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The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis: A RAND Corporation Research Study Paperback – February 1, 1989
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Why was the Navy ready to clear the skies over the Persian Gulf, yet surprised by the mines laid under it? Why is it that the Army is always prepared for war in Europe, but was caught off guard in Korea and Vietname? And why is the Air Force indifferent to "Star Wars"?
In The Masks of War Carl H. Builder asks what motives lie behind the puzzling and often contradictory behavior of America's militay forces. The answer, he finds, has little to do with what party controls the White House or who writes the budget. Far more powerful-and glacially resistant to change-are the entrenched institutions and distinct "personalities" of the three armed services themselves.
The Masks of War explains why things sometimes go wrong for the American military. It also explains why things will always go wrong for the military reformers. Changes in the military's strategic thinking have come only in the wake of full-blown disaster-Pearl Harbor, for instance. Today's nuclear world can't afford such lessons.
- Print length256 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherJohns Hopkins University Press
- Publication dateFebruary 1, 1989
- Reading age18 years and up
- Dimensions5.75 x 0.64 x 9 inches
- ISBN-100801837766
- ISBN-13978-0801837760
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Review
Builder's provocative book is institutional profile at its best, probing far beyond the flip phrases that usually describe the essence of each service, e.g., that the Air Force likes things it can fly.
― Foreign AffairsA RAND Corporation Research StudyAbout the Author
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Product details
- Publisher : Johns Hopkins University Press; 1st edition (February 1, 1989)
- Language : English
- Paperback : 256 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0801837766
- ISBN-13 : 978-0801837760
- Reading age : 18 years and up
- Item Weight : 12.8 ounces
- Dimensions : 5.75 x 0.64 x 9 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #112,617 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #212 in Naval Military History
- #238 in National & International Security (Books)
- #279 in Military Strategy History (Books)
- Customer Reviews:
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If this were all Carl Builder had done, it would have explained a great deal, but there is more to this book than some specific insight that left to itself might be interesting but not all that significant. In addition, the author spent some time describing what he means by strategy and by analysis and then shows how each service's self image affects its style of doing strategy and doing analysis. Finally, Builder tries to wrap up his understanding of these matters by reviewing the implications for national military planning and the prospects of change.
Something that makes this book all the more remarkable is that Builder, writing in 1989, just as the Soviet Union was coming to pieces, was able to see that the Army had already been repeatedly tasked with carrying out styles of war that really did not follow the 1944/45 triumph of the nation in arms narrative. He foresaw that this would continue to be the case and that the other two services would continue in their role of offering necessary support without having to question either of their fundamental self conceptions. He could not, of course, have predicted the unending war in the Islamic world of the "all-volunteer" force, but the challenge that has created for the Army's self conception would certainly be of no surprise to anyone using this work as a guide.
In many ways, Builder so correctly captured today's reality from the perspective of 25 years ago. Close air support is still an orphan in the Air Force as it tries to shed the A10 force. Minesweeping is still the lowest status job in the Navy and the aircraft carrier is still king even though debate is allowed on the subject. Engineers and civil action assets are still undervalued in the Army. The tension between Special Operations and line combat arms in the Army goes on. He also made clear that in the final analysis, it was going to be the Army and its commitment to ground based action that would actually define American commitment to military activity. The best example of that after the writing of this book was in the Balkan wars where the use of or credible threat of ground force action was the factor that forces the Serbs to consent to the dismemberment of Yugoslavia.
I think Builder really had the point of view that the personnel of the services were good and well meaning people but quite constrained by the necessarily strong internal cultures and cultural assumptions he identified. It is perhaps unfortunate that he used the word "toys" to describe the machinery of combat that each service employs, though he did try to explain he did not mean it as disrespectfully as it sounds.
In the end, this book could seem discouraging to potential military reformers but Builder wanted to make the point that change had to be worked through the culture as it really existed, taking truly into account the fundamental and different self images of the services. From this point of view this work is of quite significant value. Many books are out there about our military and what is wrong with it and what needs to change. Reading this book should provide a better perspective on all the others.
-it is what you would expect it to be - somewhat dry and academic, but well written and worth a look
To understand the behavior of the military services, which sometimes seems contradictory, it is necessary to delve into their cultural make up. Builder does this with clarity and insight based on years of intimate involvement as a defense analyst. The Air Force, for example, is the embodiment of a single idea, one that also happens to be a strategy of war. It is not love of the Air Force but love of flight and flying machines that is the common bond of its members.
The Navy, writes Builder, "jealously guards its independence and is happiest when left alone." It is perhaps the closest thing we have to a state within a state. The Army, on the other hand, is schizophrenic, viewing itself on the one hand as the loyal servant of the nation, but on the other hand the "heady memories of triumph in the closing months of World War II contradict this modest role."
We are left to ponder how conditions in the post-Cold War era, and particularly with the advance of technology, will affect these cultural outlooks and service behavior. Will the Air Force ever accept a pilotless cockpit in one of its planes? Will the Navy, drawn closer to the littorals and within global reach of communications, surrender some of its cherished independence? Will the stunning success of ground forces in Operation Desert Storm supplant the glow of victory in World War II for the schizophrenic Army?
"The Masks of War" is a terrific study and a great read. But it does leave some questions begging for answers. Builder does not explore the culture of the Marine Corps, which comes under the Navy Department. Nor does Builder address the distinct cultures of the reserve components, particularly Army National Guard and the Air National Guard.
This is a great book for the beginning defense analyst and the old pro alike.
Top reviews from other countries
それによれば、米軍のあり方を決定する主要因であると巷間信じられている脅威認識は重要な役割を果たしていない。むしろ、各軍種が持つ制度的・文化的な嗜好(著者の用語法とは異なるが、「組織文化」と言い換えてもよいだろう)こそが各軍種の組織のあり方を決めているという。そして、脅威に対応するために案出されて組織のあり方を基礎付けているかのように考えられている各軍種の「戦略」は、実際のところ、各軍種が自らの嗜好に沿った組織のあり方を守るために必要な対外説明用のストーリーに過ぎないとされている。
この考え方は、米軍という巨大な組織を観察するための視点の一つとして、確かに有用である。戦略的な思考枠組みによって米軍の歴史を解釈するオーソドックスかつ抽象的な道を辿ってきた学習者は、本書によってより現実的な視点があることに気付かされるだろう。
しかし、本書が唱える仮説をそのまま米軍観察に援用するわけにはいかない。仮説の実証に厳密性を欠いているし、陸軍賛美の風が見受けられる(他軍種と比べて著者と陸軍の関係がより強いことが影響したのか、と勘繰ってしまう)点も気になる。そして何より、米軍のあり方を決定する要因は各軍種の嗜好以外にも多く存在し、各要因が帯びる重要性はより基本的な歴史の文脈に左右されるのではないか。国際・国内政治情勢が比較的変化に乏しい時代において本書の仮説が高い説明価値を持つ場合もあるかもしれないが、変化が大きい時代にあってなおこの仮説を主張できるのかは疑問を感じるところである。
軍のあり方は軍本来の任務と関係の深い抽象的思考―つまりは戦略的思考―によってのみ導かれているわけではなく、現実的で、利己的で、見ようによっては汚い、そんな要因に大きく左右される、ということを意識させてくれる点で、本書は役に立つ。しかし、「米軍のあり方を決定している要因は何か」という当初の論点を考える際には、本書の仮説に依拠するわけにはいかない。歴史的文脈を踏まえて複数の要因を比較考量する、という当たり前のことを自分でやるしかないのだろう。

