British Military Intelligence in the Palestine Campaign 1914-1918 written by Yigal Sheffy of Israel's Tel Aviv University, is a very detailed study of intelligence
in a unique and complex environment,but fortunately the book never bogs done.
As the book states
"No successful intelligence service owes continuous achievement to boldness, brilliance or luck alone. Rather.....a conceptual
framework for the intelligence process.. on the practical level in a institutional systems which incorporates decision makers...
staff officers and intelligence practitioners....translating the leader's intelligence requirements into priorities, missions and tasks;
developing and conducting a diversity of information-gathering asset; analyzing the data collecting and weaving it together to compose
a picture of the enemy and his intentions; and presenting the findings to the decision makers for utilization...and new tasking. In short
intelligence work involves a cycle."
It had to be difficult to write of this cycle in detail and how each part depends on the other parts, and keep the narrative flowing. But to Sheffy's credit he fully succeeds.
Despite the detail, a few points stands do out
One is even before the war and in the very early stages, how detailed was intelligence. For example in November 1914, the month Britain declared war on the Ottoman Empire,the military report on the Sinai Peninsula was issued, which included a list of 350 locations of water and mostly very detailed descriptions of 51 routes in the area.And this was just one report. in June 1907 a former British military attache on special assignment wrote a detail report focusing on Ottoman's railroads in the area. The next year he wrote a even more detailed study which included more than 100 maps. There were of course detailed reports on the Ottoman military capabilities besides the Ottoman transportation capabilities.But due to the natural difficulties of operating in Palestine, knowledge of logistics and transportation aspects was especially prized. This knowledge was needed both for offensive British use and for assessments on Ottoman possible offensives.Anybody who expect early twentieth century intelligence to be slipshod will be very surprised by a reading of this book.
A second Sheffy's highlights is the general failure of Human intelligence. Ottoman soldiers sometimes didn't even know who their battalion commanders was, so interrogation was of limited use,
And Britain had no high place human intelligence assets in the Ottoman's empire. As for low level agents, The Arabs tribesmen would grossly inflate ottoman's figures and human agents was for
the most part of very low credibility. Despite this, the handlers tended to believed their agents even when other intelligence refuted their reports. As the book states:"The situation reflected the well-known phenomenon of....controllers identifying with their agents " In this as in other places, The book does a nice job of showing the importance of verifying intelligence with different sources and the necessary planning to make this happen. Of course, Human intelligence wasn't a total failure. the Nilii organization and to some extent people counting railroad cars being moved, ete had some value. But in this theater, other collection methods generally were more reliable.and timely.
A third highlight is the theater's intelligence theater assessments was consistency and significantly better ,,,concerning the theater...than London's assessments. Despite the generally high ability of London's headquarters intelligence. Because the theater intelligence analysts had a much better idea of the unique theater's logistics and transportation characteristics. Therefore what was likely or even possible. London's intelligence headquarters, knew intelligence but with so much on their plates, and their attention focus on the western front, never had the understanding of the Palestine theater necessary to make proper assessments. Fortunately the more local intelligence organizations had a firm understanding of the unique conditions.
Other intelligence's aspects is dealt with. Report writing, the focus of intelligence collection on operational needs, denial and deception and the generally excellent use of electronic intelligence. And the immense value of aerial intelligence, especially for verification.
Though the book is only a little more than 300 page, this is a a wonderful detail and interesting look at the intelligence cycle and how its quickly developed and continue to develop during the war.
A last thought...An excellent book to read before Sheffy's is "The Last Crusade" by Anthony Bruce. An superb operational history of the Palestine Campaign in the strategic context,
- Series: Cass Series--Studies in Intelligence
- Hardcover: 400 pages
- Publisher: Routledge; 1 edition (September 30, 1998)
- Language: English
- ISBN-10: 0714646776
- ISBN-13: 978-0714646770
- Product Dimensions: 6.1 x 0.9 x 9.2 inches
- Shipping Weight: 1.7 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
- Average Customer Review: 3 customer reviews
-
Amazon Best Sellers Rank:
#9,387,748 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #8193 in Middle Eastern History (Books)
- #6045 in Intelligence & Espionage History
- #3930 in Turkey History (Books)
Would you like to tell us about a lower price?
If you are a seller for this product, would you like to suggest updates through seller support?
If you are a seller for this product, would you like to suggest updates through seller support?
