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Magic and Mayhem: The Delusions of American Foreign Policy From Korea to Afghanistan Kindle Edition
| Derek Leebaert (Author) Find all the books, read about the author, and more. See search results for this author |
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AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ are the latest in a string of blunders that includes Vietnam and an unintended war with China from 1950 to ’53, those four fiascoes being just the worst moments in nearly a lifetime of false urgencies, intelligence failures, grandiose designs, and stereotyping of enemies and allies alike. America brought down the Soviet empire at the cold war’s most dangerous juncture, but even that victory was surrounded by myths, such as the conviction that we can easily shape the destinies of other people.
Magic and Mayhem is a strikingly original, closely informed investigation of two generations of America’s avoidable failures. In a perfectly timed narrative, Derek Leebaert reveals the common threads in these serial letdowns and in the consequences that await. He demonstrates why the most enterprising and innovative nation in history keeps mishandling its gravest politico-military dealings abroad and why well-credentialed men and women, deemed brilliant when they arrive in Washington, consistently end up leading the country into folly.
Misjudgments of this scale arise from a pattern of self-deception best described as "magical thinking." When we think magically, we conjure up beliefs that everyone wants to be like us, that America can accomplish anything out of sheer righteousness, and that our own wizardly policymakers will enable gigantic desires like "transforming the Middle East" to happen fast. Mantras of "stability" or "democracy" get substituted for reasoned reflection. Faith is placed in high-tech silver bullets, whether drones over Pakistan or helicopters in Vietnam.
Leebaert exposes these magical notions by using new archival material, exclusive interviews, his own insider experiences, and portraits of the men and women who have succumbed: George Kennan, Henry Kissinger, Robert McNamara, Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney, and Presidents Kennedy, Carter, and George W. Bush all appear differently in the light of magic, as do wise men from Harvard, Georgetown, Stanford, and think tanks such as RAND and Brookings, as well as influential players from the media and, occasionally, the military, including General David Petraeus as he personifies the nation’s latest forays into counterinsurgency.
Magic and Mayhem offers vital insights as to how Americans imagine, confront, and even invite danger. Only by understanding the power of illusion can we break the spell, and then better apply America’s enduring strengths in a world that will long need them.
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherSimon & Schuster
- Publication dateSeptember 7, 2010
- File size3237 KB
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Editorial Reviews
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--Robert G. Kaiser, The Washington Post
“A must-read.”
--Richmond Times Dispatch
Review
--F. Whitten Peters, former Secretary of the Air Force; member, Defense Science Board
About the Author
Product details
- ASIN : B003L786HI
- Publisher : Simon & Schuster (September 7, 2010)
- Publication date : September 7, 2010
- Language : English
- File size : 3237 KB
- Text-to-Speech : Enabled
- Screen Reader : Supported
- Enhanced typesetting : Enabled
- X-Ray : Not Enabled
- Word Wise : Enabled
- Print length : 354 pages
- Lending : Not Enabled
- Best Sellers Rank: #1,374,831 in Kindle Store (See Top 100 in Kindle Store)
- #1,220 in 21st Century History of the U.S.
- #2,346 in International Relations (Kindle Store)
- #5,931 in 20th Century History of the U.S.
- Customer Reviews:
About the author

Derek Leebaert's latest book is Grand Improvisation: America Confronts the British Superpower 1945-1957 (2018). Previous ones include The Fifty-Year Wound: How America's Cold War Victory Shapes Our World (2002); To Dare and to Conquer: Special Operations and the Destiny of Nations from Achilles to Al Qaeda (2006); and Magic and Mayhem: the Delusions of American Foreign Policy from Korea to Afghanistan (2010). He is also a coauthor of the MIT Press trilogy on the information technology revolution, and a founding editor of The International Economy and of Harvard University's International Security. He has led a global management consulting firm for the last fifteen years and serves on the boards of Providence Health System and of other public service institutions. Derek is a founder of the National Museum of the U.S. Army which opens near Washington D.C. in 2019.
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Advance Praise for
Magic and Mayhem
“A great book. It not only makes a powerful case but it is thoroughly entertaining, brimming with colorful anecdotes and wonderful portraits. It is a joy to read!”
--Liaquat Ahamed, author Lords of Finance
“A brilliant, blistering indictment of the quackery that passes for statecraft in Washington and of the glib, opinionated mediocrities inhabiting the inner circles of American power.”
-- Andrew J. Bacevich, author of Washington Rules: America's Path to Permanent War
“Derek Leebaert artfully portrays the many grand delusions about America’s role in the world that have arisen from a heady brew of magical thinking going back generations. Leebaert writes with exceptional verve and his book is a real pleasure to read.”
--Peter Bergen, CNN national security analyst and author of Holy War, Inc.
“People of left and right will find much insight in this expose of the national security magicians and their delusions, fantasies, pretenses and misuses of history. Leebaert gives us not the usual fairy godmother list of solutions, but some basic advice grounded in playing to our country’s strengths. Hear him!”
--John F. Lehman, former Secretary of the Navy and member of the 9/11 Commission
“Leebaert provides a superb story of America’s global engagements and of the ‘magic’ that caused various ones to go astray. Here is also superb insight as to how our nation should capitalize on her strengths while we come to better understand our vulnerabilities.”
--General John H. Tilelli, Jr., USA (Ret), former Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command
“This book is a bombshell.”
