Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior
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John M. Doris
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John M. Doris
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ISBN-13:
978-0521608909
ISBN-10:
0521608902
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Editorial Reviews
Review
"Lack of Character is a very important book both for psychologists and philosophers. It presents the best summary available of the psychological literature documenting the typically weak effects of personality on moral behavior and the massive effects that situations can have. The book also presents a powerful case against 'virtue ethics', which assumes that people act morally to the degree that they have certain dispositions." --Richard E. Nisbett, Theodore M. Newcomb Distinguished University Professor, Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
"Adopting a new stance towards character in moral psychology as Doris suggests ought to bring a welcome revolution..." Metapshychology
"Lack of Character is a very important book both for psychologists and philosophers. It presents the best summary available of the psychological literature documenting the typically weak effects of personality on behavior and the massive effects that situations can have. The book also presents a powerful case against philosophical 'virtue ethics,' which assumes that people act morally to the degree that they have certain dispositions. Richard E. Nisbett, Theodore M. Newcomb Distinguished University Professor, Dept. of Psychology, Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor
"Doris is a punchy, spirited and bold writer who tackles the important issue of whether we are justified in our belief that there is something called stable moral character that leads to predictable behavior... His arguments do moral psychology proponents an important service by indicating how to integrate moral philosophy with current empirical research... His work should cause quite a stir within virtue ethics circles. At the very least, it should lead to a reexamination of time-worn views about character traits and their manifestations in coherent patterns of actions." Nancy Sherman, Professor of Philosophy, Georgetown Univ.
"...Lack of Character is by far the best thing I know of written on the implications of recent social psychology for philosophical discussions of virtue and character. The book refers to and assesses an extraordinarily large literature in psychology, philosophy, and beyond, and works out in considerable detail one very plausible way of thinking of ethics in the light of the facts of psychology. Gilbert Harman, Stuart Professor of Philosophy, Princeton University
"In addition to presenting his ideas in a clear and jaunty way that allows undergraduates to follow him with little difficulty, Doris has written a book that will interest especially those working on moral theory.... This book is particularly appropriate for collections serving a philosophy major. Recommended." Choice
"This book is a rich and stimulating contribution."
William P. Smith, Philosophical Psychology
"Adopting a new stance towards character in moral psychology as Doris suggests ought to bring a welcome revolution..." Metapshychology
"Lack of Character is a very important book both for psychologists and philosophers. It presents the best summary available of the psychological literature documenting the typically weak effects of personality on behavior and the massive effects that situations can have. The book also presents a powerful case against philosophical 'virtue ethics,' which assumes that people act morally to the degree that they have certain dispositions. Richard E. Nisbett, Theodore M. Newcomb Distinguished University Professor, Dept. of Psychology, Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor
"Doris is a punchy, spirited and bold writer who tackles the important issue of whether we are justified in our belief that there is something called stable moral character that leads to predictable behavior... His arguments do moral psychology proponents an important service by indicating how to integrate moral philosophy with current empirical research... His work should cause quite a stir within virtue ethics circles. At the very least, it should lead to a reexamination of time-worn views about character traits and their manifestations in coherent patterns of actions." Nancy Sherman, Professor of Philosophy, Georgetown Univ.
"...Lack of Character is by far the best thing I know of written on the implications of recent social psychology for philosophical discussions of virtue and character. The book refers to and assesses an extraordinarily large literature in psychology, philosophy, and beyond, and works out in considerable detail one very plausible way of thinking of ethics in the light of the facts of psychology. Gilbert Harman, Stuart Professor of Philosophy, Princeton University
"In addition to presenting his ideas in a clear and jaunty way that allows undergraduates to follow him with little difficulty, Doris has written a book that will interest especially those working on moral theory.... This book is particularly appropriate for collections serving a philosophy major. Recommended." Choice
"This book is a rich and stimulating contribution."
William P. Smith, Philosophical Psychology
Book Description
This is a provocative contribution to contemporary ethical theory challenging foundational conceptions of character.
