In this work, McMahan goes after some sacred cows that virtually all non-pacifist writers about the ethics of war have taken for granted for centuries on surprisingly weak ground. Foremost among these is the idea of the moral equality of combatants; that is, that combatants on both sides of a given war are moral equals regardless of whether they are fighting for a just cause or an unjust cause.
The traditional view has it that, upon becoming combatants, combatants abdicate some of their right not to be killed in exchange for an expanded set of permissible actions, namely, the right to kill. McMahan denies that combatants on the just side of a war actually do this. If their cause is just, he argues, why should it be more permissible to kill them than "innocent" civilians? After all, both are innocent in the relevant manner.
I find McMahan is unbelievably presuasive in making this argument. If the book leaves anything to be desired it is that it is too narrow. We never really get a full-fledged account of justice of war. In fairness, the book never set out to do this. Still, I felt like a broader account would have been more fulfilling.
This book is moral philosophy, but McMahan is a practical realist. He rejects the brutal cynicism of a Hobbesian position that moral restraint cannot be applied in war. Nevertheless, he is fully understands our tortuous path to find a way out of the problems we have of armies and nations and wars. Improving human behavior in this realm will require careful thought, and McMahan is diligent. I have been aware of his work for years, and his earliest publication that I use is “The Limits of National Partiality,” his chapter in The Morality of Nationalism, McKim and McMahan, eds. I have returned to it many times to try to understand how we are all, in our own way, nationalists, and what there is to do about it. I will be coming back to Killing in War for years also.
In this book, about war, McMahan is focused on analysis and moral evaluation of the behavior of individual soldiers in war. He is asking, “During war, when should killing be permitted?” He thoroughly lines out each practical concern a soldier faces, focusing on how the individual should act. He is a very organized philosopher, and sets up a clear system for studying, in detail, what is just and moral, within the constraints of what is practical and effective, for a soldier. The fields of what is moral, and what is legal, are necessarily separate matters; McMahan is knowledgeable in both fields, having spent decades studying and lecturing and writing about ethics in war.
The task that McMahan has set for himself is to deconstruct a set of concepts that have, up until now, been the standard model for understanding the moral responsibilities of a soldier during war. According to that standard model, it does not matter which side a soldier is fighting on; her/his moral responsibilities are the same. According to this model, even if it is overwhelmingly obvious that one side in a war is aggressive in clearly wrong ways, and the other side is clearly justifiably defending itself, the ethical rules for the soldiers on both sides should be exactly the same. For example, the Filipino soldiers resisting the brutal invasion and occupation of the Japanese would be expected to toe the line to the same permissions and restrictions that the Japanese soldiers would be expected to follow. Each soldier that followed those rules would be considered to be acting morally. McMahan singles out a specific author, Michael Walzer, whose work represents this tradition. He elaborates a withering critique of Walzer, and proposes that it is time to take apart the fundamentally illogical structure of the “tidy set of rules” that governments and armies and politicians and international bodies have so comfortably used to allow soldiers to rationalize their behavior in war.
The book is too painstakingly thorough to be comfortably summarized. For example, McMahan reviews and appreciates all of Walzer’s reasoning, both practical and moral, prior to setting out his critique of that paradigm. The issues are complex; the individual soldier will often face moral ambivalence. However, there is one key point of disagreement between Walzer and McMahan that powerfully exemplifies McMahan’s understanding of how it is that we must mature, as societies and individuals, to begin to cure the disease of war at the cellular level. Walzer’s claim has been that the moral status of a soldier is unrelated to the issue of whether her/his side in a war is the just side or the unjust side. McMahan disagrees strongly, and argues convincingly that soldiers fighting for the unjust side in a war must be held to task for this.
In international treaties, it is recognized that the only just wars are those that are fought in self-defense. A country defending itself against an unjust invader is, generally, in the right. McMahan recognizes that there is seldom complete clarity, but says that most of the time it is quite clear which side is “just.” The Iraqis were wrong and the Kuwaitis were right. McMahan is not a traditional pacifist. He treats self-defense against an unjust aggressor as a complete justification for killing someone, if necessary to save one’s own life.
