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Charles P. Kindleberger

Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises (Wiley Investment Classics) Paperback – October 4, 2005

by Charles P. Kindleberger (Author), Robert Aliber (Author), Robert Solow (Foreword)

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There is a newer edition of this item:

Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises, Seventh Edition
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Manias, Panics, and Crashes, Fifth Edition is an engaging and entertaining account of the way that mismanagement of money and credit has led to financial explosions over the centuries. Covering such topics as the history and anatomy of crises, speculative manias, and the lender of last resort, this book puts the turbulence of the financial world in perspective. The updated fifth edition expands upon each chapter, and includes two new chapters focusing on significant financial crises of the last fifteen years.

Print length

355 pages
Language

English
Publisher

Wiley
Publication date

October 4, 2005
Dimensions

5.45 x 0.98 x 8.44 inches
ISBN-10

0471467146
ISBN-13

978-0471467144
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Editorial Reviews

From the Back Cover

Finance

"Underneath the hilarious anecdotes, the elegant epigrams, and the graceful turns of phrase, Kindleberger is deadly serious. The manner in which human beings earn their livings is no laughing matter to him, especially when they attempt to do so at the expense of one another. As he so effectively demonstrates, manias, panics, and crashes are the consequence of an economic environment that cultivates cupidity, chicanery, and rapaciousness rather than a devout belief in the Golden Rule."
—from the Foreword to the Fourth Edition by Peter L. Bernstein,

author of Against the Gods and The Power of Gold

Praise for previous editions of Manias, Panics, and Crashes

"Classic...Manias, Panics, and Crashes is a durable guide to meditation: wise, witty, and practical. It is a template against which to measure the latest financial crisis—whatever and whenever that happens to be."
—David Warsh, The Boston Globe

"Definitive."
—Floyd Norris, The New York Times

"[Manias, Panics, and Crashes] is a scholarly account of the way that mismanagement of money and credit has led to financial explosions over the centuries."
—Richard Lambert, Financial Times

"What long has been the best history of financial pathologies is now even better. The reader who absorbs Kindleberger's lessons will be prepared to foresee and navigate the financial crises that surely lie ahead. Like a true classic, Manias, Panics, and Crashes is both timely and timeless."
—Richard Sylla, Kaufman Professor of Financial History

Stern School of Business, New York University

About the Author

Charles P. Kindleberger was the Ford Professor of Economics at MIT for thirty-three years. He is a financial historian and prolific writer who has published over thirty books. Manias, Panics, and Crashes is his most popular book.

ROBERT ALIBER is a Professor of International Economics and Finance at the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business, where he has been a faculty member since 1965.

Product details

Publisher : Wiley; 5th edition (October 4, 2005)
Language : English
Paperback : 355 pages
ISBN-10 : 0471467146
ISBN-13 : 978-0471467144
Item Weight : 15.2 ounces
Dimensions : 5.45 x 0.98 x 8.44 inches

Best Sellers Rank: #287,917 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #145 in Microeconomics (Books)
- #822 in Economic History (Books)
- #958 in Accounting (Books)

Customer Reviews:
76 ratings

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5 star		74%
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3 star		7%
2 star		4%
1 star		3%

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Top reviews from the United States

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Ben Around&Back

How I Use The Kindleberger Text

Reviewed in the United States on January 1, 2014

Verified Purchase

I bought this three years ago and it has shaped my investing greatly. My goal in investing is always to buy low and sell high. This book helps me understand how to do the first half--buying low. I now buy after crashes.

Interestingly, something somewhere is always crashing. And I have also used Kindleberger to size up what are obvious manias (easy one: there are now more construction cranes in Toronto than any other city in North America). Places where I have bought after crashes are Greek shipping companies in January 2013 (42% gain in 12 months even including a stock that went from $70/share to $0.11/share) and Indian small caps in August of 2013 (up ~30% gain in 5 months), the US housing market in 2012, and a small bank whose shares went from $300, to $1, to $11 (counting reverse splits).

I have proven that you can still lose money even buying after a big fall (US Treasurys)--so I am not touting Kindleberger as a panacea. it is far from clear how to get the timing right during or after a crash. But this book did a great job illuminating the crazy ways people can cause a good or a stock to part from reality both on its way up and on its way down. Using it, I succeed more often than I fail. And I succeed more often than if I had not read it.

I would place this book on the short list, with Taleb's, Lefevre's, and Malkiel's work if you invest for yourself.