Book Description
This book is a provocative contribution to contemporary ethics and moral psychology, challenging fundamental assumptions of character dating to Aristotle. John Doris draws on an array of social scientific research, especially experimental social psychology, to argue that people often grossly overestimate the behavioral impact of character and grossly underestimate the behavioral impact of situations. Circumstance, Doris concludes, often has extraordinary influence on what people do, whatever sort of character they may appear to have. He then considers the implications of this observation for a range of issues in ethics, arguing that with a more realistic picture of affect, cognition, and motivation, moral psychology can support more compelling ethical theoris and more humane ethical practices.
About the Author
John Doris is Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of California, Santa Cruz.
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Product details
- Publisher : Cambridge University Press (March 7, 2005)
- Language : English
- Paperback : 288 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0521608902
- ISBN-13 : 978-0521608909
- Item Weight : 15.5 ounces
- Dimensions : 6 x 0.72 x 9 inches
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Best Sellers Rank:
#230,242 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #63 in Logic (Books)
- #199 in Philosophy of Logic & Language
- #205 in Ethics
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Reviewed in the United States on September 21, 2015
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A very influential book that has spawned a veritable minor industry of criticism – dubbed the "response to the Situationist challenge." Anyone in philosophical ethics who wants to rely on an account of robustly effective virtues now has to take this sort of challenge seriously, and reading this book is remains a good start.
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Reviewed in the United States on September 23, 2014
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Excellent book on how we are influenced by every situation.
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Reviewed in the United States on March 4, 2018
This is a truly brilliant and pioneering work. Plus, he writes with clarity, intelligence and a great deal of wit, which I really appreciate. Really appreciated the interdisciplinary approach as well. Philosophy is better when science is allowed into the project. Great work. Highly recommended.
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Reviewed in the United States on April 5, 2013
As the first reviewer was indeed too harsh in their overall assessment, and mistaken in some of their descriptions and criticisms of this book, I think it's only fair to set things straight by giving a bit of a review myself in which I also respond to a few of their pseudo-criticisms in what follows:
Empirical studies of behavior from various academic disciplines seem to strongly indicate that it's oftentimes the case that seemingly insignificant situational factors, as opposed to character traits, are better predictors of our behavior. From this situationist finding, and other premises, John Doris argues to the conclusion that there aren't such things as global character traits as understood by both traditional virtue theory and our folk psychology. That is, there aren't traits which are both 1) inter-situationally consistent across a wide range of situations of varying conduciveness to that trait, and also 2) stably manifested over iterations of similar conditions.*
This conclusion is problematic for virtue theory, he argues, insomuch as the traditional concept of virtue central to such accounts is understood as being global; and so if global traits don't exist then, a fortiori, neither can virtues. And it's likewise problematic for our folk psychology because, among other things, it suggests that our everyday attributions of character traits, which we tacitly understand as being global ("compassionate," for example), don't robustly generalize across dissimilar situations in such a manner as to allow us to confidently expect the behavioral consistency we do in fact tend to predict (as shown in studies thoroughly discussed by Doris). All those positively valanced character attributions we (us Westerners at least) liberally avail ourselves of to describe our friends and acquaintances, for instance, aren't actually likely to be of much predictive help in anticipating how those very same people would behave across a wide range of situations seemingly conducive to such behavior (thanks to often seemingly insignificant, and morally irrelevant, situational factors), let alone situations which aren't likewise conducive. The flip side of this, though, is that our negatively valanced attributions (such as "dishonest") aren't likely to be of much predictive help, either. More succinctly, we have a tendency to overattribute behaviors, both of others and ourselves, to what we perceive to be steady dispositions of character, when it's situational factors that provide the more plausible explanation of behaviors.
As far as philosophy goes, Doris' style is eminently readable: the book is controversial, illuminating, and oftentimes even humorous. And although there is a daunting density of descriptions and interpretations of a wide array of interdisciplinary studies, they're necessary for Doris' empirically grounded arguments to be of any success. Moreover, to anybody interested in current debates in moral psychology, this book isn't just important reading; it's absolutely essential to understanding what all the fuss over situationist critiques of character traits is all about. Although there has been no shortage of arguments against situationist conclusions in general, and Doris' work in particular, since he (along with Harman) largely brought it to the fore in academic philosophy, I'm presently inclined to think that most of them succeed only at the expense of unjustifiably changing the terms of the debate. This isn't to say that there aren't necessarily any successful arguments out there I haven't seen, or that they won't come yet at some later date (his position is empirically falsifiable), but if Doris' position is by and large correct, seriously undermining his position is going to take a lot of empirical evidence that currently doesn't exist and is unlikely to be forthcoming anytime soon.