It is this very argument that McMahan brings to the individual level of the soldier. He is not at all insensitive to the plight of soldiers, from the draftee to the dupe. He understands the publicly impractical and individually grave consequences that will arise from labeling individual soldiers as blameworthy or liable for what they have done if they are fighting for an unjust cause. He covers all angles of every moral and legal defense, and the unconvincing and/or partial excuses that can be raised to rationalize the killing that is done by soldiers that are fighting for an unjust cause. Among other themes, he cycles constantly back to: 1. the practical problems, after a war, of prosecuting hundreds of thousands of soldiers, 2. the effects of war propaganda and youth on the ignorance of soldiers, and the resulting limitation in what they can know, 3. the duress and threats that the soldiers’ own governments put them under, (which still do not relieve these soldiers from all responsibility for unjust killing), 4. a moral grading of the types of threats that a soldier can face, and an ongoing discussion of proportional response (e.g., it is not moral to obliterate an entire village because there was a bullet fired from one of the houses), 5. the special case of child soldiers, 6. the issue of who is a combatant and who is not, and 7. justifications of “lesser evils.” He carefully dissects and deploys terms such as innocence, liability, culpability, permissibility, diminished responsibility, collateral damage, and civilian target.
This review is only giving the reader a light overview of McMahan’s thoughtful organization and presentation of the moral elements involved in the dilemmas soldiers face in war. It is everyone’s job to disseminate these ideas to the public, and especially to soldiers and the young people who are considering becoming soldiers.
McMahan is well aware that the world is not yet ready to start regularly prosecuting masses of unjust soldiers, or even soldiers who fight in an immoral way for the just side in a war, in criminal proceedings. He knows that we do not yet have the institutional framework for these undertakings. We can’t even yet make institutionally authoritative judgments about the just and unjust side in most wars. Our efforts at this time are best put into trying to prevent wars, and especially unjust wars, wherein no self-defense is at play. If we were to begin prosecuting individual soldiers at this time, there is an understandable likelihood that the only result would be a sad “Victor’s Justice.” Yet McMahan has successfully revealed the weaknesses in Walzer’s structures, and shown us a plausible way to work toward the prevention of unjust wars. If the availability of more ethical and historical information about the individual responsibility and culpability of soldiers fighting unjust wars were distributed widely, in combination with mechanisms, however lightly applied, putting blame where it belongs, on people who kill unjustly, many young people would be deterred from killing unjustly, or even being soldiers for governments that conduct unjust wars. A government that fears that it has the full support of its population and military for unjust wars might not risk the challenge to its authority.
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McMahans ideas are highly original and for the most part clearly stated. The book is divided into five chapters, where the second chapter constitutes the major part of McMahans arguments: he puts forth a good deal of different arguments for the moral equality of combatants and dismisses them all. McMahans arguments are very intelligent, original and convincing, and he generally is very objective in his thought and does not let himself be decieved by conventional thinking. It is this willingness to devy convention which is the major force of the book.
Apart from the moral equality of combatants, McMahan also discusses possible excuses for unjustified behavior, mostly excuses made from combatants on the unjust side of a war. He also considers civilian immunity at length, and gives some very interesting arguments for why absolute civilian immunity is unfounded.
A weakness of the book is that it at times is very dense and academic. Particularly in the fourth chapter on the moral status of different types of threatening combatants, the text is difficult reading, perhaps unnecessarily so. McMahan spends a good deal of pages on categorizing various types of threats, and later applies them to the moral status of combatants on the unjust side of a war. In doing so, he develops a considerable amount of definitions ("Culpable threats", "Partially Excused Threats", "Innocent Threats", "Nonresponsible Threats"...), and it is rather difficult to keep track of the different categories. While McMahans intentions are obviously good, in the sense that he strives for a high quality of scholarship and argumentation, the unfortunate side effect is that the book becomes very dense at such a point. In general, the writing of McMahan is not as clear as that of, for example, Michael Walzer in "Just and Unjust Wars".
Nonetheless, the quality and originality of McMahans arguments set forth in his book are so great that the book must clearly be recommended as a very important, if at times somewhat dry and academic, piece of work on Just War Theory.

