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Lecturing Birds on Flying: Can Mathematical Theories Destroy the Financial Markets? 1st Edition
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LECTURING BIRDS ON FLYING
For the past few decades, the financial world has often displayed an unreasonable willingness to believe that "the model is right, the market is wrong," in spite of the fact that these theoretical machinations were largely responsible for the stock market crash of 1987, the LTCM crisis of 1998, the credit crisis of 2008, and many other blow-ups, large and small. Why have both financial insiders (traders, risk managers, executives) and outsiders (academics, journalists, regulators, the public) consistently demonstrated a willingness to treat quantifications as gospel? Nassim Taleb first addressed the conflicts between theoretical and real finance in his technical treatise on options, Dynamic Hedging. Now, in Lecturing Birds on Flying, Pablo Triana offers a powerful indictment on the trustworthiness of financial theory, explainingin jargon-free plain Englishhow malfunctions in these quantitative machines have wreaked havoc in our real world.
Triana first analyzes the fundamental question of whether financial markets can in principle really be solved mathematically. He shows that the markets indeed cannot be tamed with equations, presenting a long and powerful list of obstacles to prove his point: maverick unlawful human actions rule the markets, unexpected and unimaginable events shape the markets, and historical data is not necessarily a trustworthy guide to the future of the markets. The author then examines the sources of origin of many prevalent theories and mathematical dictums. He details how the field of financial economics evolved from a descriptive discipline to an abstract one dedicated to technically concocting professors' own versions of how such a world should work. He goes on to explain how Wall Street and other financial centers became eager employers of scientists, and how scientists became eager employees of financial firms. Triana concludes with an in-depth discussion of the most significant historical episodes of theory-caused real-life market malaise, with a strong emphasis on the current credit crisis.
In the end, Lecturing Birds on Flying calls for the radical substitution of good old-fashioned common sense in place of mathematical decision-making and the restoration to financial power of those who are completely unchained to the iron ball of classroom-obtained qualifications.
- ISBN-100470406755
- ISBN-13978-0470406755
- Edition1st
- PublisherWiley
- Publication dateMay 15, 2009
- LanguageEnglish
- Dimensions6 x 1.09 x 9 inches
- Print length400 pages
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Editorial Reviews
Review
―Risk Management Magazine
"Readers of this book may make quite a lot of noise. . . Some will cheer out loud; others will yelp as cherished beliefs are torn into. At times, the book is deliberately incendiary. Triana is trying to stimulate debate. . . On the whole, this is a good read."
―The Financial Times, July 23rd 2009
"...calls for a return to "good old fashioned commonsense decision making"."
―Daily Express, June 4th 2009
"This book explains how it is that theoretical finance can fail dramatically in the real world."
―Finanace & Management Faculty, June 2009
"The book is fizzing with ideas"
―The Economist, June 29th 2009
" Triana’s book will ruffle a lot of feathers, but it also will make many readers think hard."
―BizEd
"A deeply unsettling insider account of how bogus mathematics overtook finance and was a key contributor to the financial collapse of 2008-2009 . . . With deep insight, Triana deconstructs the "pillars" of mathematical finance . . . Like Nassim Taleb, celebrated author of The Black Swan (2007), Triana is calling for major surgical reform of such business schools' curricula. An important addition to our deeper understanding of how finance must be reformed."
―Hazel Henderson, Ethical Markets
"Should the Nobel Prize for economics be abolished? That is one of the suggestions in Pablo Triana's provocative book "Lecturing Birds on Flying: Can Mathematical Theories Destroy the Markets?" . . . As Nassim Nicholas Taleb writes in his witty introduction to the book, giving someone the wrong map is worse than giving them no map at all. . . a good read. Some may find the elaborate prose closer to Cervantes than to, say, Nobel Prize winner Robert Merton -- annoying. But perhaps Cervantes is the right writer to emulate when tilting at windmills. "
―LA Times
"The highlight of Triana's book is his valuable insights into the problems with mathematical economic models, which make his argument quite forceful."
