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The Mask of Command: A Study of Generalship Paperback – Import, January 1, 2004
Purchase options and add-ons
- Print length384 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherPIMLICO (RAND)
- Publication dateJanuary 1, 2004
- Dimensions5.08 x 0.94 x 7.8 inches
- ISBN-101844137384
- ISBN-13978-1844137381
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Product details
- Publisher : PIMLICO (RAND); New Ed edition (January 1, 2004)
- Language : English
- Paperback : 384 pages
- ISBN-10 : 1844137384
- ISBN-13 : 978-1844137381
- Item Weight : 2.31 pounds
- Dimensions : 5.08 x 0.94 x 7.8 inches
- Customer Reviews:
About the author

John Keegan's books include The Iraq War, Intelligence in War, The First World War, The Battle for History, The Face of Battle, War and Our World, The Masks of Command, Fields of Battle, and A History of Warfare. He is the defense editor of The Daily Telegraph (London). He lives in Wiltshire, England.
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Clearly, if a leader is to be effective he must have the respect and trust of his men. The problem is that the mechanisms for gaining this respect are either fraught with personal peril, require the embodiment of a cause which is rarely stain-free, or rest upon a non-trivial ideological framework. The simplest starting point, then, is to answer Keegan's question, "In front: always, sometimes, or never". "In front" always has the advantage of pressing home the point to the men that the leader is bold, unafraid to assume the same risks as his men for a purpose in which he must clearly believe. "In front" also has the disadvantage of placing the leader in mortal danger. So a complication arises, namely, that good leaders are rare and precious, that losing them does a belligerent no good, but that to eschew personal risk is to court mistrust. Alexander, Keegan's first case study, chose "in front". He was able to do so in part because early warfare did not have the lethality of later warfare -- arrows rarely hit their mark and skill at arms could tell in the local heat of combat. Alexander could thus afford it, but he too felt it incumbent to act more and more heroically, i.e., to take increasingly greater risks the more he demanded of his men, finally risking too much and losing his life. Wellington opted for "sometimes", rushing about from regiment to regiment at Waterloo, courting stray musket balls and grapeshot at every turn, exhorting and directing at all times. Still, he did not lead from the front, which was probably a wise decision when impersonal bullets could kill men in swaths. Grant more-or-less chose "never", as did Hitler.
The issue then arises for all leaders, but especially for those leaders who chose "never", to find other means of gaining trust and belief. Alexander would engage in dramatic antics, spending days in his tent in peevish anticipation of apology, and would don fabulous armor for engagements. Oration and rhetoric were vital to his success as he attempted to hearten at least a portion of his men. Wellington cultivated the persona of the stoic gentleman warrior, an iron will of perfection, fair to all but intolerant of sloppiness. Grant cultivated the image of being "one of the boys" -- surrounding himself with home-town friends, spurring his men by honestly showing them his hangdog vulnerability, and by relying on his men's belief in the justice of the Union cause - they were, after all, citizen-soldiers, volunteers, men of conviction.
Hitler's leadership required the constant bolstering of a seductive ideology, endless infusions of propaganda. Belief in his command was cemented by the ceaseless exhortations of Goebbels. Like the uncreative and largely ineffective generals of WWI, Hitler hid in secret bunkers while his men died far away. That Hitler could get away with it for so long and so successfully was largely due to the dramatic improvements in communications, but also through the constant retelling of the Fuhrer's heroism in WWI. Ultimately, Hitler was not a hero, but a false god whose command withered with the monstrous dream of the Third Reich and his distance from the realities of the front. Here, Keegan does a particularly fine job detailing Hitler's neurotic infantilism, his growing separation from reality, his insecure sense of isolation, and his final ignominious demise.
"The Mask of Command" is readable, compelling, and perhaps the most flawless of all of Keegan's histories. Quality, not quantity is the motto here. A brilliant and absorbing treatise.
As other reviewers have stated perhaps the most interesting narrative was Hitler's. My area of interest does not usually fall to the World Wars, as I much prefer to learn about antiquity, but I found his to be the most enlightening and informative. It was refreshing also to learn about Hitler in his downtime, something I know is studied but have not really come across myself, and how he commanded the military of Germany. The idea that culture affects military actions is not an entirely new concept, even at the publishing of this book several decades ago, but it is one that many non-historians don't often think about. Getting specific examples of this is very enlightening. Also, I felt that of Keegan's books that I have read (Face of Battle and History of Warfare with plans to read many more) this is the most accesible and perhaps useful to those who arn't military buffs.
The text effortless weaves these historical perspectives into a short, concise study of leadership styles and requirements and then presents a clear thesis on leadership in the nuclear age. This thesis is truly terrifying in light of the implications of history; our origins appear to contradict the requirements for future survival. This text is as much a study in leadership and management styles as it is a military science text. It is well written and highly enjoyable. If only we could get Dr. Keegan to add an addendum to leadership in the age of stateless terror.
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However, writing style is complication, circular and long winding. It’s difficult to hold on to the thread of thought, idea and concept that he tries to convey. It makes for slow reading.
Nonetheless, a must read for anyone occupying and leadership role, likely to do so or wishing to do so.
different caracters, carefuly analized and disected easy to understand