26 people found this helpful

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Brendan Chong

Enjoyed Reading

Reviewed in the United States on June 4, 2016

Verified Purchase

This book was informative and gives a detailed history of financial crises going back to the 17th century. I would say that an understanding of the principles of macroeconomics will make this book a more digestible read as it refers to economic frameworks. Seemed a little long-winded at times and the book didn't seem to have the best chapter-to-chapter transitions.

I would concur that this is a book that should be referred to every few years. For example, speculative investing & expansion of credit gave way to the Housing Bubble; these topics are covered extensively in the book (albeit written before the pop of the Housing Bubble). It will be interesting to come back to this book as the next couple of economic cycles play out given our nations leverage levels and the implications of expansionary monetary policy (Kindleberger highlighted that Debt/GDP levels should be healthily around <60-70%).

4 people found this helpful

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Individual Investor

Uneven and hard to read, not for the general public.

Reviewed in the United States on April 28, 2010

Verified Purchase

The foreword by Robert Solow warns you: "It was CPK's style as an economic historian to hunt for interesting things to learn, not to pursue a systematic agenda." From this you expect a bird's eye view but the bird turns out to be a hummingbird flitting from flower to flower in a seemingly random fashion. Also, as reviewer Evelyn Uyemura notes, if you are not an economist, many of the older references draw a blank. This is a book written for economists, not for the general public.

The new chapter 13 by Robert Aliber was especially hard for me to read, the sentence structure used being quite complex.

Still, the general message comes across clearly enough, when problems arise it is usually a lack of liquidity (which can have a variety of causes). The solution is a lender of last resort, a solution that creates its own problems, moral hazard.

Kindleberger approaches the analysis as a classical economist, as if economics were a hard science like Newtonian physics. Imagine for a moment if Newton and the other astrophysicists had to analyze a universe where distance, time and the strength of the various forces changed from instant to instant like prices do. I believe it would be mission impossible. Over the past few decades a new way of looking at economics has been tried, as a Complex Science, not as a physical science. The economy is created by the interaction of agents: buyers, sellers, producers and consumers. Being the creation of biological entities, it seems to make sense to look at it from a biologist's point of view. Stuart Kauffman has done some work in that direction. I think it is the more fruitful route to understanding economics.

3 people found this helpful

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Amazon Customer

Five Stars

Reviewed in the United States on July 21, 2016

Verified Purchase

Buy it. Study it. This book will build your frame of reference with regard to economic history, which is of paramount necessity should you be making any investment decisions. When you know history More broadly, as well as specifics of certain circumstances you become less susceptible to BS peddled by so many people today, and always. whether they are good people who only Know enough to spout off a few buzz words, or con men who are trying to swindle you etc. Knowing the information in this book will enable you to think for yourself and remain clear headed when other people are being reactive or tying to convince you of something. You'll be able to simply thank people for their advice, without necessarily being governed by their opinions.

One person found this helpful

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Boston suburban dweller

Excellent book on financial history

Reviewed in the United States on October 6, 2014

Verified Purchase

Having a solid education in the pedagogical practices of history, Kindleberger does for finance what most economists don't usually do (he sites specific examples and references primary sources, using lots of footnotes). If you are in finance, absolutely buy the book. Uncovering facts and citing sources is difficult work, and can be cumbersome to read. It is demanding of both the author and the reader. However, this is what really smart and insightful writers do. I'm sure the classes he taught were difficult, but totally fascinating. Kindleberger's book is very insightful, heavily researched, and very well written. Highly recommend to others interested in financial history.

3 people found this helpful

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Frank Reibold

Mehr Anekdoten als Analyse

Reviewed in Germany on January 27, 2012

Verified Purchase

Dieses Buch bietet eine Geschichte der wichtigsten Finanzkrisen und zeigt, was man daraus lernen kann.

Am Beginn steht immer ein Aufschwung, der irgendwann zu einer Manie wird. Die Marktteilnehmer sind dann euphorisch; immer mehr Leute wollen mitmachen und verschulden sich dafür immer weiter. Die konkreten Auslöser der Manie sind unterschiedlich (früher u. a. Tulpenzwiebeln, heute meist Blasen am Aktien- oder Immobilienmarkt).

Zu einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt zeigt sich, dass die Euphorie grundlos war; die Menschen geraten in Panik und versuchen, ihre Anlagen zu verkaufen. Durch diese Panikverkäufe sinken die Preise, sodass es durch mangelnde Nachfrage zu einer Rezession kommen kann.

