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Losing the Golden Hour: An Insider's View of Iraq's Reconstruction (Adst-Dacor Diplomats and Diplomacy Book) Hardcover – Illustrated, October 1, 2007

by James Stephenson (Author), Richard L. Armitage (Foreword)
4.0 4.0 out of 5 stars 6 ratings
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In emergency medicine, “the golden hour” is the first hour after injury during which treatment greatly increases survivability. In post-conflict transition terminology, it is the first year after hostilities end. Without steadily improving conditions then, popular support declines and chances for economic, political, and social transformation begin to evaporate. James Stephenson believes we have lost Iraq’s golden hour. A veteran of postconflict reconstruction on three continents, he ran the Iraq mission of the Agency for International Development in 2004–05 with more than a thousand employees and expatriate contractors. The Coalition Provisional Authority, which oversaw the largest reconstruction and nation-building exercise ever, was a dysfunctional organization the Department of Defense cobbled together with temporary employees and a few experienced professionals from the State Department and other agencies. Iraqis soon became disillusioned, and the insurgency grew. Losing the Golden Hour tells of hubris, incompetence, courage, fear, and duty. It is about foreign assistance professionals trying to overcome the mistakes of an ill-conceived occupation and help Iraqis create a nation after decades of despair. Neither criticizing nor defending U.S. foreign policy, Stephenson offers an informed assessment of Iraq’s future. Selected for the Diplomats and Diplomacy Book Series of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training and Diplomatic and Consular Officers, Retired.
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  1. Print length
    224 pages
  2. Language
    English
  3. Publisher
    POTOMAC BOOKS
  4. Publication date
    October 1, 2007
  5. Dimensions
    6.25 x 0.75 x 9 inches
  6. ISBN-10
    1597971510
  7. ISBN-13
    978-1597971515
  8. See all details
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About the Author

James "Spike" Stephenson is a retired senior Foreign Service officer with twenty-eight years’ experience in rebuilding states at war or recovering from war. He was USAID mission director in Lebanon and in Serbia and Montenegro prior to assuming the position in Iraq. He also served in Egypt, Grenada, and El Salvador. A decorated Vietnam War veteran, Stephenson is a recognized expert on post-conflict transition, civilian-military cooperation, and counterinsurgency. Currently he is a senior adviser for security and development at Creative Associates International, Inc. He lives near Charlottesville, Virginia.

Product details

  • Publisher ‏ : ‎ POTOMAC BOOKS (October 1, 2007)
  • Language ‏ : ‎ English
  • Hardcover ‏ : ‎ 224 pages
  • ISBN-10 ‏ : ‎ 1597971510
  • ISBN-13 ‏ : ‎ 978-1597971515
  • Item Weight ‏ : ‎ 1 pounds
  • Dimensions ‏ : ‎ 6.25 x 0.75 x 9 inches
  • Customer Reviews:
    4.0 4.0 out of 5 stars 6 ratings

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4 out of 5 stars
6 global ratings

Top reviews from the United States

D. Archer
5.0 out of 5 stars In-depth knowledge
Reviewed in the United States on November 15, 2011
Verified Purchase
I hope this gets the recognition it deserves. Well-written, in-depth and first hand by someone who was actually there for the reconstruction, and knew the intricacies of rebuilding in a war zone.
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Patrick D. Mahaney
4.0 out of 5 stars Losing the Golden Hour
Reviewed in the United States on January 1, 2008
Verified Purchase
This short work covers the USAID effort in post-invasion Iraq from the author's perspective during his tour of duty Feb 2004- March 2005. Having served in Jordan and Iraq at the same period (Nov. 2003-Nov 2004 in Jordan; Dec. 2004-May 2006 in Iraq) as a contractor for a Department of State civilian police development program, I can vouch for much of the author's description of the disorganization and lack of planning effort that occurred during the first 18-24 months post-invasion.

The fact was-- there was no post-war occupation or redevelopment plan. Nearly every post-war planning decision was made on the run and without much thought to the long-term consequences. During the preparation for the invasion, SecDef Rumsfeld prohibited any post-war planning and threatened his military advisors with termination of career if the subject was brought up; likewise, CENTCOM CINC Tommy Franks either refused to plan or simply did not have the foresight to plan post-war Iraq. Thomas Rick's book Fiasco covers that aspect very well and in greater detail than does this work, although both publications address the core issue of lack of foresight at the NSC level and lack of planning at the DoD level.

One issue that does not get sufficient attention to the deficient post-war effort is significant impact of NSPD 36, a two page document signed by the President, that gave full and complete post-war authority to the DoD in all aspects of post-war development. NSPD-36 was obviously a power-grab by Vice President Cheney and SecDef Rumsfeld to exclude the "civilian" agencies such as USAID and Department of State from bringing their experts into the mission- it worked.