*Doris argues that virtue theory is also committed virtues being global in the sense of them belonging to an evaluatively integrated whole, where traits of similar evaluative valences are probabilistically related to one another. I think he's right to do so, but since global in that sense doesn't appear likewise applicable to our folk psychological judgments, just as Doris says, and (1& 2) are together true of both virtue theory and folk psychology, as well as sufficient grounds for understanding my condensed account of Doris' project which follows, I here omit (3) only so as to simplify things a bit).
---
The first reviewer complains that Doris shies away from what they took to be "fundamental questions," such as why experimental work can even be relevant given that virtue ethics is concerned with an ideal, rather than our actual behaviors. Aside from the fact that Doris never does in fact shy away from this question in particular (nor few if any others, by my reading), but rather persuasively argues why such experimental work is thusly relevant, it is simply not the case that virtue ethics is only concerned with an ideal rather than our attempts to approximate it. Although an ideal of character may be part of virtue ethics on most accounts, and sometimes even central, it's nowhere considered to be exhaustive of the normative theory. That's because a virtue ethics that says nothing of our actual behavior isn't really a virtue ethics at all, at least in the traditional sense. And in his book, Doris carefully explains that it is (only) virtue ethics commitment to global traits, that his arguments problematize, to the extent they are successful.
Another "interesting question" that the first reviewer would have liked Doris to address is "how should we make people behave better: can we trust them at all, or should our efforts be focused instead on the design of environments that rule out possibilities for misbehaving?" With regard to whether we can trust people at all (which I here interpret as "sometimes being honest"), Doris would say "Sure," and that it's even possible that such behavior (truth-telling) be stable across a narrow range of similarly conducive circumstances, resulting in what he calls "localized" trait dispositions as opposed to "globalized" ones. His theory of local traits, in other words, is perfectly consistent with still sometimes trusting others. Which is a good thing, too, because the opposite would have the effect of making his position quite implausible insomuch as we have an overwhelming amount of empirical evidence that people sometimes engage in honest behavior. And as for faulting Doris on omitting to address what we should do to "make people better," such considerations fall entirely beyond the scope of Doris' project, which is to give a descriptive account of our moral psychology (what is the case), rather than a normative account of ethics (what ought to be the case). So this is no more a valid criticism of Doris than that he likewise nowhere provides a rough and ready framework by which to determine what makes any particular action morally better/worse than any other.
That being said, Doris does address the fact that his position has normative implications. He discusses, among other things, how situationism seems to problematize both our ideas of self-control, and also the self-identification with the motives to our actions which we tend to deem necessary for attributions of blame (further discussion of which I hereby forego). So his position is still normatively relevant even if it does not, by itself, tell us what the right thing to do is, given that situationism is true.
--
And if you've made it to the end of this review, just read the book already. I doubt you'll regret it in the event you could make it through my synopsis of it.