Nach Minsky gibt es drei Phasen der Finanzierung: (1) das Unternehmen kann Tilgung und Zinsen zahlen; (2) das Unternehmen kann nur die Zinsen zahlen; (3) das Unternehmen kann aus eigenen Mitteln nicht einmal die Zinsen zahlen. Während eines konjunkturellen Aufschwungs gelangen durch die allgemeine Euphorie immer mehr Unternehmen in die späteren Phasen. Einige Unternehmen realisieren erst in der Krise, dass sie in der nicht tragbaren Phase (3) sind, weil die Finanzierung nun schwieriger ist.

Die Voraussetzung der Manien ist aber immer in einer zu lockeren Geldpolitik der Zentralbanken bzw. einer zu großzügigen Kreditvergabe durch die Geschäftsbanken zu sehen.

Das Buch untermauert diese Thesen auf zwei verschiedenen Ebenen:

(b) Anekdoten zeigen, wie sich frühere Krisen abgespielt haben. Was dachten Investoren, einfache Leute, Banker und Regierungen?
(b) Ursachen und Bekämpfung von Krisen werden schon lange diskutiert (z. B. Banking School gegen Currency School im viktorianischen England). Soll man nichts tun, wie die Österreichische Schule fordert? Oder sollte man etwas tun? Aber falls ja, wer? Die Zentralbank? Der Staat? Der Internationale Währungsfonds?

Man ist sich heute so gut wie einig, dass Finanzkrisen durch die Zentralbanken bekämpft werden sollen. Diese müssen den klammen Banken Geld leihen. Aber sollte dies national oder international geschehen? Wem soll man zu welchen Zinsen Geld leihen? Im viktorianischen England schlug Bagehot die Regel vor, dass die Zentralbank jede beliebige Summe verleihen sollte, aber nur an namhafte Institutionen für gute Sicherheiten und gegen hohe Strafzinsen. Aber gegen diese Regel wurde oft verstoßen. Außerdem schafft eine Bankenrettung unangenehme Präzedenzfälle, die die Banken zu riskanterem Verhalten ermuntern könnten. Der Markt kann Finanzkrisen selbst bereinigen, aber nach Ansicht der Politiker braucht er dazu viel zu lange. Außerdem scheint Nichtstun teurer zu sein.

Der Anhang enthält eine Tabelle mit den wichtigsten Finanzkrisen.

***

Mir hat das Buch teilweise gut gefallen.

Die Darstellung der Weltwirtschaftskrise geht ausführlich auf die Situation in Deutschland und Österreich ein. In diesem Zusammenhang werden auch die Positionen des Nichtstuns (u. a. US-Finanzminister Mellon) und der staatlichen Hilfen (US-Präsidenten Hoover und Roosevelt) diskutiert.

Über das Buch verteilt gibt es Informationskästen, die sich u. a. mit Schneeballsystemen, Gold und Schrottanleihen beschäftigen.

Den Punktabzug gibt es, weil das Stichwortverzeichnis oft fehlerhaft ist (teils + / - 2 Seiten) und man Informationen zu bestimmten Finanzkrisen aus mehreren Kapiteln zusammensuchen muss.

Für eine Erweiterung des Minsky-Schemas kann man "Boombustology" lesen. Eine wissenschaftliche Übersicht über die Finanzkrisen bietet "This Time Is Different".

3 people found this helpful

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Daffy Bibliophile

Good Information Poorly Presented

Reviewed in Canada on December 13, 2011

Verified Purchase

Charles P. Kindleberger was a well-known economic historian and I have no doubt that he knew his stuff, but this book is in dire need of editing. On one page, I counted the phrase "the invisible hand" three times, in addition, his writing style seems disjointed, hard to follow at times. He also assumes a knowledge of arcane financial crises over the centuries and references them without giving any background.

I am not an economist, I'm a general reader with a reasonable knowledge of economics and I found this book to be a tough read, partly due to my ignorance of the aforementioned financial crises and partly due to the fragmented, dry style of writing. Two chapters, one of which deals with a domestic lender of last resort and the other which deals with an international lender of last resort were quite interesting and saved the book, in my opinion. These chapters dealt with central banks and the IMF and I wish that Kindleberger had spent more time on these topics.

You may want to check this book out of your local library rather than buying it, it has some good insight into crowd behaviour (manias) and the role of government in containing and cleaning up after bubbles, however, while reading the book is a fairly good investment of time, buying it might not be as rational.

One person found this helpful

ZoLo

Really new.

Reviewed in Japan on May 17, 2009

Verified Purchase

It's a really good book, recommended for anyone who is interested in Financial Crisis, Minsky's Model, etc.　Also, I think whoever is majoring in Finance or Banking should read this book at least once. Because this book shows so many cases of bank-runs in many countries and illustrates the reasons clearly.

3 people found this helpful

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