―Shanghaidaily.com
From the Inside Flap
Triana first analyzes the fundamental question of whether financial markets can in principle really be solved mathematically. He shows that the markets indeed cannot be tamed with equations, presenting a long and powerful list of obstacles to prove his point: maverick unlawful human actions rule the markets, unexpected and unimaginable events shape the markets, and historical data is not necessarily a trustworthy guide to the future of the markets. The author then examines the sources of origin of many prevalent theories and mathematical dictums. He details how the field of financial economics evolved from a descriptive discipline to an abstract one dedicated to technically concocting professors' own versions of how such a world should work. He goes on to explain how Wall Street and other financial centers became eager employers of scientists, and how scientists became eager employees of financial firms. Triana concludes with an in-depth discussion of the most significant historical episodes of theory-caused real-life market malaise, with a strong emphasis on the current credit crisis.
In the end, Lecturing Birds on Flying calls for the radical substitution of good old-fashioned common sense in place of mathematical decision-making and the restoration to financial power of those who are completely unchained to the iron ball of classroom-obtained qualifications.
From the Back Cover
LECTURING BIRDS ON FLYING
For the past few decades, the financial world has often displayed an unreasonable willingness to believe that "the model is right, the market is wrong," in spite of the fact that these theoretical machinations were largely responsible for the stock market crash of 1987, the LTCM crisis of 1998, the credit crisis of 2008, and many other blow-ups, large and small. Why have both financial insiders (traders, risk managers, executives) and outsiders (academics, journalists, regulators, the public) consistently demonstrated a willingness to treat quantifications as gospel? Nassim Taleb first addressed the conflicts between theoretical and real finance in his technical treatise on options, Dynamic Hedging. Now, in Lecturing Birds on Flying, Pablo Triana offers a powerful indictment on the trustworthiness of financial theory, explainingin jargon-free plain Englishhow malfunctions in these quantitative machines have wreaked havoc in our real world.
Triana first analyzes the fundamental question of whether financial markets can in principle really be solved mathematically. He shows that the markets indeed cannot be tamed with equations, presenting a long and powerful list of obstacles to prove his point: maverick unlawful human actions rule the markets, unexpected and unimaginable events shape the markets, and historical data is not necessarily a trustworthy guide to the future of the markets. The author then examines the sources of origin of many prevalent theories and mathematical dictums. He details how the field of financial economics evolved from a descriptive discipline to an abstract one dedicated to technically concocting professors' own versions of how such a world should work. He goes on to explain how Wall Street and other financial centers became eager employers of scientists, and how scientists became eager employees of financial firms. Triana concludes with an in-depth discussion of the most significant historical episodes of theory-caused real-life market malaise, with a strong emphasis on the current credit crisis.
In the end, Lecturing Birds on Flying calls for the radical substitution of good old-fashioned common sense in place of mathematical decision-making and the restoration to financial power of those who are completely unchained to the iron ball of classroom-obtained qualifications.
About the Author
PABLO TRIANA has successful derivatives ex-perience at all levels: on the trading floor and as a professor, consultant, and author. He is a frequent contributor to business publications, including the Financial Times, Forbes.com, Breakingviews.com, and Risk magazine, among others. Triana is also the author of Corporate Derivatives. He holds a master of science from the Stern School of Business, New York University, and a master of arts from American University.
Product details
- Publisher : Wiley; 1st edition (May 15, 2009)
- Language : English
- Hardcover : 400 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0470406755
- ISBN-13 : 978-0470406755
- Item Weight : 1.58 pounds
- Dimensions : 6 x 1.09 x 9 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #566,509 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #85 in Econometrics & Statistics
- #189 in Business Finance
- #622 in Economics (Books)
- Customer Reviews:
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About the author

Pablo Triana has successful derivatives experience at all levels: on the trading floor and as a professor, consultant, and author. He is a frequent contributor to business publications, including the Financial Times, Forbes.com, Breakingviews.com, and Risk magazine, among others. Triana is also the author of Corporate Derivatives. He holds a master of science from the Stern School of Business, New York University, and a master of arts from American University.