--Walter A. McDougall, Alloy-Ansin Professor of International Relations, University of Pennsylvania, author of Promised Land, Crusader State
“Why do national security professionals, despite all evidence, keep promising quick and nearly bloodless victory when committing U.S. forces overseas? The answers are chilling. Anyone concerned about how America decides to go to war must read Magic and Mayhem.”
--F. Whitten Peters, former Secretary of the Air Force; member, Defense Science Board
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Leebaert focuses on the evolution of US foreign policy since the Korean War. He criticizes decision makers for their superficial analysis of problems and inability to look for alternatives. Often doing nothing might have been the best option. However, the US has plenty of what Leebaert calls "emergency men." These are "the clever, energetic, self-assured, well-schooled people who take advantage of the opportunities intrinsic to the American political system to trifle with enormous risk." Emergency men are eager to "do something" and they tend to carry the day in Washington. Those that urge caution are often dismissed as too negative or defeatist and are usually beaten into submission.
Emergency men include McGeorge Bundy, John F. Kennedy, Henry Kissinger, and Paul Wolfowitz. These men often plunge into situations without adequate research or an exit strategy. Later reflection indicates that what they recommended was doomed to fail. However, the emergency men are supremely self-confident, notwithstanding their all-too-frequent lack of any real basis for such confidence.
The Iraq War presents an example of the emergency men in action. Leebaert calls Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Dick Cheney and Paul Bremmer "masters of mayhem." Dick Cheney promised that "the (Iraqi) people will be so happy with their freedoms (after a US invasion) that we'll probably back ourselves out of there within a month or two." This proved to be completely wrong. Leebaert complains that Americans often don't bother to learn about countries whose histories, cultures and traditions have little in common with their own. None of the architects of the Iraq war spoke Arabic or had lived in the Middle East. Paul Bremmer, who disbanded the Iraqi Army and banned the secular Ba'ath Party, admitted he knew nothing about Iraq before his arrival in the country. Adam Garfinkle, who worked as a speechwriter for Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice, said in 2007, "No one in a senior position in this administration seems to have the vaguest notion of modern Middle Eastern history."
The US has found in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan that the rest of the world does not always share American values. The Taliban did not want to live in a liberal democracy. Rather than seeing the world as it is, America's foreign policy experts see it as they believe it ought to be. In Iraq, the United Sates appointed Maliki as president. He was a man the White House thought it could do business with. But Maliki had his own agenda and would not stick to the US script. He excluded the Sunnis and the Kurds from the government and created the environment for civil war. America did not grasp that Maliki was a disaster until it was too late.
The US exit strategy in Iraq was predicated on training a local army. We have seen in Iraq and Afghanistan that newly minted armies may not be successful. In Iraq, nothing worked out as planned. With the benefit of hindsight, perhaps it was naïve to assume that the US could turn Iraq into a loyal US ally which embraced secularism, democracy, and capitalism.
Leebaert believes that the military has similar issues. The US has too much firepower for any future adversary to try and take it on in a conventional conflict. The reality is that the US continues to get drawn into small messy wars with enemies who don't have tanks and fighter aircraft. The US military is still preparing to fight big set-piece battles just like it did in World War 2, but future opponents are more likely to use guerilla tactics. The truth appears to be that the Pentagon dislikes fighting insurgencies. As Leebaert points out: "the Army not only forgot everything it had been bloodily taught about counterinsurgency in Vietnam; but in Vietnam, it had forgotten everything it had learned about counterinsurgency in Korea as well."
Leebaert gives the impression that arrogance and cluelessness are perhaps the greatest constants in US foreign policy. This book is a fun read.
What then are the warts on U.S. decision making? Leebaert examines six different aspects of the magical thinking he claims has led the U.S. to its current dilemmas, both internal and external:
Emergency Men: these are persons who step to the fore in hard times, partly informed on the issues at hand, who are telegenic and glib enough to garner the trust of governmental administrators and citizens.
The Mystique of Management: this is the tendency of administrators to impose management on what is unmanageable, particularly in foreign policy.
Star Power: this is the obsession Americans have with self-identified experts, who elbow their way into the national spotlight. Such persons are long on personality, invariably short on the expertise thev're laid claim to.
Expectations of Wondrous Results from Nominal Effort: To paraphrase, Americans seek easy answers to complex problems. When self-styled experts rise to prominence, promising some catch-all solution to complexity, we're all too willing to accept it over a slower, incremental approach.
History: We often misread history or accept the implications of history only in part.
The World Wants To Be Like Us: we're so enamored of our nation's history, of its rise to power, its particular path to economic well-being, that we assume (in error) that the rest of the world would evolve into international versions of our history, or success as a society, if only they had the chance.
Leebaert, while teetering on the precipice of rant, does provide incisive views into our decision-making history and the draining effect this history is now having on our dynamism and creativity. Identifying problems, however is always much easier and showier than providing solutions, particularly when the complexities of modern societies are brought to bear. But the author does attempt to provide the first nibbles at solution here. Some involve re-organization and re-management of government to emphasize true professionals, not political snake oil salesmen. This, however, places a greater burden on citizens to ferret out these emergency men, these stars, and to demand that reason be imposed on those who step to the fore. But this has always been the project of the Enlightenment: to provide a society in which citizens may overcome historical emotional baggage through education and understanding.
As with any complexity, Leebaert's suggestions are only a start.
This book is very enlightening. The US is so busy believing its own press releases that it has totally lost touch with the world and how it works. The book points out how we get so caught up in how smart we (think we) are that we don't think that we need to know anything about how other cultures think, believe or work.
The combination of our naiveté, arrogance and viciousness makes it surprising that we have succeeded as well as we have.