Empirical studies of behavior from various academic disciplines seem to strongly indicate that it's oftentimes the case that seemingly insignificant situational factors, as opposed to character traits, are better predictors of our behavior. From this situationist finding, and other premises, John Doris argues to the conclusion that there aren't such things as global character traits as understood by both traditional virtue theory and our folk psychology. That is, there aren't traits which are both 1) inter-situationally consistent across a wide range of situations of varying conduciveness to that trait, and also 2) stably manifested over iterations of similar conditions.*
This conclusion is problematic for virtue theory, he argues, insomuch as the traditional concept of virtue central to such accounts is understood as being global; and so if global traits don't exist then, a fortiori, neither can virtues. And it's likewise problematic for our folk psychology because, among other things, it suggests that our everyday attributions of character traits, which we tacitly understand as being global ("compassionate," for example), don't robustly generalize across dissimilar situations in such a manner as to allow us to confidently expect the behavioral consistency we do in fact tend to predict (as shown in studies thoroughly discussed by Doris). All those positively valanced character attributions we (us Westerners at least) liberally avail ourselves of to describe our friends and acquaintances, for instance, aren't actually likely to be of much predictive help in anticipating how those very same people would behave across a wide range of situations seemingly conducive to such behavior (thanks to often seemingly insignificant, and morally irrelevant, situational factors), let alone situations which aren't likewise conducive. The flip side of this, though, is that our negatively valanced attributions (such as "dishonest") aren't likely to be of much predictive help, either. More succinctly, we have a tendency to overattribute behaviors, both of others and ourselves, to what we perceive to be steady dispositions of character, when it's situational factors that provide the more plausible explanation of behaviors.
As far as philosophy goes, Doris' style is eminently readable: the book is controversial, illuminating, and oftentimes even humorous. And although there is a daunting density of descriptions and interpretations of a wide array of interdisciplinary studies, they're necessary for Doris' empirically grounded arguments to be of any success. Moreover, to anybody interested in current debates in moral psychology, this book isn't just important reading; it's absolutely essential to understanding what all the fuss over situationist critiques of character traits is all about. Although there has been no shortage of arguments against situationist conclusions in general, and Doris' work in particular, since he (along with Harman) largely brought it to the fore in academic philosophy, I'm presently inclined to think that most of them succeed only at the expense of unjustifiably changing the terms of the debate. This isn't to say that there aren't necessarily any successful arguments out there I haven't seen, or that they won't come yet at some later date (his position is empirically falsifiable), but if Doris' position is by and large correct, seriously undermining his position is going to take a lot of empirical evidence that currently doesn't exist and is unlikely to be forthcoming anytime soon.
*Doris argues that virtue theory is also committed virtues being global in the sense of them belonging to an evaluatively integrated whole, where traits of similar evaluative valences are probabilistically related to one another. I think he's right to do so, but since global in that sense doesn't appear likewise applicable to our folk psychological judgments, just as Doris says, and (1& 2) are together true of both virtue theory and folk psychology, as well as sufficient grounds for understanding my condensed account of Doris' project which follows, I here omit (3) only so as to simplify things a bit).
---
The first reviewer complains that Doris shies away from what they took to be "fundamental questions," such as why experimental work can even be relevant given that virtue ethics is concerned with an ideal, rather than our actual behaviors. Aside from the fact that Doris never does in fact shy away from this question in particular (nor few if any others, by my reading), but rather persuasively argues why such experimental work is thusly relevant, it is simply not the case that virtue ethics is only concerned with an ideal rather than our attempts to approximate it. Although an ideal of character may be part of virtue ethics on most accounts, and sometimes even central, it's nowhere considered to be exhaustive of the normative theory. That's because a virtue ethics that says nothing of our actual behavior isn't really a virtue ethics at all, at least in the traditional sense. And in his book, Doris carefully explains that it is (only) virtue ethics commitment to global traits, that his arguments problematize, to the extent they are successful.
Another "interesting question" that the first reviewer would have liked Doris to address is "how should we make people behave better: can we trust them at all, or should our efforts be focused instead on the design of environments that rule out possibilities for misbehaving?" With regard to whether we can trust people at all (which I here interpret as "sometimes being honest"), Doris would say "Sure," and that it's even possible that such behavior (truth-telling) be stable across a narrow range of similarly conducive circumstances, resulting in what he calls "localized" trait dispositions as opposed to "globalized" ones. His theory of local traits, in other words, is perfectly consistent with still sometimes trusting others. Which is a good thing, too, because the opposite would have the effect of making his position quite implausible insomuch as we have an overwhelming amount of empirical evidence that people sometimes engage in honest behavior. And as for faulting Doris on omitting to address what we should do to "make people better," such considerations fall entirely beyond the scope of Doris' project, which is to give a descriptive account of our moral psychology (what is the case), rather than a normative account of ethics (what ought to be the case). So this is no more a valid criticism of Doris than that he likewise nowhere provides a rough and ready framework by which to determine what makes any particular action morally better/worse than any other.