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Between these Markov transitions from one position to the next, the author is busy indulging himself in distasteful and unprofessional ridicule of the "arrogant" and "self-serving" financial theorists who never spent a minute on the trading floor, and who were responsible for "terrible, theory-ignited mischief." Risk management he asserts should be handed back to "freethinking, gumption-honoring, innumerate chums". In other words, the financial decision-making should return to the use of "old-fashioned commonsense." Throughout the book he lifts up the quasi-mythical "Black Swan" symbolism in order to justify his belief in the power of "rare events" and the inability of VAR models to account for them.
One can certainly commend the author's rejection of social and intellectual hierarchies, and his encouragement of this rejection to the reader. Degrees, accolades, and exaggerated recommendations mean nothing when it comes to describing and understanding real systems. The only thing that matters is evidence, and this comes at a high cost, both in dollars and in time. The obtaining of true knowledge is difficult, and frequently must be done without worrying about recognition or monetary compensation. A high degree of mental discipline is required, along with large blocks of time.
But rebellion against authority and word arrows fired against stuffy, arrogant mathematicians does not prove a thesis. The author has failed to prove his in this book, in spite of the title and the page count. Indeed the writing and logic is confused and leaves the reader wanting as to what the author is really asserting:
- Quantitative finance is derided for its potential to "sow the seeds of market chaos" but the author does not define what "market chaos" is nor entertain the possibility that chaotic dynamics in a financial market may indeed be an efficient way of allocating capital and labor. There are several systems of interest, such as data networks and the human neural system, which depend on chaotic dynamics for their proper functioning.
- Financial engineers are scolded about their attempts to predict future market movements by sole reference to the past, but the author then praises the financial savvy of "commonsense" traders who acquired their knowledge and expertise by years of trading.
- In attempting to explain the (in his opinion, unjustified and reckless) adoption of techniques from quantitative finance, he author claims that it was also due to regulatory agencies or public relations but does not give one example, even anecdotal, to support this. Which regulatory and advertising agencies were involved?
- The 1987 "crash" is blamed on Black-Scholes-inspired trading strategies, but no convincing evidence is given anywhere in the book. And along these same lines the author refers to this as a "cataclysm", as do a few others in the financial press. But it would be just as easy to refer to it as merely a market correction, considering the behavior of the market a few days after "Black Monday." And just because a collection of wealthy people lose a lot of money does not mean that it is a "cataclysm."
- The claim that no mathematical model can capture the intricacies of human psychology. This is not true, as research into cognitive neuroscience will reveal. Although much work remains to be done in this area, it is progressing with all deliberate speed.
- The author asserts that humans are so unpredictable in their financial dealings that not even a "Prophet" could sort it all out. Humans "change the rules constantly". But on the other hand many times in the book he is proclaiming the wisdom of Leo-Malamed-type "commonsense" traders to do just that. Apparently folk wisdom and "commonsense" can "untangle" the "conundrums" of the financial markets. How many commonsense "chums" were actively involved in the 1929 Crash, the Latin American banking crisis in the 1980's, Black Monday in 1987, the bond market meltdown in 1994, the Asian 1997 crisis, the 1998 Russian default, the 2000 NasDaq crisis, the 2001 Enron Bankruptcy, and the 2002 WorldCom bankruptcy? None at all? Predominantly?
- What evidence is there that "outliers" are "created by people who don't believe in outliers"? Has the author studied this real-time, or can he give some sort of historical evidence supporting this claim? Can a collection of people doing trading on a "assumption of normality" actually give results that are "non-normal"? How would one study this phenomenon? It seems the author is making a prediction here. But from dialog throughout the book, he ridicules the attempts to make predictions on human financial behavior.
There are many more outrageous claims that would add to this list, but space restricts this reviewer from going any further. To substantiate the claims that the author is making in this book would swell its pages to number in the thousands. It is a tiresome collection of ranting and ridicule, and adds nothing to the debate on the efficacy of quantitative finance. From working in financial modeling, this reviewer has always encountered extreme skepticism regarding mathematical modeling on the part of senior management. But these examples are purely anecdotal, and it would take many years to show that this is widespread, or that the converse is true.