In my experience, most of the regular military officers I worked with over the course of 2 and 1/2 years in the mission gave 100% effort in trying to overcome the deficient planning and fix the problem, even though most were way "outside" their expertise in trying to run an essentially civilian mission. The military reservists, particularly those called to active duty through the IRR, were often more of a hinderance and were generally incompetent and incapable of dealing with large-scale planning and redevelopment issues.

The State Department by and large refused to serve in Iraq. The higher level officials of the State Department had generally refused to support the invasion and this anti-war/anti-Bush/anti-DoD antipathy continued for years. Unlike the armed forces where orders were issued to report to a particular duty station, service in Iraq for DoS officials was voluntary. The end result was second and third rate DoS officials, often less qualifed professionally than the military personnel, making a stab at running a national level program. Many DoS positions remained vacant the entire eighteen months I worked in Iraq- no career DoS personnel would volunteer to serve and the Secretary of State would not order mandatory service. And the few that did show up weren't particularly capable or competent.

This work goes more into the personal aspects of trying to work through the various layers of government, both U.S. and Iraqi, while trying to
bring a democratic government to Iraq. The effect of years of Saddam repression, as well as the general level of corruption, malfeasance, and Iraqi incompetence were simply grossly under-estimated by all planners.

Mr. Stephenson criticises the in-country DoD staff as a major hinderance. I take the more neutral position that the military staff, in most respects, were making a good-faith effort at trying to accomplish an essentially civilian mission. The President clearly failed in seeing the enormous difficulties in establishing a functioning, democratic Iraq; the NSC failed the President in giving poor counsel and guidence; SecDef Rumsfeld was the primary instigator for the deficient planning; and the 'non-combatants' at the State Department refused to serve. There is a lot of blame to go around for this five-year long mission.
4 people found this helpful
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Michael Rubin
2.0 out of 5 stars Losing the Golden Hour
Reviewed in the United States on February 7, 2009
Insider accounts of Iraq's occupation are a dime a dozen; some are useful, but most are forgettable. Losing the Golden Hour by Stephenson, former director of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Iraq Mission, joins the latter.

Stephenson tells his story with little introspection or self-criticism. He describes receiving the call to deploy to Iraq while in a dentist's chair, his arrival at Baghdad International Airport, and the wardrobe of Coalition Provisional Authority administrator L. Paul Bremer but never transcends his bureaucratic perspective to address how or why USAID failed its reconstruction mission. Venal bureaucrat shines through; expert analyst is absent. Stephenson complains that Bremer did not appreciate USAID's independence as an agency, and he brags of sending home at the first opportunity "free ions" who helped administer USAID projects but did not belong to the agency. Bremer's myriad faults have been amply documented, but why should he not expect USAID to coordinate its actions with mission goals? Would Stephenson prefer that U.S. agencies in Iraq worked at cross-purposes?

Losing the Golden Hour focuses on inside baseball and bureaucratic machinations but does not explain how USAID might better perform its mission. Stephenson acknowledges that aid and development were not his top priorities; instead his priorities were the security of his palace headquarters in Baghdad's Green Zone and the safety of his regional offices, each already in fortified zones. In Iraq, USAID experts drew six-figure salaries and purchased multimillion-dollar armored vehicles so that they might survey their regions of operation but, nevertheless, refused to leave their compounds even during times of tranquility. While, from this reviewer's personal observation, USAID officials watched videos and ate food flown in from Kuwait, 8-year-olds dug wells just five miles away in villages where residents said they had not seen a single U.S. aid official. Perhaps the USAID cannot function in postwar environments. If not, Stephenson might have thought to discuss whether Congress should have funded USAID's Iraq program or instead transferred responsibility to organizations more able and willing to function in an insecure environment, such as the Army Corps of Engineers.

While Stephenson repeatedly refers in passing to USAID's management of $2 billion, he does not mention the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) model. CERP allows local military officials to allocate money to empower local Iraqis to fix sewers, repair generators, and refurbish schools, many of which remained in disrepair despite USAID reporting to the contrary. Here, Stephenson need not commit bureaucratic suicide. Rather, he might have questioned whether both he and his USAID team could have embedded with military units or adopted a CERP-like model better suited to Baghdad.

There is no doubt that the United States squandered the golden hour in Iraq. Had Stephenson discussed how the coalition might better handle reconstruction or USAID might evolve to handle current problems, Losing the Golden Hour would have been a valuable contribution to the literature. Instead, Stephenson has penned a vanity book--albeit one that every congressman should read, if only to understand how USAID is not the organization to turn to when the stakes for U.S. national interests are high.

Michael Rubin
Middle East Quarterly
Winter 2009
4 people found this helpful
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