That being said, Doris does address the fact that his position has normative implications. He discusses, among other things, how situationism seems to problematize both our ideas of self-control, and also the self-identification with the motives to our actions which we tend to deem necessary for attributions of blame (further discussion of which I hereby forego). So his position is still normatively relevant even if it does not, by itself, tell us what the right thing to do is, given that situationism is true.
--
And if you've made it to the end of this review, just read the book already. I doubt you'll regret it in the event you could make it through my synopsis of it.
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Reviewed in the United States on January 8, 2009
In Lack of character Doris investigates the implications of research into character psychology on moral theorizing, and specifically virtue ethics. The elephant in the virtue-ethical room is that psychological experiments have shown that people do not have something that can remotely be described as a global overarching character. People's decisions to help others in distress may depend on such trivialities of just having found a quarter in the phone box, or being in a hurry for a not-so-important appointment. Milgram has demonstrated that under relatively modest pressure from authority, people are willing to give others lethal shocks. Doris concludes that we cannot say people are good or evil, trustworthy or cheating. We can only be confident that people have `local' traits that predict behavior only in rather specific situations. Doris sets out to investigate the consequences for virtue ethics, the branch of moral theory that is concerned achieving a good life through building a moral character.
It is surprising that we had to wait 57 years after Nazism and some 25 years after Milgram's experiments before someone took the implications of situationism for ethics seriously (with possibly the exception of Hannah Arendt.) Moral theorists have contended themselves too much with conjuring up armchair `oughts' without asking whether their concepts have any empirical content. Thus, Doris should be commended for his choice of topic. Unfortunately the book is not as interesting as it could have been, because Doris shies away from some fundamental questions. Given that virtue ethics is concerned with an ideal of character, and not with our mundane attempts to achieve it, what is the relevance of experimental work for ethics? Doris mentions this issue but never delves deep into it. Another interesting question is how we should make people behave better: can we trust them at all, or should our efforts be focused instead on the design of environments that rule out possibilities for misbehaving? Rather Doris contents himself with some rather modest amendments (or so he says himself) to virtue theory. For example, it can be helpful to be aware of your own character flaws, so that you know to avoid ethically difficult situations.
Another problem with the book is the style. Instead of defending a clear position, Doris is engaged in a never-ending dialogue with imaginary critics in which he continually amends and nuances his statements, and each claim seems temporary.
But maybe I am being too harsh, because Doris' starting point raises more questions than a single book can answer. Testimony to the scope and importance of the argument is that 7 years after the publication of this book, a `naturalistic turn' in ethics is finally taking place.
It is surprising that we had to wait 57 years after Nazism and some 25 years after Milgram's experiments before someone took the implications of situationism for ethics seriously (with possibly the exception of Hannah Arendt.) Moral theorists have contended themselves too much with conjuring up armchair `oughts' without asking whether their concepts have any empirical content. Thus, Doris should be commended for his choice of topic. Unfortunately the book is not as interesting as it could have been, because Doris shies away from some fundamental questions. Given that virtue ethics is concerned with an ideal of character, and not with our mundane attempts to achieve it, what is the relevance of experimental work for ethics? Doris mentions this issue but never delves deep into it. Another interesting question is how we should make people behave better: can we trust them at all, or should our efforts be focused instead on the design of environments that rule out possibilities for misbehaving? Rather Doris contents himself with some rather modest amendments (or so he says himself) to virtue theory. For example, it can be helpful to be aware of your own character flaws, so that you know to avoid ethically difficult situations.
Another problem with the book is the style. Instead of defending a clear position, Doris is engaged in a never-ending dialogue with imaginary critics in which he continually amends and nuances his statements, and each claim seems temporary.
But maybe I am being too harsh, because Doris' starting point raises more questions than a single book can answer. Testimony to the scope and importance of the argument is that 7 years after the publication of this book, a `naturalistic turn' in ethics is finally taking place.
12 people found this helpful
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Reviewed in the United Kingdom on November 8, 2016Verified Purchase
It is more academic than I had hoped for.
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