If one humble lesson could be taken from reading this book it is that the financial markets of the twenty-first century rattle and intimidate some people, even seasoned traders and financial professionals. Yes, there are complicated mathematical constructions that are employed to describe financial markets and that are used to trade securities. But this reviewer looks forward to more mathematics in finance, not less, in the years ahead. Even better, and this is certainly on the horizon, is a situation where the commonsense of human financial dealings is completed automated into the technology used to implement financial transactions.
The catch? You ignore human emotional thinking and you can stick that math formula up your nose! don hall / bearcreekresearch
Negatives:
The book is way too repetitive!
-Imagine going for >74 pages (that's the longest chapter, #7) of repetition. Not only is he repeating lines from other chapters, no.... at times from the the same paragraph!
The writing style is rather weird.
- At some point he mentions Victor Niederhoffer by name and then at another chapter, he talks about the same story but this time it's no longer Victor but rather a "famous speculator"
- Again, he mentions Emanuel Derman by name and then in another chapter, he talks about the same story but this time, it's not longer Emanuel but it's now a "...famous quant/academic..."!
- I coud go on....
Positive(s):
His understanding of the subject is not in question, at least not by me!
His opinions on VaR, BSM.
His opinions on the need for change, especially the financial economics professors' influence in the real world of finance
The relating of his work experience is another positive
All in all, I'd rather pass on the book, for I can assure anyone that the repetitiveness will be found very annoying.
The only negative reviews are by the egg heads.
I was expecting more of the same from Triana, but with perhaps a slightly different viewpoint and possibly more details. What I got was a 350 page polemic from a confirmed math phobe and a slavish paen to Taleb. OK, Black-Scholes is not a great idea and VAR greatly underestimates market risk, but to repeat this theme again and again borders on the lunatic.
But that's not all, here's a quote from p. 203 that sums up the style of writing; he's referring (endlessly) to Black-Scholes-Merton and, in this case, to the S&P 500 volatility surface: "...Obviously, horizontal is not the same as curved. A curved line is a complete violation of BSM. Horizontal is not the same as curved. The end results are not BSM-compliant any more. It's not BSM. Curved is not horizontal. It's something else. BSM endorses horizontality. BSM negates curvedness. It can't be BSM. Curved is not horizontal". I kid you not.
The message of the book, delivered amply in Taleb's foreword and elsewhere, is that too often in the past econometric models put foward by the likes of Merton, Scholes and others have been blindly followed by market makers and regulators, with resultant disastrous effects. Unfortunately, Triana adds little additional insight and commits the greatest of all faults an author can make--to bore the reader.
Top reviews from other countries
日本人はリスク管理と呼びたがるが、過去の市場価格の変動に関するデータを用い、それが一定の確率分布―標準正規分布に従うと仮定し、99パーセンタイルの VaR を算出することは、リスク量計測でありリスク管理ではない。そして、その VaR には何の意味もない。
壊れた計器を盲目的に信じて飛行機を操縦するよりも、自分の目で窓の外を見て、高度や飛行速度を(数字にできないかもしれないが)感覚的に感じながら操縦するほうがマシ。
全然精度のないものが、何桁もの数字で示されるために、惑わされてしまう。
常識をもっと使え。
そういう当たり前のことを主張している本。
読んでみて。
非英語ネイティブが英語で物を書いてくれるのは有り難いなぁ、と私は感動しました。ただし、あまりに熱くてくどくて、うな丼とカツ丼とステーキを一気に食わされたような気分にはなります。げふ。ともあれ、金融素人でも文学的に読めてしまう金融本でした。
金融工学の誕生、発展、実世界への浸入、浸透、利用、悪用、欺瞞、偽装、瓦解のメカニズムを解説しています。統計学とか確率論などとは無縁の素人読者に素人読者から助言があるとすれば、「正規分布」という概念が金融工学の根っ子に腰を据えているらしい、と一応把握しておくといいと思います。この概念を基に構築されたCAPMやらブラックショールズ方程式やらGaussian CopulaやらVaRやらが金融界に巨大な影響を与えてきたと。素人の把握するところでは、これはリスク管理のマニュアル化です。才能や勘や経験という人間が全存在を掛けて行使する「生の判断力」に金融工学マニュアルがとって代わったということらしい。どの分野でも大量の石にごく一部の玉が存在するのが必然な訳ですが、金融工学というのは「石の味方」だったということでしょうか。
もうこれは読んで頂くしかない。読んで下さい。普遍的なテーマを訴える情熱的な一冊です。私はと言えば、著者の訴えはその気風の良さにも関わらず最後には「荒野の叫び声」のように聞こえてきました。ラクが出来るマニュアルがあるならそれを使うだろう。それが例え偽りであろうとも。皆が使うならば言い訳も立つ。真実が虚空ならば偽りの物語を求め、真実が暗黒ならば偽りの光を求めるだろう。人類滅亡まで繰り返される問いかけです。幻想を選ぶか真実を選ぶか、と。しかしたまに変わり者が現れて「嘘は嘘だ!」と言ってくれれば、僅かの救いにはなるというもので。
The latest Occam's razor award goes to Her Majesty the Queen. In the unlikely surroundings of the London School of Economics, she last week cut to the quick. Describing the credit crunch as "awful", she tapped a gilded economist on the proverbial shoulder and asked: "Why did nobody notice?"
Simon Jenkins The Guardian, Wednesday 12 November 2008
It was reported that the gilded economist was at a loss for words. What he could have said was: "Your Majesty, may I suggest that you read `Lecturing Birds on Flying' or `Can Mathematical Theories Destroy the Financial Markets', by Pablo Triana.
This timely tome may not have all the answers, but it certainly can shed much light on why many seemingly sophisticated financial products turned out to have been poorly constructed. Triana shows how Nobel Prize winning Economists created brilliant theories that were based on assumptions from an ideal Platonic universe. The brilliance of the theories, as recognised by the "Nobel" Judges, obscured their less than realistic foundations.
A leading suspect was the use of the Gaussian Copula Model, more familiar to most people as the Normal Distribution or Bell Curve. It describes the distribution of many things in nature that are not interconnected; for instance the range of the heights of pupils in a class at school.
Pablo Triana, like Nassim Taleb, who wrote the foreword, believes that in the financial world it is highly likely that the data is distributed in a somewhat similar way to the Bell Curve in the centre but with far more outlier events than the Bell Curve would predict. Statisticians would say that the curve has fat tails. Taleb calls these outlier events `Black Swans'. Rather than a Normal Distribution a better representation of the Financial World may be a Levy Distribution, where a 99% confidence interval can shelter five or six Standard Deviations as opposed to less than three under a Normal Distribution.
With beautiful English understatement Paul Ormerod summed this up: "The record of economists in understanding and forecasting the economy at macro-level is not especially impressive". Even a study at INSEAD concluded, dryly: "Statistically complex methods do not necessarily produce more accurate forecasts".
The great danger, of course, is that the theories give some people an illusion of certainty of future outcomes, which they, and others, may find exceedingly expensive. LCTM is an example that springs to mind.
It could be said in defence of the theories that the Black Scholes Merton model is used all the time for Options pricing, so it must be correct. Or does the `volatility smile' suggest that in fact there is scope for financiers to adjust the formula to give the answers that the market would like ?
Surely so many Nobel Prize Winning Economists could not be wrong - but is there even really a Nobel Prize in Economics ?
One should always check one's assumptions ! Answer on Page 311.
Unlike Fooled by Randomness and The Black Swan (both must reads for anyone interested in finance) this book is not easy to read without an understanding of derivatives. I lost count of the amount of times I had to refer to Google to lookup what a term meant or clarify what the author casually mentioned.
My advice, read Fooled by Randomness and The Black Swan instead.
